Bollyn=ILL-FATED 'ESTONIA' USED FOR WEAPONS TRANSFERS

ILL-FATED ESTONIA FERRY USED FOR WEAPONS TRANSFERS The day after the Baltic ferry Estonia sank on September 28, 1994, Swedish newspapers reported that a "monster wave" was the likely cause of the ferry's sinking. Since then, the official explanations for Europe's worst maritime disaster since World War II have only gotten "curiouser and curiouser."
By Christopher Bollyn The Baltic ferry Estonia, en route from Tallinn to Stockholm with some 1,000 passengers and crew on board, sank on September 28, 1994. Shortly after midnight, two concussions rocked the ship. The ferry quickly listed to starboard and sank into the frigid Baltic Sea in less than 45 minutes under circumstances which can only be described as mysterious. Although more than 500 Swedes were among the 852 reported dead, the Swedish government has blocked every effort to recover the bodies from the wreck. Even an early offer by a Norwegian diving company to retrieve the bodies at cost was rejected. Despite repeated promises from two consecutive Swedish prime ministers that the bodies would be retrieved and the wreck would be salvaged, three months after Estonia sank the Swedish government announced that there would be no recovery operation whatsoever. Instead of retrieving the bodies, the government of Sweden hired a Dutch marine salvage firm, Smit Tak BV, that specializes in neutralizing underwater nuclear waste, spending $350 million in a failed attempt to cover the ship in concrete. The wreck lies in soft mud at a depth of between 60-80 meters. MILITARY SHIPMENTS CONFIRMED Recent revelations in the Swedish mass media that the ferry was being used to smuggle Soviet military technology have confirmed long-held suspicions that the unexplained sinking of Estonia may have been connected to a secret space weapons cargo it was carrying. Immediately before Estonia left Tallinn on its final voyage, Carl Övberg, a survivor and frequent passenger who had arrived at the last minute, reported that the harbor had been sealed off and that a military convoy had escorted two large trucks to the waiting ferry. As soon as the trucks were loaded, the ship's car ramp and bow visor were closed and the delayed ferry sailed for Stockholm. Swedish state television (SVT 1) broadcast an investigative journalism program called Uppdrag Granskning on November 30, 2004, in which the former chief of customs in Stockholm confessed that Estonia had indeed been used to transport Soviet military technology to the West in September 1994. According to former customs chief Lennart Henriksson, on two occasions shortly before Estonia sank, vehicles carrying Soviet military technology had been allowed to enter Sweden without any inspection. "I have been walking around thinking about what happened for ten years," Lennart Henriksson, Stockholm's former customs chief said. "Each time Estonia's name came up I've thought the little I know should be brought into the light of day. I want to clear my conscience." Henriksson had been ordered to allow certain vehicles carrying Soviet military contraband to pass Swedish customs without inspection on September 14 and 20, 1994, but was not working the day Estonia sank because he was on vacation. Henriksson's confession sheds new light on the sinking of Estonia. The ferry was a joint venture between a private Swedish company, Nordström & Thulin, and Estline, a company owned by the Estonian government. Prior to the SVT 1exposé, reports of Soviet military technology being smuggled on the ferry had been dismissed as "conspiracy theories." Henriksson revealed that a secret agreement existed to allow military contraband cargo to enter Sweden without being inspected by customs. This arrangement was between Owe Wictorin, then supreme commander of Sweden's military and Ulf Larsson, then general director of Swedish customs. The arrangement was known at the highest level of the government as well as at the defense department. Normally, Swedish customs searched every vehicle coming from Estonia. That a vehicle was to pass without inspection was something Henriksson had never seen in 38 years of service. When the ferry arrived on Sept. 14, 1994, Henriksson spoke to the driver of the expected vehicle, a Volvo 745 station wagon driven by a Frank Larsson, a false identity. When Henriksson told "Larsson" that customs was carrying out inspections, he "gave me a look, but I said the search would be faked," Henriksson said. "We opened a few boxes and as far as I could see it was military electronics in them." The customs slip showed the car belonging to a non-existent company called Ericsson Access AB, a fictitious subsidiary of AB LM Ericsson Finance. No address was given. Henriksson discovered later that the vehicle was a rental car. There is no evidence that Ericsson was actually involved in the smuggling. Although the Swedish military authorized the smuggling, the final destination of the Soviet technology is not known. A week later, on September 20, 1994, a much larger shipment of contraband technology arrived and was allowed to pass without inspection. This time it was a van and, once again, Henriksson merely glanced into the boxes. "What were you thinking this second time?" reporter Lars Borgnäs asked. "I thought it was a strange procedure," Henriksson said. "But orders are orders and you don't reflect too much on why." (…) DISAPPEARED ESTONIANS The mystery of the sinking of Estonia, however, has affected some more than others. While survivors recovered and the relatives and friends of those lost at sea mourned, a third group was left completely in limbo, where it is to this day. To this third group belong a dozen, or more, Estonian crew members who were originally reported as having been rescued, only to have mysteriously disappeared in the days following the disaster. The disappearance of these 12 Estonia crew members points to a high-level cover-up of an international intrigue. Recent revelations in the Swedish press of "enforced disappearances" of two Egyptian "terror suspects" carried out in Sweden in 2001 may shed light on the fate of missing Estonia survivors. It was recently reported in the Swedish media that a private Gulfstream 5executive jet, registered in the United States, played a role in the "extraordinary rendition" of two Egyptian "terror suspects" from Sweden in 2001. According to Swedish journalist Sven Anér, enforced disappearances from Sweden are nothing new. There is a body of evidence that similar abductions occurred in Sweden in the days following the Estonia ferry disaster. Shortly after Estonia sank, a dozen Estonian crewmembers, all evidently survivors of the catastrophe - disappeared without a trace. Documents indicate that U.S. registered private jets were used in both the 1994 and 2001 disappearance cases. Anér has documents from Sweden's civil aviation administration concerning two specific aircraft suspected of being involved in the abduction of the missing Estonians. Enforced disappearance, according to the Rome Statute of 1998, "means the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time." Enforced disappearance, a form of kidnapping, is considered a "crime against humanity," according to the Rome Statute, which Sweden ratified in June 2001. As many as 12 Estonian crew members, which official survivor lists show having survived the sinking, disappeared in what appears to be a government-organized abduction and enforced disappearance. While the original survivor lists contain the names of 146 individuals, the names of a dozen crew members who had been listed as survivors, were deleted without explanation from the lists maintained by the Swedish and Finnish authorities in the days following the disaster. Anér has found 15 different original lists of survivors, all of which include the names of 11 Estonian crew members whose names were later deleted. In order for a name to appear on the list, a survivor was required to give his name, date of birth, status and nationality. There is evidence that some surviving crewmembers were abducted and taken to Stockholm's Arlanda airport whence they were flown out of Sweden on two private aircraft. The abductions removed key witnesses who would have been able to testify about the condition of the ship, the cargo, and the cause of the sinking. Chief among them were one of the ship's captains, Avo Piht, who was on board but not on duty that night, and Chief Engineer Lembit Leiger. It is thought that the others were crewmembers who had shared the same life raft or been rescued with Piht and Leiger in the same helicopter: Y-64.

Sabotage on 'Estonia'?

http://members.tripod.com/~MV_Estonia/article1.html




Sabotage on Estonia?
Video films from the wreck shows strange things. Johan Ridderstolpe has discovered them.
On a video from Estonia in December 1994, a packet that could be a non detonated bomb is shown on the port side of the wreck. The packet is fastened to the hull with a magnetic plate on deck 5 near the bow. Martin Volk, German expert of explosives and Stig Hermansson, Swedish rescue diver with special training on underwater explosives, have both come to the same conclusion.

What's in the packet?

The packet that is 60 centimeters long and 20 centimeters wide have by the Board of Accident Investigation been explained as trash, a plastic cover or a survival packet. Thereafter the director of the Board, Ann-Louise Eksborg said that the packet never was recovered so nobody knows what it was.

An other explanation is that it should be burning electrodes for the divers. It is not possible, Stig Hermansson says after 18 years of experience. The wrapping of the packet is a waxlike paper of the kind that explosives and ammunition is wrapped with. It is held together by tape and in the bottom right corner a detonator is probably seen.
The packet was filmed by a underwater robot, and the robot stops and interests around the packet before investigating the bow area. It would be very strange if the packet was not recovered.
There were water under the cardeck before Estonia listed, water that must have entered the ship from a leek under the waterline. Survivals also witness this. The leek or hole must be on the starboard side near the bow area. A hole can have been done by a similar explosive that somebody fastened under the waterline there. This parts of the hull has never been filmed in spite of the fact that the camera was over this part of the hull. The camera operator has to the German lawyer Henning Witte said that Swedish police forbid the camera to take pictures of some parts of the hull. Witte has for more than a year believed that the ship was sunk by a sabotage.
The Estonian Chairman in the commission, Andi Meister, resigned from his post in June 1996 after accusing the Swedes from censoring and manipulating pictures from the wreck. In his book "Catastrophe of Estonia - never finished logbook" (Estonian edition) he questions the police actions on the diving platform, and states that the crew on the bridge of Estonia never was identified in contradiction to the Estonian claims. The crew could easily been identified when they all ware a uniform.

Police in control of the diving
The day after divers investigate a number of cabins on the 6:th deck. The police are in control, and it can be verified from the band. Meister was right when he accused the Swedes, and the divers had different tasks than they had from the Estonian part of the commission.
The police are looking for suitcases and one is found in the cabin 6230. This suitcase could have belonged to the Estonian citizen Alexander Voronin who survived the accident. The case have a name tag with his name attached. He has stated that he had was in the cabin 6320, but he can have remembered wrongly. A strange coincident is that according to the Purser onboard the cabin 6230 was Avo Piht's, the disappeared Captain. A. Piht was rescued and after the 2/10-94 he disappeared and was explained dead in the accident.

The drawing and the suitcase
A clue for what they searched for is the word drawing that is mentioned by the diver when he investigates the first suitcase they find. The diver was searching for something important and broke doors and moved bodies. It seemed more important to find this something than to investigate the complete hull, that is not yet done. If this was so important to the police that obviously have Estonia as a scene of crime, it could also have been even more interesting for other people to stop something from reaching Stockholm.

Exercise of sabotage
The 2:nd of February 1994 a major RITS -exercise was held after MV Estonia had left Stockholm. The scenario was that a bomb threat should alert the crew and the police force. One bomb to be found and a second bomb to explode in public sleeping quarters at deck 2. A sabotage by exploding bombs was a realistic scenario, and this is not mentioned in the commissions report.

