Titanic: Below Decks
The first few minutes after the calamity to the Titanic have enriched many of the Titanic message boards and forums; did the ship turn to face northward? What was the nature of the engine orders from the bridge? Time and again, these topics are debated and argued over, but no 100% consensus is reached.
This is not one of those works.
About twenty minutes after the collision, the focus of the drama shifts from inside the ship to the top decks where the boats were being readied for lowering. But what was happening inside the ship? That is the point of this essay; to describe as fully as possible the frantic efforts to determine the damage, whether the ship could be saved, and what was said and done. This essay is necessarily technical, but the relevant diagrams will help, I hope, to provide a picture in the reader's mind of just where important events and exchanges took place. In some cases, it has proved impossible to reconcile testimony from survivors, and this is noted.
The sections in italics are designed to act like footnotes, amplifying and expanding the main bodies of the text.
The "traditional" locations of water inside the ship. The areas outlined in red stationed third class passengers.
The Fore-peak and Hold No.1
Lamp Trimmer Samuel Hemming and John Foley (storekeeper) were in their quarters on C Deck. Hemming was roused by the impact and looked out of the porthole but saw nothing, surmising it to be ice as he could see no vessel nearby to attribute to the shock. Then, their attention was diverted to a nearby hissing noise. Going forward to the forepeak storeroom, they both climbed down to the top of the tank but found nothing amiss. Clambering up the ladder, they then found the source: an exhaust pipe that permitted surplus air to be expelled from the tank as water entered. Alfred Haines, the boatwain's mate, and Chief Officer Wilde had just arrived, and the latter asked what the noise was, and Hemming reported to him. Wilde returned to report to the bridge. Hemming and Foley returned to their bunks for a few minutes. The joiner [sic - carpenter?] came to their room with an alarming report; "If I were you, I would turn out, you fellows. She is making water [in holds] one-two-three, and the racket court is getting filled up." Then, as the joiner left, the boatswain came with his own report. The ship's builder, Thomas Andrews, had evidently been on a rapid inspection tour of the damaged areas, and the news was relayed thus; "Turn out, you fellows, you haven't half an hour to live. That is from Mr.Andrews. Keep it to yourselves and let no one know."
The crew's area under the forecastle
The mention of Mr.Andrews presents a puzzle. We do not know when he inspected the damage to his vessel, but from the conflicting, fragments of evidence, he would be analysing the wounds to the Titanic sometime around midnight. Of course, he may have encountered the boatswain during his soujourn and been imparted with the "half an hour to live" message comparitively early during the evening's events. We must also recall that 4th Officer Boxhall was told by the Captain himself during the boats' preparation that "Mr. Andrews tells me he gives her from an hour to an hour and a half." The boatswain may have been exagerrating to impart some urgency into his colleagues. Also, did the carpenter not sound boiler room 6, which was also flooding? Although Hemming was clear on hearing the Andrews' news at both inquiries, his testimony indicates that he was perhaps less than truthful. If he is to be believed, most of the lifeboats went away with lamps, which he provided. However, only a few of the boats residents reported that they had lights.
No other survivor in the bow seemed to have been told of Mr.Andrews concerns about the longevity of the new ship. And in other areas of the bow, the collision was perceived differently by people dependent on their locations, and news was mostly greeted with a lack of concern and indifference: In or near the seaman's mess on C deck, Seaman Poingdestre felt a "big vibration," as did Brice; a few feet away, Buley only noticed a slight jar as though something was rubbing along the hull, whereas the collision nearly sent Lucas off his feet. Slightly aft, and two decks down on E deck, in the seamen's sleeping quarters, Symons was awakened by a grinding noise; Archer was also asleep and felt a "kind of crush" like a cable running through the hawsepipe; Clench was sleeping too and was awakened by the "crunching and jarring" sensation; Moore had turned in and heard a sound like a cable running out, but felt no shock; and Jewell was woken by the collision. Further forward, on either D or E decks, fireman Shiers, in his bunk, felt the shock, but it did not seem much. Fellow fireman Harry Senior related his experience in the Liverpool "Journal of Commerce" (29/4/12): "I was asleep in my bunk at the time of the collision. I was awakened by the noise and between sleeping and waking I thought I was dreaming that I was on a train which had run off the lines, and that I was being jolted about." Fireman Hurst told Walter Lord that he was awakened by"a grinding crash," and Jack Podesta told the Southampton Echo (27/5/68) that he felt a "quiver" and the crash sounded like "tearing a strip off a piece of calico." However, Leading Fireman Hendrickson, on G deck and not far from the initial impact point with the iceberg, slept right through it, being "dead to the world"!
The crew's quarters in the bow.
This provokes some suspicion; without wishing to denigrate these gentlemen's recollections, could they have reached the deck in time to see the iceberg? Scarrott was on duty, felt the ship shake as if the engines had been reversed. Going down to tell his shipmate in the bathroom at the bottom of the ladder [sic - stairs?], Scarrott then emerged in the well deck. The closest bathroom was some two decks below him. Shiers was reading in his bunk and felt the almost inconsequential rumble and went on deck. Hendrickson was asleep at the time of the collision and had to ascend 4 flights of steps to get on deck; indeed, at the British Inquiry, he was asked if he came up [to the deck] very quick, and he replied no, he walked up behind the others who were walking up. The Titanic was travelling at 22.5 knots (25.9 miles per hour) and the iceberg would have travelled the length of the ship in 23 seconds, which seems too short an amount of time for anyone to rush up at least one flight of steps and see the berg, unless this time had been lengthened by the Titanic already slowing down, responding promptly to 1st Officer Murdoch's command of "Full Speed Astern" to avoid the berg...? Indeed, Hendrickson remarked that the ship was indeed stopped. Another major problem is that anyone coming into darkness from a lit room would be blinded by the transition for a few minutes and be unable to see anything.
Many thought the strange sensation and noises were nothing to generate alarm, but telling signals of disaster were soon being seen in the quarters reserved for the firemen, greasers, trimmers and seamen, stationed near the tip of the bow. A typical example is a lookout by the name of lookout George Symons. He was asleep and was awakened by a grinding sound on the ship's bottom. The others in his quarters aroused, and like many others, hurried out on deck to see the source of the commotion and observed the ice deposited on the starboard side of the forward well deck by the 'berg. But Symons remained in his bunk, unconcerned. Shortly aferwards, his companion George Hogg came down and told him that he had better get up. Hogg had been on the well deck and saw "not much confusion" before going back down with some shipmates. He asked seaman Evans what time it was, and was told it was 11.45. Being close to the time that his duty shift would start, Hogg decided to dress.Ascending the ladder [stairs?], Frank Evans encountered "the 5th or 6th officer." The officer ordered Evans to find the carpenter, get him to sound all the wells [holds] forward and report to the bridge.
The bridge was evidently getting impatient for a report from the carpenter: Quartermaster Olliver, 4th Officer Boxhall and Evans were all ordered to find the carpenter, the first two of these being direct orders from the captain. Who was the officer that Evans had met? The 5th Officer was still in bed, and as for the other officers who are unaccounted for, 6th Officer Moody seems the only likely candidate. Evans had considerable experience in the RN and Merchant Navy and it is hard to believe he could mistake the braids etc. of the 5th/6th officer for the Chief Officer. Evans would later call Murdoch the "chief officer" in his testimony at the inquiries, and he also makes reference in his to Lowe and Lightoller. This leaves Moody, but would he have the authority to order a sounding of the ship on his own volition? It is likely that he was ordered by the captain. Also, if we remember that Haines and Hemming saw the chief officer, it is obvious that the Captain was sending whatever men he had to elicit information, with him being on the command post of the ship.
Heading below to the working alleyway, Evans met the boatswain who asked whom the seaman was seeking. When told, the boatswain told Evans that the carpenter had already gone up and what was the matter? Informing him that he thought the ship had struck an iceberg. The boatswain then went up, and Evans went to view the tarpaulin on hatch 1 which was the source of some consternation and bemusement, at which time the boatswain appeared.
Presumably, the carpenter had gone up to the bridge, where he encountered first Boxhall heading down to look for him, and then to Captain Smith; this would be very approximately at about 11.50pm.
The boatswain passed through an order in the forecastle, "Stand by, you may be wanted at any moment." Going into the mess room for coffee, Symons was informed that there was water in no.1 hold. Hearing the water first, he looked down through the gratings. He saw water coming in a "rush", nearly up to the coamings on the hatch on G deck many decks below. Many had reported that the water was rushing into the hold below this hatch so fast, it was displacing the air causing it to to balloon outards. But now water was actually coming under the tarpaulin. The order then came through for all hands to go on deck to assist in preparing the lifeboats, and as Symons was on his way to the boatdeck, 8 bells [midnight] were rung in the crowsnest.Those bells were rung by Reginald Lee and Fred Fleet, the lookouts who had seen the iceberg and warned the bridge. Relieved at midnight, they climbed down the crow's nest ladder back to the forecastle. Lee heard water and looked down hatch 1. He sees water coming in "not so fast"...[his testimony seems to indicate F deck but he doesn't seem sure; it is more likely he meant G deck]. Driven out of their quarters by the rising water, crewmen were bringing up their bags and putting them on the forecastle hatch. Then, Lee heard the boatswain call the other watch that had just finished at midnight and had gone below; they went out to the boats too. Lee's companion in the crowsnest, Fred Fleet had already gone below to turn in and found no-one there.But while most thought of the rising water as nothing serious, other crewmen had more of an inkling. Poingdestre, returning from an excursion to see the ice deposited on deck, encountered the ship's carpenter. As recounted here, and as we shall soon see, the bridge was desperate for news from this man, as he had the task of sounding the ship and finding out the intake of water. The carpenter informed Poingdestre that the ship was making water and that there was already a depth of 7 feet in hatch 1. The carpenter advised his friend to get up to, the boats, but Poingdestre stayed where he was for a few more minutes before hearing the boatswain's call.
