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Monday, April 2, 2012

Austria Submits to Sharia

Vienna is a city bursting with history. The Vienna of jack boots and swastikas is a distant memory. On the surface, the contemporary Vienna is prosperous, peaceful and civilized.

But there is another Vienna percolating beneath the surface, a dark presence that has the potential to undo the tranquility Austrians have come to accept as the norm. This is the Austrian version of banlieus, the areas populated by Muslims, mostly Turkish. In these areas, crime is on the rise, resentment is palpable and buildings are marred with graffiti.

Most significantly, the average person refuses to recognize the potential problem these communities represent. If one points out the dangers, the specter of Islamophobia or racism is raised as a chilling censor, and defenders of Enlightenment ideas, such as individual rights, property rights and the rule of law are castigated as right wing fanatics when they insist on applying these principles to Muslim minorities.

So preoccupied are establishment figures with maintaining this Austrian version of tranquility that they prefer to look away and criticize the people upholding democratic ideals. It is obvious, or should be obvious, that Sharia Law is inconsistent with Enlightenment ideas. But when it comes to peace versus principle, authorities opt for the former, fearful that any other stance will exacerbate public attitudes.

As a consequence, official state numbers suggest the Islamic population in Austria has remained stable at 500,000 over the last decade, even through the birth rate among Muslims is more than twice the replacement level of 2.1. Far better to deceive the public at large than alarm it.

The same condition prevails with the crime rate. As crime statistics are not broken down by race or ethnicity, the average person may discern a disproportionate crime rate among Muslims, but it is not part of the public record.

When Elisabeth Sabaditch-Wolf, a resident of Vienna, spoke out against Muslim practices that threaten democracy, she was labeled a right wing fanatic and is currently facing prosecution for public incitement. Rather than honor her for defending civilizational principles, she has been marginalized as an extremist by Austrian authorities. These prosecutions - even if unsuccessful - have a chilling influence on free speech and open debate.

It is remarkable that Sharia Law has won a psychological victory as it cannot be challenged without judicial investigation. Yet Sharia, in essence, cannot tolerate apostasy. Apostates, according to Koranic principles, must either convert, submit or die. This is a direct contradiction of democratic ideals and a violation of liberal religious practices established over centuries of bloodletting. Now, without a shot being fired, the Austrians have seemingly conceded. All it took was the possibly of violence and the pervasive ambience of intimidation.

One gets the impression that a nation that has grown to love freedom and prosperity has grown complacent. And with this complacency, Austrians will engage in almost any arabesque of rationalization to maintain tranquility. Without fully realizing it, this strategy is leading to the very totalitarianism it fought so hard to avoid during the Cold War. Sharia Law disavows secular prescriptions, but in its political agenda it is intent on transforming Western institutions. Signs of this goal are already evident in Austria today.

Islam in Austria

Islam in Austria


Islam is the largest religious minority in Austria with 4.22 %of the population in the 2001 census;1 after the Catholics (73.6%), irreligious (12%), and Protestants (4.7%).2 There are approximately 338,988 Muslims in Austria, that has a resident population of 8,032,926 persons.
In 1971 only 0.3% of the Austrian population were registered officially as Muslims. And even in 1991, only 158,776 Muslims were counted in the same survey (2% of the population). The duplication of Muslims in Austria within 10 years has been explained by a growing willingness of Muslims to speak publicly about their religion, in particular of those from Turkey.
96,052 of Muslims in Austria possessed the Austrian citizenship. The number of naturalization has increased significantly, especially of Turks and Bosnians. In 1991, 11,137 naturalizations were counted (1,801 of them Turks). In 2000, 24,645 new Muslim Austrian citizens (6,732 had formerly possessed Turkish citizenship).
In terms of ethnicity, the biggest group is of Turkish descent (134,210 Turks), followed by Bosnians (96,210 persons). During the last decades, Arabs (10,123 persons) became a considerable part of the Muslim population in Austria too, especially from Egypt. Approximately 6,460 mostly secular Muslims in Austria have Iranian origins. Recently furthermore, experts observed a rise in conversion to Islam in Austria too.
Islam in Austria has a long history, dating back to 1525 when the Ottoman sultans tried to invade the Austrian empire. Although these attempts failed, Islam influenced Austrian culture significantly, and numerous Austrians converted to Islam. In modern history, immigration to the Austria, especially from Turkey and Eastern European countries, increased after the 1878 Berlin conference, which assimilated Islamic populations into the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, and the new arrivals were welcomed by the authorities, which gave them a maximum of religious freedom. After the Second World War, new waves of Muslim immigrants arrived in Austria. First, laborers helped to reconstruct the country. After 1964, “guest workers” came in particular from Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, as well as, though less, from Arab countries and Pakistan. Also matriculations of students from Muslim countries increased at Austrian universities. During the 1970s then, immigration increased as a result of the economic boom. The last wave of Muslim immigrants arrived in the early 1990s from Yugoslavia.
In terms of regions, the western federal state Vorarlberg with its industrial towns has the highest share of Muslims in Austria (8.36 %), according to the 2001 survey.3 Vorarlberg (8.4%, 29,334 persons) is followed by Vienna with 7.82% (121,149 persons). The central state Salzburg (4.5%, 23,137 persons), Upper Austria (4.0%, 55,581 persons), Tyrol (4.0%, 27,117 persons) and Lower Austria (3.2%, 48,730 persons) follow with the share of Muslims around the average. Fewer Muslims, i.e. numbers are below the national average, live in Southern and Eastern states of Styria (1.6%, 19,007 persons), Carinthia (2.0%, 10,940 persons) and Burgenland (1.4%; 3,993 persons).

Federal State Muslim Pop. Share of the Pop. District with the Highest Share Pop. General Pop. Share
Vorarlberg 29,334 8.36 Dornbirn 8,969 11.82
Wien 121,149 7.82 Bezirk (Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus) 9,534 14.69
Salzburg 23,137 4.40 Salzburg (Stadt) 9,735 6.82
Österreich 338,988 4.22      
Oberösterreich 55,581 4.04 Wels (Stadt) 5,785 10.20
Tirol 27,117 4.03 Innsbruck (Stadt) 6,108 5.39
Niederösterreich 48,730 3.15 St. Pölten (Stadt) 3,681 7.49
Kärnten 10,940 1.96 Villach (Stadt) 1,973 3.43
Steiermark 19,007 1.61 Graz (Stadt) 9,023 3.99
Burgenland 3,994 1.44 Mattersberg 1,141  

State and Church

The legal status of Muslims in Austria is unique in Europe.5 For many years, as the center of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Austria closely related with Islamic populations in the Balkans. With this history, Austria’s relations with Islam as a religion have been relatively unproblematic compared to other European countries. A law of 1867 guaranteed respect for all religions throughout the empire, giving Muslims the right to establish mosques and practice their religion. Muslims also occupy good positions within the Austrian civil service, and the first mosque was already built in Vienna in 1887 with the government‘s assistance to service Muslims enlisted in the Austrian army.
Generally, the Austrian government provides religious freedom for all communities. Although Roman Catholicism is preponderant among the population, the state is generally secular. Religious organizations are established by the 1874 Law on Recognition of Churches. The law gave Muslims various rights and privileges, including the right to organize and manage their community affairs independently through municipal councils and to establish Islamic endowment funds. In 1919, these rights and privileges were enhanced by the signing of the Saint-Germain agreement, in which the Austrian government pledged its protection for minorities and affirmed the right of each citizen to assume important national posts regardless of religion or ethnic origin. This was lately enhanced by the 1998 Law on the Status of Religious Confessional Communities. Organizations are categorized as religious societies, religious confessional communities, and associations with distinct legal status. Classification as a religious society allows participation in the state-run contribution system, the provision of religious instruction in public schools and financing for private schools.
Islam in particular was recognized constitutionally as a religion, after the parliamentary treatment in the Upper Chamber and Lower House, since 1912. The Islam Law, issued by Emperor Franz Joseph I, concerned the acknowledgment of Islam’s followers within the Austrian half of the empire. In 1979, this Islam Law of 1912 was the basis for the recognition of Islam as a corporation of public law, in which also the proclamation of a Constitution of the Islamic Religious Body and the establishment of the first Viennese Islamic Religion Community was, announced (“Anerkennungsgesetz”; “Act of Recognition”). According to Article 1 of the Constitution all Muslims in Austria belong to the Religious Body.
In Austria the Islamic Religious Body is acknowledged as corporation under public law since 1979. About 200 teachers give Islamic religious education at public schools according to the nationally approved curricula.6
According to Article 3 of this Constitution the tasks of the Islamic Religious Body concern primarily “the keeping and care of religion among the followers of Islam”. The President of the organization is elected according to its Constitution; as official interlocutor of national or church authorities he is subject to public control. By the formal acknowledgment of Islam, representatives of the Islamic Religious Body (president, deputy, religion teachers etc.) become the official persons to which authorities, politicians and journalists are able to turn. The acknowledgment as religious community promoted religious education.
Finally, in 1989, the Austrian government amended the ‘Law of Islam’ to recognise all the Islamic theological schools in addition to the Hanafi School, which was covered by previous legislation.7 This led to increased rights and privileges for Austria‘s Muslims. Women, for instance, are permitted to wear the veil at work and in public ceremonies, students in public institutions too were permitted to veil, and Muslims gained the right to study Islam in state schools and in the army. Austria’s Muslim soldiers also gained the right to take paid vacations for the Islamic holidays of Eid Al-Fitr, which marks the end of the fasting month of Ramadan, and Eid Al-Adha.

