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Tuesday, May 3, 2011

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE NEGRID LEADERS

Avarice: The madness of King Mswati
Autocratic rule of the last African monarchy is a road block for progression towards prosperity, writer says.

Over 70 per cent of Swazis live on less than a dollar a day and 25 per cent are infected with HIV or AIDS - the highest rate in the world [EPA]

Swaziland – a bewitching, verdant and mountainous little kingdom in southern Africa – has lately been more troubled than usual.
Last week, trade unions and activists banded together to challenge the absolute monarchy here.
King Mswati III has responded to their demands for greater political freedom, less corruption and more transparency in government with despotic crackdowns on their leaders.


The landlocked country of 1.4 million citizens, which is bordered on three sides by South Africa and on the east by Mozambique, gained independence from Great Britain in 1968.
King Mswati III was born four months before independence and inherited the mantle of authority from his father in 1986, eighteen years later.
Today, Swaziland is Africa's last absolute monarchy. Royal partisans dispute this characterisation; they point out that the King shares power with his mother, according to custom.


The past twenty-four years have seen the King develop a reputation for profligacy, ostentation, corruption, and petty self-indulgence in a country where thirty per cent of the people are unemployed, and seventy per cent subsisting on less than one dollar a day.
Royal birthdays are celebrated in a football stadium, and during every Reed Festival, tens of thousands of young women present themselves to the King in hopes of becoming his next bride.
To date, he has fourteen wives and twenty children.


Mswati's estimated net worth of $100 million and trusteeship of a $10 billion fund are not quirky informational tidbits like the dollar value of the UK's Crown Jewels; the King's wealth has had a tangibly negative impact on the lives of ordinary Swazis.


The World Bank has classified the country as "lower middle income", which means that Gross National Income per capita is between $996 and $3,945 (the actual number is $2,470).
That designation disqualifies Swaziland from engaging in a variety of foreign aid partnerships. In reality, the King's enormous fortune acts as a statistical outlier and skews the national average upward. The effect is felt exclusively by the Swazi poor.


Mswati's absolute power extends to the press as well. When he was famously cuckolded by his own justice minister, he placed his 22-year-old wife under house arrest, imprisoned his former friend and banned media coverage of the story.
Likewise, when a photograph of a new $500,000 car purchased by the King emerged, Mswati banned photography of his vehicles.


Beyond poverty, royal absurdities are nestled in the context of an especially horrifying reality; twenty-five per cent of Swazis are HIV positive or have AIDS – that's the highest rate in the world.
Far from being sensitive to their plight and an activist on their behalf, Mswati has lobbied for their ostracism. In a parliamentary debate in 2000, he said that HIV-positive people should be "sterilised and branded".


It is no wonder then that the King is now witnessing the beginnings of a challenge to his power. Those challenges have been propelled by the uprisings in northern Africa and a nation-wide fiscal crisis.


Swaziland relies on the Southern African Customs Union for up to sixty per cent of its funding, and sixty per cent of that revenue has evaporated with the global recession.
The International Monetary Fund has recommended that the country implement austerity measures in order to avoid insolvency.
The Swazi government mandated a ten per cent cut in civil servant salaries while simultaneously approving a larger annual allowance for the King – from $24 million to $30 million in 2011.


In response, protests erupted last week on the 18th of April. Political parties – which are banned here – made use of the occasion to present the Mswati-appointed prime minister a petition calling for the resignation of the government.


The government responded by arresting prominent leaders and ejecting journalists from the country. Those moves succeeded in stymieing the protests for now, but opposition groups are planning renewed protests in May.


Swaziland is a country with abundant natural resources and a youthful population, thirty-eight per cent of whom are under the age of 14 (although life expectancy is only a shocking 46 years).
It faces many serious challenges, perhaps the most dire of which are poverty and HIV/AIDS infection rates. The country's progress and ability to tackle its problems are being hampered, however, by a rapacious King.


If Swaziland is to prosper, Swazis must rid themselves of the parasitic elements of the monarchy – something they've already undertaken to do.
As in the rest of Africa and the Middle East, autocratic rule is being challenged by young people clamouring for opportunity and self-governance.
The King may or may not be listening to their voices, but they don't appear to be willing to wait.

Ahmed Moor is a Palestinian-American freelance journalist based in Cairo.

Monday, May 2, 2011

Sirhan Sirhan says girl manipulated him

Convicted RFK assassin says girl manipulated him

Linda Deutsch – Associated Press April 28, 2011

Convicted assassin Sirhan Sirhan was manipulated by a seductive girl in a mind control plot to shoot Sen. Robert F. Kennedy, and his bullets did not kill the presidential candidate, lawyers for Sirhan said in new legal papers.

The documents filed this week in federal court and obtained by The Associated Press detail extensive interviews with Sirhan during the past three years, some done while he was under hypnosis.

The papers point to a mysterious girl in a polka-dot dress as the controller who led Sirhan to fire a gun in the pantry of the Ambassador Hotel. But the documents suggest a second person shot and killed Kennedy while using Sirhan as a diversion.

For the first time, Sirhan said under hypnosis that on a cue from the girl he went into “range mode” believing he was at a firing range and seeing circles with targets in front of his eyes.

“I thought that I was at the range more than I was actually shooting at any person, let alone Bobby Kennedy,” Sirhan was quoted as saying during interviews with Daniel Brown, a Harvard University professor and expert in trauma memory and hypnosis. He interviewed Sirhan for 60 hours with and without hypnosis, according to the legal brief.

Sandi Gibbons, a spokeswoman for the Los Angeles County district attorney, said prosecutors were unaware of the legal filing and could not comment.

The story of the girl has been a lingering theme in accounts of the events just after midnight on June 5, 1968, when Kennedy was gunned down in the hotel pantry after claiming victory in the California Democratic presidential primary.

Witnesses talked of seeing such a female running from the hotel shouting, “We shot Kennedy.” But she was never identified, and amid the chaos of the scene, descriptions were conflicting.

Through the years, Sirhan has claimed no memory of shooting Kennedy and said in the recent interviews that his presence at the hotel was an accident, not a planned destination.

Under hypnosis, he remembered meeting the girl that night and becoming smitten with her. He said she led him to the pantry.

“I am trying to figure out how to hit on her…. That’s all that I can think about,” he says in one interview cited in the documents. “I was fascinated with her looks …. She never said much. It was very erotic. I was consumed by her. She was a seductress with an unspoken unavailability.”

Brown was hired by Sirhan’s lawyer William F. Pepper.

Pepper’s associate, attorney Laurie Dusek, attended the interviews. and Brown said in the documents they both took verbatim notes because prison officials would not let them tape record nearly all the sessions.

Sirhan maintained in the hypnotic interviews that the mystery girl touched him or “pinched” him on the shoulder just before he fired then spun him around to see people coming through the pantry door.

“Then I was on the target range … a flashback to the shooting range … I didn’t know that I had a gun,” Sirhan said.

Under what Brown called the condition of hypnotic free recall, he said Sirhan remembered seeing the flash of a second gun at the time of the assassination. Without hypnosis, he said, Sirhan could not remember that shot.

Pepper, a New York lawyer with an international practice, previously tried to prove that James Earl Ray was not the assassin of Martin Luther King Jr.

The lawyer said he is convinced that Sirhan was a victim of a mind control project such as those used by the CIA in the 1960s. He is seeking an evidentiary hearing to exonerate Sirhan in Kennedy’s killing.

Dusek said in an interview that Sirhan was hypnotized for perhaps 30 percent of the interviews, most of which had to be done through a glass partition with Brown talking to him on a phone.

Only when Sirhan was moved from the state prison at Corcoran to his current location at Pleasant Valley State Prison in Coalinga were they allowed face-to-face visits, she said, and a few of those were recorded.

Other portions of the motion allege suppression of ballistics evidence and the autopsy report, and claim ineffective assistance of counsel. It contends previous lawyers for Sirhan accepted from the start that he was the lone shooter, settled on a defense of diminished capacity and did not seek other avenues of defense.

During the trial, Sirhan tried to confess to killing Kennedy “with 20 years of malice aforethought,” but the judge rejected the blurted statement.

A large portion of the new documents seek to prove the bullets that hit Kennedy came from a different direction than the spot where Sirhan was standing. The papers do not name any other possible shooter.

Sirhan was denied parole in March by a panel that said he had not shown sufficient remorse for the killing.

Thursday, April 28, 2011

Layla Anwar-Raw...



Raw...

Layla Anwar

An Arab Woman Blues, April 28, 2011

I am Layla Anwar and I am raw...I am Layla Anwar and I am naked...I have been naked for the past 8 years...

I lost my skin, my dermis, my protection...what you see is nothing but flesh, raw.

Raw as in no place to hide, no bunker, no shelter, no nothing...naked as is no clothes, no protection, no cover...

Raw as in under open skies, raw as in unknown destinations, raw as in no country...

My country was my protection...a place, as imperfect as it was, I could run back to, a place...and now I lost my anchor...am sailing, not knowing where...carried by waves and winds I can't control. No one taught me how to navigate...I was just thrown into deep waters...naked and raw...

I carry my rawness with me, it is my baggage, my suitcase, my luggage...How can one let go of one's flesh ?

I, We, queue in waiting...unsure...we just queue hoping...hoping for what ? We don't know...