JOHAN RIDDERSTOLPE
Engineer

1999.02.03
In serge of the suitcases
Following a part of the conversation between the diver (D) and the diver supervisor (L). The full out print of the conversation can be read at:
http://members.tripod.com/~MV_Estonia/police.html.

After 20 minutes work the diver enters cabin 6132:
L - a lot of suitcases there, isn't it?
D - A single one - you see my hand (diver show his hand in a mirror)
L - Oh, there is a mirror there yea
D - This cabin...I have to try...exactly now...to check this thoroughly...
L - OK, we check this one very thoroughly because of the...eee...suitcase it could possibly have been occupants
D - OK roger
L - ...Yea John, could you POSSIBLY check the suitcase, it MAY have a name tag on.
D - OK...I...it appear to bee...I would say a female cabin
L - Possibly a female cabin
The diver look around and pick up the suitcase
D - OK, it's open, and...I'm looking for a cargo or something...something which will identify the case with me to this cabin
D - Eee...It concern to me attached that drawing he had
L - (immediately) stand by.......NO.., PLEASE SAY NO! (upset)
D - OK, the case WAS open when I came in and...
L - Yes, the case was open, we saw that
D - And nothing fell out when...
L - OK, we will have a good search in here John, underneath cushions and everything
D - An anorak...not readable...in fact....account...not readable
L - He is going to check the coat if there is a name tag on it (obviously L is telling someone else)
D - I'll see if there is something behind the door that I've missed
L - OK they...they are not really to concerned of the name now, John, just have a good look around to confirm or deny
The diver speak about the panel in the sealing that has fallen down in the companionway , then starting to brake into 6134
L - OK, John, after we have done this one the police don't want us to brake any more doors, we just try them or try corridors.
D - I understand that! (as if he already knew it)
The supervisor is upset when the case was open, or by the fact that the diver was concerned of something. The case doesn't seem to belong to the women that had the cabin. The police is refereed as "they" and some cabins are interesting and others are left without even trying to enter. A bit forward on the tape it is time for a large cabin 6230.
L - Very big cabins this, might take a while searching
L tells the diver what the cabin look like, where the toilet is and everything
D - Enters
Diver look around, find refrigerator, make joke of cold beer if any, look around
D - I'll found an attaché case here
L - Attaché case, any markings on it?
D - Eeee...yes, hold on here, jepp, we got a name....Alexander Vorin
L - Alexander...
D - Alexander Vorin
L - Can you spell it?
D - Victor, Oscar, Romeo, Alfa, November, November
They try to read the name tag several times and come to VORANI
L - OK, I'll just see if that name rings a bell up here...
D - Can I leave...suddenly
L - OK, it's a Russian name, Alexander Voran
D - Voranoly
L - Yes
D - It possibly could belong to the man outside
First the supervisor tells the diver that it can take a while to search the cabin, then the diver leaves the cabin directly after finding the suitcase. The suitcase was the target.

JOHAN RIDDERSTOLPE

'ESTONIA'-Possible reasons to the sinking.

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Possible reasons to the sinking. Only one alternative to the sinking is examined through the work of the JAIC

JAIC states that the reason of the sinking was water on car deck, but that the water couldn't sink the Estonia unless water entered the ship's accommodation areas. How this was possible is not investigated. The theory that the commission present is so vague, impossible and unbelievable that there are no words for it. No other possible explanation is presented. At least the commission should have excluded some of the most reasonable alternative causes to the disaster, but not even that have been done. The alternatives are presented here.

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• Collision. Estonia could have been involved in a collision with some floating object, or even with a ship, for example human smugglers or a military vessel, even a submarine. A floating, or half floating object could have hit the fin stabilization system causing a leakage.
• Sabotage. There are a number of theories of why a sabotage could have been the reason to the disaster. It could have been because of a smuggled cargo, it could be because of a fight between the Mafia in Riga and Tallinn, or because of that the shipping company did not pay the Mafia "port fees".
• Mine. Drifting mines are not unknown in the Baltic sea. Some time before the disaster there were reports of a drifting mine a bit more north in the Baltic sea.
• Fatigue. Some underwater part of the hull could have been poorly repaired and has cracked or broke because of fatigue.
• Grounding. Estonia was south of her normal rote. It is quite unlikely, but unknown underwater rocks have been found in a lot of places in the Baltic sea during the years. One shall remember that most of the deep measurings have been done a long time ago.
• Explosion aboard. An explosion aboard could have happened. There are a number of tanks aboard.

None of these alternative causes have been investigated nor excluded by any investigation. The sabotage theory was thrown over board just a couple of days after the disaster, almost before the ship was found and long before the visor was found.

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There are several indications that some of the alternatives above could be the real reason to the disaster.

• According to witnesses the sound was a blow, explosion or sound that could not have been caused by the waves. The sound was extremely loud.
• The ship was lifted when the sound of the blow came.
• The ship started to move in all directions after the blow. If something hit the fin stabilization system it could have been a normal behavior from the ship.
• There are several reports of a secret and dangerous cargo.

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Index

'ESTONIA'-Russian ships in the area did not respond to distress calls

Russian ships in the area did not respond to distress calls or go to the place of the disaster

All traffic in the Baltic sea were plotted by radar during the night of the disaster. In spite of that there are some ships that have not been officially in the area. One of the ships, Russian Leonid Bykov, was reported in a strange maneuver outside Jussarö, quite close to the place of the accident. Leonid Bykov did not respond to the distress calls and did not go to the place of the accident.

Date: 29 Sep 1994
From today's Aamulehti, bottom corner of page 13:
On Wednesday night, an hour after "Estonia" had sunk, the coast guards of Jussarö lighthouse noticed a ship sailing off course towards underwater rocks. They tried to alert the crew with searchlights and radio messages in Finnish, Swedish and English. No response. The ship passed the lighthouse, averted the first rocks by sheer luck, then turned sharply to south and safety. After this radio contact was established and the captain of the "Leonid Bykov" explained that the fresh First Officer keeping watch didn't know any English but when radio messages continued had figured out that maybe he needed to wake up the captain (who had made the safety move).
Earlier this month another Russian vessel, "Volgoneft 4" was in a similar situation near Jussarö.

It is clear that it should have been possible for "Leonid Bykov" to come to assistance, while several Finnish cost guard vessels left from Jussarö shortly after the time of the accident.
"Leonid Bykov" is own by Moscow River Shipping, a company that according to "Ricano Plus, Russian Industry Analysis" have had no trading during 1994. The ship is a dry cargo ship of 4540 Dwt that was built during 1991.
The other ship, "Volgoneft 4" has not been found, but there are at least 74 other ships named "Volgoneft" with numbers from nothing to 301. All ships are tankers of approx. 4000 - 5000 Dwt, many are identical. They are own by either Volgotanker River Shipping or the Russian Government. Almost all the Volgoneft tankers are administrated by the "General State Supervisory Department for Communications in the Russian Federation, Ministry of Post and Telecommunications". A smaller number of the Volgoneft tankers are administrated from Panama by the "Ministerio de Hacienda y Tesoro, Dirección General de Marina Mercante, Departamento de Telecomunicacions Marítimas".
It is quite strange that these ships that are built as tankers would be run by Telecommunication Departments. It is also very strange that these ships have been operating in Finnish waters near Jussarö, and that they have been involved in strange maneuvers close to underwater obstacles. It is more likely that "Volgoneft 4" was training maneuvers in narrow waters maybe preparing for an escape with another ship later on.

'ESTONIA'-THE WEATHER

http://members.tripod.com/~MV_Estonia/wether.html


'ESTONIA'-THE WEATHER

The weather situation at the accident site has been exaggerated mainly by the media, but also from rumors among people, believing that "of course, there must have been a storm, the ship sank". We have all heard and read that Estonia sank in stormy weather, and also with wind around 25 m/s. The fact is that the storm came first in the morning the 28:th, and that the center of the storm was more towards the west, at Bogskär. The weather was rough but far from extreme or storm.

Shown in the table below, the wind observations during the night. The wind in the area between Utö and Ristna where Estonia sank, was mean 15 m/s. In the early morning at 05.00 it was mean 18 m/s up to max 29 m/s at Ristna, but at Utö it was still mean 15 m/s.
One shall remember that 15 m/s is rough weather, specially for people not used to the sea. Most passengers aboard this type of ferry are not specially used to rough weather. People in a ferry like this get seasick on open water already with wind around 10 - 15 m/s, and believe there is a storm.

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Wind observations (from the JAIC final report, table 5.3).

Day/ time	Söder- arm	Svenska Högarna	Bog- skär	Utö	Rus- sarö	Ristna
27/9 1700 hours	SW 09 mean 12 max.	SW 12 mean 14 max	SW 13 mean 14 max	SW 09 mean -	WSW 09 mean -	SW 08 mean 12 max
27/9 2000 hours	SW 11 mean 13 max	SSW 14 mean 16 max	S 14 mean 17 max	SSW 13 mean -	SW 08 mean -	SSW 08 mean 14 max
27/9 2300 hours	S 13 mean 17 max	SW 16 mean 18 max	SW 17 mean 18 max	SW 15 mean -	S 16 mean -	WSW 16 mean 21 max
28/9 0200 hours	SW 14 mean 15 max	W 17 mean 18 max	SW 20 mean 21 max	SW 15 mean -	SW 12 mean -	WSW 15 mean 22 max
28/9 0500 hours	W 20 mean 20 max	WNW 24 mean 24 max	W 19 mean 22 max	WSW 15 mean -	WSW 12 mean -	W 18 mean 29 max
28/9 0800 hours	WNW 17 mean 20 max	WNW 18 mean 25 max	WNW 21 mean 24 max	WNW 13 mean -	WNW 09 mean -	W 17 mean 26 max
28/9 1100 hours	WNW 12 mean 17 max	WNW 14 mean 18 max	- - -	W 15 mean -	WNW 11 mean -	W 12 mean -

'ESTONIA'-the conference of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects 13-14 March 2002