Muslim Organizations

Muslims in Austria are officially represented by the Islamic Faith Community (Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft) of Austria (IGGIÖ), which was established in 1912.8 The organization manages most relations with the state, including Islamic instruction, chaplaincy, etc. Regional committees select the organization’s leadership. The IGGIÖ is also allowed to collect “church tax” but so it has not exercised this privilege yet. After originating the first European Imam Conference in June 2003, the IGGÖ organized its first Austrian Imam Conference in April 2005, which contained Standpoints and resolutions concerning “Islam in Austria.”
However, after the national acknowledgment of Islam as corporation under public law, various additional associations were created. These organizations range between local private clubs and supra-regional organizations. Sometimes a group operates several mosques, which can be accommodated in several flats, and registered as “associations”. While in the 1990s more than 80 Mosque Communities or Islamic Associations existed in Austria, more than 200 Mosque Communities for the about 340.000 Muslims were counted after the turn of the century. Nevertheless, exact member numbers of these organizations are difficult to get since the group of sympathizers expresses its affiliation usually not by membership dues, but by the Islamic alms-tax (Zakat). The organizations generally have a prayer room, a leisure club, and a shop.
A key organization is the Islamic Centre in Vienna that was founded in 1977 and the Islamic Religious Authority, founded in 1979, which functions as the religious and spiritual representative of Muslims in the country, in the same way as Austria’s key Christian and Jewish bodies do for their communities.
Apart from the official Islamic Religious Body, some groups or individuals act independently of the umbrella organization, such as {Muhammad Abu Bakr Müller}, an Austrian who converted to Islam, who represents a very radical interpretation of Islam.9
The “Muslim Youth Austria” for instance, that launched at the end of the nineties an Islamic youth organization throughout Austria, and is close to the IGGIÖ, defines itself as Islamic, independent, multi-ethnical, constitutional and German-speaking, places the work “from and for young people” into the centre of its activity.10
The first Islamic Center in Austria was built in 1968. Its Trustee Council was formed under the chairmanship of Hassan Al-Tuhamiy, Egypt’s ambassador to Austria at the time, who later became secretary-general of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The Center was inaugurated in November 1977 and has been playing an important role in religious teaching the Muslims in Austria.11
Other Islamic education institutions include the Islamic Academy in Vienna, founded in 1998, and the Al-Azhar Institution in Vienna, founded in 2000.
There are various Islamic associations sponsored by different Muslim countries.12 However, the activities of non-state unions are confined to religious and educational activities, and their institutional structures do not include any mechanisms for political action. Among them several Turkish organizations, united in the “Federation of Turkish-Islamic Associations” that is controlled by the Directorate for Religious Affairs. Other Turkish-Muslim groups, such as the Süleymancıs and Milli Görüş, can be considered as branches of the pan-European organization Milli Görüş centered in Germany. The Alevis, a major group among the Turks, do not take part in the activities of the Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in general.
In terms of ethnicity, Turkish associations are numerous in particular in Vienna, Tirol, Upper Austria and Vorarlberg. The Turkish association of the AMGT (“European National View Organization”), i.e. Milli Görüş (“National View”) is also independent and important in Austria. In contrast to the Islamic Community Milli Görüş (IGMG) in Germany, the Austrian group is not a registered association, but an alliance of mosques. The umbrella organization of this alliance is the 1988 created “Islamic Federation” that has a coordination function. The ideology of the Milli Görüş mosques is relatively strict, promoting the Islamization of all areas of life. Apart from a “modernization and democratization of the Islamic Movement” and an “Islamizing of modernity and democracy” as ideological objectives, Milli Görüş Associations of Austria concentrate in their practical work mainly on the social integration of Muslims.

Islamic Education

Since in Austria the religious education at public schools is a right of recognized churches and religious communities, also the Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich (IGGIÖ) makes use of this right, and established an Islamic instruction. The government provides funding for instruction in all state-recognized religions at public schools, and instruction in Islam has been offered at public schools since 1983. Recent counts had some 37,000 children participate in such classes at 2,700 schools across the country, taught by 350 teachers and the number continues to rise.13 Muslim Pupils at public schools do not have to attend lessons on Muslim holidays.
The IGGIÖ is entitled to give lessons of religious education in state schools. It organizes teachers and is in charge of the content of the instruction, which is held in German. According to the organization, the purpose of the instruction is to improve students’ knowledge of Islam and to encourage them to reflect upon and discuss issues related to religious identity and living as a Muslim in Austria.
In the 1980s, about fifty teachers gave Islamic religious education (about half of them taught in Vienna). Today, there are about 200 lady teachers. In the first years the lacking knowledge of the German language as well as the educational approach of the assigned teachers gave often cause for criticism on the part of parents, of the teaching staff and of the supervisory school authorities – a situation which was quite unsatisfactory for the IGGIÖ.14
Eventually, the IGGIÖ decided to install after the model of the religion-educational academies already existing an own teachers’ training college: the private Islamic Religion-Educational Academy. Since 1999, a private Islamic Religious Academy has been training religious teachers of Islam in Vienna. The task of the academy is clearly defined: it serves “a scientifically founded and practice-oriented vocational training on high school level in educational and social relations fields.” The academy offers a three-year program in cooperation with a public pedagogical college. In a newspaper article published in September 2004, the president of an umbrella organization for Turkish associations in Austria claimed that his organization has received numerous complaints from parents about the instruction in Islam at public schools. According to him, these complaints suggest that some teachers of Islam are seeking to spread inflammatory ideas and that this problem is compounded by the fact that the teachers generally are poorly trained. The president of IGGIÖ rejected the allegations as unfounded and defamatory, although he admitted that he, in his role as educational inspector, is not able to personally oversee all Islamic classes organized in the country. In a separate statement, IGGIÖ emphasized that it greatly appreciates the way instruction in Islam is organized in Austria and that it takes its responsibility in this respect seriously. The organization said that it is engaged in continuing efforts to ensure and improve the quality of instruction. Among recent measures taken are the establishment of the Islamic Religious Academy and the appointment of a commission to develop a new curriculum for instruction in Islam, which will offer teachers “practical and detailed guidance.”
The Islamic religion lady teachers act according to a uniform curriculum, and teach in German language. The religious education at public schools, which is based on a uniform nationally approved curriculum, is the guarantee for the state that Islamic religious education is not given outside the school in a way which dodges the national educational system. In Austria there are – due to the national religious education – at least no such problems as with the so-called Koran schools in Germany and Switzerland.15 Only two of the 1,552 private schools, recognized in 2005-06 by the government as running in compliance with the Private School Law, are Islamic schools.16


The number of well-educated Muslims in Austria rises. This is also due to the fact that the self-confidence of the Austrian Muslims has quite changed in the past years. In the younger generation the proportional part of persons with qualified graduations rose, and academic elite came into being. But still, this group remains a minority yet among the Muslims living in Austria.17
In terms of numbers, no relevant data exists. The OECD collects data on education from various statistical agencies within the country, the majority of which comes from census data from the year 2000. The OECD classifies educational achievement using the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED): ISCED 0/1/2: Less than upper secondary; ISCED 3/4: Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary; ISCED 5A: “Academic” tertiary; ISCED 5B: “Vocational” tertiary; ISCED 6: Advanced research programs. 0-2 is considered low, 3-4 as medium and 5 and above are considered high. This data is not reported by religion, but does have country of origin as reported by the respondent. It is thus possible to construct an approximate picture of the educational achievement of the population in the country with ancestry from predominately Muslim countries. One significant problem is that some countries, such as India and Nigeria have large Muslim populations but the immigrant population cannot be readily classified as predominately Muslim or non-Muslim. As such, the educational data is split by predominately Muslim origin, predominately non-Muslim origin, and a separate category for those whom classification would not seem justified. Proportions are for all reported data, individuals with no reported ancestry or education are excluded.

  High Medium Low
Muslim 6% 30 % 64%
Non-Muslim 11% 55 % 34%
Indeterminate 8% 32 % 60%

Labor Market

Although, there are no readily available statistics for Muslim unemployment in Austria, the unemployment rate is more than 1.5 times as high for the foreign-born, of which a substantial proportion are Muslim.
In particular women, dressed according to Islamic dress code, have problems in participating in the labor market in Austria.18 Regularly, employers announce that they are unable to employ women in Islamic dresses, regarding a lack of tolerance on the side of their customers and business partners.


Spatial segregation of Austrian Muslims in first and foremost not a religious but a social (class) problem. In addition, Austria’s Muslims are often segregated according to specific theological and ethnic differences. The Turks, for instance often live in a closed community with their own mosques and social life.19
Nevertheless, ghettosation is not a major problem for the Austrian Muslim community. For years, the Austrian government has acted to prevent spatial segregation. Urban planners are well-aware of the negative consequences which are caused by isolation into a kind of parallel society, are seen by the Muslims in Austria, and therefore segregation models are rejected. Today, members of a growing Muslim middle class live in non-Muslims neighborhoods.

Islamic Practice

There has not been significant controversy at the legal level over the Islamic headscarf in Austria. Halal slaughter was restricted by state governments until 1998, at which point a federal court mandated that the practice was protected by the guarantee of freedom of religion in Austria.20
Muslims in Austria differ however not only by their country of origin and denomination, but pretty substantially also by kind and strength of their religiosity. Altogether, 150 prayer rooms exist in Austria today; 60 Mosques in Vienna. These spaces of religious practice have a significant social role as well. Often, prayer rooms are based in “backyards” and old houses and are therefore not visible in public. In recent years however, Muslims have begun to move out of these hidden places. A prominent example is the construction of a Mosque cultural centre in Vienna’s Pelzgasse, powered by the Turkish Union.
Recently, a 34,000 sq km Islamic cemetery has also been built in Vienna.21

Political Participation and Muslims in Legislatures

For a long time it did not appear that any Muslims had been elected to the national or European legislatures. There were only very few numbers of Muslims active in regional parliaments throughout the main three parties (Social Democrats, Conservatives, Green Party). Ten years ago, it was not unusual that imams reflected in their Friday prayers about the question whether or not Muslims should participate in Austrian elections. This has changed. Recently, imams called their communities to use their right to vote as Austrian citizens.
The Islamic community thus made efforts to play a role in the country’s political life, and several Islamic figures qualified themselves to assume distinguished positions inside parties and governmental bodies. A major turning point was the election of the Vienna municipal parliament in 2001.22 One of the most famous Muslims politicians in Austria is Amr Al-Rawi, a Muslim parliament member for the Social Democrat Party of Austria (SPÖ). Al-Rawi was born in Iraq and searched his voters consciously in Mosques and Islamic community centers.23 A major problem, Al-Rawi faced when running for parliament was that he had to explain many of his potential voters, who were to elect for the first time in their lives, why and how they could support him directly. Al-Rawi gained 2558 votes in Vienna (3rd position on the list), and entered the municipal parliament in 2002. In the following national parliamentary elections, he received 3151 votes. This time, however, also other parties had recognized the potential of Muslim voters and tried to campaign in Mosques and Muslim centers as well. This time however, the conservatives (Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP)) had a Muslim candidate, Sirvan Ekici, too. She fought for the right of Muslims not to work on Islamic holidays, such as Eid Al-Fitr or Eid Al-Adha.24 And also the right-wing FPÖ listed a candidate, who was born in Egypt, on one of the backmost positions of its list. The Green party had already had Muslim candidates, although they didn’t emphasize very much their religious beliefs.
Although Austria’s Muslims reached most of their political aims, such as Islamic holidays, one issue that has yet to be resolved with the government is related to a law that allows hospitals and medical centers to take human organs from the recently deceased without the permission of their families, provided the deceased is not carrying documentation expressly forbidding this. This is a problem for the majority of the Muslims. To counter such campaigns, they, in collaboration with various political parties and authorities, organized a campaign to underscore the tolerance of Islam and its openness to other religions and cultures. During the campaign, various political leaders hailed the honorable role of Muslims in Austrian life.
In other efforts to promote integration and understanding, the Communist Party held an iftar feast in Ramadan 2002 in which the party leader highlighted the importance of Muslims’ participation in elections and noted their tangible role in Austrian life in general. Altogether, the Austrian People’s Party held three iftar banquets in Ramadan 2003 for the Turkish Muslim community.