By midnight, the general alarm had been relayed to the crew. 3rd Officer Pitman had awakened, and after being told by 6th Officer Moody, who he found on portside aft on the boat deck, that there was ice in the forward well deck, Pitman went forward to investigate. He too saw the crowds of firemen streaming up with their bags, and looking downthe hatch, he sees water round at the bottom of the ship, a little stream on both sides of the cover on G deck.
If Poingdestre was right about the time, at 11.50pm, the water had reached a depth of 7 feet in hold no.1; less than 10 minutes later (that is, shortly before 8 bells were rung at midnight), the water had risen over 30 feet...and if we compare Lee and Pitman's account with Symons, only a few minutes before, the flow of water had changed from a rush to nothing more than a stream. Why should this be? This is due to simple physics: when water flows into a receptacle, it flows in quite fast at first, and then, as the water levels inside reaches that of the level outside, the flow decreases; when the two levels are the same, the flow stops. But then there was water in more aft areas, and the weight would pull the bow down, changing the water levels inside the ship, causing the flow to pick up...and so on...until the inevitable end....
Relatively few firemen were saved. Why was this? There are some sinister hints. 1st class passenger Major Peuchen gave evidence in America that when he first came on deck, when the covers had been taken off the boats, and they were ready for lowering, he saw 100 stokers with "dunnage" bags, and who crowded in front of the boats. An unknown officer forced them all of the decks. Mrs Candee saw the same incident, and also remembered that none of the boats had been lowered. 2nd class passenger Charlotte Collyer wrote in "The American Semi Monthly Magazine" (May 1912) that, again, before the boats were lowered, she observed a commotion near one of the gangways and a stoker with an injured hand told her that the ship was doomed. "[1st Officer] "Murdock [sic] posted guards at gangways to prevent others...from coming on deck." What do crew members say of this expulsion from the boat deck? Surviving crew members do not mention it at either inquiry, but stoker Harry Senior says that Captain Smith ordered the firemen to keep below, on the well deck. Although the newspaper article contains some fanciful descriptions, most of it is consistent with what we know of the events during the sinking. This article says of John William Thompson, that he "later recalled that, after he and some other firemen had gone on deck after the collision, Leading Fireman William Small ordered them back below, apparently to go back to the boiler rooms." Then, Wally Hurst, another fireman, wrote to Walter Lord in 1955 stating that after the call to muster, they were told by a quartermaster while on the forewell deck "not to come on the boat deck until later on." Both Hurst and Senior said that they went onto the boat deck upon seeing boat no.1 being lowered; by leaning out over the side of the well deck, boat 1 would have been easily observable. Although a few lucky stokers, trimmers and greasers did get in early boats, the majority seem to have departed in later boats. If there was discrimation shown against the stokers, why did none of them mention it at the inquiries? Firstly, few were asked. Secondly, it does not make sense to offend potential future employers.
Interestingly, Paul Mauge of the a la carte Restaurant, related that stewards were preventing restaurant staff from reaching the lifeboats.
Hold No.2
Hendrickson returned to his quarters in the bowels of the ship after seeing the ice on deck and the berg far astern. His companion, Ford, came back and told him that there was ice below, down the spiral staircase that allowed the 'Black Gang' access to the boiler and engine rooms without sullying the rest of the ship with coal dust and the like. Looking down the portside stairway, Hendrickson saw water rushing about the base of the spiral steps, practically "falling in." Alarmed at this, Hendrickson clambered up the steps to report this observation.
The observed and surmised flooding in the 2nd cargo hold. The coloured areas are as follows: Bright green - outline of fireman's passage; thick red- outline of watertight bulkheads; purple lines - flow of water inside the hull in the first few minutes.
The iceberg managed to cut its way a few feet inside the hull of the Titanic, as the covering for the fireman's spiral staircases was ruptured allowing water inside. And With no watertight door in the fireman's passage, the water was free to pour down the length of the tunnel. It is also likely that the tunnel enclosed the water on the starboard side of the ship at the Tank Top (lowest) level, helping to explain the 5 degree list to Starboard registered by Captain Smith on his bridge instruments a few minutes after the catastrophe; once the water was high enough, it would flow over the top of the tunnel allowing a more even distribution of water. At the forwardmost end of the tunnel, the spiral staircases allowed water to eventually enter G deck in the preceeding watertight compartment, contributing to its rate of inflow. The water seen rushing around the hatch cover on G deck could well be due to water damage in the compartments comprising holds 1 and 2.
Taking a brief break from assisting in readying the boats for lowering, Poingdestre returned to his quarter to fetch his rubber boots. By his own estimate, this was 30-45 minutes after the collision. As he was leaving the quarters, a wooden bulkhead ruptured, and he found himself deluged up to his waist in icy cold water. As he clambered up to D deck, the 3rd class male passengers were swarming up to the forward well deck. There were quite a few of them; perhaps a 100 or so with their baggage, according to Poingdestre, and there were stewards in the crowd, conversing with their charges.
Hatch no.2 was trunked on the sides bordering the seaman's quarters, preventing water that had risen via this hatch from entering their area. Poingdestre's evidence tells us that the forward portion of E deck, where his - and some third class cabins - were located - was flooded. Annie Robinson's story tells us that sometime shortly after 12.00am, water was within a few stairs of reaching E deck from F deck in the area of the mail rooms. With the ship down at the bows, the water would have already started to slop over the bunker hatch/cargo hatch no.3, several feet forward of the mailroom area. Effectively, the area of E deck forward of the working alleyway and 1st class areas was flooding. The third class on the forward well deck would be effectively trapped...the only way to escape would be to go up, through the gate on B deck and up to the boat deck...
As usual, when one delves deeper, one can find contrary evidence. Quatermaster Walter Wynn had woken and, in his own words, "I went up on the forewell deck and asked what was the matter. I saw a lot of men passengers there, and I saw the ice on the deck, and they pointed it out to me: "Look at that" they said. "We have just struck an iceberg." Then I went down below and woke my two mates up, and then I dressed and walked on the bridge to await orders from the Captain". To get from his quarters to the well deck and back, Wynn would have to go to the forward end of the alleyway, ascend the flight of steps to the 3rd class general area, and then up another set of steps to the well deck, directly above. To follow any other route would be to venture into the taboo area of 1st class cabins. The male passengers would be the ones that Poingdestre saw flooding out of the forecastle, but we do not know how much time had elapsed before Wynn had encountered them. What can be inferred from Wynn's story is that he managed to get to his quarters, and back again later (to fetch his knife) without being hampered by water. A reasonable inference is that only the forward end of this compartment, the section comprising hatch no.2, was flooded.
3rd class and seaman's quarters on E deck, indicating the positions of the gangway doors.
As we shall see in the next section, just after midnight, water had nearly reached the starboard 1st class section, through the mailroom; this water had originated from damage in the third cargo hold and had risen up through the bunker hatch. This hatch had an opening forward of the 1st class area, in the space reserved for 3rd class cabins. By the time Poingdestre fled his quarters, the water from the 3rd cargo hold would be entering this area, by flowing forward, downhill until it was stopped by the forward watertight bulkhead. It has been assumed that the water that Poingdestre encountered was due to water coming up the 2nd cargo hatch, but the flow from the 3rd may also have contributed. Since we know nothing of the flooding between the sighting of water swirling around the fireman's spiral staircase, and then over half an hour later, of the water in the fireman's sleeping area, we do not know enough to reach a definite conclusion.
Hold No.3
Previous discussions of the flooding of hold no.3 and how it impinged upon the decks above can be found here. The only other witness to the water in this area was Norman Chambers, who occupied cabin E-8 with his wife. He felt no very great shock, "the loudest noise by far being that of jangling chains whipping along the side of the ship." After dressing, he leisurely went up as far as A deck but could see nothing amiss. Returning to his stateroom, his wife joined him on deck but could see nothing to warrant alarm. As they descended to their cabin, they saw, "at the top of [the] stairs [leading down to the mailroom] I found a couple of mail clerks wet to their knees, who had just come up from below, bringing their registered mail bags." Looking down into the "trunk room" [the 1st class baggage room] from the landing on F deck, he saw water within 18 inches to two feet of reaching the deck upon which he was standing.
The way down to the mail sorting areas from E deck (far left) to the Orlop deck (far right)
Boxhall saw water within 2 feet of G deck at about 11.50-11.55pm; Chamber's observations would be some little time after this, but before those of stewardess Annie Robinson, who saw the water nearly reaching E deck.
The flooding areas on F deck
The flooding areas on F deck; the red areas outlined indicate 3rd class areas
How can we be sure that the water seen down no.1 hatchway by Pitman etc. was on the same deck as seen by Symons about 10 minutes earlier? There does seem to be some confusion at the British Inquiry whether it was F or G deck that the water was seen running around the hatch with the tarpaulin. But most of the observations were made from a high deck and looking down the hatch. If F deck had a tarpaulin, then it would not have been possible to look down from C deck (say) and see G deck's tarpaulin. It is not known which hatches had bars, rather than tarpaulins, but, from the discussions in London, it seems that decks D, E and F had bars fitted over the hatches.
The unlikely waterline scenario as deduced from observations.