On 13-14 March 2002 the conference of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, the Marine Accident Investigation Board and the Nautical Institute about Learning from marine Incidents IItook place at London. See the program! The printed program with invitation to attend was sent out early February to several thousands interested parties and included a paper by Heiwa Co. Read the paper! The program was also published on the Internet. On 22 February 2002 the organizers informed Heiwa Co - "I have been contacted by the Reviewing Committee regarding your paper, they have informed me that while your paper has considerable merits and could prove valuable they are concerned that the second half of your paper constitutes attacks on people rather than processes and for that reason in its current form they feel unable to accept it". Heiwa Co requested information about, e.g. the persons of the Reviewing Committee and what items of the paper constituted attacks on people rather than processes and why the Reveiewing Committee felt unable to accept it. The second part was about - 2. IMO RES. A.637 (16) and A.849 (20) - but what does the second half refer to? Is it paragraphs 5.9 - 5.11 of the paper starting at page 7 (halfway)? 5.9 RE-OPEN THE ('ESTONIA') INVESTIGATION The 'Estonia' accident thus took place in September 1994 and the Final report [2] of the accident investigation was published in December 1997. Since then several attempts have been made to have the investigation re-opened to review new proven facts never examined by the official investigation. On 20 September 1999 and 4 January 2000 the responsible Swedish minister, Ms Mona Sahlin, announced that there were no reasons for a new investigation. No new (sic) facts of sufficient value had been presented, in spite of the fact that 90% of the information in this paper was then known to Ms Sahlin. On 16 March 2001 Ms Sahlin, after secret consultations with the heads of the political parties in the Swedish parliament, again announced that no new investigation was needed."Maybe some technicians together with some trustworthy laymen could review the new facts (including the ones in this paper?)," Ms Sahlin thought and the heads of the other political parties did not disagree. 5.10 CAUSE AND EVENT The head of the Finnish investigators Mr Kari Lehtola added on Swedish television the night before, that the writer - duly named - of this paper was an amateur - 'completely unable to do a proper analysis of cause and event' and that it was worrying that he "should be able to overthrow the government of an independent state". The writer has no intent to overthrow the Finnish government, but it is interesting to note the Lehtola remark about cause end event. Mr Lehtola and his colleagues in the Commission have stated that a lot of 'events' took place when the 'Estonia' sank, but for most of these alleged 'events' there is no proven or identified cause. 5.11 EVENTS AND CAUSES This paper is not about cause and event, but events ... and causes (and lessons not learnt). Ms Sahlin and Mr Lehtola and the heads of the Swedish political parties were and are unfortunately not properly informed about the laws and codes for international maritime accident investigations, which Sweden, Finland and Estonia have adopted in the United Nations. UN-resolution IMO A.849 (20) and its Code for Investigations of Accidents and Incidents at Sea, paragraph 13, is clear: "When new evidence relating to any casualty is presented, it should be fully assessed and referred to other substantially interested States for appropriate input. In the case of new evidence which may materially alter the determination of the circumstances under which the marine casualty occurred, and may materially alter the findings in relation to its cause or any consequential recommendations, States should reconsider their findings." It is as simple as that. The reason is of course that the safety at sea will be improved. The cost is minimal. If Mr Lehtola, who announced a false wreck position - believes that the writer is an amateur - "completely unable to do a proper analysis of cause and event" - he is kindly invited to prove it. Ms Sahlin cannot ignore in 2001 that new proven facts have been presented 1997-2001, which require a full new investigation - the alleged events disclosed by the Commission have different causes than concluded by the Commission or are physically impossible. In the United Kingdom several marine accident investigations ('Derbyshire', 'Gaul', 'Marchioness') have been formally re-opened (sometimes 10-15 years) later, when new facts have been presented. This has then resulted in real improvements to safety.

The only reply from the RINA was on 28 February 2002 -

"I apologise if it was not made 100% clear when your abstract was accepted that all conference papers are subject to a final review before inclusion in RINA conferences. I have forwarded your comments to the technical co-ordinator for the conference and await his response. However as matters stand at this time the RINA cannot accept your paper for publication or presentation at the conference".

In view of the fact that the organizers refused to inform who the persons of the Reviewing Committee were and what items constitued 'attacks on people' and why Heiwa Co decided not to attend the conference in spite of having made all the necessary arrangements.On 19 March 2002 the organizers informed:

"You state that you were invited to speak at the conference. This is incorrect. You submitted an abstract of your proposed paper in response to the First Announcement and Call for Papers. Your abstract was accepted subject to review of the full paper. A comparison of the abstract (which was published in the provisional program before your paper was received) with the full paper attached to your email clearly shows that it gave no indication of the contentious elements in your paper".

Actually Heiwa Co had submitted a synopsis of the paper in November and had then been invited to submit the full paper as per a certain layout. There was no mention of a later review of the paper. The synopsis (or abstract) was not published in the (provisional - sic) program - it was the Summary of the full paper and the conference program was evidently the final one. Furthermore from the organizers, RINA:

"You state that your invitation to speak was withdrawn. This is incorrect. You will be aware that acceptance of an Abstract does not constitute a right of the author to present his paper, at any reputable conference. Your paper was reviewed, as were all other papers received, and it was considered that whilst it undoubtedly had considerable merit and contained elements which could prove valuable, the second half of the paper contained attacks on people rather than processes which were inappropriate to the subject of the conference. I believe that those who have had the opportunity to read your paper will concur with this view. I should also point out that the decision not to accept your paper was made by The Royal Institution of Naval Architects, and not by the MAIB or the Nautical Institute".

Heiwa Co considers it very strange that thousands of invitations are sent out to attend the Conference with a program indicating a Heiwa Co paper which had been submitted in January and that it is later removed from the program. Furthermore from the organizers:

"You state that you sought clarification but none was given. This is incorrect. I refer you to our emails of 28 Feb, 1 and 8 March, in which we re-iterated the reasons for not accepting your paper".

Heiwa Co has still not received any information about the Reviewing Committee and what items of the paper were considered inapproproate and why. Furthermore from the organizers:

"You state that your "speech" was censored by The Royal Institution of Naval Architects. This is incorrect, and indeed is an unworthy accusation to make against an internationally renowned professional institution, and one which has given much space in its journals for such views on the Estonia incident to be expressed. The Institution recognises and respects your right to hold the views you do, and to express them in the proper forum. The "Learning from Marine Incidents" conference was not a proper forum".

The fact is that the Synopsis submitted in November was accepted as Heiwa Co was invited to prepare the full paper (speech) according to certain rules, including writing a Summary. The original Summary of the Heiwa Co paper was not the one printed in the program/invitation - it was a modified - censored - version, which Heiwa Co accepted in retrospect.
On the same day (19 March 2002) of the above letter from the conference organizers The Times of London wrote in its editorial:

LYING FOR ONE'S COUNTRYDeceit is justified in wartime, rarely in peace ... Deception is the hallmark of good strategy. The general who misleads his opponents and take advantage of their confusion saves lives and wins battles. In every war, intelligence plays as great a role as armour. ... Deception must implicate not only the enemy but one's one side also. Many were the instances ... when official announcements covered up the truth, hid losses or mislead opinion. The morality here is obvious: the arsenal of democracy must include poisonous words. The morality of peacetime deception is far less clear. Western intelligence routinely fed lies into the public domain for 40 years during the Cold War, hoping that the communists would fall for myths created by covert CIA funding ... The target of such deception were Western institutions themselves: newspapers, public organisations and even democratic institutions. The strategy was not only risky but counter-productive. Covert funding, if revealed, discredited the benficiary; false statements undermined public trust; lies, when exposed, provoked political cynicism. ... And news management comes close to falsehood ...: spinning is now seen as not an adjunct to but an enemy of democracy. ... There are still obvious areas where truth is harmful. ... can all require categorical denial of what has been truthfully revealed or blurted out. ... The fight against terrorism is, of its nature, covert, deceptive and underhand. In all other battles democracies employ such methods only at hugh cost.

The Times of London has a good understanding of the situation. The truth of the Estonia accident cover-up cannot even be discussed at a joint RINA, Nautical Institute and Marine Accident Investigation Board conference in London about what we can learn from marine incidents. So the Heiwa Co paper has to be read on the Internet. It seems that the Swedish Board of Psychological Defence is in action again.
As of 28 May 2002 no further info has been given from RINA in spite of numerous assurances from the organization clerk that clarification will be given. Evidently the Royal Institution of Naval Architects is not interested in safety at sea and promotes censorship to this effect.

'ESTONIA'-Proven untrue Testimonies

1.48 Proven untrue Testimonies by Estonian Crewmembers. Treu, Sillaste and Kadak lie to the Commission about their Escape ... and everything else! 