Radicalism, Security and Anti-Terrorism Issues

In May 2004, a new law substantially restricted asylum rights by limiting appeals and nations of origin. The law was immediately challenged in court and is currently under review.25
Austrians have fears of Islamic terrorists or Islamic fundamentalists, among other things because there is a material basis for them in attempts and acts of terrorism. This is not ignored by the Muslims who live in Austria. Following the events of 11 September 2001, Austrian officials expressed their rejection of all forms of terrorism like their counterparts around the world but they refused to link the phenomenon with Islam. The Austrian foreign minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner underscored that Islam is a religion of tolerance and peace and that it has nothing to do with terrorism. This stance runs in accordance with the broad lines of the Austrian policy of consolidating dialogue between religions with the aim of increasing comprehension and rapprochement.
As in other European countries, there have been concerns that foreign imams are not well-integrated, speak little German, and may be spreading ideas that are hateful and violent. The IGGIÖ monitors mosques and professes the willingness to intervene, which they say has happened “once or twice” in the past decade. The Ministry of Interior also plays a similar role in monitoring potentially violent speech.26
In October 2007, Austrian authorities arrested two Bosnian suspects who attempted bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Vienna.27 They were arrested Monday after trying to enter the embassy with a backpack containing explosives and nails. The Bosnian was arrested after his bag set off a metal detector and the man fled on foot, authorities said. The suspect was described only as a 42-year-old native of Bosnia-Herzegovina who now lives in the province of Lower Austria, which encircles most of the capital. Police said they made the arrest a short distance from the embassy in a neighborhood where security is tight. The motive for the attack was not immediately clear. Vienna police spokeswoman Michaela Raz said explosives experts were examining the contents of the backpack. Guenther Ahmed Rusznak, a spokesman for Vienna’s Islamic community, issued a statement late Monday condemning the attempted bombing and rejecting radical Islam.
In 2008 an Austrian court has sentenced a young Muslim couple to prison for posting a video on the Internet calling for terrorist attacks in Austria and Germany.28 The defendants’ lawyer disputed their alleged ties to al Qaeda. A 21-year-old Austrian woman on Wednesday, March 12, was sentenced to 22 months in prison and her 22-year-old husband to four years for belonging to a terrorist organization, trying to blackmail the Austrian government and inciting a crime. It was Austria’s first case of “home-grown” terrorist activity. The sentences were below the maximum of 10 years. The Egyptian-born man, Mohamed M., was found guilty on charges of being involved in a March 2007 video that threatened to target Austria and Germany with terrorist attacks if they did not immediately withdraw their troops from Afghanistan. “In standing by the United States … you have provoked those whom you call terrorists to target you,” said the voice on the film as German and Austrian flag appeared against a burning background.

Bias and Discrimination

In Austria, threatening and offensive comments against Muslims have become more common.29 In recent years, the number of anti-Muslim campaigns organized by right-wing extremists and neo-Nazis increased.
Experts see the 1999 national elections as a turning point when the right-wing FPÖ started a populist “foreigner campaign” (“Ausländerwahlkampf“).30 The party instrumentalized subtle popular fears of Islam and promoted slogans like “Stop Foreign Infiltration” (“Stop der Überfremdung”). Critics accused the FPÖ of introducing Islamophobia into the accepted political discourse and to scare foreigners in Austria.31 The campaign caused a huge debate, ranging from issues of anti-Semitism to racism, but not considering explicitly Islamophobia. Since 1999 several campaigns have been organized through mass media and intellectual and cultural forums to distort the image of Islam, and there have also been attacks against Islamic figures and institutions. The last election campaign for the National Assembly was again lead at the expense of the image of Austrian Muslims. “Home not Islam” (Daham statt Islam) and other Anti-Muslim slogans predominated the campaign of the FPÖ.
In 2008, the Graz-based FPÖ activist, Susanne Winter, denounced Islam’s prophet and Muslim men in general as “child molesters”.32 Winter had accepted police protection following her remarks at the weekend, said a spokesman for the interior ministry, Rudolph Gollia. After her speech, a video threat of Islamists appeared on YouTube. The video showed pictures of the destruction of the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001, and warned: “Look, Susanne, something like this could happen to your country and you are responsible.” “It was a mistake for you to take on … Allah’s warriors,” the video said in German. “We, the Muslims, are those warriors with whom you now have a problem.”
In April 2000, Vienna’s Muslims, in collaboration with various political parties and authorities, organized a campaign to counter the hostile attacks launched by the FPÖ against them. In general, as Austria’s Muslims gradually increased their role in political life they became more important for the leaders of the big political parties, who made greater efforts to win their political support and votes.33
Muslims face different sorts of concrete discrimination in everyday life too. Thus, women with headscarves have had difficulties finding jobs,34 and social acceptance of the headscarf has decreased in recent years.35 This has occurred to the degree that employment offices have sometimes considered the headscarf as a disability in a job search.
Three reports about racism in Austria, conducted in 1999, 2001 and 2002, by the ZARA organization, contain much information about Muslim Austrians.36 When Paul Zulehner and Hermann Denz asked Austrians „Whom do you not want to have as a neighbor?” For a study in 2001 study, 24.7 % of the Austrian population answered “Muslims“; only “Gypsies” were less popular (38.5 %). The numbers increased significantly since the previous report of 1999. In 1999, three years earlier (before 9/11 though), 9.3 % less of the asked Austrians had had any problems with having Muslim neighbors.
Also regarding FPÖ campaigns, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance has criticized the tone of Austrian politics as anti-immigrant sentiment has become more powerful over the last few years.37 An EU report about changes in the Austrian’s attitude towards foreigners after 9/11, draws a positive conclusion, however. Altogether, the report says, very few violent attacks against foreigners occurred in recent years and there is a positive attitude for dialogue.38
Finally, the equal opportunities directive of the EU that had to b e adopted by July 19, 2003 became the basis of an anti-discrimination law (Anti-Diskriminierungsgesetz) that will certainly influence anti-Muslim behavior on the labor market.39 In the future, employers have to prove that they are not decimating Muslims – until today, it was the employee who had to proof that he/she was discriminated by the employer.

Media Coverage and Public Perception of Islam

After 9/11, reports about “radical Islam” (among other things: September 11, 2001; Terrorist attacks in Madrid in the year 2004 and in London in the year 2005; Murder of the film producer van Gogh; Controversy on the “Mohammed caricatures,” Fitna-Film Controversy) increased significantly.
Routinely in the Austrian public and media critical questions about “Austrian Islam” is asked whenever issues of “radical Islam” are debated. Thus each report on Islamic extremism and on questions about the Islam in the West has the undertone: How does it actually look with “our” Muslims in Austria? And are “they perhaps also as ready for violence as the Muslims in the media”? Thus, if acts of terrorism happen, also representatives of the Islamic Religious Body are asked for an “official” statement. Beate Winkler, director of the in Vienna “European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia” (EUMC), even observed that the events of the last years created “an atmosphere in which Muslims must constantly defend themselves and explain that they were not terrorists”.40
Apart from (though often linked to) media reports and public debates on Islamism, are Mosque controversies. The question of mosque building or of the height of minarets led in the past years repeatedly to discussions. For example in the year 2001 a mosque in the Traun city centre was pulled down on grounds of an official decision.41 The negative answer read among other things: “The established washing facility (three taps for cold water, which were duly attached to the public water mains and to the public sewage channel) can change the sanitary and hygienic conditions in the place”.42 Local politicians used the controversies to spread hatred against Islam and Muslims in general. In Telfs in Tirol the tempers ran high by the building of a planned minaret in November 2005. The building of the tower was approved meanwhile in first instance. Building projects of mosques with dome and minaret in the classical style could not be carried out for instance in Graz and Salzburg due to citizens’ initiatives or to high plot prices so far. Several mosque controversies are still going on. In 2008, the provincial government of Carinthia passed a law effectively banning the construction of mosques or minarets.43 The controversial legislation, passed with the votes of the Conservative People’s party and the right-wing Alliance for Austria’s Future was a sign against the “advancement of Islam”, provincial governor Jörg Haider said. The legislation links the construction of mosques with rules concerning the overall look and harmony of towns and villages, thereby aiming at preventing their construction. While Haider, a former leader of the right-wing Freedom Party that in its heyday enjoyed the support of up to 27 percent of Austria’s voters with its anti-immigration rhetoric, praised the new rules as a “guidepost” for Europe, the province’s Social Democrats slammed the measure as a populist farce.
Other common themes in the media include issue of ritual slaughter of animals, Islamic cemeteries, and problems in school and gym instruction. Here, conflicts arise with cook instruction, if the Muslim children may not eat the food, which they should prepare after the Austrian curriculum, or with swimming instruction, because girls may not be in the same bath as boys. Problems occur also during outdoors projects and school meetings, because a girl may not pass the night without his parents outside. Another central media debate concerns the carrying of religiously motivated clothes. Since then head cloth debates, and associated therewith discussions about the integration of Muslims flared up time and again, either in consequence of similar debates in other European countries or because of a terrorist attack or news about Islamic extremism. Eventually, general debates on migration policy often reflect issues related to the integration of Muslims.

Political Discourse and Intercultural Dialogue

Media debates on Islamic slaughtering, mosques, and headscarves reflect the political and intercultural dialogue. On the right-wing of the political spectrum, the FPÖ and the populist politician Jörg Haider tried repeatedly to introduce a number of anti-Muslim comments, often couched as attempts to protect traditional Christian society, such as: “The increasing fundamentalism of radical Islam which is penetrating [Europe], is threatening the consensus of values which is in danger of getting lost.”44
Liberal and left-wing parties as well as Muslim organizations tried to enhance better understanding and to fight discrimination against Muslims, confronting a negative image in the political discourse, by organizing a number of intercultural dialogues. Recently the president initiated a inter-religious dialogue in the Vienna Hofburg where representatives of Jews, Muslims and the Christian confessions met. Another important event was the City-Experts-Talk (“StadtexpertInnengespräch“) in the Vienna city hall that was initiated by the Greens.45 On this occasion, the director of the Vienna public transport organization assured Muslim women to wear a headscarf together with their uniform and the appropriate hat when working in public transport in Vienna.
On April 24, 2005, 160 living directors of public prayer, among them also about 25 women, met in Vienna. As Locating Islam in Austria a detailed statement passed, in which is said among other things: 1) the participants of the conference emphasize their sticking to constitutional principles in the Republic of Austria, enclosed in it and particularly stressed the equality of all citizens before the law, pluralism, democratic parliaments and rule of law. 2) The acknowledgment status of Islam in Austria and the practical advantage associated with it: the right to free and public worship, the internal autonomy of the Islamic Religious Body, the religious education in schools, and the consideration of religion e.g. in the federal army.
Austria’s contribution to the dialogue of religions also goes beyond national borders. In June 2003 in Graz a meeting of the “Directors of Islamic Centers and Imams in Europe” took place. The development of an authentic Islam in Europe, which is but independent of the Arab world, was topic of the three-day-long conference. At the end the “Declaration of Graz” was adopted. Therein is said among other things: “The Islamic message is built on moderation. From this the clear refusal results to any form of fanaticism, extremism, fatalism. Muslims must tell of their loyalty toward constitution and law also in its secular structure.”
Finally, Muslim communities started organizing “Open Mosque Days”. On 8 April 2000, an Open day was launched at the Islam Centre (Islamisches Zentrum) in Vienna and attracted more than 1000 visitors. Meanwhile, smaller communities have started organizing similar events.