One other point remains: The Carpenter/Joiner informed Hemming soon after the collision, "If I were you, I would turn out, you fellows. She is making water [in holds] one-two-three, and the racket court is getting filled up." The only way for water to enter the racket court was via the mail room; once this area on G deck was full, water would flow aft, round a corner to port and then down stairs to the court. Since this required passing over the landing that Chambers was standing on, we can only assume that the carpenter must have been apprised of the squash court situation after Chambers's sighting. The carpenter/joiner probably inspected the damaged areas several times; for instance, Stewardess Robinson saw him looking at the water when it was a short distance of E deck. This was long after the initial sounding of the ship, and after the carpenter's report to the Captain on the bridge. By Hemming's estimate he was told this information about a quarter of an hour after the impact, something that tallies with the evidence of other survivors on being summoned to the boat deck. If this is so, very shortly after Boxhall's visit to the mail area (which he saw was nearly flooded to the top of G deck), Chambers saw the water had risen nearly the height of another deck. Despite the appearance of the flow of water ceasing, very soon afterwards, water started rising, and then into the squash court. By this time, the carpenter became aware of water in the court...and this information was then relayed to Hemming. This is conjecture as it posits a very compressed time in which Boxhall, Chambers and then the carpenter in turn inspected the water.
So we now have the following scenario:
Thomas Andrews comes down and sees the water
Johnson sees the water
Chambers sees the water.
The carpenter comes along and finds water flowing into the squash racket court.
Hemming is told of the flooding by the carpenter
The boatswain tells Hemming of Andrew's report.
From Symons's story, the boatswain had summoned the seaman just before midnight; the whole timeline suggests that Andrews's story, as relayed to Hemming and despite its dubious qualities as noted above, is based on an extremely rapid inspection of the Titanic, its damaged areas and consultation with key members of staff. Since the above happened after Boxhall's viewing of the damage in the area of the mailroom, we now must say that all of the events above must have occurred in about ten minutes, from approximately 11.50 to 12.00. But if Andrews was positive that the ship was doomed before midnight, then why did Captain Smith wait nearly another half hour to send out the wireless distress call?. An important point is that the captain was seen below decks, and this had to be before midnight.
Boxhall's story tells us that, straight after the crash, he went down, saw nothing and came back up. He was told to find the carpenter, who he met on the way up to the bridge, and Boxhall went down to see the flooding mailroom for himself. He then returned to the bridge to report to the Captain. On his second trip, he could not have been down for more than 10 minutes, and yet, in this time, he was seen below decks. Could he have made it down, and then back to the bridge in this space of time?
So we now have the following scenario:
Thomas Andrews comes down and sees the water
Johnson sees the water
Chambers sees the water.
The carpenter comes along and finds water flowing into the squash racket court.
Hemming is told of the flooding by the carpenter
The boatswain tells Hemming of Andrew's report.
From Symons's story, the boatswain had summoned the seaman just before midnight; the whole timeline suggests that Andrews's story, as relayed to Hemming and despite its dubious qualities as noted above, is based on an extremely rapid inspection of the Titanic, its damaged areas and consultation with key members of staff. Since the above happened after Boxhall's viewing of the damage in the area of the mailroom, we now must say that all of the events above must have occurred in about ten minutes, from approximately 11.50 to 12.00. But if Andrews was positive that the ship was doomed before midnight, then why did Captain Smith wait nearly another half hour to send out the wireless distress call?. An important point is that the captain was seen below decks, and this had to be before midnight.
Boxhall's story tells us that, straight after the crash, he went down, saw nothing and came back up. He was told to find the carpenter, who he met on the way up to the bridge, and Boxhall went down to see the flooding mailroom for himself. He then returned to the bridge to report to the Captain. On his second trip, he could not have been down for more than 10 minutes, and yet, in this time, he was seen below decks. Could he have made it down, and then back to the bridge in this space of time?
The route the water took down to the squash courts from the mailrooms
Boiler room 6
Leading Fireman Fred Barrett was on the aft starboard side of boiler room 6, talking to 2nd Engineer Mr.Hesketh, when the red indicator light illuminated, indicating that the bridge had signalled the ship to stop. Barrett yelled out to "shut all the dampers" [valves above the furnaces to control the flow of draught and hence combustion]. Before they could all be shut, the collision occurred, and water came pouring in two feet above the stokehold plates, and about two feet from Barrett. Barrett and Hesketh jumped through the closing watertight door into boiler room 5, leaving the other stokers behind. One of whom was George Beauchamp also in the aft portion of the stokehold. He noticed the shock and said it was like the roar of thunder. A few minutes after the watertight door dropped, the order was given to draw the fires. Beauchamp noticed the water "coming through the floor plates." After drawing the fires in the boilers, somoene shouted "that will do" and everything in the room was shut down and he and the others went up the escape ladder. By his estimate, it took about 15 minutes to draw the fires.
Beauchamp remarked that the watertight doors dropped "5 minutes" after the order to stop, which is clearly wrong. He also does not seem to have been in a position to see the water pouring in through the side of the ship. Using the dimensions of the boiler room, and the estimate of the height of the iceberg damage as averaging 3/4s of a inch as calculated by Harland and Wolff Naval Architect Edward Wilding, crude calculations show that it is probable that about 3 tonnes of water per second was entering the boiler room with water jetting in at about 40 feet per second. It would have taken just over two minutes for water to have reached such a depth to start to obscure the hole, and, as we shall see, there is evidence of lights going out in other boiler rooms. Beauchamp probably did not see the rent in the side of the hull. He is also probably mistaken about taking 15 minutes to draw the fires too, if Barrett's and Hendrickon's stories are any indication. We can presume that the fires in boiler room number 2 were not drawn, as the steam from these boilers were used to power the emergency dynamos.
By Barrett's estimation, about 10 minutes after the collision he heard the order from Mr.Hesketh for "all hands stand by your stations". Since this meant the flooding boiler room next door, the only way to get in was via the escape ladder from the working alleyway. Clambering up and looking into the room, he and engineer Shepherd saw 8 feet of water already in there.
A few minutes after the collision, there was a 5 degree list to starboard, which begs the question: which end of the boiler room was Barrett looking into? The water would appear deeper at the starboard side than the port side, and this could lead to incorrect estimates of water in there.
Boiler Room 6 with a 5 degree list to starboard; the entry point of the water is indicated.
Later, as the list shifted to port, water could either flow out of the boiler room into the alleyway on E deck, or into it. This is all dependant on whether the rate of flow in the boiler room was greater than the flow of water from the more forward compartments heading aft as this would determine which area of the ship was "feeding" another.
Another important point to consider is whether Barrett took into account the two feet spacing between the tank top and the floor plates. He may have seen 10 feet of water in there. Incidentally, using Wilding's figures, it would take just over 30 minutes to fill the boiler room to the waterline (assuming that the bow was not dipping down), and another ten minutes to flood as far as E deck, when the water would spill out.
In the later stages of the sinking, the list shifted to about 10 degrees to port. The escape route through the working alleyway is indicated.
Boiler room 5
Immediately after jumping through the watertight door into the next compartment aft, Barrett noticed water rushing into the coal bunker 2 feet aft of the bulkhead. The amount of water was a greater rush than a fire hose. There was no water on the compartment floor plates, and he closed the door on the bunker, sealing the water in. Temporarily. It was then that Barrett received the order to stand by his station (see above), but this attempt was thwarted by the rising water. He and Mr.Shepherd returned to boiler room 5, where they found two engineers, Mr. Harvey and Mr.Wilson attending to the pumps.
Were they trying to pump water out of boiler room 6 or any water in the bilges? There was no way to pump water out of the coal bunker that had been injured.
Immediately after this, an order was telephoned through from the engine room for all the stokers to go up, but Barrett was to remain; Mr.Harvey relayed this order. Apparently, Barrett's role was to fetch anything from the engine room that was needed. Before, it was an easy job to go through from stokehold to stokehold, but now, with the watertight doors closed, this entailed a tedious diversion up and down the escape ladders. Finally, the only people left in boiler room 5 were Barrett, Wilson and Shepherd. Then the lights went out. Harvey sent Barrett to fetch some lamps, and at the top of the ladder, he sent two fireman, who came back with 12 to 15.
This should be compared with Hendrickon's account of being sent to the engine room for lamps, and also Cavell's story. Unless the boiler room lights went out quite a few times, this helps to pin this part of the story down and Hendrickon's recollection tells us that this must have happened well within the first 15 minutes of the collision.
Descending into the boiler room, Barrett found that the lights had come back on again. After checking that the boilers had no water in them, Mr,Harvey ordered Barrett to fetch some men to draw the fires. He requisitioned between 15 and 20 men. In 20 minutes, the task was done and the men were sent back up again.
Slower than in boiler room 6! How well were those fires drawn? Remember that 2nd Officer Lightoller was blown clear of the ship by a blast of hot air from below as the bridge dipped under hours after this. Could this have come from an uncleared boiler? It is hard to reconcile how hot air could originate from a closed, but admittedly, not watertight boiler, to migrate upwards to Lightoller's position.
Harvey's next order was lift a manhole plate on the starboard side of the boiler room. The room was now awash with steam. Mr.Shepherd, walking across the room, fell into the open manhole and broke his leg. Barrett and Harvey carried him into the pump room at the aft end of the room.
George Kemish wrote to Walter Lord that he saw "an engineer" fall and break his leg; although declining to name him, how did Kemish know? Only Barrett, Harvey and Shepherd were in the room at this point.