First a short recapitulation of the accident.
According to the Final Report (5) the 'accident' - the heeling - occurred at 01.15 hrs - caused by
(a) the loss of the visor (after 10-20 minutes of noise and destruction of structure and badly designed outfittings/locks by a German shipyard allegedly heard by various unknown persons aboard) that ripped open the ramp - and
(b) water that entered the superstructure 2.5 meters above waterline (when the bow pitched below water) and ended up in the side of the superstructure (the car deck) and suddenly (sic) listed the ship,
At 01.16 hrs the angle of list was 15 degrees (you need about 500 tonnes of water in the superstructure for that) and the vessel turned 180° East 500 meters West of the lost visor,
at 01.20 hrs 30 degrees list with the bow in lee after the turn (you need > 1 500 tons of water for that, and that water should now flow out according basic laws of physics),
at 01.24 hrs the lifeboat alarm was raised on and inside the ship (a little late to say the least!) and the list was (about) 40 degrees (you need > 2 000 tons in the superstructure for it and you wonder how it came in through the bow in lee?) - the ship was stable(physically impossible),
at 01.30 hrs the angle of list was 60-70 degrees (or more) - but the ferry was still stable (physically impossible).
At 01.52 hrs the ship allegedly finally sank 1.9 1 560 meters East of the lost visor after having drifted sideways for 22 minutes with the astonishing speed >2,2 knots!
There is no evidence for any of these events - e.g. 70 degrees stable listing at 01.30 hrs 15 minutes after the 'accident' - or then 22 minutes 'sinking' while drifting >1 200 meters (final sinking after 01.52 hrs). No capsize is ever recorded. But this is the official story. It is a 100% invention of the Commission.
The real Events - the Lifeboat Alarm - the Crew Escape
No civilian survivor has provided evidence for above fairy tale. According to the majority of all survivors, crew and passengers, there were an impact followed by another longer loud sound and then a sudden listing, >30 degrees, the latter at 01.02 hrs, i.e.13 minutes earlier than officially stated, i.e. all times/angles of heel are not proven. The ferry then became stable at a smaller angle of list, so that persons could escape during 5-10 minutes and it would appear that the vessel was stopped in the water. The lifeboat alarm was raised, if it were raised, 1.33 first nine or 22 minutes after the'accident' and when most survivors had escaped to the open and when it was impossible to get out. Actually very few survivors have mentioned the lifeboat alarm.
What caused the sudden listing, i.e. what was the real cause of the accident in lieu of the allegedly defective visor locks?The Commission suggested that water loaded on the car deck inside the superstructure very soon after the accident caused the listing, but there is no evidence of any kind for that. A critical amount of water (1 800 tons) on the car deck in thesuperstructure would have caused immediate capsize and floating upside down. But how could so much water get in? Why didn't the water flow out, when the ferry stopped? A collision followed by hull leakage and loss of stability has not been investigated.
The engine room crew was questioned the same day and later about the 'accident' and three engine crewmembers are quoted below - verbally from the Final Report (5) - about what happened in the Engine Control Room, ECR, on deck 1 after the sudden listing and how they escaped to the open - and survived. These testimonies are a mix of several early and late testimonies - the Commission puts a fairy tale together to suit its dark purposes. The three crewmembers evidently didn't cause the accident! They are 100% innocent. But for strange reasons their statements are used to support an impossible cause of accident. And - sadly - they have never retracted their statements. Why? Simple. They were, and still are, threatened by evil people to shut up! This is very disturbing. To say the least.
Falsified Testimonies
The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that the three testimonies below are not correct - they are 100% falsifications.The persons behind the testimonies are a different matter. It is very probable that
(a) the Estonian crewmembers, shocked after being rescued, were asked, or forced, or kindly convinced to say something that never happened, and
(b) that, whatever the Estonian crewmembers said, it was edited, particularly the times, in the Final report (5) to suit the Commission's false sequences of events.
There are in fact two false but official sequences of the 'accident': In the first attempt of the Commission - October 1994 - it was only a leaking bow ramp that caused the 'accident'; the Estonian crewmembers were told to say that they saw that the closed bow ramp was leaking a little so that water came into the superstructure.
Later, in the second round/attempt, - December 1994 - the Commission concluded that it was a fully opened ramp that caused the sudden water inflow/listing and that the ramp then suddenly closed itself (?) so that the sinking took so long a time. But the Estonian crewmembers had never seen an open ramp, even if the Commission and the media said the opposite.
The job to modify - read falsify - the testimonies of the Estonian crewmembers was not very well done by the Commission. Actually - the Commission soon realised that either invented scenario would have led to immediate capsize - floating upside down. So the Commission convinced some 'experts' to announce that a ferry does not capsize with water in the superstructurebut floats in stable condition on the deck house, while these spaces were being filled (sic) with water, and that the ferry drifts, at high uniform speed, and suddenly - PLOFF - sinks with all buoyancy lost!
Margus Treu - his unbelievable Story
Third engineer Treu was allegedly in the ECR on deck 1 before and after the 'accident' - the listing - occurred at 01.15 hrs. Treu never experienced the sudden listing like all other survivors at 01.02 hrs. According Treu the ferry just started to list slowly - nothing to worry about. Treu therefore stayed for about 10 minutes (!) down inside the hull and called the bridge by telephone several times about saving the ship, while there was full panic everywhere else, finally saying (sic) that he was leaving deck 1 to go up to deck 8. Chapter 6.2.3 in (5) describes his experiences after the listing and his escape 10 minutes later - in seven interviews 1994-1996:⁹²

"... the starboard list became permanent. Lose objects started to move. At this time (i.e. a few minutes after the sudden listing) (Sillaste) and (Kadak) entered the control room ... Approximately one minute after the alarm "Mr Skylight to number one and two" the (life)boat alarm went out over the public address system (i.e. at 01.22-01.24 hrs - but Treu ignored it) and the alarm bells started to ring ... the port main engines tripped ... With the help of railings (Treu) crawled to the control panel and tried to restart the engines ... (Kadak) was in a state of panic ... (Treu) felt there was nothing (Treu) could do in the control room any more and (Treu) told the bridge that (Treu) was going upp on deck to check the function of the emergency diesel generator. ... all watertight doors were closed.

"With >2 000 tons of water on the car deck at 01.24 hrs..."

In a ... testimony (Treu) said he left at about 01.30 hrs and that the list was at this time 70-75 degrees. (Treu) has also said that he left about 01.25 hrs, not earlier ... . (Treu) took the engine staff's own staircase (sic) to deck 8 to the emergency diesel generator. ... (Treu) checked the emergency diesel generator, which was still running. The ship was at this time lying on her side ... the list was 90 degrees ... the emergency generator shut down ... (Treu) ... moved aft along the hull ... When the emergency diesel generator stopped ... the hard plastic flooring on the deck was falling on him ... (Treu) saw that some passengers had opened life raft containers ..."

Thus, our hero Treu on deck 1 tried to re-start the main engines after the lifeboat alarm at 01.22 hrs (the Commission does not explain why), then he telephoned the bridge that he was going (sic) up and then, a few minutes later (!), he attended the emergency generator on deck 8 before jumping overboard. Now, how do you take a staircase seven decks up in a few minutes, when the list is 70-75 degrees? How do you walk (sic) to the emergency generator room? How do you check an emergency generator, when the list is 90 degrees - see figure below? The generator is sitting like a painting on the wall! At this time all other survivors were already at the port, upper outside of the vessel.
No Panic - Treu walked up!
But our hero Treu never panicked before he decided to escape - he ignored the lifeboat alarm at 01.22 hrs and stayed on for another 3-6 minutes down in the ECR on deck 1 trying to save the ship (starting pumps, engines, telephoning the bridge several times, etc.), while the 'Estonia' heeled from 0 to > 60-70 degrees. Treu was never afraid that the ship would turn upside down and that he was going to be trapped inside the hull. Treu was questioned the last time on 28 February 1996 as a witness by the Estonian Transport Investigation Bureau (the story had changed a little - no starting pumps or main engines, no telephone calls, no visit to the emergency generator):

"... When he (Treu) was in the ECR he heard the "Mr Skylight to number one and two" and the (life)boat alarms(i.e. at 01.22-01.24 hrs). The angle of list was >20 degrees. When the auxiliary engines (generators) tripped, when the angle of list was 40 - 45 degrees, he decided to leave the ECR via the chimney (sic). Sillaste and Kadak had left before him. He crept (sic) out from the ECR at about 01.25 hrs, not before, as it was the last time he looked at the watch. His escape took 2 - 3 minutes (sic) and when he reached open deck, the angle of list was 70 - 75 degrees."

OK, according to the Final report (5) 1994/5 testimonies Treu took a staircase, in 1996 the escape was via the chimney - say via vertical ladders as there is no staircase in the chimney (read engine room uptake). And when he got out on deck 9, he went down to the emergency generator on deck 8. How do you get to the emergency generator from the chimney, when the angle of list is 70-75 degrees? There is no factual truth in Treu's statements - it is 100% fairy tale! Nobody could do what Treu did! Treu later refuses to comment about his obvious lies.
Henrik Sillaste - repairing the Toilet System - walks to meet Treu
System engineer Sillaste, another hero, was allegedly on deck 0 below and forward of the ECR urgently repairing the toilet system, when the 'accident' - the listing - occurred and went to the ECR through one or two watertight doors and up one ladder - it took one or two minutes. This was while all the other passengers immediately tried to reach deck 7; 2.1and 2.12, and there was panic among the passengers on decks 1, 4, 5 and 6. But Sillaste on deck 0 did not panic!
He decided to go and see his boss Treu in the ECR. To discuss what was going on! No panic! Let's first discuss in peace and quiet! No risk that the ship sinks! Can we believe that?
Chapter 6.2.4 in (5) describes his incredible experiences in five interviews 1994-1996. He thus, after the listing, moved to the engine control room:⁹³

"Shortly after (Sillaste's) arrival in the control room, the watertight doors were closed ... After the engines had stopped (Sillaste) heard the alarm "Mr Skylight to number one and two" over the public address system ... and the(life)boat alarm sounded (i.e. at 01.22-01.24 hrs). ... When the list was about 45-50 degrees (Sillaste) and (Kadak) left the control room. ... In a later testimony (Sillaste) said that they left when the list was about 60 degrees ... . (Sillaste), together with (Kadak), gained the outer deck 8 amidships, quite near the emergency generator, which worked. ... Their climb (Sillaste) stated took one minute or two. ... Out on deck 8 (Sillaste) saw crew members preparing life rafts ... (Sillaste) ... saw the second and third officers leave the bridge ...".

"When the list was about 45-50 degrees ..."

Sillaste was thus with Treu in the ECR when the main engines tripped and when Treu tried to re-start them. Then Sillaste walked/climbed quickly up to deck 8, where he could see the second and third officer leave the bridge, when the list was 90 degrees - see figure below?But how could anybody leave the bridge (or the ECR for that matter) when the list was 90 degrees - the door of the bridge was then 80 cms high (the width) and you stepped out into open air (the deck was the wall)!Sillaste was questioned the last time on 13 January 1996 as a witness by the Estonian Transport Investigation Bureau:

"... When he was in the engine room he heard the 'Häire, häire' alarm from the information and the "Mr Skylight to number one and two" alarm. The angle of list was 20 - 30 degrees. Treu told him and Kadak to escape from the ECR after the main engines had tripped, when the angle of list was 60 - 80 degrees (very difficult to estimate).Treu remained in the ECR. He (Sillaste) decided to leave the ECR via the boiler room (sic) to deck 8. His escape took 1 - 2 minutes and when he reached open deck, the angle of list was 60 - 80 degrees. At 01.27 hrs he was in a life raft together with, e.g. Kadak, Linde, Sirje Juhanson, Mats Finanger, Alexandr Voronin (total 16 persons)."

Sillaste and Kadak thus climbed seven decks up in a very short time - via the 'boiler room' - maybe he meant engine - room. The watertight doors were closed, but to get to the engine room one watertight door must be opened again. If the list was >60 degrees, it must have been very difficult to walk on the decks ... . This is another fairy tale that is similar to Treu's. Who told Sillaste to make it up? Sillaste has later, bravely, stated that he is misquoted, i.e. it is not correct what the Commission says he said. So what happened really?
Hannes Kadak - in the Workshop - notices a 'strange' Listing
Motorman Kadak, another little hero, was allegedly in the workshop on deck 1 on starboard side of the control room, when the listing to starboard occurred and he walked to the control room. It was his first night aboard the ship. He must have walked upwards against the list. Chapter 6.2.5 in (5) describes his experiences in three interviews 1994-1995:

"While (Kadak) was working in the workshop, the ship suddenly developed a list, which he found strange. He went to the control room ... several lamps started to flash "boat alarm" ... At this time (Sillaste) arrived and the watertight doors had been closed ... pumps were turned on ... from the bridge they received orders to do something with the pumps. ... it was no longer possible to stand upright. At a certain point the main engines tripped (at 01.20hrs). ... Then (Kadak) and (Sillaste) left the control room through the emergency exit. The list at this time was about 50 degrees. ... the emergency generator startade automatically. The list was about 90 degrees, when they reached deck 8 ... the emergency generator stopped ... (Kadak) put on a life jacket and slid into the water..."