Netherlands/Belgium: The link between crime and ethnicity

Friday, June 25, 2010

Netherlands/Belgium: The link between crime and ethnicity

Netherlands/Belgium: The link between crime and ethnicity

In the Netherlands, half the Moroccan youth get in trouble with the police by the time they're 22. A third of this group are repeat offenders with more than 5 incidents on their record, according to a new study published in the recent issue of the Tijdschrift voor Criminologie (Journal of Criminology).

To the surprise of the authors, it turns out Moroccan girls commit three times as many crimes as Dutch girls. An multiple offenders are on average not more violent than people who commit a crime every now and then. According to another study in the same issue of TVC, asylum migrants commit more crimes than ethnic Dutch or regular migrants. An evaluation of of both studies, and the question is whether this study can be generalized for Belgium. Not so.

This article was prepared by the Islam in Europe blog - islamineurope.blogspot.com

The link between ethnicity and studying criminality is a sensitive issue. Registration of somebody's ethnic background soon brings charges of 'racism'. In Belgium there are no studies about this issue, but in the Netherlands there are. TVC devoted an entire issue to this subject.

A new study by Arjan Blokland, Kim Grimbergen, Wim Bernasco and Paul Nieuwbeerta is central. They followed everybody who was born in the Netherlands in 1984 (!) until they were 22. They checked how many times these people got in trouble with the police for a crime.

Such a study was never done before. Though it did appear already before that that the number of immigrants in the annual group of suspects in the Netherlands is twice as big as their part in the population. And also that about a third of all registered crimes in the Netherlands are committed by a non-Western immigrants. And you had another study by the city of Rotterdam, which showed that in 2007, more than half of the Moroccans in Rotterdam aged 18-24 got in trouble with the police at least once for a crime. The recidivism in this group is around 90%. These studies were snapshots and could therefore be biased. Never before was a complete birth 'cohort' (a group from a certain birth year which is followed for years) from across the Netherlands followed. That did occur now.


What are the most important results?

* 14% of these youth from 1984 got in trouble with the police at least once. Among Dutch men that was 20%, among Moroccan men 54%.

* Immigrant youth got in trouble with the police for a crime more than ethnic Dutch. This is true for all immigrant groups (Moroccans, Turks, Antilleans, Surinamese..)

* Moroccan boys are on average the youngest when they were first registered (17.6). The average starting age for Dutch men is 18.5. Moroccan boys also got in trouble with the police most often, on average (4.1 times).

* Turkish men commit mostly violent crimes, Dutch men are registered for destruction, disturbing the public order and traffic offense. Moroccan men commit property crimes.

* 5.4% of all girls born in 1984 got in trouble with the police at least once as perpetrators. For Dutch girls that was 4.5%, for Moroccan girls 16.6% (3.7 times as many). In the crime statistics, not only are Moroccan boys overrepresented by also Moroccan girls. This finding undermines the widespread idea that Moroccan girls are much better behaved than Moroccan boys. By Moroccan girls the crimes were mostly property crimes (presumably shoplifting) and very little violence. Girls from all backgrounds are less violent than boys.

With the group of criminal girls, Surinamese and Antillean girls commit percentage wise three times as many violent property crimes as Dutch girls.

* What's the situation with repeat offenders? The authors define anybody who was registered more than five times for a crime as a repeat offender. Among men, that was 3.4% of all men born in 1984, or 14.9% of all criminals in this group. But the differences between the ethnicities are great. For Dutch men, it's 12.8% of all criminals, for Moroccan men it's 32.3%, almost three times as many. Most repeat offenders committed at least one violent crime, but in general their criminal career is not more violent than that of other criminals. The latter also surprised the authors.

Repeat offending is a man's thing: the number of men who do it is 11 times the number of women who do it. However, it's remarkable that the percentage of repeat offenders among Moroccan girls (7.4% of all female criminals) is twice as high as that of ethnic Dutch (4.8%). In total, barely 0.3% of all women born in 1984 is a repeat offender, and the same goes for 5.4% of all female criminals.

* Delinquent immigrants are more violent than delinquent ethnic Dutch. That is true both for one-time criminals and for multiple offenders.

* The Turks are most like the Dutch, though they too commit more crimes and are more violent than the Dutch.


The authors don't bring any real explanation. They do discuss all possible options.

* They say that the cultures and religions of these groups differ enormously. Therefore, the explanatory factor can't be that.

* The lower social-economic position of all immigrants certainly plays a role, for three reasons:

- Because in the lower circles have more negative "role models" (people who made it socially thanks to crime) than in the higher ones.

- Because the process of becoming an adult takes longer, and therefore the "criminal transition in puberty" also drags on longer and the risk is greater that this criminality would be lasting.

- Because various social factors can have negative neurological effects for small children, which encourage aggression.

But.. the lower social-economic position is not the decisive factor, since Dutch from the same low social class get in trouble with the police less for crimes than immigrants from that class.

* Being well or badly integrated in Dutch society also plays a small role. It's been suggested that for Moroccan boys, the criminal group is better integrated than the not-criminal group. Moroccans with a strong focus on the Netherlands are often more frustrated that they can't realize their desires from their disadvantaged position than Moroccans who aren't focused on the Netherlands, say the authors.

* Social control does seem to be an important factor. This social control plays out both in the family and in the community. Social control could explain why Turks score so 'well': the Netherlands has a strong Turkish community, but that doesn't apply to the Moroccans. Moreover, the Turks see petty crimes as "losing face" and that doesn't apply to the Moroccans.

And yet, social control can't explain everything either, since Moroccan girls are highly controlled, probably more than Dutch girls, certainly in their family, and they also score extremely high in the statistics.

* Does registration by the police play a role? A study from 1999 showed that there is little evidence that immigrants are treated differently than ethnic Dutch by the Dutch police. The fact that HALT cases (alternative sentences for petty crimes by minors who confessed) aren't included in the statistics, since in such cases there's no record, can mean that the number of ethnic Dutch is underestimated, because this group is over-represented in HALT. And the policy to focus on certain disadvantaged neighborhoods and repeat offenders can lead to an over-representation of Moroccans.

On the other hand, it seems that the differences between immigrant and ethnic Dutch are even bigger in studies in which everybody says which crimes they've committed, than in the police statistics. And so the effect of the registration factor could be limited.

The authors conclude that linking ethnicity and risk-factors for criminals on individual, neighborhood or social levels is a complex issue. "The danger exists that people will see ethnicity and culture as an explanatory factor, while ethnicity is just a social category which at best refers to other underlying causes," they argue.


In the same issue of TVC Jan de Boom, Erik Snel and Godfried Engbersen published a study about the link between 'asylum migration' and crime. They checked how many asylum migrants were suspected of a crime in 2004.

Asylum migrants include both asylum seekers and recognized refugees, even those who got Dutch citizenship. Also rejected asylum seekers (ie, illegals) are included in the term 'asylum migrants'.

3.4% of the recognized refugees were registered as suspects in 2004. This figure increased to 5.4% among asylum seekers (who were still in the process) and 10% of rejected asylum seekers. There more crime among asylum migrants - with an average of 5.1% suspects - than among ethnic Dutch and regular migrant groups, say the authors. In 2004, 1.5% of all ethnic Dutch were registered as suspects, 6% of Moroccans and 7.5% of Antilleans. But the data is difficult to compare, because asylum migrants are a specific group: (then still) mostly young men with strong social frustration and deprivation.

Mostly it's petty property crimes (16% committed a single theft or shoplifting, 9% a robbery), and forgery (using false documents). According to the authors it's notable that the worse the legal status of an asylum migrant, the higher their criminality.


What's the situation in Belgium? We don't know. In the Netherlands you can register the ethnic origin of perpetrators and suspects, compare databases and do scientific research on this subject. In Belgium - mostly due to the pressure of the PS (Socialists) and the privacy commission - not yet. In Belgium just recording somebody's ethnic origin is 'racist' for some groups.

The few studies about the over-representation of foreigners (in Belgian studies that's mostly people with a foreign nationality), the crime statistics in Belgium are invariably focused on possible police and court racism and on social exclusion. Cultural explanatory models are taboo here. As the reactions to the studies of Marion and San showed..

Comparisons between Belgium and the Netherlands and generalizations from one country to another should be done carefully. For multiple reasons:

- The Netherlands has certain groups of immigrants (Surinamese, Antilleans) that Belgium doesn't. Belgium does have others (Congolese, Black Africans). These groups have different cultures and can't be all thrown together. It should be said that the Dutch study of Blokland and co was about people who were born in 1984 in the Netherlands. This means that a number of ethnic groups now present in the Netherlands and Belgium (Russians, Kosovars, Serbs) weren't included, since in 1984 they were behind the Iron Curtain.

- In Belgium a study like that of Blokland and co isn't yet possible, because our country only has such crime statistics since 2000. So it's not that simple.

- Integration is different. Moroccans are probably better integrated in the Netherlands than in Belgium. The employment percentage in the Netherlands is any case higher than here. In Belgium unemployment among immigrant youth in Brussels is up to 50%. It's not clear what role this plays in criminality.

- The dutch police works - at least on the local level - more efficiently and professionally than the Belgian police. It's not clear what the results could be: more registration of Moroccan suspects (through possible racism) or less (due to no-go-areas)?

If the Belgian police and courts are more racist than their Dutch counterparts is doubtful. A study by the Comité P showed that just 16.4% of the complaints lodged against the Belgian police for racism between 2005 and the end of 2008, were founded. And the only study about possible discrimination in the detention of Moroccans - the study by Dr. Walter De Pauw from the Department for Criminal Policy about the handling of drug crimes - showed that there was no discrimination.

The scientific study of the link ethnicity-crime is still unexplored terrain in Belgium. TVC explains the big difference between Belgium and the Netherlands by the 'tendency of the government to keep the crime problem in relationship to migrants out of the discussion'. TVC moreover thinks that 'The Belgian migration debate threatens to be reduced to a debate about Islam. That debate drives apart supporters and opponents and doesn't only disturb the social dialog between population groups, but also the climate in which scientific research is done.'