Here we are standing in line like good obedient subjects, objects, holding that rawness - that bag, in a hand - a passport, a document, an identity card...coaxing it to speak for us, coaxing to say - we were, we are...we once existed, we are trying to exist...

We queue and say Insha'Allah...

And in the rawness of our flesh - tempests scream, tornadoes blow, wild fires consume us...and we say Insha'Allah...

We swallow the caustic No, the indifferent Look, the slammed Door in our faces...

We swallow the Silence,

The bitter pill, your bitter pill, hoping to forget like you did.

But Raw stands in line - in front, behind, next to me...and refuses to forget.

Tuesday, April 26, 2011

IMPORTANT-CHINESE LABOUR STRUGGLES

New Left Review 34, July-August 2005

A railway worker caught up in the events of Tiananmen Square, now using his radio show to broadcast the problems of Chinese factory hands live on air. Han Dongfang describes life in the Red Army, student-worker unity in 1989, surviving TB and torture in prison and the China Labour Bulletin’s legal strategy. Can the PRC’s official trade unions be captured from below?

HAN DONGFANG

CHINESE LABOUR STRUGGLES

How would you describe your family background?
I was born in Beijing, but my family is from the province of Shanxi. We came from an extremely poor area in the Taihang mountain range, where my parents were peasants. In the early 1950s, however, my mother came to Beijing when the husband of her elder sister moved there as an official, to work in their home and help look after their children. So I was born there in 1963. Soon afterwards my parents divorced. When I was three, the Cultural Revolution broke out and we were sent back to the village, where we spent the next five years. Everyone went hungry. People assume it was the peasants who had the hardest time, but we had come to the country from the city, and therefore did not receive even the small food allowance given to those officially registered in the village. Relatives helped us survive, and I started primary school there. In 1971 we went back to Beijing, where my mother got a job as a construction worker. We were dirt poor, and the work was extremely hard. The building sites were all over Beijing, but to save money, she wouldn’t take a bus. Virtually every morning she used to leave home around six o’clock, and wouldn’t get back till nine or ten in the evening. That was the life of a construction worker in the 1970s.
Coming from the countryside, I had to repeat a year of primary school and found life at school very tough, as a village boy who didn’t speak proper Mandarin and stubbornly refused to learn it. But I continued through elementary, middle and high school in Beijing. On graduating in 1980, when I was seventeen, I joined the army. Everyone is supposed to do military service, but this isn’t how it works out in reality. In practice, I volunteered. Why? I clung to a dream. I hadn’t been able to square my experience of school with the idea of people living in harmony under communism. Like many other young people of my generation, I very much admired Lei Feng, the soldier officially celebrated since the 1960s for his concern for others, and joined the pla hoping to follow his example.
How long were you in the army?
I served three years in the Beijing area, in a detachment of military police assigned to guard the prisons of the region. Within six months, I had become known as a model soldier; in fact, when I was eventually arrested, one of the prison officers immediately remembered me, as we had served in the same unit. I was put in charge of a squad and could have made a career in the pla simply by following orders. But I became disillusioned with the corruption of the officers, and began increasingly to question the orders I received. So I was passed over for promotion, and repeated applications to join the Party were turned down. After I left the army, I briefly worked in the library of Beijing Normal University before being offered a job on the railways in 1984. There I was trained as an electrician, controlling the temperature on refrigerated trains used for transporting meat, fruit and vegetables from one region to another. I got to travel around the country a great deal, which had always been a childhood dream.
How did you get involved in the movement of 1989?
On New Year’s Day in 1987, a friend who worked at the Beijing Daily told me there was a student protest in Tiananmen Square. I was living in an alley opposite the paper, a few blocks east of the Square, so we went off to take a look. It was a really cold evening, and there were two or three hundred students holding banners with slogans such as ‘We support the Communist Party’, ‘Fight Corruption’, and ‘Support Reform Policies’. Foreign reporters were filming the scene—there were also police cars and cameras. The students were just entering the largely empty square from the north-west to cross it towards its north-east end, when I saw the police pushing the tv cameras around, and then between fifty and a hundred policemen charged the students and began to beat and kick them, dragging several away and throwing them into police cars. This was probably the last straw for me: all my illusions collapsed.
My involvement in 1989 was really an accident. My work on the railway took me out of Beijing a lot—we would spend a month or more away, and then have three weeks’ leave. It was during one of these periods that my wife and I went past Tiananmen Square on a bus. Someone mentioned that people were gathering on the square and my wife, who is a very curious person, insisted we go and have a look. This was on 16th April, the very first day of the movement, and there was very little happening—two or three hundred students were discussing why Hu Yaobang died, how there was no internal democracy, what democracy is, and so on. I began to talk to people there, and it was the first time I had heard serious discussion of democracy as something with an independent meaning: it had always been incorporated into other concepts, such as ‘democracy under the proletarian dictatorship’. Of course, I knew what the word meant—the Chinese min zhu translates as ‘the people are the master’. I joined in the discussion there and then. I tried to interpret it in my way, to make this general idea of democracy, which I did not understand at all, apply to my life. I said that we should think about workplace democracy, about control over management and profits. Because I lived close to Tiananmen Square, I had a lot of discussions with people there and became part of the demonstrations. It was a place where I was being educated as well as communicating with people—collectively. It had something of the feel of a festival.
How did the idea of setting up an independent trade union come about?
The union was created on the evening of 19th May, right after Li Peng declared martial law. A group of teachers and workers from state enterprises were trying to get together to appoint stewards in the Square. Early on the morning of the 20th, I think, I arrived at the north-west corner of the square and saw their banner. I just walked in.
I talked to various people, especially Li Jinjin, who was doing a PhD on the Constitution at the law school in Beijing University. I asked him several questions, because I was not a well-educated person, but really wanted to make sure this independent union would have a solid legal basis. He told me that according to the Constitution, we did have the right to demonstrate and to freedom of association. So I said I wanted to join, but was told there was as yet no organizational structure—people had just been getting together to protect the students. We discussed how to form a structure for this workers’ organization, under the already existing banner of the Beijing Workers’ Autonomous Union. We set up a preparatory committee and held elections—those running for election gave a speech to the 50 to 100 people who were there, and voting was done by a show of hands. I was one of five people elected as committee members, and was then appointed as a spokesperson for the committee.
Were you in touch with workers in big factories in the city?
There were huge popular demonstrations in the second half of May—on the 17th, 23rd and 28th, in which very many workers rolled into the Square from different factories with their trucks and banners. But when we approached them asking if they wanted to join our organization, they would step back, saying they were just there to support the students—they didn’t want complications. This was to some extent a hangover of fears dating from the Cultural Revolution—being part of a counter-revolutionary organization was far worse than being declared a counter-revolutionary individual, so people would rather join demonstrations as individuals and not take responsibility. On 1st or 2nd June Wang Chaohua and several other students came over to our tent for discussions. They said the student mobilization was losing momentum, and wanted to see how workers could be organized. This was the first time students had talked with us about this, and I was very encouraged. But our fledgling organization lacked strength. So I suggested that instead of talking to workers in the street, the students, who were already organized, should send teams to several different factories to talk to the workers and discuss how they could organize themselves. We would accompany them, but didn’t have the capacity to do this by ourselves. Later that evening we all went to Beijing University to set up a meeting with some students, and I stayed there overnight. The next morning we went back to the square, and heard that an army car had run people over the previous night, and soon the disaster occurred.
You mentioned the fear stemming from the Cultural Revolution. But did the workers not also have a sense that, as the Constitution of the prc then declared, they were the masters of the country?
Yes, I absolutely agree. The reason the workers came out onto the streets was to provide moral support for the students, like a big brother, but there was nothing in particular they wanted for themselves. When we asked factory workers, they said they wanted the government to treat the students better—and nothing more. Even when we got organized and drafted our charter, we wrote in a very general way; there was nothing as concrete as benefits, salaries, working hours or collective bargaining, though we did mention factory democracy, if I remember correctly. Politically and socially, we had never had the chance to be ourselves, as individuals or even as working-class people; we had not been able to base our thinking on what we needed. We were trying to make a leap, but it was our first leap, and we didn’t know how.
Were you in contact with your workmates at all during this period?
At that time, no. The only contact I had with my colleagues was when some of them came to Tiananmen Square to warn me that representatives from the railway would come and ask me to return; they said I should refuse, that it was a trap. Sure enough, I was visited by people from the railway company and its security section, who offered to protect me by putting me on a train for six months, away from Beijing. I thought they were treating me like a child, but politely thanked them, and said I had a duty to fulfil. I was elected as a committee member, I was a spokesperson—I had to keep speaking. I would probably end up in prison, but this was something I had to accept. When they told me I might be executed rather than imprisoned, I actually felt a kind of elation: it would be alright to die like this, I thought—and doubtless many students thought the same thing. Dreams of heroism were in the air.
Where were you when the repression came on June 4th?
I arrived back in Tiananmen Square in the afternoon of June 3rd on foot, because there was no public transport. For the previous few days there had been rumours about the army moving in, and I was trying to calm people down—I kept saying that I had done time in the army, and didn’t believe well-trained soldiers whose moral understanding was they should serve the people would fire on their fellow citizens. On one level I really believed this, but in another part of my mind I thought they might attack, but if they did so it would be with rubber bullets, tear gas or water-cannon. I didn’t know for sure that they had such equipment—the Chinese official supposedly responsible for human rights, Zhu Muzhi, later claimed that the troops did not have rubber bullets, so ‘had no choice’ but to use live ammunition on the demonstrators. I simply thought, as a matter of principle, that soldiers such as I had been would not carry out orders to fire live rounds at civilians.