After 15 minutes, a rush of water surged through the gaps between the boilers, heading aft. Mr.Harvey ordered Barrett to go up the ladder, and without stopping to look, the leading fireman ascended. In the working alleyway, Barrett headed aft, noticing a small amount of water forward. Barrett estimated it was now 1.10am
The accounts of the "flooding" of boiler room 5 by some authors are pure fiction. It is likely that it was the coal bunker door and not the bulkhead that gave way, the door not being watertight. Barrett never saw Harvey or Shepherd swamped by the water.
How much water was being admitted by the hole in the coal bunker? It is highly subjective. It was calculated that the average height of the iceberg damage was 3/4s of an inch. Barrett said the hole extended two feet past the bulkhead. We can estimate a theoretical maximum amount of water entering the hull: about 5 cubic feet per second, or 0.1 tonnes per second. This is over 250 pints of water in one second. This seems excessively high! A modern fire reel delivers a minimum of 1/3 litre of water, about the same as a garden hose. If we use this, and accept Barrett's estimate of 1 hour and 30 minutes before he was forced to vacate boiler room 5, we can work out how much water would have to be contained in the bunker. This works out to be 1600 litres or 56 cubic feet. The floor of the coal bunkers are 2 feet below the floor of the boiler room, and have a surface area of approximately 300 square feet. 0.33 litres of water would give a depth of just 2 inches! So, the water rushing in was somewhere between these two values (5 cubic feet per second and 1/3 of a litre per second.
The space enclosed by the empty forward starboard coal bunker in boiler room 5 was, to the height of the watertight door, is about 2300 cubic feet. If this bunker was catastrophically flooded and then opened, it would empty into contents and the water would, after the initial torrent, level out across the whole compartment, which has a surface area of 5200 square feet. If all the water was released, the total depth above the coal bunker would be about 1/3 foot; since the floor plates were two feet above the level of the water tanks at the bottom of the ship, this water from the bunkers would fill this cavity; the boiler room would only seemingly be temporarily awash. This amount of water would have a mass of some 47 tonnes. The pumps in the boiler room couple cope with 250 tonnes per hour, plus a possible additional 125-150 tonnes per hour. Many spectators suggest that following the "rush of water," the boiler room was doomed. Was it?
Interestingly, the UK "Daily Mail" newspaper reported on 20th April that "Leading stoker [Thomas] Threlfall states that ... the wateright doors were closed, but they were opened to bring through an engineer with a broken leg, and were closed after him again." However, some elements of his story in that newspaper are proveably wrong (viz. the parts about him taking refuge on a raft with other fireman and Chief Engineer Bell swimming up and declining a place on the boat). but, in the Bridgwater Mercury newspaper, he is reported as saying, "'My watch was asleep,' Threlfall said, 'when we were awakened by a shout 'Get up; we've run into something.' I got up and saw the tarpaulin over a hatch bulging out with the pressure of water underneath. The water was pouring down the passage from our room into the stokehold. The ship had torn herself right open from No. 6 section to the forehatch. We waded along the passage with our clothes to the mess deck. Then the boatswain piped 'all hands,' and the second engineer told me to take my watch below. We went down to the stokehold to draw the fires. At about 1.20 Mr. Hesketh, the second engineer, said 'We've done all we can men, Get out now.'" The last sighting we have of Hesketh is in boiler room 5 when it flooded. This timing of 1.20am will recur in our story later.
Boiler room 4
Trimmer Thomas Dillon was in the reciprocating engine room, and by his estimation, 30 minutes after the impact, the doors to the forward stokeholds were ordered to be opened. He and his team got as far as the juncture between boiler room 4 and 5, and the door was not opened. This was, by his timing, an hour and 40 minutes after the meeting with the fatal iceberg. When he got to the forward part of boiler room 4, he noticed that the floor plates were damp, and that a small quantity of water seemed to be coming up through the floor.Another trimmer, George Cavell, was already in boiler room 4. He was in the aft starboard coal bunker and the impact dislodged the coal, showering him. Extricating himself from the avalanche, he climbed up into the stokehold, and then the lights went out. He goes up into the working alleyway and saw 3rd class passengers, some of whom were wet, with stewards shepherding them. Leaving temporarily to fetch some lamps, Cavell returns to boiler room 4 to find that the lights have come back on; they had only been out for 4 minutes, he reckoned.
Cavell claims to have seen the 3rd class passengers 1 1/2 to 2 hours after the crash!
Clambering down, Cavell helped to draw the fires from the boilers. By this point, water was gradually coming over the floor plates, reaching a foot in depth. Cavell went for the escape ladder, leaving men still in the room scraping out the cinders. Seeing no one in the alleyway above, he decided to check on his comrades and partially descended down the ladder but visibility was poor due to the steam. He climbed back up, and saw no water in the alleyway.
Presumably, the watertight door between boiler room 3 and 4 closed automatically when water raised the floatation device used to detect water in the room. Also, were the pumps not activated in boiler room 4? Tha amount of water was sufficiently small to be tackled successfully by the bilge pumps.
In a forthcoming discussion, we shall see how Cavell's estimation of time is likely inaccurate, and that, based on his observation that there was no water in the working alleyway when he ascended to it for the last time, Dillon's notion, described at the British Inquiry, that the door to boiler room 5 wasn't opened ,"because there was too much water [there]" is wrong, as that room didn't admit water until after room 4 was abandoned.
Not long after the crash, the watertight doors, which had been closed under instructions from the bridge were reopened to allow easier access to the forward, unflooded stokeholds, and to obtain a large suction pipe that was stored in a more aft watertight compartment.
When were the watertight doors to the turbine room and the stokeholds opened? Dillon and Scott indicate that 30 minutes had passed, but this seems too long. Quatermaster Olliver, after returning from his orders to find the carpenter and to get him to sound the ship, returned to the Captain on the bridge. All this occurred within minutes of the collision. Then, Olliver was sent below again to deliver an order to Chief Engineer Bell in the reciprocating engine room. While he was there, Olliver noticed that the door to the stokehold was open. When he returned to the bridge, after waiting "2 or 3 minutes" for a reply from Bell, Olliver was sent on an errand to tell the boatswain to uncover the boats. We know this occurred at about midnight.
Hendrickson, too, reported to the engine room, when he saw the hatch on No.1 hold billowing up outside his quarters. Since he saw no water, this had to have been before Symons saw the hatch about 11.55-58pm. When he got to the engine room, he noticed that the fore and aft watertight doors were closed. Although Hendrickson thought this was about 3/4s of an hour after the impact, Olliver disproves this. Of course, we do not not know how much time elapsed between Hendrickon's and Symon's viewing of the no.1 hatch.
There is more data to support an "early" re-opening of the watertight doors, and how long it took to heave them up. Dillon was in boiler room 2 when he heard the order to draw the fires from the boilers. He had already passed through two sets of doors, and had two more to open. This order to pull the fires was certainly made a few short amount of time after the collision according to Barrett's and Hendrickson's recollections of the lights going out and being forced to fetch lamps from the engine room.
The issue of when the engine room was ordered to be abandoned will be discussed presently.
The working alleyway on E deck. The red square indicates Joughin's cabin; the blue square indicates the watertight door that he referred to in his testimony. The bright green square indicates the Quartermaster's cabin.
So, from Cavell, we know that he fled boiler room 4 before Barrett abandoned boiler room 5. Between these two events, the bow of the ship on E deck was flooded; since there was no watertight door at the forward part of the working alleyway, this water could not have originated entirely from, say, boiler room 6 flowing into the alleyway, as it would have flowed forward towards the bow first.
The route down to the Turkish Baths, showing the watertight doors.
A little later, saloon steward Fred Ray went back to his room, and saw the forward end of the working alleyway flooded; he could only just get into the companionway that allowed him to "leisurely" walk up to the top decks.
Ray's account could conceivably be used to place the flooding of E deck in some form of chronology. Before he went below, he saw boat 9 being swung out over the side of the ship, and then saw boat 7 - the very first - leave the Titanic. He then went back to his E deck room via "the back stairway" where he saw the water. After fetching his overcoat, he headed up the grand staircase, pausing only to briefly converse with Mr.Rotschild. He arrived on the boat deck in time to see boat 9 being loaded with women and children.
Compare this with Wheat's account: after seeing the third class, he headed aft along E deck and up a set of service stairs, where he came out at B deck, meeting Chief Steward Latimer. He then went forward in time to see boat 9, being loaded.
Obviously, Wheat's account of flooding was well before Ray's. But they both arrive on the boat deck within minutes of each other to see boat 9 being prepared. Wheat must have taken longer to get to the boat deck than Ray for the timing to work. How long did it take for Wheat to Ray to get below decks from seeing boat 7? How long did it take either man to get back upstairs again? Despite his brief conversation with Rotschild, Ray's route to the boat deck was more direct and would take less time, if his and Wheat's walking speed were the same. But even so, this leaves a very short space of time between boat 7 leaving and boat 9 being readied. The respected re-evaluation of the launch time of the Titanic's lifeboats gives a 50 minute gap between boats 7 and 9. Maybe there was a delay in loading and lowering boat 9? But then there must have been a period of time between Ray and Wheat's story, as Barrett states he saw water forward of the escape ladder from boiler room 5.