"The list was about 90 degrees when they reached deck 8 ..."

OK - our little hero Kadak, who could not stand up, left the ECR with Sillaste via the emergency exit. Where was it? When Kadak quickly reached deck 8, the list was 90 degrees and the deck was vertical like a wall with the now horizontal deckhouse side 12 meters above him. But Kadak states that he was up on the horizontal ship's side 12 meters higher up at abt. 01.30 hrs! How did he get there? Where do you get the life jacket? According to other witnesses Kadak ended up inside a life raft.
Kadak was interviewed at 11.00 hrs on 29 September 1994 at Turku hospital by Mr. T. Laan. The language used was Estonian. The protocol was later translated by the interpreter Ms. H. Laan:

"... The main engines stopped ... at this moment it was clear to everybody that the ship was sinking (sic) ... I, together with Henric (Sillaste) left the ECR via the emergency exist and opened a watertight door. ... On the way up the generators stopped and the emergency generator started automatically. When we came up/out the angle of list was 90 degrees and the emergency generator stopped. I put on a life jacket and slid into the water".

Interestingly enough Kadak believed that the ship was sinking due to the listing, when the main engines stopped. Evidently an emergency escape does not contain a watertight door. Hannes Kadak (HK) was interviewed a last time by the Commission on 31 March 1995. The protocol was made by 'expert' Bengt Schager (BS):

BS: What happened when you saved yourself?HK: When the main engine stopped, I went up from the engine room in the chimney and then I got out and then I was in the water. ... When I got out of the chimney ... I walked to the side guard rail ... the ship was lying on the right (starboard) side ... and I got out on the left (port) side ... I walked toward the bow, to the right. And when I fell into the water I experienced the ship as a black wall. There were many persons and you had to survive so it wasn't much time to think how the ship was lying. ...
BS: Were you standing on the ship hull side or the superstructure?
HK: When I came out of the chimney from this special stairwell system from the engine room, you exit on deck 8. Then I pulled myself via the ladder from deck 8 to deck 7. ... and then to the guard rail (on deck 7).
BS: When you were on the side, did you see the bilge keel?
HK: I didn't make any such observations.

It is clear that Kadak claims that he 'walked' from the port side of the chimney (sic) to the starboard side of the ship (deckhouse), when the list was 90 degrees.
But how did he manage to do that?
He could not stand up in the control room. The chimney port side was 10 meters below the upper, port side of the ship. The decks 7 and 8 were vertical walls! Evidently Kadak must have got out much earlier - because you cannot walk - or pull yourself - up to the port ship's side unless the angle of list is <30 degrees! Expert Schager and the Commission believe that you can walk up a vertical wall! So this is another fairy tale that sounds like Sillaste's and Treu's. Who told them to make it up?
Silver Linde - another Fairy Story from the Deck House - Decks 5-8
Silver Linde, the Estonian seaman who did the hourly fire watches on the 'Estonia' and who joined Sillaste and Kadak on the port upper side of the 'Estonia' and shared the same liferaft S, was questioned the last time on 25 January 1996 as a witness by the Estonian Transport Investigation Bureau. This writer believes a lot of what Linde is saying except the times given. From early newspaper interviews it is clear that Linde experienced the sudden listing already at 01.02 hrs. Linde had been on the car deck as part of his fire patrol round and had not seen any water there and not heard any noise. Then he had returned to the bridge - when probably the big bangs occurred around 00.55-58 hrs. And then he had, allegedly, been ordered down to investigate strange sounds on the car deck or leakage on deck 1 reported by phone to the bridge (of which there is no evidence):

"He (Linde) was at the information (deck 5), when the ship suddenly listed. He (and a Swede) fell. He (Linde) ran down to deck 4 and met escaping passengers from deck 1. He (Linde) then escaped via the central stairwell from deck 4 to deck 7, it took one minute, and reached open deck. The angle of list was 30 degrees or a little more. When he was on deck 7, he heard the 'Häire, häire' alarm from the information and the "Mr Skylight to number one and two" alarm (which alarms Sillaste and Kadak heard in the ECR at 01.22-01.24 hrs). Tormi Ainsalu was announcing the alarm. He (Linde) was then standing on the wall to deck 8 below a lifeboat, the angle of list was 70 - 75 degrees or 80 - 90 degrees, the ship was rolling. The time was 01.24 hrs. He was in a life raft together with, e.g.Kadak, Sillaste, Sirje Juhanson, Marge Rull, Raivo Tõnisson (total 16 persons). "

This story is clear and simple - no heroic work. There was a sudden list - Linde tried to save himself immediately - no 5-10 minutes wait like his colleagues in the ECR - but he was in the same raft at Kadak and Sillaste. Strange?
Linde had been interviewed eight times earlier by the Commission and the police - from 6.2.2 in the Final report:

"(Linde) ... on the bridge before being ordered down ... He ran to the information desk on deck 5 to ask them to unlock the car deck doors ... when he arrived at the information desk ... (Linde) had to wait for a couple of minutes. While he was waiting, the ship heeled over so much that all objects fell. He continued down to deck 4 ... he realized that the situation had become serious. The list was now around 25-30 degrees. He ran to deck 7 ... he reported ... that the people said "deck 1 is under water". ... he managed to save himself by getting to a liferaft on the ship's side ... he was in the liferaft at 0124 hrs ...

The people Linde met on deck 4 came from deck 1 and the passenger compartments just forward of the Engine Control Room, where Treu, Silllaste och Kadak were starting pumps, etc. Many of these passengers had noticed water on deck 1 and started evacuation before the sudden listing occurred and thought the ship was leaking and sinking. The Commission conveniently ignored what these passengers reported. It is quite possible that Linde met Treu, Sillaste and Kadak on their way up! They stayed together! In some strange testimonies Treu says that he saw Linde on the car deck (via a TV-monitor) just before the accident.
The emergency Exit - the Escape Route - miraculous Evacuation
As seen from above first three Estonian testimonies (edited of course by the Commission based on several questionings) thewatertight doors of the ferry were open, when the listing occurred. If they were closed later is uncertain, even if the three crewmembers say so, as there is no indication panel for the 20 watertight doors in the ECR. Kadak/Sillaste must later have opened a watertight door to get out as the ECR was located inside a watertight compartment with watertight doors forward and aft. Treu must also have passed a watertight door to get out!
You could not remotely close the watertight doors from the ECR. It was only possible from the bridge 1.23. If a watertight door was open it could only be closed manually at the door itself (apart remotely from the bridge). If a watertight door were closed, it could be opened manually - it took about 15 seconds. Alarm bells would ring when the door closed.
To reach the ECR Sillaste had had to go through one or two open watertight doors on deck 0. They must then have been open or were being opened.
Sillaste and Kadak allegedly left the ECR on deck 1 after the lifeboat alarm at 01.22 hrs, say at 01.23 hrs when Linde was already on deck 7 standing on the wall to deck 8. They took the emergency exit. The angle of list was 45-50-60 degrees (difficult to estimate - but they could not have been standing on the floor/deck 1 of the ECR at that time and how and where they stood in the ECR is not described - on the starboard wall?). The emergency diesel generator started, i.e. there was a black-out. After one, two or three minutes they were on open deck 8 at the chimney port side adjacent to the emergency diesel generator, which stopped. Now there was a problem - deck 7 port side was 10 meters above them!
The miraculous escape from deck 1 to deck 8 - a 20 meters inclined climb on ladders in the chimney/engine uptake or on horizontal ladders and vertical platforms, with regard to the angle of list - thus took only a few minutes.
It is of course impossible to climb up through a tilting engine room uptake but Sillaste and Kadak kept together and got into the same life raft as Silver Linde (33). According Linde the raft was on the port (uppermost), flat side of the ferry, before it got into the water, i.e. Sillaste and Kadak had therefore managed to climb up another 10 meters from the chimney/funnel on deck 8 at the centreline, which was 10 meters below the port side high above, then flat outside side of the ship to get into the raft.
How Sillaste and Kadak managed to climb up to the port (upper) side from the exit of the emergency exit (that does not exist) near the centreline of the ship, when the listing was 90 degrees and when they had just reached deck 8, is a mystery - see figures 1.48.1/2 below. They had to climb 8-10 meters straight up!
Survivor RS 2.12 has told the writer that he and a friend (Y) were on deck 8 port side, when the normal lights and also the emergency lights went out. Then RS and Y climbed a ladder up to the helicopter deck 9 aft of the funnel. At this time lose items on the port deck guard rail dropped down on the persons below. The angle of list was then about 70-80 degrees, so they almost walked on the side of the deck house.
When RS was on the edge of the helicopter deck (deck 9, which sloped straight into the water) he observed two persons, one tall and one short at the funnel. The short shouted "water is coming in on cardeck", but was silenced by the other with a fist in the face. Then the angle of list was about 90 degrees and the two persons could only move on the flat side of the funnel.
These two persons could hardly have been Sillaste and Kadak, who were then already on the port, upper side of the deck house 10 meters above the horizontal funnel, where RS was standing. Maybe RS imagined the whole thing?
When the funnel (pointing South) came under water there was a big, white cloud. RS estimates/guesses that the time was then about 01.20-01.25 hrs (they had started their escape from the Admiral's pub at 01.02 hrs 2.12). RS and Y felt that they could not stay on the ship. RS felt as if the 'Estonia' started to roll upside down, so they decided to jump into the water - into the waves and the wind, i.e. towards the stern with the funnel to the left. RS was never up and out on the upper port side, which was behind and above him. RS dived into the waves and went deep down. RS is/was a dive instructor with about 1 000 dives - RS had to release lung pressure 5 times when he was below water. RS swam against the waves - in a southward direction - and found a lifeboat - where he met Treu! The ship sank maybe 15 minutes later. Y drowned.
If Sillaste and Kadak had escaped through the engine casing/chimney they should have to abandon ship like RS and Treu - jump into the water and swim into the wind. But they ended up in a life raft that was launched from the port upper side in the North direction. How was it possible?
The Mystery - how did Treu, Sillaste and Kadak escape to Deck 8?
The big mystery is of course, how Sillaste and Kadak got out of the ECR on deck 1 to deck 8 in the first place after having stayed down in the ECR for >8 minutes. And it is strange that the Commission never asked them how they really got out. In above testimonies three different escape routes are stated - crew stairwell, emergency escape, chimney. It is not easy to falsify testimonies. The Commission knew that Treu, Sillaste and Kadak lied!
Treu left the ECR later, say at 01.25-01.27 hrs, when the list was 70-75 degrees, i.e. he must then have stood on the starboard, lower wall of the ECR, which then had become the floor - the watertight doors were closed - and he took the engine staff's own staircase to deck 8, where the emergency generator was still running - soon to stop.
But there is no engine staff's own staircase from the ECR on deck 1 in the hull! The ECR was located between two watertight bulkheads and the 'normal' access was through watertight doors (that should have been closed at sea). Then there was the 'emergency exit' - a vertical ladder straight up to deck 2 the car deck three meters above him. It was of course useless, when the list was 70-75 degrees! But Treu managed to escape. He could in principle only reach deck 2 via the emergency escape.
But, a few minutes later, Treu was allegedly inside the emergency generator room deck 8 (on the port, upper side) and soon after out on open deck 8 again (which was like a vertical wall!). It seems as if Treu overtook Sillaste and Kadak after the escape from the ECR, as he arrived at the emergency generator before it stopped. Soon afterwards Treu was swept into the water on the South side, even if the location on deck 8 port side at that time was about 10 meters above water - see figures below. Treu must have been standing on the wall between decks 8 and 9 well away from any water at that time - 01.30 hrs - if we believe the Commission. The ship should have sunk 22 minutes later after having drifted >1 200 meters.
Facts about the Emergency Exit from the ECR on Deck 1
The emergency exit from the ECR on deck 1 is, as stated, a vertical ladder to deck 2 - the car deck (it is the only way out of the ECR, when the watertight doors are closed).
But how did Sillaste and Kadak then get up to open deck 8 in a few minutes, when all decks and stairs were sloping >40-60 degrees?
From the exit of the emergency ladder on deck 2 (the car deck) there was a 10 meters walk to the stairwell on deck 2 and then another 17 meter straight up to pass five or six deck levels! And when they reached deck 8, how did they get up and out on the port, flat ship's side - it was another 10 meters straight up - on a 90 degrees/vertical sloping deck?
How do you climb a wall?
The writer has tested to escape from ECRs on deck 0 or 1 to an upper deck 8 on various ferries, when they were upright. A typical escape is out from the ECR (inside the engine room) - up a stairway (to the car deck) - then a walk on the deck - then up two stairs to deck 4 - then a walk on that deck in a corridor and turning to reach the next stairs - then up the final four stairs. It can be done in two minutes - but the ship must be upright. When the ship is listing more than 20 degrees, it is no longer possible.
Untrue Testimonies = Fairy Tales
The testimonies or fairy tales of Sillaste and Kadak in the Final Report (5) as quoted above cannot be correct about their escapes from the ECR. Actually the testimonies clearly show that the three persons are not telling the truth - it is just invented stories. It is very likely that it is was the Commission that made up the three testimonies of the engine crew - because a normal engine crew member would never have stayed down in the engine room for 10 minutes. They would have - like Linde - escaped immediately to the open.
A repetition: Treu remained alone in the ECR after Sillaste and Kadak had left and then he took "the engine staff's own staircase to deck 8", when the list was 70-75 degrees.
This testimony cannot be correct. An obvious lie.
First of all there is no staircase from the ECR and, second, you cannot walk in stairs, when the list is 70-75 degrees. So how did Treu, Sillaste and Kadak get out?
The Way out - and an unstable Ship - as per the Commission
A plot of the ship's course, speed, angle of list, amounts of water inside the ship is shown in 1.9. This plot is another falsification.