By evening I was incredibly tired—I hadn’t slept properly for days—and went to sleep in my tent. I was woken up by Robin Munro from Amnesty International, who was there to observe the occupation of the Square. He was very nervous, and warned me to be careful. We talked for two hours or so, before I said I was too tired to continue, and he left. I had just fallen asleep when someone woke me up saying they had started shooting—with real bullets. I couldn’t believe it. I walked out of my tent and saw these pink lines in the sky—rubber bullets would not make that colour. For a moment I thought it could be a sign that they were shooting into the air, rather than at people, but then I told myself to stop being so naïve. Others were asking me what to do, the police were breaking into the square. I didn’t know what to say, my mind had gone completely blank. I just walked back to my tent, physically exhausted, unable to think, watching people running out and in, trying to burn documents. I was completely lost.
At around 11.30 pm on June 3rd, a group of fifteen or twenty young people arrived looking for me. My comrades tried to push them out, but they just broke in, saying I had to go with them, that there was going to be a bloody massacre here. Without saying who they were, they insisted I should not stay, and mentioned Solidarność, comparing me to Lech Wałęsa. Of course, I was flattered to be accorded such importance, but I didn’t think my life was more valuable than anyone else’s. Besides, it would be shameful for me to run away. I told them I was staying. Eventually the young people left, but returned five minutes later and one of them said: ‘Excuse me, but I’m afraid you have to go with us. That’s our mission, your destiny’. A very strong fellow gestured to the others, and several of them just picked me up and physically carried me out of the tent. Then they walked me to the east side of the square—the army came from the west—surrounding me to protect me from bullets. It was an extremely touching moment. In the north-west corner we saw a burning tank. We went past the Public Security headquarters, and then the Beijing Hotel, where I saw a man riding a bicycle eastwards with one arm, the other bleeding copiously. By this time it was around one in the morning. When we reached the Dongdan intersection on Chang’an Avenue, near where I lived, they said: ‘Alright, now leave the city. We have to go back to the square to protect some other people’—and then they disappeared. I never found out what happened to them, whether they survived in the square, were injured or went to prison.
What did you do next?
I got my bicycle and rode out of Beijing, into Hebei province. My plan—like everything else I did, it was naïve, considering I was 25 years old by then—was to disappear for a year or two, travelling south by bicycle, talking to peasants and workers wherever I went. I didn’t have any money, but thought I could track down student leaders in cities I passed through—since I thought there must be student organizations everywhere—and ask them for help. I would study what was happening in society, get to know the lives of people in factories and villages, and so be better equipped to help present a real challenge to the Communist Party. For I felt embarrassed to be the spokesman for a workers’ organization that the workers themselves didn’t recognize. It was a nightmare for me when reporters would ask me in the Square, ‘How many affiliates do you have? How many members?’. I knew that when we approached workers on mass demonstrations, they denied we were any kind of organization representing them. Nobody had followed us, nobody had supported us.
For a few days I wandered through the countryside, sleeping out in the fields. I remember a conversation with a farmer looking after his water-melons, asking him about his life, his income, what he really wanted, and trying to talk to him about democracy, the need for a genuinely elected government—things I had learnt just in the last month—and I realized that he did not have that many complaints about the Communist Party. Then, in a town one day I found myself watching a tv monitor, and suddenly, one after another, pictures of the twenty-one most wanted student leaders appeared on it, many of whom I recognized. Then my picture appeared too. It suddenly felt as if my universe had fallen apart. Of course I knew my situation was serious, but hadn’t imagined it could come to this. Having thought I could go around the country talking to people, discussing with students in Zhengzhou or Nanjing, I now realized this was impossible. I felt as if everyone was watching me. Pulling my straw hat down over my face, I took off on my bicycle, heading nowhere. It was very hot, and feeling sleepy, when I came to a river bank with some shade I lay down beside it. There I started thinking about what to do. Should I just keep running? Then I remembered the speech I had made when standing for election in Tiananmen Square. I had given my name and personal details, so that everyone would know who I was, and that they could trust me; after that, I had said we had legal grounds for what we were doing, and that if one day we were put on trial, we would have a good defence. But if we had to go to jail, I would be the first to go—and I would not let anyone arrest me, I would walk voluntarily into the prison myself. I had been loudly cheered. Now, I thought, I faced a choice: I could try to escape, swallowing the words I had said in front of these people, and be branded a liar—and that would be the end of my political life. Or I could keep my promise.
So I decided to go back to Beijing. Hurrying along, asking people for directions—I didn’t know exactly where I was—I rode towards the city. My great fear was that I might be arrested before I could get to Beijing. I remember crossing a bridge over a river, with guardhouses at either end, and uniformed police sitting outside them. I went past them very slowly, whistling casually, and had gone about 30 metres when they called out for me to stop. They asked where I was from, and got very animated when I said Beijing. I told them I was unable to go to work because of the chaos there, and had decided to return to my village for a few weeks. I pretended I was lost, and asked them the way to Shanxi. Suspicious of my travelling by bicycle, rather than by train or bus, they accused me of being a student who had fled Beijing, and asked to see my id card. For some reason I had hidden it in my shoes, but said I didn’t have it with me, and made up a name when they asked me. They took me to a yard, asked me to empty my bag and searched me. Then they made me undress and stand in the corner, and kicked me. At this point I decided to preserve my dignity, and told them they should treat me with respect. I was a normal citizen, I had done nothing wrong. And did they want to search my shoes—or even just shoot me?
They had calmed down by this point, and told me to put my shoes and clothes back on, and sit down. But one of them was looking at a little handbook, his eyes moving from me to one page, and then to another. ‘This looks like him’, he said, reading out the description. The other one said ‘Stand up’, and they compared my height with the particulars in the book. Luckily they didn’t quite match, and I had cut my hair very short. So the other said, ‘That’s not him’, and they eventually told me to pack my things and leave. I had ridden 10 metres away, when I turned around, going back to ask them for a chit to prove that I had been okayed, in case I was stopped at other checkpoints. The policeman who had said I definitely didn’t match the descriptions replied, ‘You know what, just run and save your ass’. I’m pretty sure he knew who I was, and had helped me through.
You got back to Beijing safely?
Yes, I arrived on my bicycle without further difficulty. In Tiananmen Square I saw soldiers with guns, and thought with pride of what I was about to do. In front of the Public Security headquarters, I walked up to a soldier and said, ‘I am Han Dongfang, I gather the Public Security Bureau are looking for me.’ He just took two steps back—he was a very young boy—and said, ‘Which department are you looking for?’ I said, ‘No, it’s not which department I’m looking for, it’s Public Security that’s looking for me’. He merely replied: ‘Go to reception, and get registered’. For a second I began to regret my decision. I thought I had become famous, but no one had recognized me, even when I gave my name; I could easily still run away. But then I was approached by someone coming down the stairs who clearly did know my face, and I remembered that this was not just about myself, but about the whole movement. It turned out this was one of the security officials who had been present on May 28th or 29th when I and others from our organization had negotiated the release of three workers who had been arrested in the Square. He said: ‘So you came in to give yourself up. What a wise decision—it’ll save your life’. I replied, ‘What do you mean—“give myself up?” I’m here to be responsible for what I did, because I believe what we did was absolutely right. Please get the soldiers to record that I have not given myself up.’
I had raised my voice, and by now there were a few onlookers in the reception area. He asked me not to create a scene, but to go quietly with him into the building, where he took me to a room and gave me tea. Half an hour later, another three or four plain-clothesmen came in and took me away through a back door into a car. We drove out past Dongdan, by my home, and I asked if I could speak to my family or pick up some clothes. They just said ‘Where do you think you are?’—and took me to the Paoju detention centre. There I was stripped and searched by two young armed policemen, who poured vicious abuse on me. When I said, ‘Why don’t you just beat or shoot me then?’, the plain-clothesmen told them to leave me alone. To me they said, ‘Now you know where you are, you’d better behave. You’re not in charge. We can do what we want next time.’ Then they took me to a cell.
How soon were you tried after that?
There was no trial. There was continuous interrogation. For the first ten days or so they focused relentlessly on one aim: getting me to say that I had given myself up—which of course I denied. They showed me newspaper reports of executions in Zhengzhou, Shanghai and Beijing, comparing me, for instance, with a man who was condemned to death for burning a truck. They said I could be shot a thousand times over for the damage I had caused, but that I had a golden opportunity to save my life—I just had to say I had given myself up. They kept me awake day and night—I slept no more than an hour each day. The worst was when they would get me up at midnight and bring me into a small, very brightly lit room. I would be put in a corner and cross-examined by people who were behind the light—I couldn’t see their faces, but could hear their voices. I could see a little red dot in the corner of the room which I was sure was a camera.
They just wanted me to say that I knew I had been wrong, and therefore had given myself up. Each time all I wanted was an hour of sleep, until the longing became truly desperate: counting the minutes, telling myself I must hang on for just one more before giving in, was really tough. In the end, one morning they said they had tried their best to save me, but that I didn’t know the value of life. ‘One day soon you will face a bullet, and we hope you remember us then’. I thanked them, and asked if I could go back to sleep. ‘Yes, now you can go to sleep forever’. So on the one hand, I had achieved a certain dignity. But on the other, life was about to vanish. It was a kind of emptiness that terrified me. I went back to sleep, and woke up haunted by guilt at not having been better to my own family, and because I no longer had any chance to express regrets to them before dying. For a month, I expected every day that the door would open and I would be called out to be killed. From a journalist friend I knew how executions were done in China. The final humiliation is to make you kneel down and face the earth, in front of a hole that has been dug in the ground. Then you are shot in the back and pushed into the hole. This moment before you die, when you have to kneel on the ground, about to be killed, was the most painful of all thoughts to me. I began to imagine how I would escape from this position. Eventually I decided I would bolt as soon as I got out of the police car in which I was being taken to be executed, so they would have to shoot me while I was running. Or else I imagined that, if they caught me, they would have to hold me down and shoot me while I struggled and shouted against them. After forming this plan I was calmer: I felt ready to die, and bore myself more firmly in the detention centre. My attitude of standing up to this whole killing machine earned me respect from the prison guards. Nobody ever touched me or beat me physically while I was in prison, although in due course I was tortured in other ways.