There is another problem with this timeline: 1st class passenger James McGough returned to his stateroom on E deck from the upper decks to put on his life preserver. His stateroom was nearly adjacent to the bottom of the grand staircase, and practically "just round the corner" from the stairs leading down to Wheat's area of the ship. When questioned at the US Senate Inquiry, McGough makes no mention of seeing water, then flowing up from the mailroom just a few feet forward of his cabin. Wheat then ascended the stairs to get back to the boat deck in time to enter boat 7, the first one to leave. Even allowing for the few minutes it would take to go from E deck to the boat deck and then a wait on the deck before entering the boat, there is a conflict with Ray and Wheat's story above. A solution may lie in the flooding rate: between McGough leaving his cabin, and getting into boat 7, and Ray coming down to E deck after this lifeboat had left, the starboard E deck corridor, where the 1st class cabins were located, could have gone from being reasonably dry (dry enough for McGough not to notice any water) to being flooded back enough for the base of the grand staircase to be under water.
The approximate list when Wheat saw the water at the indicated location (the blue square)
Chief Baker Charles Joughin's cabin was aft on the working alleyway, near the reciprocating engine room casing. After his boat (no.10) had gone ("a decent bit after 1 [am])", he retired to his room for drink, where he had a half tumbler full of liqueur.
The many accounts of Joughin being paralytically drunk, like the film version of "A Night To Remember" are hopelessly wrong on his point!
He sees water in his room, just enough to cover his feet. Due to the list of the Titanic, the water was tending to be deeper on the port side than the starboard. Obviously the water had flowed up the alleyway. At about this time, he saw two men coming who said they were going to close the watertight bulkhead door just in front of his room. To Joughin, the alleyway seemed fairly dry.
In London, at the inquiry, Joughin said of the water; "If it had been higher I should have thought something about it, but under the circumstances I thought it might have been a pipe burst, because there was a pipe burst on the "Olympic" from the engineers' quarters and we got the same water. It might have been the same thing." But the engineer's 'quarters' [sic? _ mess?] were aft of his cabin; the water he saw was coming from forward and was obviously a consequence of the flooding in the ship.
Water flowing against the port side of the ship due to the list on that side. Highly exaggerated!
Sam Halpern's diagram of the flooding at approximately the time lifeboat 13 was launched and when Joughin went to his cabin; this author has modified the sketch to show the waterline on the port side of the ship, and Joughin's cabin (the blue square). The green lines indicates the location of the working alleyway forward of Joughin's cabin, the orange lines indicate the crew's stairway up to the boat deck, and the cyan line denotes the approximate list along the working alleyway. Due to the portside list, the water would tend to be more greatly accumulated against the more port side of the alleyway, leaving the doorway to the staircase relatively clear of water.
Interestingly, Joughin says that, after seeing the water in his cabin, "I went up the middle staircase, what we call the crew's staircase." This was also known as the steward's staircase, and went from E deck up to the boat deck (unlike the Olympic which only went to A deck). The entrance to this stairway was on the alleyway; it couldn't have been flooded that much to allow Joughin to traverse it. We should perhaps be cautious about Joughin's statements. Just before the final plunge, Joughin claimed to have seen the ship take a huge plunge to port which caused everyone to tumble onto that side; he also says the ship remained lit until the very end. Neither of these two claims are confirmed by any other witnesses.
Left to right, the boxes indicate; Joughin's room; the watertight door; the crew's working staircase.
Hendrickson's Account
Leading fireman Charles Hendrickson's account is of importance in providing a sense of timing of the events deep within the ship. His story is as follows: after seeing the water swirling round the base of the fireman's staircase, he left the fireman's quarters and headed aft to report this. He got as far as the working alleyway where he saw Mr.Hesketh, an engineer. After telling him his report, Hendrickon was told to get some lamps and some men and go below in the darkened stokeholds with them, this being the time that the lights had gone out. Hendrickson, found four or five men and returned with some lamps, but boiler room 6 was too full to allow entry.
This must have been after Beauchamp et al. had vacated the room. Whether this is before or after Barrett and Shepherd saw "8 feet" of water inside is debateable. Hesketh can't have known or he would not have ordered Hendrickson inside the room, and if he had, he would have informed Barrett and Shepherd of this.
Hendrickson went slightly aft and descended into boiler room 5 instead, where he found Mr.Shepherd who asked if he had the lamps. When he replied yes, he was told to light them and put them against the steam gauges. Shepherd ordered that the fires be drawn from the boilers, and Hendrickon got a rake and was about to start pulling the coals and ashes from the furnaces when another engineer, Mr.Harvey approached him and ordered him to get some more men down. Ascending to the alleyway, he found some men and they went below, leaving Hendrickson to return to his quarters, at which point he saw the hatch cover billowing.
This must have all occurred before c.11.55 as this was when water was seen around the hatch, something that Hendrickson did not mention in his evidence. Also, from Hendrickson's evidence, can we infer that hte lights remained off for the duration of his visit?
After informing the engine room of the tarpaulin, he went up and stood talking to the storekeeper. He had noticed some steerage passengers in the alleyway when he went to fetch the lamps, and they were still there now, "walking to and fro" and sitting on their luggage. Hendrickson walked forward to his quarters and heard the order "We want a leading hand: all hands get lifebelts and get up on deck," which he duly obeyed.
Presumably this is the Boatswain's call, but which one? Recall that there were two calls to muster, one just before midnight, and the second after midnight, to summon the 8-12 watch that had just finished. Hendrickson would have to go from G deck up to C deck, and then back down to E to reach the working alleyway, and the "as the crow flies" distance between his room and the engine room was some 500 feet (or 2 minutes at normal walking pace); then he would spend time descending and ascending ladders. I would propose that it was the 2nd Boatswain's summons that he heard.
Stewards et al.
Many of the stewards were asleep at the time of impact, and were mostly roused by the vibrations and shuddering of the engines. Some thought that a propeller blade had been dropped. But, in those first few minutes afterwards, while curious heads peered out of dormitories and portholes, events occurred that were far from ordinary.Unlike the firemen, seamen and others stationed in the bow who felt the tremble and saw the ice on deck, the others who were stationed amidships in or near the working alleyway felt nothing was amiss...until word started filtering along, and samples of ice from the forward well deck were passed round. In short, the stewards were understandably slow to react.
Bedroom Steward Henry Etches was one of those slumbering, along with 18 others in his quarters. He was next due on duty at midnight. Between 7 and 10 minutes after the crash, he heard a loud shout which he recognised as the Boatwain's voice, yelling, "Close watertight bulkheads." Looking out of his room, Etches saw the Boatswain running from fore to aft, with a seaman following him. Etches partly dressed and again peered into the corridor where he saw third class passengers heading aft, carrying their belongings. Another one who apparently heard the Boatswain cry was 1st class steward Edward Wheelton. After looking out of the port, and chatting to some of his colleagues, he clambered back into bed when he heard, "watertight doors." Third class pantryman Albert Pearcey may have been one of those who carried out these orders. He was on F deck, outside the pantry when he felt a small motion. He next heard the order "All watertight doors to be closed," which he and several other men did, closing the doors aft on F deck, as well as the ones leading to his pantry. John Hardy, Chief Second Class Steward, had also received an order from Mr.Barker (a purser) to close the doors and rouse the passengers "as a precaution". The doors on F deck were duly closed.
The Boatswain must have reacted instinctively to some extent. He apparently ordered that the doors be closed, but did not know what had happened. Seaman Frank Evans recalled being sent below to find the carpenter, and the Boatswain inquired who he was looking for. Upon being told that he had "gone up" Evans informed him that he thought the ship had struck an iceberg, and the Boatswain "went up" (to the bridge?). Also, it is prudent to mention Boxhall, when he inspected the damaged areas on F deck; the watertight doors forward were not closed then; but, when he comes down again, he notices that the (admittedly non-watertight door) at the forward end of the 1st class companionway on E deck is closed, forcing him to find a different route to see the water entering the mail rooms.
When were the stewards roused to congregate their passengers, assist in provisioning the boats, etc? The common consensus is 20 minutes, and there is widespread agreement, give or take a few minutes, in their accounts. An interesting story is given by second class smoking room steward James Witter. He informed Walter Lord, and then told a BBC interviewer a year later, that he had closed up the smoking room at midnight, and then went to his room, where his attempts to waken his colleagues was met with hostility. This is interesting, as it shows that not all stewards had been woken by 12.00am plus the few minutes it took for Witter to get to his room, and it also shows that his colleagues (at least) had not yet received the order to get to their stations. If they had, and they had been told the order had come from the chief, or head stewards, they would not have been so reticent to rise. One steward threw a boot at Witter!
The evacuation of the 3rd class
During his foray carrying lamps back from the engine room, Hendrickson encountered a big crowd of male third class passengers in the working alleyway, heading aft, carrying their luggage. Hendrickson saw no stewards herding them, and he put this encounter at 3/4s of an hour after the collision. This estimate is wrong, as he saw these passengers before he saw the ballooning hatch 1 tarpaulin, and this was before it was seen to admit water just before midnight.
This means that the third class passengers were very quick "off the mark" to react to the danger, well before midnight. Compare this to the first class passengers who were (mostly) roused after the stewards themselves were awoken, and this would be after midnight. Perhaps the third class knew of the imminent catastrophe by water entering their cabins?
Cavell was another one who saw these passengers. Like Hendrickson, he saw them at about the time the lights had gone off in the boiler room, and lamps were requisitioned from the engine room.