But the Belgian attitude is more the rule than the exception in the West. According to TVC, the crime-migration relationship can only be spoken of in England if it's brought up as a question of selective policing, racism and deprivation. Germany is very cautious about studies about people's ethnic background since WWII, and in France there are only French, no Frenchmen with another ethnic origin.

However wants to have a crime policy, both preventive and repressive, must abandon these taboos. The fact that the Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism is now asking for ethnic registration (specifically to research the social evolution of regularized illegals) is a positive sign.

See: TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR CRIMINOLOGIE, Criminaliteit, migratie en etniciteit, 2010, (52)2, Boom Juridische Uitgevers, Den Haag

Source: John De Wit, GvA (Dutch)

Muslim Crime in the UK

Muslim Crime in the UK

Muslim Crime in the UK: Part 1

A Consideration of Muslim Crime in the UK
and the Response of the British Authorities

By Pike Bishop

I. Introduction

Why we decided to produce this document

This document is an attempt to accomplish the following three objectives:

1.To draw public attention to the serious and worsening problem of Muslim crime, in the UK specifically, and throughout Western Europe more generally.
2.To draw attention to problematic aspects of the response of the UK authorities to Muslim crime.
3.To promote a public debate on the implications, short- and long-term, of Muslim crime for Britain and its people.

Who we hope will read this document

We hope that any and all interested parties will read this dossier. However, we particularly hope that people in the media, academia, the government, and the police force will engage with the serious issues it raises.

What do we mean by ‘Muslim crime’?

Muslim crime is simply crime committed by Muslims. That said, we have a particular concern with violent crime (up to and including terrorism), sexual crime, property crime, and organized crime as committed by Muslims. By the word Muslim, we simply mean all people of Muslim background and upbringing who have not explicitly renounced Islam, irrespective of how devout they are, or how observant of the requirements of their religion.

Why focus on Muslim crime?

Of course, no single type of crime becomes any worse in and of itself simply by virtue of having been committed by a Muslim. Nonetheless, there are good reasons to be concerned about Muslim crime in its own right. These include the following: 1

Muslims appear to be overrepresented as the perpetrators of serious crime to an extent which is far from trivial (this claim will be justified in greater detail later).
Terrorism and terrorism-related offences, a crime category in which Muslims manifestly make up a massively disproportionate fraction of all convictions, impose enormous indirect costs on millions of people for long periods of time.
Muslims throughout the West have pronounced and undeniable separatist, supremacist, and subversive tendencies. This being the case, Muslim crime acquires a significance above and beyond that which might be expected, due to the possibility of it being — and being perceived as being — motivated by these tendencies. To rephrase, some crime is ‘just’ crime, whereas other crime will be perceived as being part of an ongoing inter-group conflict, and therefore possess the potential to further provoke that conflict. How much Muslim crime (or white crime, or black crime, or any crime, for that matter) is actually motivated by inter-group conflict is, of course, an empirical question.
The rate of growth of the Muslim community in the UK is extremely rapid, in both absolute and relative terms. Unusually high crime rates amongst this population therefore take on a significance they would not otherwise have.

What qualifies us to talk about crime at all?

This document has not been produced by professional criminologists. However, it has been produced on the basis of a belief that:

1.Citizens engaged in the civic life of their country have both a right and an obligation to consider such key topics as crime and community cohesion.
2.Educated people of good will are perfectly well-positioned to draw some provisional conclusions on these subjects on the basis of their own carefully-considered interpretation of information available in the public domain.

We do not pretend to have all the answers to the questions we pose in this document. Indeed, it is precisely those areas where data are poor, understanding limited, or interpretation difficult that we hope will draw increased attention in the future from criminologists, police officers, and politicians, as they attempt to address the serious problems that now afflict this country.

Given that this document is not academic in nature, we have not felt the need to include all the sources for the facts and figures herein. The more important or contentious the claim in question, the more likely it will be to have a source. More general information may be unsourced. Those who are sceptical about any of our claims are invited to do their own research and make up their own minds. Either way, we are confident that the factual claims made in this document are accurate.

Why do we not discuss terrorism in this document?

With apologies to the Muslim Council of Britain for the hate crime no doubt implicit in our use of the term, Muslim terrorism has been a key public concern for so long now that we consider it to be a fairly well-worked seam. There is little we feel we can add to the discussion on terrorism, so we propose to largely ignore it in this document. We will reiterate, however, what we said above about how the indirect costs of terrorism (police budget, security services budget, airport security budgets, indirect costs through productivity losses, etc.) have not, to our knowledge, ever been calculated with any accuracy. This research should, in our opinion, be conducted so as to enable a better understanding of the costs of the presence of so many Muslims in our country.

II. A Bird’s Eye View of Muslim Crime in Britain

Obtaining a statistical overview of Muslim crime in the UK is very difficult, due to the extremely low quality of the data available, and the problems involved in their interpretation. Every three years the government releases a breakdown of criminal convictions by race. These summaries offer a significant amount of information to the student of crime, but not, sadly, information that is useful in a consideration of Muslim crime. As such, we must look to other sources.

As far as one can tell, there is no breakdown of crime rates or convictions by religion. This is the first hurdle we face in trying to gain an overview of Muslim crime in a broad, statistical sense. A breakdown for crimes such as terrorism-related offenses could undoubtedly be put together relatively easily, but it would fail to give us any insight into any other type of crime.

Given the lack of crime rate data, the most natural step is to look at the incarceration data for different religious groups. The Home Office figure of a Muslim prison population of 11% in 2008 is the obvious place for this discussion to start.2 Comparing Muslims to non-Muslims, and taking the Muslim population of the country to be approximately 4% (2.4 million out of 62 million), we calculate a disproportionality of three for the Muslim population, which is to say that three times more Muslims are in prison than we would expect given the number of Muslims in the country.

More disturbingly, it appears that this disproportionality may grow significantly if we look at high-security prisons. Four high-security prisons seem to have even larger Muslim populations than one would expect from the 11% figure. HMP Whitemoor has a Muslim population of 34%, HMP Long Lartin of 24%, HMP Full Sutton of 15%, and HMP Belmarsh of 22%. However, HMP Frankland has a Muslim population of only 3%, and there are other high-security prisons in the UK (HMP Strangeways, HMP Woodhill, HMP Wakefield, etc.) whose Muslim populations we have not been able to ascertain. Taking a weighted average of these figures to reflect different population sizes at each prison, we arrive at a figure of 18% for mid-2008.3 This figure could well go down if it were recalculated for all high-security prisons, as those for which we do not have data include one in Scotland and one in Northern Ireland, which we do not expect to have large Muslim populations. Nonetheless, the figure is a cause for concern, meaning as it does that, in the high-security prisons for which we have figures, nearly 1 in 5 inmates is a Muslim.

A complicating factor in all this analysis is that the phenomenon of conversion to Islam on the part of inmates makes it difficult to know exactly what fraction of the prison population was Muslim at the point of incarceration. According to one estimate, 30% of all people who identify as Muslims in prison converted after being incarcerated, but the accuracy of this figure is difficult to ascertain. It is also difficult to know how many people meeting our earlier definition of Muslim (i.e. being of Muslim background and upbringing and not having renounced Islam) do not identify themselves as Muslim in prison. These factors make it difficult to draw firm conclusions, but it may well be the case that the disproportionality in ‘real’ Muslim incarceration is slightly less than the factor of three calculated above.

There is a great deal more to say on this subject, but we feel that it will be more profitably said subsequent to other discussions. Accordingly, we will take this theme up again in Section VI.


1The reasons for this definition will become clear later on, in Section V, which features a contribution from Dr. Nicolai Sennels, a psychologist from Denmark. To summarise here, the psychological attributes inculcated by Islam appear to be at least as significant in causing Muslim crime as conscious religious feeling on the part of Muslims.
2In actual fact, this figure was for England and Wales, not the whole of the UK. However, other sources suggest that the figure for England and Wales is now 12%, so taking 11% as our figure for the whole UK will keep our calculations acceptably accurate.
3Of course, this figure is liable to change. Moreover, the estimates it is based on were not all made at the same point in time in 2008. Accordingly, it should be taken as a representative figure rather than an exact figure for an exact moment in time. The current figure could be somewhat higher or lower.

Muslim Crime in the UK: Part 2

A Consideration of Muslim Crime in the UK
and the Response of the British Authorities

Part Two

By Pike Bishop

III. Two Rhapsodies on the Theme of Muslim Crime


Among the most disgusting examples of dereliction of duty on the part of our ‘law enforcement’ apparatus is that which pertains to the pimping of underage white girls. Of course, the usual disclaimers must be made here: it is not only Muslims that pimp out these unfortunate white girls, and not all Muslims do pimp them out. However, insofar as one can discern from the limited amount of information that makes its way into the mainstream media, there are certain groups of Muslims who appear to be particularly culpable in this regard. We acknowledge the uncertainties here, and the great difficulty in trying to develop any accurate picture of exactly what is going on. As we will see, however, this lack of information is unlikely to be an accident.

Though we use the term ‘pimping’ to describe the practice under examination here, the fact of the matter is that it consists of the dragging of underage white girls into a life of sexual slavery and violence. Those who are interested in learning about it in more detail are invited to read the September 2007 Times article Mothers of Prevention by Julie Bindel4 and to watch the March 2008 edition of Panorama, ‘Teenage Sex for Sale’.5 We urge all those who read this document to familiarize themselves with the relevant material, the better to understand the nature of the multicultural paradise and glittering rainbow nation that is modern Britain.

Here, we will content ourselves with a brief summary of the essentials. Pakistani drug-dealing gangs concentrated in the north of England are orchestrating a system in which underage white girls ‘just happen’ to make friends with Pakistani boys of roughly their own age. They are then introduced to older ‘cousins’ of these boys, who are the actual pimps, and who, in time, become their new ‘boyfriends’. These men use a wide variety of techniques to control the girls and induce them to prostitute themselves out to the Pakistani community. These techniques include, but are not limited to, pretending to need money, threatening the girls, drugging them, and beating them with iron bars. Through a combination of a reluctance to appear ‘racist’ and fears of race riots of unspecified type, the British police seem to have devoted rather less than their full energies to this matter, with the result being that the Pakistani Muslim criminals in question are essentially engaging in all these criminal activities with impunity.

It is hard to avoid the impression that there is a slice of the vibrant, bustling Pakistani Muslim community of the UK that simply considers the native British population to be a resource, existing for no other reason than to be chewed up and spat out by vibrant, bustling Pakistani Muslim predators like themselves, for their sexual pleasure and financial gain. And it is far from obvious that this slice is some sort of anomaly in this population. On the contrary, the Pakistani organized crime gangs in question and their Pakistani customers seem to range from the very young (the teenage boys used to befriend the girls), to their slightly older ‘cousins’ (used to start pimping the girls), to older men still (those orchestrating these activities in the background), with the girls’ clients presumably running the gamut from young to old.