After a while I was put in a cell with twenty prisoners, all of whom had tb; some also had liver problems or skin conditions. These people really looked terrible—they were all coughing blood. The deputy chief of the prison, before putting me in this cell, told me he respected me a great deal, but that I was going too far; didn’t I know what co-operation meant? By then my only fear was of getting sick, and not living long enough to see the Communist Party fall. In the cell I contracted tb, and received no proper treatment. I was there for about nine months, till the spring of 1990. Then I was moved to Beijing First Prison in Banbuqiao, until the Public Security Bureau decided to build an apartment compound for its employees there, when all the prisoners there were transferred to Qincheng, in the northern suburbs. Several times I went on hunger strike, and came really close to dying. I couldn’t do anything on my own, and eventually had to be fed. One day some people from the prosecutor’s office in Beijing came into my cell—I had by this time been moved to Qincheng—and said they wanted to question me. I was too weak even to speak, so the other prisoners asked them to bring a pen and paper. I wrote that if they wanted to complete my case before I died, they should send me to hospital. They were so shocked, they just went away. But an hour later the prison authorities came and cut my hair, moved me out of the cell and put me on a drip for a day to make me stronger. They then sent me to a major hospital, where I stayed for two weeks and recovered a little.
My family was asked to sign papers for my release in the spring of 1991, but was not told about my illness. They thought I would be able to go for walks in the park, but I couldn’t stand up, or string a full sentence together. I weighed 90 pounds. Even the military hospital couldn’t diagnose my condition. My right lung was so badly damaged that it was like a piece of rock—nothing went in or out, so no bacteria showed up in any of the X-rays. A doctor from the Boston-based ngo Physicians for Human Rights, who had flown over to Beijing, looked at one of my X-rays and said he had never seen a case of tb infect a whole lung in this way. I was on medication for a year and a half, and then I was told the lung would have to be removed—otherwise, my heart would be affected. The afl-cio organized the operation for me at Columbia University Medical Center, and I got a visa to go to New York in the autumn of 1992. My friends told me that I should have the operation in Beijing, since if I left China I would never be allowed to return. I told them I knew what I was doing—I didn’t want any medical accidents—and said I would be back within a year.
One year later, I did come back. I didn’t tell anyone, not even my wife. I flew from Boston to Helsinki to give a speech at a conference of international public-sector trade unions, and bought a one-way ticket from there to Hong Kong. Nobody knew I was coming, I just arrived. On landing I called Robin Munro, who was very surprised to hear me, but picked me up and hid me on Lantau Island. After a week my Hong Kong tourist visa expired, so a Hong Kong friend and I took a boat to a little town on the border. We chose a place with just a police checkpoint but no computer, since I figured—correctly, as it turned out—that a computer would remember my name, but a policeman wouldn’t. Everything went as planned. Once across the frontier, we went by bus and taxi straight to Guangzhou airport. But all the flights to Beijing for that day were sold out, so my friend suggested we check into an expensive hotel, which would undoubtedly have a way of getting tickets for their guests. So we went to the Orient Hotel, which I learnt afterwards is controlled by the Public Security Bureau. At around 4.30 the next morning, there was a knock on the door, and a group of policemen burst in and arrested me. That afternoon they sent me back to Hong Kong via the Luohu bridge in Shenzhen.
After you were returned to Hong Kong, did you begin organizational work fairly quickly?
During the first two months, I tried several times to get back into China—after all, it is my country, I was born and grew up there and have a Chinese passport. Each time I was turned back, on one occasion being physically grabbed halfway across the bridge, and thrown back to the other side. But then I realized it wasn’t my job simply to make the Chinese government look bad by trying to cross the border every two weeks surrounded by reporters. I had to go back to my original purpose, which was to help create a workers’ movement. So in March 1994 I started the China Labour Bulletin. The aim was to produce a weekly paper that would talk about what was happening in China, describing the lives of workers, and explaining the idea of trade-union organizing to them. The concept was essentially an educational one. Based in Hong Kong, the Bulletin would face two ways, with one edition published in Chinese and another in English. Because of the amount of work involved, especially in the translations, it gradually turned into a monthly. We would send the English version out to trade union organizations abroad, and the Chinese version to factories in the prc. You can buy a directory of mainland factories, updated annually, in Hong Kong bookstores, which contains around 100,000 addresses. We would send the Bulletin out in an exploratory sort of way, to different plants selected from it. We would address the Bulletin to the trade union office in the factory, though I knew this meant it would often, if not always, end up in the local police station. But I didn’t mind that—police officers need educating most. After 1999 or 2000, we stopped printing the Bulletin and switched to a purely online version, an e-newsletter. We find it’s more attractive, and reaches more people. There’s also the fact that we can put transcripts of conversations with workers from my radio programme straight online and send them out, together with my commentary on the cases in question. You can check it out: www.china-labour.org.hk.
What about your radio programme, Labour Express?
I started doing a programme on Radio Free Asia in March 1997, shortly before the handover of Hong Kong by the British to the prc. They gave me airtime twice a week to comment on Chinese labour matters; but after a few months of this—at the end of 1997—I told them I couldn’t continue to talk about Chinese workers without talking to them. I was losing touch, my ideas were drying up. I suggested I give out a telephone number so that my audience could call toll-free. Sure enough, people began to call in. I would ask those ringing from home to call again from a public phone, and then I would return the call. Those ringing after office hours would leave messages—when we arrived in the mornings we would find the tape full. My writings really benefited as a result of this dialogue with my radio listeners—my articles became much more down-to-earth and concrete. I then realized that all these conversations should really be brought into the open, and decided we should put them on the air, provided the callers agreed. I began to get more and more phone calls, and people were very willing to talk. To begin with we used software to alter callers’ voices so they couldn’t be recognized, because I didn’t want to get them into trouble. But they increasingly said, ‘No, I don’t want my voice changed! I want to speak the truth.’
Then we began to cover demonstrations and strikes, not after the fact, but as current news stories. I would produce a report including interviews with workers, government officials, trade unions, management and so on. For example, in 1998 there were a number of disputes over back pay, and the treatment of retired and off-post workers. There were protests in the street, and I would receive a call from a public phone in front of a government building, telling me there were five hundred people there. So I would phone back, and interview people at the other end of the line, asking them about their problems and their lives. It was extraordinary—like having a reporter on the scene, recording the news live. Then I would call local government officials, and ask what they were going to do, and why the situation was getting worse and worse. And I would ask the trade union officials what they were doing for the workers—and they would reply that they were trying to calm them down and send them home, because workers didn’t understand the difficulties that management and government faced, and so on.
Were the calls you were getting coming from any regions in particular—for example, were they mainly concentrated along the coast?
No, they came from everywhere—even Tibet and Xinjiang. The distribution of the calls has depended more on the period than on the region, in particular on the timing of the reforms of state enterprises in any given part of the country. Around 1998–99 there were a lot of off-post protests in Heilongjiang, Gansu and Guizhou, for example, and stoppages of trains in the coalmine areas of Sichuan.
Are people able to listen to the programme all over China?
It depends on the area—sometimes the signal is jammed, and people call and complain. They can’t believe the Americans, with all their technology, can’t get around the jamming, which is done by local radio stations where the army is involved. Basically, they just broadcast alternative programmes over the same frequency, operas and the like.
Has the element of fear diminished since you started this kind of reporting?
Yes, people’s fear is disappearing. The reason, in my view, is that anger is growing, and eclipsing fear.
How would you say your ideas have developed as a result of the radio programme and the Bulletin?
I’ve learnt a great deal. By talking to so many different people I have been forced to become more realistic, and think in increasingly concrete terms about how to resolve problems. It was very difficult in the beginning, but I developed an ability to get a general picture of a factory by talking to different workers, managers and government officials. Then I realized that though I could comment on these things, I could not provide solutions—firstly because I was unable to, and secondly because no one had voted for me. I did not represent anyone.
To start with, when I put together reports on demonstrations and talked to various officials, I would try to force them to respond to my questions, to which they would give stupid answers that highlighted the sickness of the system. I would get quite excited about our success in doing this. But after a while I realized that activity of this kind doesn’t actually help resolve any of the problems in the factory. The question of back pay, for example, is dependent on the budget of the enterprise; if the money isn’t there, I could be sitting in the official’s chair without any better solution myself. I felt then that workers should try to resolve disputes in a peaceful and rational way, by negotiation. If nine months of back pay are owed, and the government can only pay for three, there’s no point standing in the street until the full sum is paid; you negotiate and get them to pay three months, say, and the rest in nine months’ time. But then I realized that, without a legal basis for the negotiations, there is nothing to hold the government to its promises.
So we developed a form of struggle which involved encouraging workers to file lawsuits. The law is very clear on the government’s responsibility to pay workers’ salaries; not only is the Ministry of Labour obliged to disburse back pay, it must also pay a fine for letting arrears build up. Since about two and a half years ago, the Bulletin has been actively intervening in such cases. We no longer observe from the sidelines, we explain the legal procedures to workers, and find lawyers willing to take their cases. Two years ago, some ten workers from a huge textile factory in Suizhou, in the province of Hubei, were arrested after a demonstration. We got them a lawyer from Beijing, whereupon the charges were dropped and the authorities sent them directly to a re-education centre without trial. So we went to the local Public Security Bureau with the lawyer, insisting that this was an illegal administrative decision, and they released the workers. It was a very effective intervention. After this, we developed a ‘law case intervention programme’, which has been very productive so far. More and more lawyers are willing to work with us directly, they don’t feel the need to hide themselves at all—they are making money from it, in professional fashion.
So far you’ve spoken about state enterprises. What about disputes in the private sector?
The private sector can be divided into two parts: domestic and foreign enterprises. It’s much easier to deal with foreign firms than with Chinese. Local companies mostly consist of privatized former state-owned enterprises, whose current owners are former managers or officials, cutting local officials in on their profits. So in cases like these, one is still up against local government functionaries, who are very protected. With foreign factories—including those owned by Taiwanese, Hong Kong and Korean investors—the owners of course pay off local officials, but you can push these officials into a corner by pointing to the labour law and telling them they are protecting foreign investors at the expense of Chinese workers. It’s much easier to apply pressure by making this kind of argument.