Cavell adds two interesting points; the first is that he sees stewards telling them male passengers to keep calm; and secondly, he notes that that they were wet and carrying lifebelts. But an obvious conflict is his estimate of when he sees these passengers; he thinks this was an hour and half to two hours after the impact. Were these the same passengers that Hendrickson had seen? We have no way of knowing for sure. But by 1 1/2 hours after the fatal collision, all the third class areas forward would be flooded. Indeed, the forward half of the working alleyway would be underwater. Is it also likely that third class passengers would remain static in the working alleyway for such a long period of time? This seems unlikely. A close reading of Cavell's story is that he indeed went into the alleyway shortly after the climbing into the stokehold from the coal bunker, when the lights went out. They were only out for a few minutes, and in this space of time, he was in the alleyway. How he estimates 1 1/2 to 2 hours is unclear. William Ward also notes that some passengers were wet, and like others who saw these men, puts their appearance before midnight.
There are significant problems with the "wet" passenger sighting at about 11.50pm. If one consults the profile picture of the bow, reproduced earlier. One can see that the red areas, denoting the third class areas, are unlikely to have been flooded so early after the collision. This presupposes that the time estimates of witnesses, as depicted on the diagram are "off"; an inevitably considering that people's perceptions of time may be influenced due to the chaotic surroundings. We only know that Symons' timing observation of seeing hatch 1 flooding is correct as it is corroborated by the ringing of 8 bells in the crows nest.
Interestingly, Paul Mauge, the secretary to the a la carte restaurant chef, also stationed on E deck, remembers hearing a bell, which he says was "to alarm the 3rd class passengers" which he saw coming aft "with luggage and children [sic]." Mauge was stationed too far from the bow to have heard any 3rd class alarm, which no-one else seems to have heard. Is it possible that he heard the warning bell down in the engine rooms, near to his room?
Within a minute or so of the collision, 4th Officer Boxhall had headed down into steerage areas to see if he could inspect the damage. He sees nothing, but only goes down as far as F deck, whereas there were some quarters on the deck below. If only he had gone down those stairs! We do not know how long he was below decks, but on his return to the bridge he encounters a man who was heading down to passenger accommodations who tells him about the ice in the well deck. Boxhall does not mention seeing any of the crewman who should have been there, and conversely, none of the crewmen mention seeing Boxhall. We can infer little from this, sadly. Did Boxhall head back up before the 3rd class men in the bow were roused? There is no way to tell but I would suspect that the massive number of 3rd class, choking the corridors would have been obvious. Boxhall also does not seem to have noticed the firemen, stewards and 3rd class passengers who would been in the working alleyway when he wandered down to look at the mailroom!
One possible area for a flooded third class area is the accommodation on G deck, all the way forward near the 2nd cargo hatch. The steerage quarters slightly further aft, near the squash courts, were located on the port side of the ship, and, with the list to starboard, it seems unlikely that they would have flooded by the time Boxhall reached there. One drawback for this theory is that water would have reached G deck a very short space of time after the collision. We know water was in this compartment when Poingdestre when below for his boots at c.12.10am
If water was entering third class space forward within the first ten or so minutes, then it means that the ingress caused by the iceberg must be much larger than previously suspected. It is worth mentioning what third class passenger Daniel Buckley told the American Inquiry:
"I heard some terrible noise and I jumped out on the floor, and the first thing I knew my feet were getting wet; the water was just coming in slightly ... I did not feel any shock in the steamer; only just heard a noise. I heard a kind of a grating noise."
Despite some speculation that the "terrible noise" was the commotion of moving people outside his cabin, his testimony fits in nicely with the theory that only a very short time had elapsed between the collision and him getting his feet wet. We do not know where Buckley was located, except that his cabin was in the bow (even though he thought it was in the aft part of the Titanic) and that it could hold at least four people. Was Buckley one of those who headed aft along the alleyway? It is widely assumed that he headed up, rather than aft, and wound up in the forward well deck, where ice had been deposited, and where a gate was forced open to allow the "suppressed" third class into first class space...and to the lifeboats. But Buckley's testimony shows that, after leaving his cabin and being on deck, he tried to go back to his room again to get a lifebelt. His plan was thwarted by the rising water level. As he headed down, "All the boys and girls were coming up against me...The girls were very excited, and they were crying; and all the boys were trying to console them and saying that it was nothing serious." Single ladies and families were stationed near the stern. This would seem to indicate that he was heading forward for his lifejacket from the stern...perhaps the stern well deck? It has been pointed out that Buckley thought that the gate was "just at the top of the stairs going up into the first class deck." This relates better to the forward than aft well deck. But how well did Buckley know the geography of the ship? He would only know that people of a higher class were on the higher deck. He might only have guessed that it was first class space. The stairs from the aft well deck led to second class space. All he would see is a sign saying "NOTICE 3rd class passengers are not allowed on this deck." There is no mention of it being 1st or 2nd class space at all.
There is further evidence to support a prematurely flooded 3rd class space. The newspaper Cleveland Plain Dealer, Friday, April 26, 1912 had an account of the disaster by Victor Sunderland, who said, "I lay on my bunk in Section G, third deck from the main deck, at 10 o'clock that Sunday night ... Three of us were smoking...A little before midnight we felt a slight jar and heard a noise similar to that a basket of coals would make if dropped on an iron plate. Seven of us ran up the companionway to the main deck, where a steward told us to go back. We saw a number of pieces of ice on the deck, but he said there was nothing wrong, so we went back. We laid down in our bunks again and smoked for about a quarter of an hour. Suddenly one of us noticed water pouring into the section under the door. This time we knew something was wrong and three of us again ran up, but only to the first deck. The others were asleep, and I guess they were drowned. An officer stopped us there and told us to go back and get life preservers. Those preservers were located in racks over the bunks. When we got back we found the section full of water -- twenty feet of it -- and we had no chance to get our life belts. We ran aft between decks and up to the main deck."
A few inaccuracies are apparent. If Sunderland was situated in compartment G, this would be on F deck, hardly the "third deck" from the main deck. However, 3rd class passengers were allowed in the forward well deck, which was on C deck, which was indeed 3 decks above compartment G. The identity of the "officer" is unknown, but the timing of the order to get the life preservers (about midnight) ties in with other testimony. What is interesting about this account is that Sunderland confirms that, within a very short space of time, compartment G was flooded. The only way for water to enter this area was from forward - as can be seen on the following diagram, there were stairs leading up from G deck level with the front of the squash court, and also far forward, to the starboard and forward of the number 2 hatch, which, like the bunker hatch would also allow water to pass. Boxhall went down and saw that the watertight doors were open on F deck; Sunderland proves evidence that they were left open, for, if they were closed, water would not have been able to enter his compartment. Another occupant of compartment G was Olaus Abelseth and he testified at the US Senate Investigation. Sadly, or perhaps fortunately (!) he did not linger long enough to see the water near his berth: "I went to bed about 10 o'clock Sunday night, and I think it was about 15 minutes to 12 when I woke up; and there was another man in the same room - two of us in the same room - and he said to me, "What is that?" I said, "I don't know, but we had better get up." So we did get up and put our clothes on, and we two went up on deck in the forward part of the ship. Then there was quite a lot of ice on the starboard part of the ship. They wanted us to go down again, and I saw one of the officers, and I said to him: "Is there any danger?" He said, "No." I was not satisfied with that, however, so I went down and told my brother-in-law and my cousin, who were in the same compartment there. They were not in the same room, but they were just a little ways from where I was. I told them about what was happening, and I said they had better get up. Both of them got up and dressed, and we took our overcoats and put them on. We did not take any lifebelts with us. There was no water on the deck at that time."
Compartment G, the berths of 3rd class single men. The red areas indicate watertight doors..
However, we know from prior evidence, that the forward part of E deck was flooded well before then. Ray noticed that it was inaccessible when he returned from seeing the very first boat lowered, which would be shortly after 12.45am by our current understanding of the Titanic chronology. Pearcey got on deck in time to help pass two babies to a lifeboat that was eventually lowered at 2.00am. His timing of "1.30" cannot be right. What was he doing in the intervening time? Another point is that, if all the third class men were indeed relayed up to the boat deck, where were they? There is scant evidence of any steerage men being seen on the upper decks at this time.
John Hart was a 3rd class steward; at 11.40pm he was in his bunk near to the 3rd class restaurant down on F deck. The collision did not rouse him and he slumbered on until someone woke him, telling him there had been an accident. This failed to elicit much excitement on the part of Hart and he went back to sleep for another 20 minutes by his estimation whereupon he was woken by the chief 3rd class steward Mr.Kieran who ordered the stewards to attend to the people under their care. For Hart, this was in sections K and part of M on the deck above, and much further astern; eventually all his people were up and lifebelts affixed. After this, according to Hart, a large number of single men came from forward with their baggage [presumably the men who had been seen travsersing the working alleyway earlier?] making for the after well deck area, which was 3rd class space. They traipsed past the open emergency door to 2nd class quarters, which Hart said had been opened at 12.30am. To ensure that anyone coming from forward would have a lifebelt, he placed surplus belts in an alleyway that such people would have to pass. Waiting for further instructions, Hart heard the order to "pass the women up to the boat deck." Taking 30 people aft, they went up the 3rd class stairway up to the aft well deck on C deck. the forward past the 2nd class library and then into 1st class space, where the grand staircase took them 3 decks up the boat deck.
Charles Joughin also remembered that the door to 2nd class quarters, adjacent to a staircase that led stright to the boat deck, was open. Whey, then, did Hart not use this convenient route? Then there is the lack of corroboration for Hart's story. As noted by Peter Engberg-Klarström here, "I have read that Mrs Johnson and her two children said something to this effect; a steward led them up on deck, but that is it. I am sure there would be more cases, however. " Nrs.Elin Hakkarainen reputedly said that she was encouraged by a steward to join a small group of women that he was leading to the boat deck. Mrs. George Joseph Whabee also remembered "well dressed men" (stewards?) leading her and others to the boat deck. But there seem to no other cases of women or children being led up by Hart or his compatriots. Given the tales collected in books such as "The Irish Aboard the Titanic" (where stories from 34 saved Irish women are detailed), it is astonishing that not one such story of heroism on the part of 3rd class stewards has trickled into the public domain.