That is the depth of the slice. What of its breadth? Well, let us consider the matter. There are approximately one million people of Pakistani origin in the UK. Let us assume, not unreasonably, that half of them are male. If 5,000 child prostitutes exist in the UK,6 and the problem is particularly bad in the north of England, which appears to be the epicentre of the phenomenon, then there are perhaps 2,000 girls being prostituted there by Pakistanis (we will not dignify them by calling them Britons of Pakistani descent). How many times, on average, has each of these girls been raped by Pakistani ‘clients’? 400? 500? How many individual ‘clients’ have they been raped by? 100, with each having raped them 4 or 5 times, on average? What is 100 multiplied by 2,000? 200,000? Does that mean that 200,000 Pakistani males, or 40% of the total, have raped underage white girls in the UK? Well no, probably not, as some Pakistani males have presumably raped more than one girl. So shall we reduce our estimate by a (fairly arbitrary) factor of two to take into account this redundancy in the Pakistani raping of underage white girls? Why yes, let us do that, and generously conclude that only 100,000 Pakistani males have raped an underage white girl.7

Now, 100,000 is one fifth of 500,000. This means that, according to our estimate, one in five of the male Pakistani population of the UK is the rapist of an underage white girl. Bearing in mind that the fraction of the Pakistani population under the age of 18 is very large, and that these rapes will be predominantly committed by the population aged 18 and over (who number approximately 330,000), we must conclude that somewhere in the region of one in three adult Pakistani males is the rapist of an underage white girl. Having concluded this, and bearing in mind the various other forms of criminality and sedition that seem to be prevalent amongst ‘British’ Pakistanis that we have not even considered here, would it be unreasonable to suppose that the Pakistani Muslim population of the UK is in fact, taken as a whole, an enemy of the British people?

We seem to have arrived at a rather unfortunate conclusion. Surely there must be a mistake in our reasoning, or a mistaken premise? Very well, let us take a stab at this puzzle from a different angle. According to the information available in the mainstream media, pimping out one underage girl for one year can bring in £300,000 to £400,000. Let us take the low end of the estimate (£300,000) and see what we can conclude from it. How much does one have to pay to a pimp to be able to rape the girl under his ‘care’? Let us assume it costs £100 a time. This means that a girl being pimped out is being raped 3,000 times a year, or roughly 60 times a week. Returning to our earlier estimate of 2,000 girls being pimped out by Pakistanis, we see that there are six million occasions each year upon which a Pakistani male rapes an underage white girl in this fashion. Now, we established above that the population of adult Pakistani males in the UK will be in the region of 330,000. Six million divided by 330,000 gives us a rounded-down figure of 18, which means that the average adult Pakistani male in the UK rapes an underage white girl or girls 18 times a year. But surely there must be many adult Pakistani males who are not involved in this crime? Why yes, there must. Let us be generous and assume that half of all such people are not involved. We must therefore conclude that the remaining 50% are perpetrating an average of 36 such rapes a year. Perhaps two thirds of all adult Pakistani males are uninvolved, leaving the remaining one third to rape underage white girls on an average of 55 occasions8 a year, or more than once a week.

Try as we might, we cannot refrain from concluding that the male Pakistani population of the UK, as a whole,9 views the native female children, and presumably the native population in and of itself, as a barbarian horde might view the abject and downtrodden people of a country it had just devastated. One need not be a goose-stepping, sieg-heiling, supporter of a future Fourth Reich to think that something rather unfortunate is happening here, or that the unwillingness of the authorities to shed much light on this problem is motivated by a desire to keep certain uncomfortable truths under lock and key. For which government will freely acknowledge that a minority population imported against the wishes of the natives is, in effect, waging an underground war against them, a war in the face of which the apparatus of state appears to be helpless?

Are any of the above estimates likely to be accurate? Well, the uncertainties being so great at each step of the calculation, it is impossible to know for sure. But given that there is reason to believe that both the pimping and consequent raping of underage white girls are low-risk activities (at least if one is a Pakistani), it is hard to see what deterrents could exist to persuade Pakistani males not to engage in them. And given further that no one else seems to have generated any estimates as to just what fraction of the Pakistani population of the UK is involved in this activity, who is there to gainsay us in this regard? Are there better figures out there? Can they be revealed? In the absence of real information, those who are concerned about the problem will have to generate their own estimates of its severity. Those concerned, in turn, about these estimates need to plug the gap with credible data. Until this is done, we see no reason to consider the above analysis particularly implausible.

Ideally, of course, amateur criminologists such as ourselves would not have to engage in such speculative calculation. But we can hardly rely on the police to do it for us, as they appear to have already established (with certain honourable exceptions) such a record of willful uselessness in this regard as to make Clouseau look like Columbo. Nothing illustrates better than this sickening saga of professional malfeasance10 just how mistaken we are if we persist in seeing the UK police as being some sort of relatively neutral law enforcement tool, that, like, hears about a crime, then, like, investigates it, and then, like, brings the perpetrators to justice. We are talking about a police force that once arrested a man for ostensibly homophobic comments made to a horse. Does anybody really believe that the UK police force, in the 21st-century, is some sort of unbiased, apolitical enforcer of the law?

No, our police force has become contaminated by:

1.A concern not to appear politically incorrect, let alone ‘racist’.
2.A fear of the implications of actually enforcing the law with respect to large, hostile, and unassimilated Muslim populations.

It is hard to say which of these factors is the more important in explaining the criminal negligence of the police vis-à-vis pimping. Perhaps they can tell us themselves. But one thing should be understood. If the Pakistani Muslim populations of many towns in the north of England are now large enough to force the police to refrain from enforcing the law concerning a matter of this gravity, then, short of massive ethnic cleansing or a radical change in law enforcement policy, this state of affairs will exist in perpetuity, as the rapid growth of these populations can only stack the deck ever more against the apparatus of state. Have the British people given their consent to the effective expulsion11 of the police from vast swathes of urban Britain? If not, they need to ask themselves whether the state is even attempting any longer to fulfill its obligations under the social contract that exists between itself and the people, and what they will eventually be required to do if it is not.

We are reminded of fairy tales in which, once a year, a dragon descends upon some unfortunate village, and demands a fair young maiden to devour in return for not destroying the villagers’ homes with its fiery breath. The main difference with our situation is that rendering up the maiden to the dragon at least buys the villagers a year of peace and quiet.

What, precisely, is being purchased by the disgraceful, despicable, degenerate behaviour of those police forces that have, it seems, ‘de-emphasised’ the pursuit of the systematic rapists, pimpers, druggers, and destroyers of white girls? An extra hour’s kip, feet up on the desk, snoring away? Or something even more important? Can we be told?

Of course, many will protest that it is really terribly, terribly, difficult to crack down on a crime of this sort. This is presumably why the authorities have had to resort to ‘educational campaigns’ and the writing of warning letters to suspected pimps (yes, really). Jack Straw’s Blackburn constituency is one of those afflicted with a Pakistani pimping problem,12 and Mr. Straw is quoted in Mothers of Prevention talking about how he has undertaken only various vague and unquantifiable activities to address the problem.

We do not intend here to cast aspersions upon Mr. Straw himself. Quite the contrary, in fact. Of all the Stalinist, dhimmi-by-choice, pointlessly-spacefilling, turnips-on-a-stick to have sat in the House of Commons in the last five years, he is by some margin the most distinguished. But if he really believes that discussing matters with ‘community leaders’ might help him address the sexual destruction of the children of his own country by recklessly imported Muslim savages, then one rather wonders what could possibly be the point of him.

Given that the police find it so frightfully, frightfully hard to deal properly with the pimping problem, there are only two ways this matter can develop. The first is that this blight on the face of our country continues, with vibrant, bustling Pakistanis destroying staid, non-bustling white girls with impunity. The second is that non-state actors respond as they see fit, paying no heed to the law. If the former is unacceptable, where does that leave us? And does it not seem probable that, if faced with a realistic threat of the latter occurring, the police would suddenly discover that the problem was not so terribly difficult to deal with after all?

If there is a better reason than the above-outlined Pakistani Muslim depravity for lighting torches, grabbing pitchforks, and launching a tribal civil war that burns down the entire country and leaves it populated only by seagulls and hedgehogs, so that, before too long, people in mainland Europe talk only of a legendary country called Brittaine that existed, it is rumoured, in the days of yore, then it has not yet occurred to the authors of this document. And we have thought about it jolly hard. If it proves to be the case that the apparatus of state has chosen not to protect the female children of this country from the depredations of hostile, rapacious aliens, then a great number of heads of all different shapes and sizes will have to be observed to roll before justice can be considered to have been done.

In closing, I invite readers of this document, kafir and believer both, to reflect with the utmost seriousness on what the future could hold for this country if these matters are not dealt with to the satisfaction of British patriots, who see no reason to be colonized and preyed upon by Pakistani Muslims, a people so hopeless as to have turned their own country into a byword for national collapse, civilizational failure, and religiously-inspired psychopathy. On this matter, we demand satisfaction.

Female Genital Mutilation

Female genital mutilation is by no means a cultural practice engaged in by all Muslims around the world. Nor, indeed, is it one engaged in only by Muslims, there existing many places in Africa where it is practiced by non-Muslim peoples. Nonetheless, it provides us with a specific example of a very disturbing phenomenon, and one which threatens to discredit the law and with it the legitimacy of the apparatus of state. The disturbing phenomenon in question is not the removal of certain parts of the sexual organs of young girls, disgusting, dangerous, inhumane, and repugnant though this is. Rather, it is the conversion of enforceable laws into unenforceable laws through the importation of culturally alien peoples.

To make this point properly, we need to understand what is meant by an unenforceable law. Consider the law prohibiting the possession of ecstasy, a Class A drug. Strictly speaking, possession of ecstasy is punishable by up to seven years in prison, which makes it a serious criminal offence. Nonetheless, it was once estimated that, every weekend in the UK, a million people take this drug. Assuming for the sake of illustration that this figure is still accurate, this means that one million people, give or take, are breaking the law in this regard every week.

Now, what steps could the British government take if it were to suddenly to decide that this state of affairs were unacceptable, and that ecstasy use must be eradicated? In principle, the police could start raiding nightclubs across the country on Friday and Saturday nights, slamming punters up against the wall, and going through their pockets. Some number of unfortunate clubbers would, as a consequence, find themselves facing seven years (reduced, of course, to three and a half) inside. But the British prison population is already about 95,000-strong, and incarcerating people is a fantastically expensive thing to do.

In addition, the political fallout that would greet a government using such heavy-handed tactics and consuming such massive resources in a ‘war’ against a drug that seems to be essentially harmless (we ignore here the many other considerations a full discussion of this matter would require) would make the whole affair prohibitively expensive in that regard too. Even dragging 2,000 people off to jail on a single weekend would leave the other 998,000 (or 99.8% of the total) unmolested by the long arm of the law. If we assume three and a half years incarceration each, multiply by 2,000 people, and then multiply by £40,000 for the costs of one year of incarceration, then we have a cost of £280 million for the incarceration of these wrongdoers. Adding in police costs, court costs, and the opportunity costs of the incarcerated not being able to work, we are surely looking at a bill in excess of £500 million to remove 0.2% of all ecstasy users from the streets of the UK for three and a half years.