I’ve also realized it’s easier for workers in foreign factories to launch actions. They often come from the countryside, and have never been taken care of by anybody. In former state-owned enterprises, many workers stayed on after privatization, even at dramatically reduced wages. Yet many of them still feel as if the state should somehow take care of them. The belief is residual, but it’s enough to stifle their independence—they don’t want to burn their bridges by doing anything drastic on their own. Years ago, for example, the government was going to close down a factory. We encouraged the workers to take legal action and organize, but they didn’t want to. Many of them were scared, and willing to accept less favourable terms. Most lost everything, and even those who kept their jobs are working in far worse conditions. Now they’re eager to fight, but it’s too late. The platform for building solidarity has been lost—where you had, say, five thousand workers before, now you have only three hundred. All this makes organizing in former state-owned enterprises a disheartening experience. We believe that workers in foreign factories should be the main target of organizing for the labour movement in China. Once you get these people organized, they will influence the privatized state-owned enterprises.
You mentioned back pay. What are the other main issues that arise? Working conditions? Wages? What about unemployment?
Alas, we cannot hope to organize the unemployed. Often workers contact me complaining in advance about an unfair dismissal. I encourage them time and again to file a lawsuit, but they refuse, preferring to petition the authorities—again and again, until they formally lose their job. By that time it is too late, because there is no legal record to show that they did not consent to their dismissal. This sort of thing is especially upsetting, because these people are the poorest of all, those who need help most. Against our will, we are forced to choose particular points of entry, if we hope to build a movement. We don’t see China Bulletin as a service centre—though we will of course help with individual cases where we can. We see ourselves as creators of a labour movement, and believe that workers’ protection in future depends on whether we can successfully create a strong one. So we have to make painful choices—to drop one case and continue with another, if the second looks as if it could develop into a collective issue, in which workers might select representatives who could eventually develop into trade union leaders. For it is through these legal struggles that they can be encouraged to form a union in their factory. Once there are elected union representatives, we are one step further towards reforming the official trade union, which we do not want to get rid of, since we see it as a useful shell. It has to be changed internally, with increased worker participation. At factory level, once you have members pushing for elections, impeaching irresponsible officials, bringing lawsuits, so many things become possible. We offer legal education to workers, telling them how to organize a union, helping them with election procedure, producing membership cards, keeping contact with people.
At the same time, because we do everything on a solid legal basis, the local Public Security Police can’t do much to these workers. We explain to the workers that we are helping them because of their labour disputes, and that we wish to solve them for the good of everyone. So if the police ask them if we have a hidden agenda, there’s nothing anyone can say against us. Recently, there was a 49-day strike in a textile factory in Xianyang in Shaanxi. Most of the workers were women. I drafted election procedures for them, highlights of the trade union and labour laws, and offered to find a lawyer for them in Beijing. Then the leaders were arrested. On the one hand, I was reasonably sure they would not be treated like the workers in Liaoyang. On the other hand I thought, my God, I have effectively sent these people to prison. Three months later, they were released. After this, we learnt to stay focused on the most down-to-earth labour disputes and concrete issues. The Xianyang factory was bought by a Hong Kong-listed company, with a state background, called China Resource. They promised the workers nothing would change, and that everyone would get long-term contracts. But as soon as the deal was done, the workers were told that the longest contract available would be for three years, and that everyone was on six months’ probation. Extremely skilled workers who had been in the same job for 20 years were now on probation, and receiving only 60 per cent of their previous salary. That’s why they began to protest—they locked the factory gates and completely stopped production. Today, they are still working. They have not been laid off.
Just recently I received an email from a primary school teacher employed at a coal mine in Jilin, writing on behalf of thousands of miners. He said he had read one of my articles on the internet, and absolutely agreed about the need to organize the workers, so he had downloaded the article, printed it out and circulated it among the miners. They were very excited about the idea of getting organized legally, but wanted my help because they didn’t know the correct procedure. These are the sorts of cases I want to focus on, which need to be dealt with extremely carefully. People in China experienced the Cultural Revolution, June 4th, and then after June 4th came darkness; they are very afraid, but cannot explain why they are afraid. I believe the worst fear is felt when you can’t understand it or find a reason for it. Once you know the reason, you can deal with it. By giving legal assistance to the workers, we’re making it very clear that there is no reason to be scared, that for everything they are asking for there is hope.
Would it be accurate to say that all branches, wherever one looks, of the official trade union are acting on behalf of the management, rather than for the workers?
Yes, this is absolutely true, and it applies everywhere. In most cases, the trade-union functionaries themselves are also part of the management.
Is your strategy to get workers to be sufficiently self-confident to vote these people out of office, and insist on having real representatives?
I used to think that, but I view it as impossible so long as people are afraid. Also, I don’t know the technical procedure. Furthermore, even when I’ve talked to workers about labour law, trade union law and so on, they would still rather concentrate on specific cases than on trade union elections. I have to convince them that a union election is closely connected to their case, to make it more legitimate. But we do believe that if there are more workers in the factory organizing elections, there will be real pressure on this trade union system—if you don’t represent these workers, they will kick you out of office. Even the best people in the present machinery, who have genuine sympathy for the fate of their workers, have never been trained to organize anything. They have no idea how to represent the workers. So far as lawsuits go, on the other hand, the most important thing is that they build self-confidence. If you have collective self-confidence, it’s fine to make mistakes with procedure, you can correct them, learn and move on. But if you don’t have self-confidence, you won’t even begin. This is why providing legal guidance and lawyers is so helpful to these workers—they’ve finally found solid ground to walk on.
The implication of what you’re saying is that the workers can have confidence in the courts.
If you have enough workers together, you make it more difficult for the courts to make decisions that go against the country’s own laws—which of course they are fully capable of doing.
Are there cases in which workers try to strike for higher wages? This would be a normal thing elsewhere.
It is happening more and more now. There are virtually daily strikes in the Shenzhen area. These are strikes for shorter working hours, higher wages, better working conditions. But this is the nature of the working class—they will wake up by themselves, whether or not the China Bulletin is there. All we can do is to make the journey to collective self-confidence shorter, and one for which workers will pay less of a price, avoiding desperate struggles that they can only lose.
Are the people who get in touch with you mostly elderly or younger workers?
A mixture. It depends on where they work. In former state-owned enterprises, it’s mostly older people, who are not yet retired—around 40 or 50 years old. They still need their jobs, and now want to fight, but don’t know how. At the moment we are focusing on foreign factories, especially in the Shenzhen and Guangdong areas, on cases of work-related disease. In struggles over wages, it can sound like you’re asking for more than the basic; but here, where people have contracted diseases because of bad working conditions, you’re asking for well below the basic. For this reason, when we hold the local labour bureau to account, we get a lot of sympathy from reporters, lawyers, judges, even government officials responsible for other areas. It’s through cases like these that we can explain everything—freedom of association, collective bargaining, labour and trade union law, respect for basic human rights—analysing everything in concrete terms. It’s because we go through the legal system that no one can be against these workers. If we can persist, we could make ourselves indestructible.
Your strategy wagers everything on legal actions, of a defensive character, to build collective self-confidence. But don’t ordinary people in China, both workers and peasants, employed and unemployed, feel passionately about issues of social justice, just as strongly as about legal justice, if not more so? There is massively growing economic inequality, seizures of peasant land, huge enrichment of corrupt officials, businessmen and yuppies. How can one realistically expect the anger this causes not to lead to popular explosions outside, and against, the highly repressive laws of the land? Would you tell people they must keep quiet and suffer the status quo, when their indignation boils over?
It is correct that ordinary people in China now feel no less strongly about social justice than about legal justice. However, our approach does not mean that our understanding of the one precludes the other. In China’s modern history, efforts to solve social problems by social means have occurred again and again, in a cyclical pattern. This is not just something that has happened in the past—it is very much present at the moment. In other words, it does not require anyone to push or to mobilize for it to take place. It happens all the time without special mobilization. The contribution that we can make at the China Labour Bulletin is to offer another line of thinking, that differs from the tradition of uprisings, armed struggles, revolutions.
Our approach is to offer more options to ordinary Chinese people when there is an explosive social problem. Will you put your trust in gathering tens of thousands of people onto the streets, or in seeking legal help from a lawyer? Most Chinese people believe in the former rather than the latter. It’s not just part of our modern history. It’s very much in the blood of our reality today or even tomorrow. So there is no need for us to work on it. What China has historically lacked is a fair legal system and the rule of law. Efforts to create these have never yet succeeded. This is what we are trying to do—to solve existing social problems through existing legal systems. In a sense, you could call it a cultural project: encouraging people to trust in peaceful negotiations. That kind of confidence is needed for a healthier development of the country in the future. When people speak of ‘sustainable development’, it must also mean a society where the government is restricted by laws, and cannot abuse its power with impunity. Meanwhile, citizens have to learn the skills to negotiate for their own benefit, as well as to use legal leverage to fight for their civil rights.
These are all means that lie outside the ‘old’ modern Chinese conception of social revolution. Unfortunately, they have not yet taken root in contemporary China. But we have to try to develop them. To speak pessimistically, this is to work when you know it is almost unworkable. It’s to make an effort. To be sure, I will never criticize or try to stop ordinary people in China when they take to the streets to protest against social injustice. I have no objection to mass protests and no obligation to defend the ccp’s version of ‘social stability’. However, I will not encourage people to take to the streets, either. Whenever there is an opportunity, I try to point out the other options.