Sometime between 12.15 and 12.30 (by his estimate), Joughin sees Muller, the third class interpreter just aft of this emergency door, passing the steerage along with their children and baggage, which was obstructing the passageway. Muller and his fellows could not encourage the passengers to leave their baggage behind.
This dovetails with Hart's story. He testified in England thus, "I believe that somebody went forward after the collision to try to see what damage was done after the collision had happened, and there met the passengers coming along. He came along with them. I believe that was the interpreter Mellor [sic- Muller]" And Bath Steward Samuel Rule recalled seeing Muller with the 3rd class male exodus from fore to aft: this was somewhere near Rule's quarters on E deck, as he said "when I left the deck the interpreter was forcing people along the watertight doors in the alleyway." The only watertight doors in that area of the ship were in the aft portion of the alleyway, near Joughin's cabin. The time of this would be about 20 minutes after the crash.
The barriers that would not normally allow admittance were already opened, and Hart arrived in time to see lifeboat 8 on the portside being lowered. Leaving his crowd there, he went back to his group once more, passing another group of third class men and women being led to the boats. Hart arrived back back on E deck to find that others had joined his crowd, and the men now wanted to go to the boats. He took a group of 25 women and children [Hart noted that, on his second excursion topside, there were stewards stationed at intervals to guide the way]. He took his 25 to boat 15, having come out opposite it (or further forward at the 1st class grand staircase, he does not seem sure) in time for the boat to be lowered, thus saving himself and his passengers.
The aft end of the working alleyway.
There are numerous contradictions between the two accounts. From Scott's description of where he would have emerged on the working alleyway, where he obtained the lifejacket, and the staircase he used to gain access to the upper decks, he would have had to have seen the 3rd class that Hart described. However, he doesn't. He admits at the British Inquiry that he wasn't looking, but did see some stewards in the alleyways. He could not have failed to notice the more than 50 third class men, women and children who would have choked the alleyways. Of course, maybe either Scott and/or Hart were lying about certain details, or one man could have got his times wrong. Scott could have left the engine room before or after Hart congregated his passengers, and/or Hart could have gathered his throng after, or before Scott had left. But then there are issues with the timing. Scott claimed to have emerged on deck at 1.40am, in time to see 5th Officer Lowe pull out his revolver at lifeboat 14, and his timing relates reasonably to what we know of the Titanic's lifeboat lowering sequence. But if he left E deck with his lifejacket before Hart roused the 3rd class (say, about 12.30), then we must ask: what was he doing in the intervening 1 hour or so? There seem to be gaps in many Titanic's crew recollections. George Beauchamp's testimony makes it sound as if he went straight to boat 13 after leaving boiler room 6...but there is over an hour's gap unaccounted for. If Scott is right, then Hart's story makes sense only if he tended to his 3rd class passengers but well after Scott had left...and that indicates that the steerage were ignored until long after the collision. So, what do we make of Hart's story? He wanders up to boat 8, leaves his gang there, heads below, and arrives back in time for boat 15. Boat 8 left at about 1.00am, and 15 at 1.40am, or a 40 minute gap. Even allowing for an unruly crowd below, this means a transit time of about 20 minutes. To go down 5 decks and walk aft about 600 feet, the latter distance taking about 2 minutes. Then there are the third class passengers he leaves on deck. None of them got into boat 8; understandable as it was being lowered when he arrived on deck. Assigning third class to lifeboats is controversial and prone to never ending debate, but if Hart's story is true, they may have mingled on deck, getting later boats, or perhaps even going back down to E deck to find their loved ones they left behind? An illuminating discussion can be found Here, but there is a fatal flaw in one of its arguments: namely that Hart's gang was led up to the boats via the forward 1st class staircase on E deck at about 1.30am, in line with Pearcey's story. By 1.30am, the emergency door leading from the working alleyway to the 1st class landing would be underwater.
There is some corroboration for the 1.20am order to vacate the engine room: Dillon also puts the order at this time too. He says that he left the reciprocating engine room to open the stokehold doors, and that this was 30 minutes after the collison, nicely matching Scott's evidence. But if we analyse this in relation to other events, we see that there are problems. When Dillon got to boiler room 4, there was a little water on the stokehold plates; later, when Cavell left the boiler room, there was about a foot of water. Dillon's evidence makes it clear that he was ordered up out of the engine room straight after arriving there, back form boiler room 4. If we allow for just a few minutes to journey from BR 4 to the reciprocating engine room, we see that Dillon's sighting of the water was well before Cavell's. But when Cavell got into the working alleyway, he sees no water. Then when Barrett flees, he sees water; and when Ray goes below decks, the forward half of the alleyway is underwater; this would be very shortly after the launching of the first lifeboat which occurred within the first hour after the collision. The order to evacuate the engine room must have been before even this, meaning that both Scott and Dillon were wrong about the 1.20am timing, and it must have been before 12.40am. This gives some credence to Hart's timings.
But it all comes down - whom do you believe: Scott or Hart? They can't both have been in the same area and seen different things.
The Disappearing Boatswain
Alfred Nichols, the Titanic's Boatswain has been instrumental in mustering the crew to prepare the lifeboats for launching. But he disappears from the drama about half way through the mighty ship's struggle for life. We know that he helped lower boat 3 with Symons, and then, a little later, he assisted just slightly forward at boat no.1. Prior to this, a Jacob's Ladder fetched by Hogg had been discarded (though it is not clear if Nichols gave the order to obtain the ladder, or to dispense with it). At any rate, this Ladder, which could be used to board a lifeboat from an open hatch, was not used. Hogg left soon after, in the very first boat to leave, no.7. Boats 3 and 1 would leave within the next half hour of the Ladder being abandoned on the boat deck. While preparing boat 6, 2nd Officer Lightoller sent Nichols and 6 men to open the gangway doors to allow the half-filled boats to be loaded from close to the waterline. Rather than referring to one set of doors, Lightoller was general in his instructions, implying that more than one set of hatches be opened. Nichols and his men trooped down below. They were never seen again. Not one set of patient eyes in the water recalled seeing any doors opened to the night.In the same boat as Hogg, lookout Jewell recalled later hearing Murdoch to stand by the gangway, but the boats rowed off into the night. Others recalled hearing a similar order.
The disappearance of Nichols and his compatriots is a mystery. If he had attempted to open the forward doors on E deck, he would not have been able to reach them. Poingdestre's evidence shows that, an hour earlier, E deck forward was flooded, rendering the door inaccessible. (See the previous diagram for the location of the doors and the seaman's quarters.) The working alleyway was partially submerged, according to Ray, not long after the first lifeboat was lowered. Nichols would have realised this when he journeyed below decks, and perhaps headed aft towards the other gangway doors on E deck, or even the 1st class entrance hatches on D deck....? And if he succeeded, what happened to him?
The stern area of the wreck is a jumbled mass of wreckage and it is difficult to determine whether any doors were opened: Ken Marschall's painting of the port side shows two open doors, one being an access door to a storeroom, the other being the main 3rd class entrance on E deck. Both of these are missing their doors, and from the condition of the shell plating in this area, it could be that the doors became detached during the implosion of the stern, from the fall to the seafloor, or on impact with the impact. There is one point to consider, though. 4th Officer Boxhall was interviewed by the BBC in 1962, and what he says is extremely illuminating: "“And the captain looked over the side from the bridge and sang out and said, told me to go ‘round to the Starboard side to the gangway doors, which was practically at the opposite side to where I was lowered. I had great difficulty in getting the boat around there. There was suction, and I was using the stroke oar standing up and there was a lady helping, she was steering the boat around the ship’s stern. When I passed ‘round the boat to try and get to this gangway door on the Starboard side her propellers were out of water. I’m not certain if I didn’t pass underneath them.  But when I did eventually reach there I found that there was such a mob standing in the gangway doors, really, I daren’t to go alongside because if they’d jumped they’d swamp the boat. She was only a small boat, could hold about thirty five people. No, no buoyancy tanks in her at all. [It was] the boat that was always turned out ready for emergency purposes, like man overboard. However I decided that it was not, that I daren’t go along the side again, and I pulled off and laid off - until I pulled away about a quarter of a mile, I suppose. And I couldn’t, what struck me as being strange, that all the other boats, I couldn’t see one of them.â€" Boxhall did not mention this mob at either inquiry into the Titanic's loss, but it does explain why his boat took such a strange route round the Titanic's stern.
The starboard E deck door is in the area of a huge rupture in the hull; Parks Stephenson says of the port side door: "Below the well deck, port side of the hull, the E-deck entrance door there is missing. NOAA imaged the safety gate for that door in the down position from a vantage point outside the hull in 2004, Cameron imaged it from inside in 2005. Was the door blown open when the bow section impacted with the ocean floor, or was it open during the sinking? If the latter, then this would have allowed sea water to reach the forward end of the non-watertight Scotland Road passageway as soon as the rising waterline reached that height."
However, it is hard to imagine how the door could be opened with the safety grill down.
The 1st class D deck doors are all closed with one exception (again, due to a lack of imaging, Ken Marschall had to guess as to the status of the doors on the starboard doors, and guessed - incorrectly - that one was open): a portside 1st class entrance door is open, and it is widely assumed that impact with the bottom jarred it open. But, the grilles inside the hull, closed when the gangway doors were shut, are in an open position. Could these two sets of doors corresponding to this open gangway door also have been jarred open upon impact? All the other grilles are closed.However, it is hard to imagine how the door could be opened with the safety grill down.