If these exertions were repeated every weekend for a year, at a total cost including incarceration of, say, £26 billion, 89.6% of the original one million users would still be at large at the end of the year, despite having broken the law a grand total of 52 times. It is hard to envisage a scenario in which such massive exertions could possibly be considered to have any net benefits, which is why they do not occur. Trying to stop the flow of ecstasy into the UK in the first place might seem like a better idea, but the slightest familiarity with the U.S. War on Drugs suggests that such things are not easily accomplished.

This is not to suggest that the possession (and therefore the use) of ecstasy could not be prevented in principle. Paramilitary death squads could be created and equipped with on-the-spot ecstasy blood tests to dispense ‘justice’ to those having indulged in the drug. But this would be politically impossible in the UK, and the cost-benefit analysis would still, to put it mildly, edge towards the unfavourable. What this means is that the laws on ecstasy possession are completely unenforceable in any meaningful sense, as the takers of this drug understand very well.

The reader will now be wondering what, if anything, any of this could possibly have to do with FGM, and the answer is simply that the British government is already in an essentially identical position with respect to this hideous crime. It is estimated that several hundred female genital mutilations take place every year in the UK, mainly within the UK Somali population. Let us put this figure at 500, and assume that both the mother and the father of the mutilated child are implicated in the crime. That means that 1,000 people, mainly Somalis and all immigrants, are implicated every year in the crime of mutilation.

If, on the last day of 2010, the police were to build irrefutable cases against 100 of them, who were then arrested, tried and sentenced to long prison sentences, a great blow would have been struck for justice and the British way of life, and our political overlords would be thrilled. Correct? Actually, no. Incorrect. There is nothing our political overlords would like less than this. Let us explain.

Consider what putting 100 Somalis (fifty Somali couples) in prison will involve. Under the Female Genital Mutilation Act, someone found guilty of female genital mutilation can receive a sentence of up to 14 years. Let us assume they receive average sentences of ten years each, of which they serve five. Let us also bear in mind that:

1.Such convictions could only be secured via compulsory medical examinations, against the wishes of the parents.
2.Convicting two Somali parents of this crime will mean that all their children will have to be taken away from them, permanently, and placed in care, at great public expense.
3.There is no guarantee that other Somali parents will be deterred by this, making it overwhelmingly likely that the whole process will have to be repeated, perhaps in perpetuity.

Taking hundreds of Somali children into care, and therefore out of their communities, every year would itself result in accusations of cultural genocide or the like. Accusations of ‘stigmatisation’ would fly through the air thick and fast. After a few short years, there would already be facilities somewhere full of Somali children in care where, presumably, the staff would have to be Somali so as to allow the children to preserve the oh-so-precious cultural heritage from which they had to be rescued in the first place.

It is fairly clear that no one is going to walk into the expensive, nasty, grueling, polarising minefield such an endeavour would turn out to be without good reason. And if the welfare of the children in question constituted such a reason, it would already have happened. Besides, they would have been cut in Somalia, would they not? Now they are being cut here instead. What of it?

Anyone who is unconvinced by this analysis needs to present an alternative explanation for the way in which, despite the Female Genital Mutilation Act having been passed in 2003, there have been, to date, no convictions at all. Life peer Ruth Rendell would certainly appreciate such an explanation. As quoted in December 2009 in the Independent13:

“When I helped take the Bill [the FGM Act] through Parliament seven years ago, I was very hopeful that we’d get convictions and that would then act as a deterrent for other people. But that has never happened and my heart bleeds for these girls. [...] I have repeatedly asked questions of ministers from all departments about why there has never been a prosecution and why we still do not have a register of cases. But while they are always very sympathetic, nothing ever seems to get done.“ [Italics added]

We do not wish to scorn the efforts of Ruth Rendell, who is clearly a compassionate woman, and one who has committed a good deal of time and energy to opposing the horrible barbarity of FGM. But expressions of sympathy are cheap, and she is reading too much into those made by the empty suits with whom she discusses these matters.

Given that incontrovertible evidence of FGM can be obtained by medical examination, the failure of all these supposedly titanic efforts to address it must indeed seem odd to some. But it will only do so as long as one continues to look it at from the wrong perspective, in which those in government are genuinely trying to bring this barbarity to an end. The correct perspective is built on the insight that to date, our governing elite has introduced useless smokescreen legislation to give the impression that it is doing something, whilst making absolutely sure that the police do not have the powers they need to address this crime properly, i.e. the power to perform, or have performed, medical examinations.

To rephrase, this lack of police power is not a bug, but a feature, in this system, a system whose architects are doubtless relieved that the mutilation in question does not consist of plucking out an eyeball — that would oblige them to actually do something about it, as empty eye sockets are not so easily hidden.

Certain anti-FGM campaigners argue for a tactic of targetting the ‘cutters’ who are responsible for the mutilation. They present this as a more moral course of action, targetting those profiting from the work rather than confused and uneducated parents doing what they think is best for their children. But this makes no sense, as the cutters themselves are of the same culture, and are doubtless just as ‘confused’ and uneducated as the parents, sharing as they do their beliefs about the necessity of the procedure. Indeed, they have probably all already been ‘cut’ themselves.

We suspect these campaigners understand all too well that the problem is hopeless within extant political paradigms, under which FGM has become de facto legal, for the reasons outlined above. Targetting the cutters is their only remaining option, as it would, in principle, allow them to address the problem by targetting people whose incarceration would not pose the insoluble political problems described above. However, we must observe that this approach, roughly analogous to targeting drug dealers instead of drug users in the ‘War on Drugs’, would likely prove similarly ineffective for the same reasons, even supposing that it managed to secure one of the convictions that have so far eluded it. Cutting down on the supply of cutters will only increase the price of their service, and with it the incentives to provide it.

Can the grotesque contamination of our country that FGM constitutes be tolerated? Most of us are probably relatively unconcerned about the de facto legality of ecstasy consumption. But can we look at each other, shrug, and say that, for some groups in 21st-century Britain, cutting pieces of the sexual apparatus out of one’s daughters is an entirely risk-free undertaking with respect to the law?

Even if, appallingly, we thought we could stomach the occasional clitoridectomy, we should not delude ourselves that this is the only type of crime that has slipped off the radar of the criminal justice system, and therefore, in effect, out of existence. Forced marriages (often of underage girls) and attendant abductions, beatings, and threats; honour killings; the drugging, pimping, and raping of underage white girls; violence towards and the forced confinement of female family members: what reason do we have to believe that the authorities really have the slightest interest in enforcing the law with respect to ‘culturally sensitive’ matters? And why is it that so many culturally sensitive crimes are committed overwhelmingly, if not entirely, by Muslims? Is this a coincidence?

Ultimately, we have to ask ourselves one key question. Is British law to be determined by our democratically elected representatives in Parliament? Or is it to be determined, in practice if not in principle, by the cultural standards of whatever random assembly of unassimilable aliens has been allowed to congregate on our shores, through immigration policies which have long since ceased to reflect the desires of the British people?

We end this discussion by including the closing paragraph of the Independent article mentioned above:

“A Home Office spokesman said: ‘We have appointed an FGM co-ordinator to drive forward a co-ordinated government response to this appalling crime and make recommendations for future work.’”

‘Future work’ that will have no effect on anything at all. A slow, slow train coming.

IV. A Critique of Police Priorities in the Face of Muslim Crime

There is criticism aplenty of the apparatus of state in the previous section, both explicit and implicit. However, there is one particular issue that needs to be addressed here directly. If one were to ask a thousand people at random what the primary objective of the police is, nearly all would surely reply that it is to enforce the law, bring criminals to justice, and thereby deter to some extent future crimes. Intriguingly, there does not seem to be any consensus amongst criminologists or other students of these matters that this answer would be correct.

Of course enforcing the law is one of the primary objectives of the police, but there is a body of thought that insists that, in actuality, the maintenance of public order is (or at least ought to be) their main concern. Many otherwise incomprehensible phenomena can be understood once one realizes that this second objective vies with the first.

It is far from contemptible that the police should be required to attach great importance to the maintenance of public order, for frequent, uncontrolled disorder in the public sphere will have seriously detrimental effects on any country in short order. However, we are troubled by the way in which the relative importances attached to the maintenance of public order and the enforcement of the law appear to vary as a function of the ethnic/religious group being policed. A great many examples of this disturbing trend already exist, but we will examine a single one here to establish the point.

We are confident that all readers of this document will remember the now-infamous demonstration outside the Danish Embassy in London, in February 2006. During the Mohammed Cartoon Crisis, the Saviour Sect and Al-Ghurabaa, two of the most unsavoury of the many unsavoury Muslim groups in the UK, held a protest outside this embassy. The protest showcased the global ummah at its most unappealing, consisting as it did of several hundred deranged, frothing, homicidally-inclined Muslims loosing a volley of outrageous threats and abuse towards the Danish cartoonists and Europeans in general.

The photos of these protesters and their placards — in our capital city — have sullied, in perpetuity, the reputation of our country. Given that the protest was illegal irrespective of content (in that the organizers had not obtained a permit) and given further that it was illegal in terms of its content too, involving as it did a large number of psychopathic Muslims openly and unashamedly inciting murder against the entirely innocent citizens of a friendly country, would it really have been too much to expect the police to break it up, with force if necessary? Clearly, the answer to this question was yes, because the maintenance of public order took precedence over the enforcement of the law.

According to an article14 in the Telegraph which provides a serviceable summary of the police and public response to the demonstration:

Scotland Yard, which has received at least 100 complaints from members of the public so far, defended the decision not to make arrests. It said the officer in charge at such scenes had to weigh the need to make arrests against the likelihood of provoking more serious unrest. [Italics added]

This may seem innocuous enough on first reading, but it contains the seeds of something terribly destructive. If the likelihood of arrests being made is inversely proportional to the potential for serious disorder, then those more likely to cause serious disorder will be extended greater leeway to break the law in public. And this fact is unlikely to be lost on them.

Real holocaustSadly, it was most certainly lost on the Metropolitan Police, who made the decision to allow the protest to go ahead unmolested. Having seemingly forgotten that prevention is better than cure, they decided that, rather than actually stop the crimes being committed, they would gather evidence to be used later, in their assiduous pursuit of the perpetrators of the crimes they had proven so unwilling to prevent in the first place. According to a police spokesman quoted in the Telegraph:

Specialist officers were deployed to record any potential event, should it be needed at any point in the future.