Venezuela under Chávez: The Path toward Dictatorship


Venezuela under Chávez: The Path toward Dictatorship By Roger F. Noriega
Latin American Outlook AEI Online  

Perhaps the most generous interpretation of Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez is that he is a man who wants to help his nation’s long-neglected poor majority. He certainly appears to enjoy their support. According to most recent polls, his approval ratings hover around 55 percent. From his earliest days in power, Chávez tapped into discontent among the poor majority of the nation who regard previous governments as corrupt and unaccountable. He has used this political clout and a caudillo style to centralize power under a highly ideological executive.

In short, although Chávez has thus far managed to appease outsiders by maintaining the façade of democracy (allowing but harassing the opposition parties and the independent media; and conducting increasingly uncompetitive elections), he and his political allies in the legislative branch and the courts have almost taken complete control over the state.

Many leaders in Latin America and the Caribbean tolerate him because he is generous in spreading Venezuela’s oil wealth around to buy influence for his revolutionary, anti-American project. But what happens when Chávez no longer maintains popular support? Will the strong, centralized system allow dissent? As the country prepares for presidential elections in December, it is time for both Venezuelans and the international community to evaluate the state of democracy under Chávez. Historians will likely look back at this period and write of “Chávez the dictator” or of “Chávez the would-be dictator”--depending on whether his people and his neighbors are able to contain his undemocratic project.
 
Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez has forged an intensely ideological, combative, and intolerant regime, brandishing polarizing rhetoric to divide and incite social classes and mobilizing the tools of the state to suppress and persecute his opponents. Since taking office, he has systematically concentrated power under his so-called Fifth Republic Movement (Movimiento Quinta República or MVR). One of his first orders of business after taking office was formulating a new constitution that established the Fifth Republic Movement and cast out checks and balances in order to consolidate power in the executive branch. His 1999 constitution eliminated the Senate and did away with congressional oversight of the armed forces.

Chávez’s allies in the National Assembly have used their power to place the courts and other public ministries in the hands of hard-core Chavistas and to adopt measures to harass the media and other potential opponents. Chávez sealed control of the National Assembly in the December 2005 elections; opposition parties boycotted the process (and 85 percent of Venezuelans did not vote) after Chavista electoral authorities refused to take steps to guarantee a free and fair process. And, the military and some police organizations have allowed themselves to be converted from legitimate instruments of the state to partisan weapons to be wielded against fellow citizens. Rather than seek to ameliorate political unrest and social tension, Chávez and his loyalists use polarizing rhetoric and measures to “smoke out” those who do not share their political beliefs and to stifle dissent.

Harassed Opposition and Controlled Elections
 
Several regional leaders--including Organization of American States (OAS) secretary general José Miguel Insulza--have declared that it is not enough for a leader to be elected democratically if he does not govern democratically. The case against Chávez is fairly damning. International observers have found that the voter lists and electoral apparatus are seriously flawed. And, it is difficult to conceive that any future election conducted under the current conditions by the partisan electoral apparatus would “pass muster” with international observers. While opposition candidates certainly face a popular Chávez, they are further impeded by an electoral system largely controlled by regime loyalists. A recent poll by Consultores 21 found that less than half of Venezuelans thought the National Electoral Council was impartial (46 versus 49 percent).[1] Said presidential candidate Teodoro Petkoff, Chávez “has the entire state apparatus at his service, and he uses it unscrupulously.”[2]

It is indisputable that Chávez came to power--and has held onto it--through elections with considerable popular support: he was elected twice to the presidency and survived an August 2004 referendum that would have truncated his term in office. The opposition has been unable to prove its claims of fraud in the referendum balloting. However, in legislative elections held in December 2005, despite Chávez’s urgent appeals to the revolutionary fervor to consolidate his hold on power, only around 10 to 15 percent of Venezuela’s registered voters participated.

Opinion polls show that most of Venezuela’s voters support Chávez and consider him a committed democrat. However, Chávez has surely learned from his tutor Fidel Castro that, although a dictator might care about public opinion, the simple fact is that he does not have to--particularly once he brings his opposition under control. And, while he might concern himself with the outcome of a given election, whether to even hold an election is up to him.

Chávez appears not to fear elections--in part because of his string of victories (of decreasing transparency). He appears to have made a cynical calculation that, as long as he conducts open contests, he can blunt any criticism from abroad. He has spared little effort to bring the electoral authorities of the nation under his control, relying on his absolute control of the National Assembly to change the composition of the National Electoral Council. Today, not a single person identified with the opposition serves on the council that oversees national elections.

Most recently, Chávez responded to allegations of flawed democracy in Venezuela by accusing the opposition of plotting to boycott the December presidential elections so that they would not have to recognize his inevitable victory. Should they do so, he threatens to call a referendum to ask the public if they want him to serve until 2031. Chávez has proven himself to be a shrewd politician: he simultaneously allows a fairly vocal opposition while spinning their cries for democracy into reasons to further legitimize his control over the electorate. So, in essence, Chávez has assured his movement of electoral victory--whether the opposition chooses to compete or not.

Chávez’s regime does not rely only on legal means to abuse its opponents. Before and since the political crisis that led to his temporary removal from power in April 2002, Chávez’s security forces used indiscriminate and excessive force to put down political demonstrators. His opponents have been subjected to extended and unlawful detention and torture. Internationally respected human rights organizations have documented in dramatic detail cases in which Venezuelan security forces used excessive force or caused the death of innocent bystanders.

A nationwide network of so-called Bolivarian Circles (Círculos Bolivarianos) and violent groups like the Tupamaros consisting of armed thugs routinely attack Chávez’s political opponents. Also, the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has criticized the state for failing to prosecute hundreds of cases of extrajudicial killings and for not investigating “death squads” operating in the country.[3]

The Judiciary in Chávez’s Hip Pocket

“Justice” is meted out swiftly against opponents of the regime, while a pattern of alleged abuses by government security forces goes unpunished. In a 2004 report, Amnesty International issued an extraordinarily damning declaration against what is supposed to be a democratic government, saying, in part:

Over recent years, these [Venezuelan] institutions have failed to fulfill their constitutional role to act with equal impartiality against government sup-porters and opponents accused of committing crimes related to the ongoing political crisis. This lack of impartiality, combined with long standing structural weaknesses of these key institutions, threatens to strengthen the culture of impunity that has accompanied human rights abuses over many years in Venezuela.[4]

The OAS’s commission has also accused the Venezuelan state of repeatedly violating its international commitments by failing to comply with decisions issued by the commission, thereby placing “in peril the lives and personal integrity” of Venezuelan citizens.[5]
Chávez and his allies have worked assiduously to reconstitute the Supreme Court and lower courts in order to ensure the political reliability of the magistrates. The new rules established for the appointment, renewal, and suspension of judges--by a simple majority of the National Assembly--have had the effect of packing the courts with judges known for their ideological loyalty to Chávez’s political movement. The scrupulously impartial OAS Human Rights Commission has asserted that these laws “appear to have helped the executive manipulate the election of judges during 2004.”[6]

In December 2004, Chávez loyalist Pedro Carreño, head of the legislative commission nominating new judges, said that not one of the nearly fifty appointees on that occasion could be considered opposition figures. “We’re not going to score a goal against ourselves,” he said.[7] Omar Mora Díaz, the current head of the Supreme Court of Justice, boasts of his commitment to armed struggle as a teenager. Although he denies being associated with any political movement, he declares himself a “revolutionary.”
The OAS Human Rights Commission has complained bitterly that the Chávez regime has failed to investigate and prosecute accusations of politically related violence and murder. In fact, the regime uses the investigatory powers of the state to harass and persecute its opponents. One infamous example is that of the political witch hunt conducted by Chavista prosecutor Danilo Anderson, whose mandate was to ferret out those involved in anti-Chávez activities. On November 18, 2004, Anderson himself was murdered by a car bomb. While the regime has declared him a hero of the revolution and used his murder to widen its assault on its opponents, several have accused Anderson and his team of extorting bribes from would-be targets.