However - the situation according to the Commission, when the list was 70 degrees at 01.25 -01.30 hrs with 4 000 tons of water on the car deck and 14 000 tons of water in the deck house above and with 300 persons on the open decks and when Treu was still in the ECR, is shown in figure 1.48.1 right of a transverse section of the ship at about amidship. South is right, North is left. The wind blows from S to N. The waves are coming from South. The 'Estonia' floats high above the waterline, as all watertight compartments on deck 0 and 1 below the car deck are dry - it is only water on the car deck and in the deckhouse. The condition is completely unstable - the centre of gravity of the ship G (no consideration is given to the water in the deckhouse) is 8 meters to the side of the centre of buoyancy B (the air in the hull and the superstructure) and the ship should have capsized, turned upside down immediately.

Figure 1.48.1 - The 'Estonia' with 70 degrees heel - escape from the ECR - unstable condition

This is something the investigators always refuse to admit - they maintain that the ship was stable at this time floating on the deck house (but cannot prove it) and sank 20 minutes later! The Swedish NMA (safety at sea director Franson and director general Selén) has stated to the Swedish government (Minister Mona Sahlin) several times that the 'Estonia' was floating on thedeck house at this time and this is also the official story - not clearly stated - in the Final report (5). But the Final report is here based on a totally false stability calculation 3.12 where the deck house is 100% watertight on the submerged side, while survivors had just left that 'watertight' deck house on the opposite non-watertight side. How ironic - the deck house was watertight on the side under water but open on the other side, where passengers climbed out.
This is one of the obvious stupid errors of the Final report (5). The lee side below water of the deck house is watertight - as the whole ship floats on it - while the windward, upper side is open - persons are escaping through doors and windows. Only an ignorant child believes such fairy tales.
The Escape Route - only to Deck 2, the Car Deck
The escape route via the emergency exit from the ECR on deck 1 and stairs in the deckhouse is shown in red in the figures. It is a simplification - the vertical escape ladder from the ECR on deck 1 ends on the car deck 2 and the stairs are10-15 meters apart on decks 2 or 4. Note the last bit to the emergency generator - out on deck 7 and then up to deck 8.
How did Treu reach the emergency generator? And how did all three get up to the port, upper side of the ship, when they reached decks 6, 7 or 8 at the centreline of the ship - the port flat, upper side of the ship was >10 meters above them? How do you climb a wall?
Actually - the investigators of the Commission are and were fully aware of the fact that the Final Report as quoted above is wrong or misleading - informally they⁹³ have later suggested that the escape from the ECR was not as stated (via the'emergency exit' or a 'crew stairwell') but via another route - via seven vertical ladders in the engine casing starting in the engine room (aft of the ECR) up to the funnel at deck 9 (via the exhaust boiler room on deck 8)!
The Engine Casing
To reach the engine casing from the ECR you have to pass one watertight door (between the ECR and the engine room) and then reach the the first ladder in the casing via a grating in the engine room. But it is in fact impossible to get from the ECR to the engine casing uptake, when the list is >40 degrees.
The vertical ladders in the engine casing are then no escape route - in a fire in the engine room the casing will be full of smoke. The easiest escape from the engine room is of course the emergency escape ladder to the car deck via a fire door. Then you are safe (when the ship is upright). The car (no. 2) deck in the superstructure is the emergency station with a fire in the Engine room (the hull below). There is A-60 fire insulation between the Engine room and the car deck and the CO₂ fire extinguishing control is located on the car deck.
The normally vertical ladders in the casing are 40 cms wide with rungs every 30 cms. You cannot climb them, when the list is >25 degrees. It is evidently impossible to even use a ladder when it is tilted 60 degrees. The ladders in the engine casing are furthermore not lined up between the deck platforms - you cannot get from one ladder to another, when the ship is listing. The only purpose of the ladders is to allow maintenance of exhaust pipes and cleaning, etc. And when you reach the funnel at amidship on deck 9 - how do you climb up to the port side of the ship 10 meters higher up? How do you climb a wall?
Sillaste and Kadak were in a life raft at 01.27 hrs together with Linde (33), who had launched it himself on the upper, port side, which was then flat but sloping towards the stern. How did Sillaste and Kadak get to and into the life raft, if they escaped via the engine casing ladders and the funnel and arrived there - at the funnel - when the list was 80 degrees?
Tests on ships similar the 'Estonia' show that there is no possibility at all to get out of the ECR on deck 1 to deck 8, when the angle of list is >20 degrees. Therefore the Final Report above about the engine crew escape from the ECR is pure falsified disinformation.
Stable Condition at 01.30 hrs
A stable condition with water in the engine room and the work shop and other compartments on decks 0 and 1 below the car deck, when the listing is 70 degrees at 01.30 hrs (28 minutes after the listing at 01.02 hrs - the ship sinks completely below water after another few minutes) is shown in the figure 1.48.2 below.

It has been developed by the writer assuming that the underwater hull was leaking and that several compartments on decks 0/1 were flooded as reported by the passengers escaping from deck 1. 300 person have escaped to open decks, >600 persons are according to the Commission trapped inside the ship and Treu is still in the ECR on deck 1 port (yellow, upper) side. Survivor RS is on the wall between decks 7 and 8 but further aft of the Emergency Generator room. The ship is trimming on the stern, so RS is closer to the water. When the ship heels another 30 degrees, the funnel, pointing South (right in picture), is under water and RS can dive into the waves that are coming in on the funnel side. The wind is blowing from South (right) to North (left in picture). Several compartments on decks 0 and 1 are flooded and the centre of gravity G(reduced to car deck level due the water in the hull) is just above the centre of buoyancyB, i.e. there is balance - stable condition.