The beautiful leaded glass windows in the adjacent reception room photographed by James Cameron in 2001 survived the 2 1/2 mile plunge and impact nearly intact, so who can say for sure if the doors could have been opened when the bow hit the ocean floor. There are vertical buckles running vertically down the port side from C Deck downwards, below the forward expansion joint (and not too far from the doors), but not the starboard side - this may have a bearing on which gangway port opened. With the bow down by the head, a growing list to port, and this "open" D deck door hinged on its aftermost side, it would have easier to open this door than its couterparts. But, of course, if any portion of the door was submerged, this would have hindered attempts to open it.
The open gangway door on the portside of the ship. Since this photo was taken (c.1994), the door has fallen off and is now part of a travelling exhibition of recovered artefacts.
One possibility remains for this "open door" hypothesis. Using simple fluid equations it is possible to estimate the amount of water that an open D deck door would admit into the shattered hull, and then compare it to the water already pouring into the ship through the iceberg damage. The results are highly speculative, as many of the variables are not known (for instance, the 14 square feet damage calculated by Edward Wilding has been used), but very rudimentary calculations suggest that, if the door was only 6 feet below the waterline, it would provide an inrush equivalent to nearly 50% of the rate caused by the 'berg. However, we know enough from survivor's testimony to know that the portside doors would be underwater by about 1.30am. This author speculated that the sudden "dip" that caused the bridge to submerge and cascading a huge surge of water aft that swept up Colonel Gracie and others, might have been caused by an open door. This would be about 2.10am. The "dip" occurs too late for this hypothesis to work, indicating that the doors were probably closed. So, we must now concede that Nichols and his men probably never tried to open the forward or amidships doors.
The waterlines at various times in the flooding of the Titanic. The location of the open gangway door is shown.
For what it is worth, this author long considered that the whole Nichols/gangway story was an invention by Lightoller (and others, since Lowe overheard this account) to explain away and excuse the poor occupancy of the lifeboats.
This picture demonstrates how close an E deck gangway door is to the waterline during a normal voyage. This picture was taking during the Titanic's final stop at Queenstown, where the open gangway door (circled) allowed admittance to the tenders.
Passenger Accounts
In contrast to the fascinating accounts by crew members, there is a definite lack of recollections from the passengers in the ship. Other than Daniel Buckley's story, portions of which have been related above, we have the following:Archibald Gracie posthumously tell us, "According to an account by Miss Allen, her employer's niece, Miss Kreuchen went to her room and informed them of the danger. 'she said: " Miss Allen, the baggage room is full of water." I replied she needn't worry, that the water-tight compartments would be shut and it would be all right for her to go back to her cabin. She went back and returned to us immediately to say her cabin, which was forward on Deck E, was flooded.'" We do not know precisely where Miss Kreuchen's cabin was.
Miss Francatelli, the secretary to the Duff-Gordons, was in room E-36, which was level with the end of the 2nd funnel, and aft of the Grand Staircase. She later wrote to a friend, "I was just going to bed. Madame & Sir Cosmo [Duff Gordon] were upon A deck the top, and I on E, the bottom deck for Saloon Passengers when I felt a shudder, then two gentlemen came up and told me that we had run into an iceberg, but were quite safe. I stood still there quite 20 minutes quietly, then the water was on my deck, coming along the corridor and I found all the people, running up and down the stairs. Oh Marion that was a sickening moment, I felt myself go like marble. Sir Cosmo then took us up on top deck. Crowds of people were up there." We do not precisely know when this occurred to place it in a timeline. Sir Cosmo told the British Inquiry that, after he had been on deck and stripping off the lifebelt covers, and returning to his wife, a steward came to his cabin and relayed the order about lifebelts and to go up to the boat deck. Duff-Gordon then says, "Miss Francatelli joined us in the cabin just at that time. We went up to the boat deck together." Reconciling these two versions, Miss Francatelli saw water on the 1st class corridor, having evidently finally emerged from the mail room staircase, and come creeping up towards her, at about the time that the canvas covers on the boats were being stripped off.
This author has not been able to verify the accounts on this webpage, namely that; "Dorothy Gibson (berthed in cabin E-22) also recalled seeing the stairs leading to E Deck flooding as she and her mother made their way up on deck. The Gibsons left in the first lifeboat, number 7, which was lowered about 12:40, according to the latest research...My understanding from the wording in Gibsons story (again I will have to double check as I dont have my notes at hand) was that water was on the steps "BELOW" the grand staircase. She said she saw it, as did her mother, when they were heading up on deck after the general alarm was circulated. She does not say how far up the stairs the water had risen...I remember that when Carl Johnson (third class) jumped out of his bed, the water spilled over his foots [feet? boots?]." None of the accounts of other E deck passengers that this author was able to check (Mr. Harder, Mr.McGough and the Speddens) mention any ingress of water. Interestingly, all these passengers were amongst the first to board lifeboats, which were on the starboard side.
Concluding remarks
Adept readers will notice that I have refrained from providing much in the way of timing estimates in the above essay, and with good reason. I believe that any such subjective timings can be influenced due to the malleable nature of the human mind; coincidentally, the above was being written during the broadcast of the excellent BBC documentary series "Eyewitness" which proved that humans can be very poor impartial recorders of the truth. And even when events are imprinted upon the human mind, it is often incomplete, and the element of imagination merges with memory. During the night the Titanic went down, the unfortunates on the doomed vessel faced a mixture of the mundane, the perplexing and the terrifying, and this combination can't help but have a detrimental effect on the human mind.This author has long thought that the timings of events can be best envisaged based on relative and not absolute timings, correlating common events, and then relating surrounding events to these elements of commonality; seeing the no.1 hatch billowing up, the 3rd class making their way down the working alleyway, the lights going out in the stokeholds etc. There are very few events in the Titanic timeline where we have markers. Markers such as someone looking at their watch when the ship disappeared from sight and announcing "it is 2.20am," or hearing 8 bells in the crows nest after seeing water rush into the hull down the hatchways. But a relative timing approach has its faults too. How can one explain gaps in witnesses recollections? One witness goes below and comes back, seemingly a few minutes later and yet, supposedly, nearly an hour had passed. How much did that witness tell us? Did they stop to talk to a friend, go to the lavatory, or perhaps retire to their cabin for a swift drink? Or did they deliberately omit details that would be prejudicial? We can never know - we do not know enough, and there were no cognitive memory recall techniques to let us know if someone was accidentally or deliberately being selective in their tales.
The timings of events are fragmentary and can only provide snapshots of events. Why are estimates of times so contradictory? There are a few simple experiments that the reader can try; firstly, without any way of being able to tell the time such as wearing a wristwatch, having a clock in the room, engage in light activities, (sitting, reading etc.). With a partner, agree on a "start time" and then, at irregular intervals, ask your partner to record your own perception of time, and what the time actually is. Repeat for a long period of time, ideally 2 hours or so. Then, perform the same experiment, but this time performing strenuous activites (going for a walk, doing some gardening etc.). When you compare the times, you will probably find that, at first, your perception of timing matches "reality" quite well, but after a while, they start to diverge. This is why this author is sceptical of any time estimates given by Titanic passengers and crew unless backed up by the evidence of an observed timepiece, and even then, the proposed 47 minute clock alteration at midnight, which supposedly was never enacted except by a few, tends to muddy the waters. For this reasons, this author tends to accept estimates such as "20 minutes after the collision" but is wary of claims of (say) "1 hour and 40 minutes." Without a watch, there is no way to know. A brief introduction to the psychology of perceived time can be found at this link.
However, to provide some form of completeness to this analysis, this author would like to present the following hypothetical timeline of events in the first hour. All timings are extremely conjectural:
| Time | Event | |
|---|---|---|
| 11.40 | Collision | |
| 11.45 | Boxhall's initial inspection | |
| 11.45 | Lights go out in boiler rooms | |
| 11.50 | 3rd class evacuate and head down working alleyway: F deck watertight doors closed (but perhaps only the aft ones?) | |
| 11.50 | Watertight doors are ordered re-opened | |
| 11.55 | Order given to draw the fires in boiler rooms 2-5 (NB: the boilers in room no.1 had not yet been lit) | |
| 11.55 | Boatswain orders all hands on deck; Sunderland notices that water is seeping into his cabin. | |
| 12.00-12.05 | Stewards are roused | |
| 12.05 | Second call from boatswain to muster hands | |
| 12.10 | Water rushes in on Poingdestre | |
| 12.20 | Water starts to come in on boiler room 4; (surplus?) hands told to leave Engine Room | |
| 12.25 | Boiler room 4 is abandoned | |
| 12.30 | Hart's 3rd class passengers are assembled | |
| 12.35 | Wheat sees water flowing into the Turkish Bath/Swimming Pool area | |
| 12.40 | Barrett leaves boiler room 5 | |
| 12.45 | Ray sees that the forward portside working alleyway is flooded |
In most cases, an arbitrary 5 minute gap between events has been assumed; the last few timings in the table are extremely flexible. If Wheat and Ray's timings are correct, there must have been very little time between (a) first seeing water going into the F deck space and (b) the portside alleyway forward being full. But Barrett's story tells us that he must have left between these two events.
We may never know exactly what happened on board the RMS Titanic, but, by considering the impact on the human mind and its ability to perceive, a clearer picture can be assembled.
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