As a new presidential election season nears, the regime continues to use its now well-practiced judicial team to target popular opponents. Henrique Capriles Radonski, the thirty-three-year-old popular mayor of Baruta, a middle-class neighborhood in Caracas, was a target of Chávez’s judicial harassment under the assassinated prosecutor Danilo Anderson. Just as the 2004 referendum process was under way, Capriles was charged for crimes he allegedly committed two years earlier. On April 12, 2002, during the period of Chávez’s brief ouster, anti-Chávez protestors amassed outside of the Cuban embassy located in Baruta. Fearful of violence, a European ambassador asked Capriles to come to the site to quiet the crowd; he was admitted to the embassy by the Cuban ambassador Germán Sánchez Otero. Capriles urged the crowd to disperse, effectively ending a siege of the diplomatic compound. Capriles was later charged with trespassing, abusing his post, and violating international principles for his actions at the Cuban embassy. He was jailed for three months and then released in October 2004 after the case was thrown out by appeals courts.8 Now that Chávez has a stronger hold on the judiciary and is setting the stage for the upcoming presidential elections, Capriles’s case is back in court. He is set to go to trial on June 9.[9]

Also coming before the courts again is the case of María Corina Machado, one of the founders and leaders of Súmate, a Venezuelan nongovernmental organization (NGO) dedicated to promoting democracy. Súmate has been meticulous in documenting electoral tampering and has been vocal about its findings, making it an obvious target. In February 2004, Chávez announced the investigation into the financing of the group for accepting funds from the U.S.-funded National Endowment for Democracy--which Chávez asserts were used to destabilize his government. Machado was charged with “conspiracy,” under the penal code that stipulates that soliciting foreign intervention in Venezuela’s domestic policy is subject to eight to sixteen years in prison. The prosecution also has declared Súmate to be a political party (which would make it explicitly illegal for it to receive financial support from foreigners), even though the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral or CNE) does not recognize the group as a political party.[10]
Machado also has been charged with treason on equally questionable grounds for allegedly signing an anti-Chávez manifesto during his April 2002 ouster. Machado explains that she never signed such a document and that her signature was taken from the guest registry of the presidential palace. In February 2006, the case was dismissed and sent to another court after the European Union ambassadors advised the government that they planned to attend and monitor the court session.[11]

Media under Assault

It is true that opposition voices are heard regularly through the media. However, since Chávez’s rise to power--in which some media moguls actually supported him against the traditional power structure--he has gradually eroded freedom of expression. Using both legal measures and mob violence, his regime has harassed media organizations and individual reporters to reduce the coverage of dissident views and to produce self-censorship. Popular channels have virtually eliminated their opinion and news programming, and national reporters considered unfriendly to the regime have been harassed, detained, and accused of baseless offenses.

Patricia Poleo, a Venezuelan reporter who has earned international acclaim for her investigative reporting, has been the subject of judicial harassment since she embarrassed the Chávez regime by revealing that Venezuelan security forces were harboring international Peruvian fugitive Vladimiro Montesinos. She has been prosecuted at least once and has been summoned to reveal the sources in her investigation of the November 2004 assassination of Chavista prosecutor Danilo Anderson. While Poleo asserts that the state is trying to hide the truth behind the Anderson killing, the regime has responded by accusing the reporter of masterminding the car bombing.

In December 2004, the National Assembly approved a media law that international observers--including Human Rights Watch, Reporters Without Borders, and the Inter-American Press Association--have criticized as a tool to stifle freedom of expression. The OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights stated, “The use of vague terminology together with the existence of potentially excessive penalties, could have the effect of intimidating the media and journalists and, consequently, of curtailing the flow of information about matters of public interest.”[12]

Undermining Independent Labor Unions

Chávez has even led an assault on the independent labor movement. In December 2000, his government orchestrated elections of labor leaders in which non-union members were allowed to cast ballots. This transparent attempt to replace independent leaders with Chavista loyalists was strongly rejected by the International Labor Organization (ILO). Nevertheless, when elections were finally held in October 2001, the non-Chavista slate was reelected, although the regime has failed to accept these results.

Several union leaders are now being pursued by the regime for their role in the April 2002 events in which Chávez was removed from power for forty-eight hours. National labor leader Carlos Ortega was originally charged with “rebellion, sabotage, and treason,” and he fled the country. After returning from exile, Ortega was tried for “civil rebellion” and “incitement to commit a crime” for his role in an opposition-led national strike in 2002-2003. Ignoring a ruling by the ILO in June 2004 that declared the strike a legitimate exercise of workers’ rights, Ortega was convicted and sentenced to nearly sixteen years in prison. He is in prison today.

The “Enemies List”

After succeeding Richard Nixon as president, Gerald Ford is said to have remarked, “A man who has to make a list of his enemies has too many enemies.” In 2005, Chavista legislator Luis Tascón revealed the existence of a list of over 3 million Venezuelans who signed petitions in 2003 and 2004 calling for a referendum on Chávez’s tenure. Tascón published the list on his website prior to the August 2004 referendum.
Venezuelans have complained of having been persecuted for daring to associate with the opposition by signing a petition. Many on the infamous list say they have lost government jobs or contracts. Others have been refused basic public services, including passports. Close to 150 people who signed the petitions have reported being fired from their government jobs, and another 600 have complained of harassment on the job.[13] Venezuelan minister of health Roger Capela stated publicly that “a traitor cannot have been in a position of responsibility, and this state has a policy and a responsibility to the government in which there is not space for a traitor . . .  those that have signed are fired.”[14] Because this naked political aggression attracted so much attention, the Chávez regime disavows using the list and claims to be investigating its origins.
The list has resurfaced in a new iteration, as an electronic file called Batalla de Santa Inés Maisanta that contains the information of more than 12 million registered Venezuelan voters. The file contains not only the address and whether or not the individual signed the referendum petition, but also codes his political affinities and electoral participation rates.[15] The electronic list is available for purchase both on the streets of Caracas or at MercadoLibre (Venezuela’s version of eBay) for less than five dollars.[16]

Although losing a job or a government contract are by no means on the same level as gross human rights violations committed under previous authoritarian regimes in South America, the importance of these practices, particularly for expressing a political opinion or exercising an essential political right, should not be underestimated. Given the overwhelming role of PDVSA (Venezuela’s state-owned oil enterprise), which accounts for roughly one-third of the GDP and almost half of Venezuela’s fiscal income, and the role of the government in the economy more generally--public spending is equal to almost one-fourth of the nation’s GDP--government jobs and contracts are in many cases vital for an individual’s economic well-being. The threat of losing a government post sends a powerful message that not only threatens a citizen’s right to cast a secret ballot but to exercise other constitutional rights in opposition to the government.

  
Blurring the Military-Civilian Line

Chávez has militarized politics and politicized the military. During the past several decades, Venezuela has never had a strong separation between politics, military, and civilian life--although the military institutions in particular were respected as professional. Under Chávez, these barriers have been eliminated. Chávez has interfered in military personnel matters and has given civilian posts to trusted military comrades.
Chávez and the Fifth Republic Movement both got their start in the revolutionary faction of the Venezuelan armed forces, the Movimiento Boliviano Revolucionario 200 (MBR-200). Chávez first made his name as a lieutenant colonel in the Venezuelan army and as one of the junior officers and founding members of MBR-200. The populist movement was based ideologically on the teachings of Simon Bolivar. As early as 1982, the group began plotting a revolutionary coup against the democratically elected civilian government. A decade later, Chávez made his first television appearance after admitting defeat during a failed coup attempt in April 1992, immediately after which he was imprisoned. Although the coup failed, Chávez was successful in imprinting his name and image in the hearts of those sectors of the public that opposed the existing political order. The ideals of the MBR-200 later were accorded political legitimacy when reconstituted as the Fifth Republic Movement.

The 1999 constitution was the first step in many of reversing some of the de jure checks and balances put in place by previous governments. It further politicized the armed forces by removing the previous constitutional stipulation that the military maintain a “non-deliberative” role, giving standing officers the right to vote, and granting Chávez the power to ultimately arbitrate military promotions. Chávez’s polemics then encouraged opposition voices within the armed forces to retire, while he used his new authority to reward his supporters within the ranks of the armed services. The promotions were not just within the armed forces; he rewarded some supporters with high-level governmental positions (although individuals did have to retire from the armed forces before serving).