Figure 1.48.2 - The 'Estonia' with 70 degrees heel - escape from the ECR - stable condition

The ship floats much lower in the water (on the remaining air in the hull and superstructure) but the staircase in the deckhouse decks 4-6 is below and filled with water. The ship is not rolling any more - it is quite stiff with all water in the bottom of hull. The ship's aft end is under water, the bow is maybe 20 meters above water - the above figure shows the section amidships. The ship is going to sink after another two minutes - at 01.32-01.36 hrs. Because the deck house is filling up much faster than the hull compartments, the ship will roll over >110 degrees at this time just before sinking. It is quite easy to simulate.
Any statements to the effect that the ship would float another 16-20 minutes in this condition - floating on the deck house (and drift >1 200 meters at a speed of >2,2 knots) - is just propaganda formulated by the Swedish Board of Psychologic Defence - see next chapter - and repeated by the Swedish National Maritime Administration and Johan Franson, director of safety at sea.
Impossible to leave the ECR
It is of course impossible to leave the ECR at this stage. The stairs in the longitudinal direction are almost horizontal, i.e. the steps and the landings are vertical - there is no possibility to get from the landing at, e.g. deck 7 to the open, port, upper side 12 meters above!
The 40 cms wide vertical ladders in engine casing with steps every 30 cms are at this time also almost horizontal and you cannot climb on them. Water in the deckhouse has started to flood the car deck from deck 4. If Treu had tried to leave the ECR at this time, he must have swam up through water filled staircases! As it was not possible, Treu should have been trapped inside the ECR. But Treu survived in good health - how and when did he get out? And who told him to tell the untruthful testimony?
The reason, why the Commission delayed the sinking - or disappearance - of the ship until after 01.50 hrs, was partly to enable the engine crew to escape at 01.30 hrs. On paper - the Commission never understood, when it falsified all the testimonies, that escape from the ECR was then impossible. The Commission invented the testimonies from the ECR. Nobody could have remained there for 8-10 minutes after the sudden 'listing', whenever it took place. The inventions were necessary to present 'witnesses' that had seen water on the car deck - on a TV monitor. But - as will be shown below - the engine crew probably escaped immediately at 01.02 hrs - like all the passengers. They never witnessed anything in the ECR.
The above quoted testimonies from the Final report are fantasies, fairy tales, inventions - to cover up the real cause of the accident. Because the three crew in the Engine room - Treu, Kadak and Sillaste - know exactly what happened - two big bangs, hull leakage, water in the hull on decks 0 and 1, open watertight doors, etc. That the plotted sequence of events is false has already been shown in 1.9. It is clear that we are encountering a quite clever manipulation here - false statements from the engine crew about their escapes and a false plot created by dr Huss. One falsification supporting another.
Probable Escape Route from the ECR
The three persons in the ECR must have left the ECR much earlier - if they ever were there, when the sudden listing occurred at 01.02 hrs due to leakage and water inside the hull on deck 0 - in order to survive.
There are two possibilities. In Figure 1.48.3 Escape routes from the ECR on deck 1 the ECR is situated on deck 1 left. Right is the passenger cabin spaces. Just outside the ECR forward outside a watertight door is a stairwell leading up to deck 4 and then to deck 7. Inside the ECR adjacent to the watertight door is a trunk with an emergency ladder to deck 2. 
Either they used the passenger staircase - i.e. the first staircase forward outside the ECR from passenger spaces on deck 1 reachable via a watertight door at the forward bulkhead of the ECR - and then they started evacuation immediately at 01.02 hrs, as all the other passengers on deck 1. There was no time for seven or ten minutes of heroic work or hearing alarms in the ECR. They would then arrive on open deck 7 a few minutes later (like many other, young strong survivors from deck 1 and Linde) and had then to climb up to deck 8 to reach the emergency generator (if they ever were there). It is possible.
But no surviving passengers on deck 1 noted any engine crew member from the ECR escape up the starways to deck 4, but maybe they escaped before the passengers started to leave. All surviving passengers describes great difficulties to reach the the open deck 7 port from the stairwell at centreline due to the list - the landing between the stairs and the deck house side door (to open deck 7 port) was sloping against them.
Alternatively they could have escaped through the engine casing using the vertical ladders there. It would have taken longer time, but it was still possible, as long as the angle of list was <20 degrees. They of course had to pass a watertight (but open) door from the ECR into the engine room. Then, after climbing eight ladders they would arrive to the funnel on deck 9 and some other survivors say they saw two of the engine crew there. And it was still time to get out on the port side and jump into the life raft with Linde.
This writer believes that it does not matter how they escaped, but that that it is clear that Treu, Sillaste and Kadak could only have escaped, if they started the escape at once, like Linde, where ever they were, before or after the two big bangs before the 'Estonia' lost its initial stability - but remained stable, albeit with a list. To reach the upper, port side and get into a life raft at 01.30 hrs, they must have been on the deck 7 port side already at, say 01.10 hrs, and then climbed up on the outer ship side like all other passengers and Linde, which started to evacuate at 01.02 hrs. They probably escaped together - on open deck 7. Sillaste, Kadak and Treu got out on the port side.
Treu may have gone to the emergency generator and could later not reach the port side 10 meters above him, so he jumped into the water on the starboard side. They could thus never have heard any alarms at 01.20 hrs in the ECR.
It is very possible that the three engine crew members were not in the ECR at all. They might very well have been alarmed before the sudden listing (at 01.02 hrs) and was mustering with the crew on deck 7. Thus they easily escaped and survived. The false story about repairs (by Sillaste) and then their gathering in the ECR after the sudden listing for seven minutes must have been made up by somebody and then Treu, Sillaste and Kadak were forced to repeat that story to the media and the Commission.
In the confusion that false story gained acceptance and it is one of the corner stones of the false Final report (5). No doubt professional disinformation experts assisted to spread the false story.
Miraculous Escape - a well constructed emergency Escape Trunk - the Germans come to the help of the Commission!
OR, if the three engine crew actually were in the engine room or the ECR on deck 1 at 01.25-01.30 hrs, when the angle of heel was 45-50-60-70-75 degrees, and if they were on open deck 8 a few minutes later and later on the flat, open port side of the deck house.superstructure, they should of course tell us, how this miraculous escape was possible. Estonian journalists should ask them.
The Germans have reported (chapter 2.5.2 their Final report) that "The centre casing (in the superstructure) contained staircases from the spaces below the car deck, lift trunks and various utility spaces for machinery and catering functions. ... Emergency escape trunks from the engine room area were arranged inside the casing".. The Commission has never mentioned these emergency escape trunks from the engine rooms. And there was no staircase from the ECR! It was one of the major design faults of the ship. There was only a vertical ladder to deck 2.
New Information by Sillaste 1998
In May 1998 the British journalist Phillip Wearne actually asked Sillaste how he got out and what happened, when Sillastewas in one of the engine rooms on deck 0 (as reported in the German Final report 21.2.4). The estimated times of the Commission of the events are then shown and then more realistic times based on, e.g. 2.2, i.e, in order to get out on the port outer side together with Linde Sillaste must have been out at 01.10 hrs. There is little time for Sillaste in the official sequence to be in the ECR and then to get out and save himself:⁹³

Sillaste thus explains to P. Wearne:	Time (5)	Real time
- there were 3 strong blows, following one after the other but much quicker than wave blows do and which were different to wave blows; (there were 3 bangs, most of the others forget the first one, which was the weakest one, there were about 30 seconds between them, and the 3rd one was the strongest);	01.13	00.55-01.00
- he (i.e. Sillaste) assumes that the vessel righted up again after the 1st and 2nd bangs (he calls the "bangs" "beats" or "blows") and associates each "bang" with a heeling movement, the bangs came from forward;
- after the 3rd most heavy bang the vessel heeled excessively to starboard and the plastic containers slid down to the starboard side and he (i.e. Sillaste) rushed to the ECR;	01.15	01.02
- after the 3rd blow the ship heeled quite heavily and he (i.e. Sillaste) knew that something must be wrong;	01.15	01.02
- ran (after the heel) through the auxiliary engine room, the storage room, main engine room and in these 4 rooms there was no water,	01.15- 01.17
- rushed towards the ECR;	.	01.03-01.05
- looked at the monitor and saw water rushing in at both sides of the bow ramp, the first thought was that something was wrong with visor and bow ramp;	01.17
- then 2 of the 4 main engines had already stopped, then there was an attempt to pump the ballast but this was a failure;	01.20	01.16
- the heel increased continuously clicking like the second hand of a wrist watch;	.	01.10-01.30
- next also the other 2 main engines stopped, while the auxiliaries continued to run;	01.24	.
- tried to contact the chief engineer but telephone had fallen down;	.	.
- just before the auxiliaries shut off, there was the "Mr. Skylight to No. 1 and 2" message followed by the general alarm;	01.22-01.24	01.10-01.12
- he (i.e. Sillaste) refers to what he said right after the accident, he might mix up things now, e.g. 4 October 1994 he told the Estonia police: (- heel was 45° and the engines stopped, the coded fire alarm "Mr. Skylight to No. 1 and 2" was sounded, the watertight doors were closed and boat alarm given;	01.22-01.24
- upon instructions of Treu I (i.e. Sillaste) left via the engine casing (sic) and on deck 6 level the auxiliaries stopped and the emergency generator started; at a heel of 45°-50° he (i.e. Sillaste) went up with Kadak via the emergency exit inside the engine casing (sic);	01.24-01.26	01.06-01.10*
- came up to deck 8, when the heel was 80°)	01.26	01.10*
- when they (i.e. Sillaste and Kadak) were between the 4th/6th deck, the electricity went off and 2-3 seconds later the emergency generator started to work and they continued to deck 8, had problems opening the door at the port side because the heel was already some 70° and it was above their heads, managed finally to open the door by pressing their backs against it;	01.25 01.26	.
- the emergency exit was well constructed by the yard, it was quite narrow, thus they could lean with their backs against the left wall and climb all the way up, if it had been wider, they would have just fallen down;
- in life raft with Kadak, Linde, etc.	01.27	01.27
- ship sinks	01.52	01.36