Tension between Chávez and apolitical military professionals came to a head in April 2002 when senior military personnel refused Chávez’s order to use military force to quell civilian demonstrations. Chávez took advantage of the ouster attempt to further purge opposition from the ranks of the armed forces.

In an effort to further link the military to the government and then to economic development under his Fifth Republic Movement, Chávez has expanded the role of the military into civilian projects such as his first social assistance program (or misión), the Plan Bolivar 2000, in which the armed forces replaced state and municipal governments in regional development projects such as building infrastructure and performing mass vaccinations.

Chávez has recently called for restructuring the armed forces, including increased reserves (from 30,000 in 2004 to 150,000 in 2006) and the mobilization of the Guardia Territorial (Territorial Guard) to protect Venezuela against invasions. The latter would be a completely civilian reserve paid $7.44 per session to train in physical conditioning, the use of assault weapons, and obstacle courses that include using tear gas.[17] Already, 1.5 million civilians have begun the four-month training session; the majority of these come from the poorer regions of Venezuela where Chávez enjoys great popular support. Critics charge that the Guardia Territorial responds directly to Chávez, and therefore could be used as an instrument of repression.[18]

What Is to Be Done

The United States should not seek confrontation with Chávez--but it will not have to because Chávez will persist in provoking his arch enemy. However, the United States must walk a fine line between responding to Chávez’s every provocation and being straightforward in expressing U.S. concerns regarding the deterioration of democratic institutions in Venezuela and Chávez’s destructive, divisive agenda in the hemisphere. Particularly because so many others nations are reluctant to speak out in defense of common democratic values, the United States should not be silent on these issues. But, explains current assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs Thomas Shannon Jr., “The purpose is not to allow him to define the terms of the confrontation and to make sure that as we engage with him, we are not doing so in a way that harms our larger interests. . . . It would be a mistake for U.S. policy in the region to overly concentrate on the guy. If we allow ourselves to be trapped in the kind of confrontation that he wants to have with us, it lessens our influence with others in the region.”[19]
Chávez’s weekly attacks on the United States and President George W. Bush are far from undisciplined outbursts. By squaring off against the “empire” and accusing the United States of planning to invade Venezuela, Chávez achieves two key objectives: he denigrates any opponent inside or outside of the country as a pawn of the United States, and he can portray his domestic opposition as traitorous agents of an enemy power. Indeed, in multilateral fora, most Latin and Caribbean leaders are unwilling to confront Chávez’s excesses at home, in large part because they do not want to be drawn into Venezuela’s internal affairs or a bilateral confrontation between the United States and Chávez.

Latin Americans must recall the history of militaristic regimes that have undermined democracy. They must also remember their commitment under the Inter-American Democratic Charter that “[t]he peoples of the Americas have the right to democracy, and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it.”[20] Certainly no one expects a single Latin American or Caribbean leader to confront Chávez. But working as a team--particularly within fora and at meetings at which the United States is not present--they should ponder their unique responsibility to their Venezuelan brothers and sisters. For example, as the Mercosur countries welcome Chávez with open arms, they should consider the implications for their own “democracy clause”--one of the first of its kind in the world. Of course, this requires our friends in the region to educate themselves about what is happening in Venezuela and what Chávez is doing to subvert democracy in their own countries. All of the region’s leaders should think about what they want history to record of their actions, as 30 million Venezuelans find themselves at the mercy of an emerging dictatorship at the dawn of the 21st century.

Chávez’s direct intervention in the electoral campaigns in other countries demonstrates that he respects no limits when it comes to advancing his agenda beyond Venezuela. He has made reckless statements for and against political candidates in Bolivia, Peru, and Nicaragua, and he has signed an oil pact to provide support through the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) to influence the ongoing presidential campaign in Nicaragua. His intervention has finally convinced some Latin Americans that they must speak up to defend their sovereignty from his imperial designs.

OAS secretary general Insulza has a mandate from the 2005 General Assembly to devise proposals for the OAS to respond to “situations that might affect the workings of the political process of democratic institutions or the legitimate exercise of power.”[21] He also has the authority under both the Inter-American Democratic Charter and the OAS Charter to bring undemocratic practices to the attention of the OAS Permanent Council. The OAS’s human rights institutions have been the most categorical in documenting the abuses of the Chávez regime, although they have failed, thus far, to impose any effective penalties. The OAS’s very relevance and credibility are at stake as Venezuela continues down a path toward dictatorship and the organization fails to respond effectively.

The OAS, the European Union, and others should refuse to observe Venezuela’s 2006 presidential elections until significant changes are made in the rules of the game. International observers threatened to withdraw their imprimatur from elections in Nicaragua in 1990 and Peru in 2000, and in both cases the regime in question relented. If Chávez refuses to overhaul the electoral machinery of his regime, no international observer should risk its credibility by being associated with another electoral whitewash in Venezuela.

International NGOs--groups of democratic politicians, labor unions, journalists, lawyers, and human rights advocates--must also make a conscious effort to close ranks with their colleagues in Venezuela and take up their cause in international fora. They should also hold their international conventions in Venezuela to try to generate global attention to their plight and create the political space that Venezuelans require to begin to reclaim their future.

The ultimate responsibility for salvaging Venezuelan democracy rests with Venezuelans themselves--not merely those who oppose Chávez, but those who value their own freedom. Whether or not political parties decide to boycott the upcoming presidential elections is a decision they must make for themselves. However, it is an essential obligation of the political opposition in a democracy to present an alternative vision. Although they have every right to make substantial election reform a key issue in the public debate (and perhaps a precondition for their participation), they must also be able to present a constructive agenda for the political restoration and social development of a great nation. To be sure, the inter-national community will be much more willing and able to support democracy if the country’s democratic opposition is united, coherent, and engaged responsibly in the political struggle. Given the record amassed by Chávez, one would hope that a majority of Venezuelans would take a stand to secure their essential liberties, to begin to reconcile a divided country, and to back a political alternative that appeals to their hopes and not their fears.

AEI research assistant Megan Davy contributed to this article. AEI editor Scott R. Palmer worked with the author to edit and produce this Latin American Outlook.

Notes
1. “Encuesta versus Estrategia” [Survey versus strategy], El Nacional (Venezuela), March 19, 2006.
2. Fabiola Sánchez, “Venezuela Ex-Guerrilla Fighter Pledges to Take on Chávez in Presidential Elections,” Associated Press, April 21, 2006.
3. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Follow-up Report on Compliance by the State of Venezuela with the Recommendations Made by the IACHR in its Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Venezuela (2003),” Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2004, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122 Doc. 5 rev. 1, (Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States, 2005), paragraph 165, available at www.cidh.org/annualrep/2004eng/chap.5b.htm.
4. Amnesty International, Venezuela: Human Rights under Threat (London: Amnesty International, May 2004), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engamr530052004
5. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “Follow-up Report on Compliance by the State of Venezuela.”
6. Ibid., paragraph 180.
7. See “Chavez Camp Today Designates 49 New Magistrates,” El Nacional, December 13, 2004.
8. Jackson Diehl, “In Venezuela, Locking up the Vote,” Washington Post, April 10, 2006.
9. Henrique Capriles Radonski: Comprometido Contigo, “Juicio a Capriles Radonski Tiene Fecha” [Trial for Capriles Radonski has a date], April 10, 2006, available at www.caprilesradonski.org.ve/detalle.asp?id=245&plantilla=3.
10. Elizabeth Núñez, “Imputan a Organización Civil Súmate por Solicitar Intervención Extranjera” [The civil organization Súmate is charged with soliciting foreign intervention], El Nacional, December 27, 2004.
11. Jackson Diehl, “Locking up the Vote.”
12. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “The IACHR Expresses Its Concern over the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela’s Passage of the Social Responsibility in Radio and Television Bill,” news release no. 25/04, November 30, 2004, available at www.cidh.org/Comunicados/English/2004/25.04.htm.
13. Fabiola Sánchez, “List of Venezuelan Government Opponents on Web Site Draws Discrimination Complaints,” Associated Press Worldstream, May 13, 2005.
14. Recording of Roger Capela on “Hablemos con Washington,” Voice of America News, April 26, 2006.
15. Francisco Olivares, “El Código Chávez” [The Chávez code], El Universal (Venezuela), May 21, 2005.
16. “Lista Tascón--Lista Maisanta--Lista Santa Inés--Firmaste?” [Tascón List--Maisanta List--Santa Inés List--Did you sign?] MercadoLibre, available at http://articulo.mercadolibre.com.ve/MLV-4956320-lista-tascon-lista-maisanta-lista-santa-ines-firmaste-_JM (accessed May 8, 2006).
17. Fabiola Sánchez, “Chávez Prepara un Ejército de Civiles” [Chávez prepares a civilian army], Associated Press, April 22, 2006.
18. Greg Morsbach, “Caracas Prepara Guerra de Guerrillas,” [Caracas prepares a war of guerrillas], BBCMundo.com, March 6, 2006.
19. Nicholas Kralev, “Chavez Accused of Ties to Terrorists,” Washington Times, May 17, 2006.
20. OAS, Inter-American Democratic Charter, September 11, 2001, sec. 1, art. 1.
21. OAS, Declaration of Florida, Delivering the Benefits of Democracy, AG/DEC.41 (XXXV-O/05), adopted, June 7, 2005.