* Sillaste must have left the ECR early and reached open deck at 01.10 hrs. Sillaste must then have heard all alarms on the open deck - not in the ECR. Sillaste's alleged 'stay' in the ECR was probably invented to support Treu's alleged doings there. The heel was probably 80 degrees at 01.24 hrs, i.e. Sillaste spent 15 minutes on the side of the 'Estonia', before she sank.
They managed to open the door - it was above their heads (the heel was 70 degrees) - by pressing their backs against it! How?
The last statement is also interesting - the emergency exit was well constructed by the yard! But did it really exist? From the ECR on deck 1 to deck 8 (the boiler room)? It is not shown on any drawings?
Why would you fit an emergency exit from an ECR located outside the engine room to exit seven decks higher up to be used by engineers? What about the passengers on the same deck? How were they supposed to get out?
A square vertical tube shaft 20 meters high that would fill with smoke, if it were a fire in the engine room! The easiest way to escape from the ECR was to move to the passenger space forward (see fig. 1.48.3 above) or to the engine room aft - through a watertight door and use a normal stairwell to get up/out. Or to take the vertical emergency ladder inside the ECR to deck 2 - the car deck - the official emergency exit shown on the drawings (see fig.1.48.3 above)!
The writer has asked the German expert captain Werner Hummel (several times) to provide the drawings and an explanation for the alleged 'emergency exit well constructed by the yard' to be used only by engineers. Where did it start and end? How was it protected? No reply! Because the emergency exists do not exist! Werner is a humbug of Hamburg.
Could Sillaste really mix up the engine casing with a well constructed emergency exit? And why was there no normal exit - a staircase to deck 2 - from the ECR inside two watertight bulkheads?
Actually well constructed, protected emergency exits are fitted only on single deck cargo ships with a single open engine room with no protected escape from deck 0. It is a trunk that starts at deck 0, protected by a fire door, and ends on the weather deck, protected by a weathertight hatch. If the normal escape from the engine room - a sloping ladder to the upper deck - is blocked by smoke, you go down to deck 0 and take the protected emergency exit vertical ladder to get out.
Why does the German group of experts make us believe that there existed on the 'Estonia' one or two 20-25 meters long vertical escape trunks for the engine crew from the engine rooms on deck 0 through a superstructure (two decks) and through a deck house (four or five decks) ending on deck 8 or 9, when the escape route from deck 1 to deck 2 is clearly shown on all drawings? What was the logic behind such trunks? To escape? But if there were a fire in the engine room, the engine crew should only escape to deck 2 - the car deck - and fight the fire from there. The CO₂ room with controls was located on deck 2. And there is an escape trunk for that.
Actually - in 1997 the German expert captain Hummel/Humbug flew down to see the writer at his office and tried to convince the writer for a whole day that his observations about stability - immediate capsize - and engine crew escape - not possible from deck 1 at >30 degrees list - were wrong. Hummel made a very strange impression - and convinced the writer that he was not a serious accident investigator either. He was just playing his game - whatever it was. After this stupid attempt to intimidate the writer, Hummel has never replied to any questions of the writer.
Re-assess all Ships with regard to Evacuation
The Final Report (5) (page 228) concludes with:

"A significant factor in the ESTONIA-accident was the very quick increase in the list to an angle exceeding 30 degrees, leading to ... difficulties (sic) in getting out from inside the vessel ... Therefore all existing vessels should be re-assessed with regard to evacuation ... ."

Exactly - the writer had done it with his own ships. The result is that evacuation from an ECR on deck 1 to open deck 7 or 8 is impossible, when the list exceeds 20 degrees, so the crew shall evacuate immediately and not play heroes. There are no tube shafts up the engine casing to the funnel. The result is as shown in the above analysis - the 'Estonia' engine crew evacuation as described in the Final Report cannot be correct - it must be a falsification. And another question:
Why hasn't the Swedish NMA re-assessed all existing Swedish ships with regard to evacuation? Why does the Swedish NMA sleep? Actually no Swedish or Finnish ferries were ever re-assessed as recommended by the Commission.
Evidently it is not possible to escape from the ECR or engine room of any Swedish ferry, when the list is >30 degrees. It is apparently better not even to discuss the matter.
Strange Interrogations - the same Lies in 15 Interrogations
It is interesting to note that the Final Report (5) clearly states that the information about the engine crew escape originates from 15 different interrogations over several months - some of them by Finnish and Estonian police - but also by the Commission itself.
Treu was, e.g. interviewed three times by the Commission and three times he apparently stated that he escaped after01.25 hrs via an engine crew staircase from the ECR (in later interviews he crept through the tube shaft?). It is of course a clear evidence of the incompetence of the Commission that it never questioned that statement of Treu (how could he really use the escape route?), particularly in view of what the Commission later says about escapes in general - chapter 16.7 in (5):

"... the possibilites for escape ... to open decks ceased, when the list was between 45 and 50 degrees. ... The time span for the evacuation to the open decks, from the time people started to the 45-to50-degree list , was thus between 15 and 20 (sic) minutes. For the majority, who were not alarmed until the first heel, the time span was about 10 minutes."

This is a very strange comment (apart from being total nonsense - you cannot get out on e.g. the ship's open port side from inside the ship, when the list is 45-50 degrees, or the Commission states that the possibility to escape ceased, when the list was 45 degrees in spite of the fact that 3/E Treu escaped in two minutes, when the list was >70 degrees).
Were Treu, Sillaste and Kadak alarmed and did they escape before the List?
What was the 'alarm' that a majority aboard was not aware of before the sudden listing? Ten minutes of noise? The Final report (5) states that the various alarms were raised about seven minutes after the listing (at 01.15 hrs (sic)), when escape was impossible. But the Final report indicates that some people were alarmed before the list - due to noise - or a crew-only alarm? And is it true that the possibility of escape ceased, when the list was 45 to 50 degrees? The writer thinks that it was impossible for most passengers to escape, when the list was >20 degrees. Surviving passengers reported a sudden list >30 degrees and then a stable phase, when the list was less - say 15 degrees - and it was then that they managed to get out.
According to the recapitulation above of the Commission the accident took place at 01.15 hrs and the angle of list was 40 degrees at 01.24 hrs, when the lifeboat alarm was raised. The lifeboat alarm was thus raised, when escape was not longer possible!
The Commission has no comments to this amazing fact.
Regardless - escape was according to the Commission possible during maximum nine minutes. But the Commission suggests that people escaped during 20 minutes, e.g. between the sudden list at 01.15 hrs and 01.35 hrs, when the list was >80 degrees ??, which is not possible, so some people were apparently alarmed before the first heel! Who were they? What kind of alarm was it? Only one passenger is known to have started evacuation 5-10 minutes before the 'accident'. She stayed in a cabin on deck 1 and became worried for various reasons and walked up to deck 7 starboard side before the listing occurred.
Is it possible that only the crewmembers were alarmed, before the first heel and long before the passengers? The miraculous escape of the engine crew and many other crew members 1.42 could very well be explained with the simple theory that the crew actually escaped before the list took place - at 01.02 hrs! The Germans indicate this 3.18. The Germans suggest that some lifeboats were made ready before the listing occurred. Of course the ECR must have been informed from the bridge - or vice versa - that something was wrong, e.g. the ship was leaking and deck 0 was flooded.
Maybe Treu, Sillaste and Kadak told the Commission that they noticed the leakage long before 01.00 hrs and actually tried to stop the leakage but escaped before the list occurred and the Commission told them to make up completely different testimonies. That something was wrong on board before the listing occurred - at 01.02 hrs - is clear. Sillaste had been called upon to assist with something. He says it was a problem with the toilet system (one section of a limited number of cabins didn't work), but who fixes the toilet system in the middle of the night? There was no panic - they could easily fix the toilets in port.
Lies, Lies, Lies
The complete Final Report is full of lies - or manipulations and desinformation. The above edited testimonies are just a few examples. We know that the official sequence of events 1.9 is 100% false. The above testimonies have just been edited to support the false sequence of events. The four crew members are still alive and can be questioned again. They were evidently threatened after the accident to provide the false information. All will be revealed if a new accident investigation is done. And therefore no new accident investigation will ever be done. The subject is taboo in Swedish media. The Swedish government will never permit a new investigation to be done, because all lies will be revealed. It is the only reason why the Swedish minister Mona Sahlin refuses to appoint a new investigation. Ms Sahlin is not interested in safety at sea. She seems to be more interested in protecting lying young Estonian seamen. And respectable Swedish civil servants Preamble covering up the real events. This is a political, dirty game.
Who ordered the Lies?
More serious. It is clear that three Estonian engine crewmembers lied about the same fantastic story - if you are to believe the Final report. Who asked them to lie? Who made up the false story, which the three crewmembers were asked to repeat over several months? And note - they lied already on the day of the accident! That question is further developed in 4.4.
Ask them again!
It is never to late to ask Mr. Treu, Sillaste and Kadak - and Linde - again how (and when) they escaped and how three of them met on the port side. And at the same time to ask who told them to lie. Because they lie in the Final report and they will live with these lies until they die. And they are still quite young men. The German group of Experts knows of course that the three Estonians were lying - but still the Germans used all the false information in their Final report to blame the accident on bad maintenance of the visor - otherwise the scenario was correct - the visor had fallen off, etc.
Evidently the three Estonia engine crew members did not cause the accident, they were only subordinate crew members, who must have been forced to lie to protect the real culprits. They were fooled by the authorities ... and refuse to admit it. It is quite interesting how first the Commission twists their stories and then how the Germans make another twist of the story - either story as false as a two dollar bill!
The questions without answers - stability, sinking, escapes, etc. - shall in the future be handled by the Swedish Board of Psychologic Defence and the Swedish Ministry of Defence - next chapter. Many persons believe it was the Swedish Board of Psychologic Defence that made up the false story in the first place and ordered to fuck the crewmembers. The reason should have been to cover up embarrassing facts about the accident, including frequent transports of ex-USSR military equipment and weapons, and to protect the culprits. It is always good to be protected by a state when you have committed a crime. Unless you know too much ... and are kidnapped and made to disappear.
---
⁹² According to an interview 29 September 1994 at Turku hospital (act D24) Treu did not hear any alarms in the ECR. Treu remained in the ECR for some time after Sillaste and Kadak had left and was then in telephone contact with the bridge and Treu told the bridge that he was leaving the ECR. He used the engine crew stairwell. When he left all doors were closed. On the open deck Treu checked the emergency generator and saw various persons opening some life rafts. He did not mention any alarm - siren. Then he was swept into the water. In the water he found a life jacket and put it on. Then he swam to a lifeboat, which was upside down, with four persons on its keel. He got up on the lifeboat. He saw, from 80 meters distance, the ship sinking.
⁹³ According to the first interview 28 September 1994 at Turku hospital (act D23) Sillaste did not mention (a) that the watertight doors were closed and (b) that there was an alarm heard in the ECR and (c) on what deck he came out. When he was outside (on deck 8) he heard the ship's siren, i.e.the boat/general alarm. Time between 'accident' and when he was in the water - 15-20 minutes. According to the second interview 29 September 1994 still at Turku (act D9) Sillaste did not mention (a) that the watertight doors were closed and (b) that there was an alarm heard in the ECR. Sillaste left the ECR and walked through a watertight door to the engine room and via the boiler room (sic) got out on deck 8. No mention of any special emergency exit. Sillaste stated that he saw two officers leave the bridge and that these two persons (sic) joined Sillaste on the open deck/ship's side to open life rafts. These two persons should have left the bridge on deck 9 either through the port side door or window and they might have been walking on the sidewall between decks 8 and 9. However - to reach the ship's port side below deck 7 they then had to climb six meters up to the side wall between decks 7 and 8 and later another four meters straight up to the side below deck 7. In a third interview summary (act D13 or B13) on 4 October 1994 there is no mention that watertight doors were closed or that an alarm was heard in the ECR. The escape route is not mentioned - only that Sillaste left when the listing was 45-50 degrees. Time between 'accident' and sinking 15-20 minutes.