They would deploy some of their specialist officers, no less, to bring justice to the wrongdoers. We can reveal here for the first time, after extensive independent investigation, that said specialists were not bog-standard peelers with video cameras. Far from it, in fact. Every single one of the specialists deployed by those tasked with our protection had spent the last ten years on a mountain top in China, training in the arcane art of ‘filming-criminals-whilst-they-are-breaking-the-law-but-not-actually-doing-anything-about-it-because-they-might-lose-their-tempers.’

Given that the Metropolitan Police had decided to pull out all the stops and use their ‘specialists’ to bring the guilty to justice after the protest had ended, readers might be tempted to conclude that they did not botch their response so badly after all. But, cruel, cruel world! To the great dismay of these modern-day ninja warriors, certain of the more technically savvy Muslims unleashed a devastating countermeasure of their own: a high-tech cloaking device which rendered them completely impervious to the long arm of the law. Needless to say, the device does not bestow complete invisibility on its user. One can still make out a vague, and vaguely human, silhouette. But it is, nonetheless, a formidable weapon in the criminal armoury of the global ummah. Readers are invited to study the accompanying image to see exactly what the police were up against. Who said Muslims were technological incompetents?

Such dastardly criminal brilliance, in the face of which Holmes himself would have gnashed his teeth and Moriarty swooned in admiration, seems to have confounded the best efforts of the specialists deployed by our law enforcement establishment. Consider their dilemma. There are people. They are breaking the law. They are standing still, in public. But they have covered their faces. How to proceed?

Thumbing desperately through their well-worn copies of Law Enforcement for Dummies, brows furrowed in concentration as they wrestled fiercely with conceptual difficulties that would have reduced Newton himself to a groaning wreck, they eventually admitted defeat. A thousand curses! There was nothing to be done! We tried filming them, but the face coverings worn by the criminals were visible not only in real life, but in our footage too! Cameras are complicated! This was not covered in training! Ten years on top of a mountain for nothing!

We are reluctant to continue in this facetious vein in a document written in deadly seriousness. Nor would we want our readers to jump to the unwarranted conclusion that we have a low opinion of Sir Ian Blair, who was commissioner of the Metropolitan Police during this disgraceful fiasco.

Quite the contrary, in fact. Of all the useless, insensate, dhimmi-by-choice, Hello-Kitty pieces of vegetable matter to have ever been in charge of policing in our capital city, he was by some margin the most intellectually distinguished. But if he really thinks that responsible police work consists of filming people for the purposes of subsequent identification despite the fact that the people in question are hiding their faces and cannot be identified, then it is rather hard to see what could possibly have been the point of him.15

Anyway, we have digressed shamefully and must return to the original subject of our enquiry, to wit, Holocaust-inciters swathed in ACME cloaking devices. Perhaps the Americans, or the Israelis, or some other such group of serious people, could have devised a way to bring this woman to justice. But not the British bobby. No, the despicable creature who advised us to ‘Be Prepared for the Real Holocaust’, is still at large. What would the police have done if they had wanted, or needed, to arrest her? Deployed their tactical Ouija board?

Of course, this is not to suggest that the police let all the protesters get away scot-free. On the contrary, the ‘film-first-arrest-later’ approach resulted in a total of four (quatre, cuatro) protestors eventually being convicted of a variety of offences relating to the incitement of hatred. According to the Metropolitan Police, there were 450 protestors present on the day, which means that a trifling 99.1% of them were able to participate in the inciting of all kinds of death and damnation against all manner of people without suffering any unpleasantness themselves on the day itself or afterwards. Behold the majesty of the law!

If the 450 Muslim protestors outside the Danish Embassy had been 450 neo-Nazi protestors outside the Israeli Embassy, with equivalent signs and rhetoric, screeching about holocausts and whatnot, and with an identical ability to riot and cause public disorder, would the same softly-softly approach to the policing of criminal scum still have been adopted by the Metropolitan Police? Or would they have waded in and given it, shall we say, a bit of welly? It is impossible to say for sure. But we are fairly confident that their response would have been quite different, and that, if a few heads had needed to be cracked to make our hypothetical Nazis see the error of their ways, then they would have been cracked good and hard.

There are many examples of this unfortunate wilting of the police in the face of Muslim anger or expected Muslim anger:

  • The last-minute cancellation of the legal SIOE (Stop the Islamization of Europe) and EDL demonstration outside the Harrow mosque due to mass Muslim violence and the threat of such violence.
  • The treacherous, pusillanimous behaviour of the despicable Anil Patani of the West Midlands Police, who pursued the makers of Undercover Mosque rather than the Muslims caught on camera within it.
  • The refusal to properly investigate pimping as described above.
  • The willingness of the police to tolerate vast numbers of Muslims calling, in public, for Salman Rushdie to be killed.

All of this makes terribly clear the relationship that now exists between the British state and the Muslim population of the UK. The degree of tribalism, aggression, and contempt for this country, its people, and its laws in the UK Muslim community is so great, and so ready to erupt at any time, that the police have taken appeasing it as being one of their chief objectives, the better to preserve public order.

We need to be clear as to what exactly this means. A disproportionately criminal, parasitic, terrorist, and seditious group of people, having escaped the run-down hellholes that they or their recent ancestors hail from, are doing their level best to convert our country, Britain, into the same kind of hellhole, where the same moral standards and general chaos obtain for the same reason (i.e. the dominance of those Muslims who will engage in massive religiously-motivated violence and disorder at the drop of a hat). And the police are letting them do it. For when the maintenance of public order trumps all other considerations, those who threaten it most effectively will be granted the most concessions. In contrast, those who can be cracked down on without fear of repercussions will find themselves on a much shorter leash.

The Thin Blue Line is proving itself to be not only thin, but feeble to boot, and more feeble by the day, at least vis-à-vis Muslims. The British police are, like any other police force anywhere in the world, not some sort of omnicompetent law enforcement mechanism, a magic wand that can be waved over any infringement of our laws to make it go away. They have evolved over the years, as has our entire criminal justice system, to deal with the public order and law enforcement challenges of a specific people, the British, in a specific country, Britain. They are, in a fundamental structural sense, quite incapable of adequately policing our Muslim population which, despite its diversity in terms of national origin, is, in certain crucial ways, showing its ‘Muslimness’ in much the same way as the Muslim population of every other Western European country.

Tribal, aggressive, implacable, and a strong presence in every major urban area throughout the country; the British police, indeed our criminal justice system as a whole, have not been designed, trained, or equipped to deal with such operational challenges. Those who are still sceptical on this point would do well to view the footage available on Youtube of the aforementioned attempts of SIOE and the EDL to stage a legal demonstration outside Harrow mosque, and the complete inability of the police to allow them to do so. The police are, perhaps unwittingly, simply incentivising disorder and the threat of disorder, and disincentivising law-abiding behaviour. Do we need to point out that this cannot lead anywhere that we could possibly want to be?

All this with a Muslim population of 4%! How will things be when the Muslim population of the country is 6%, or 8%, and has taken over an even greater fraction of virtually every part of the urban UK? The fear of disorder on the part of our authorities and the willingness of Muslims to threaten it are an unholy combination, setting up a positive feedback loop which must be broken sooner rather than later.

For the Danish Embassy protest was emblematic of a wider problem. If the UK is not to eventually turn into a country dotted with a patchwork of Muslim no-go zones in and around which British law barely obtains at all, the authorities will eventually have to establish that the law applies to Muslims as much as to anyone else.

Two things are patently obvious to the current authors:

1.That breaking out of this vicious cycle will be extremely painful and costly.
2.That there is no guarantee that the poltroons responsible for formulating law enforcement policy vis-à-vis the possibility of Muslim disorder have the courage required to endure this pain or these costs.

We wish to state here for the record that the potentially catastrophic consequences of the hopeless short-termism that seems to prevail on the part of our law enforcement establishment are not wreathed in mist. They are, by and large, fairly obvious, and include the complete breakdown of law and order in Muslim-dominated areas, as can already be seen in parts of many European countries, and a descent into outright, permanent, sectarian conflict between Muslims and their host societies, conflict that the authorities will be powerless to control.

Let those in positions of authority, whether in government or in the police, not pretend to be unaware of this. Their culpability will not be forgotten when British patriots are eventually forced to do what is necessary to save their society from complete disintegration.

Next Installment: “Islam, Muslims, and Crime from the Perspective of a Psychologist” and “The Dark Figure and Other Subtleties”


4Times Online
5Link for the first of six parts.
7Now all we need to do is add in the Pakistani taxi drivers, shop-owners, security guards, and schoolboys aiding and abetting the entire process. How many would there be? Five thousand? Ten thousand?
8Yes, 55, not 54. This is the rounding error coming back in.
9It is crucial to understand what this means. We are interested here in the properties of groups of individuals, not of individuals themselves. Lions are more dangerous to human beings than badgers, and this conclusion cannot reasonably be altered even if we know that some lions are harmless and some badgers dangerous. Similarly, the criminal and destructive behaviour of adult Pakistani males in the aggregate requires us to draw certain conclusions. Those who object to this way of conceptualizing the issue should ask themselves whether they would rather walk through a cage full of lions or a cage full of badgers. Few would choose the lions, and few would consider themselves to have been discriminatory or prejudiced for having done so. There are patterns in the world, and they do not go away just because some choose to ignore them.
10We do not say what we say about the police to malign the rank and file, well aware as we are of the fact that most people who join the police do so to serve and protect the people of this country. These good people will be just as horrified by the situation as we are. Our criticisms are aimed at the politicians and the politically-motivated senior police officers for whom protecting the public comes in a distant second compared with sweeping thorny subjects under the carpet whilst mouthing platitudes about how diversity has enriched us all. Has it enriched the girls destroyed by one of its most despicable manifestations?
11By this, we do not mean that the police do not operate in the areas in question but that, at least with respect to certain crimes, they might as well not due to their complete lack of interest in carrying out their responsibilities therein.
12By rights, white British people should be responsible for a majority of all crime types in all areas, due to their massive numerical dominance. According to the detective quoted in ‘Teenage Sex for Sale’, however, ‘Asians’ are mainly responsible in the north of England, blacks in the West Midlands, and whites, Turks and Kurds elsewhere (note that Turks and Kurds are also overwhelmingly Muslim). That such small groups as the minorities in question dominate this type of crime in any area at all makes it clear just how big a problem their members are on a per-capita basis. If 20% of the population of an area is responsible for 90% of all crime of a certain type in that area, that means that the 20% in question is overrepresented for that crime by a factor of fully thirty-six, or one and a half orders of magnitude. This point must be understood, or all too many people will shrug this matter off as a case of Pakistanis dominating in one area, blacks and whites in others. To arrive at this conclusion would be to misunderstand the matter entirely.
13The Independent
14The Telegraph
15It is worth remembering that his deputy, Brian Paddick, was a man of great comedic talents. Subsequent to the 2005 London Tube and bus bombings, he said that ‘Islam and terrorism are two words that do not go together’. Of course, if this were true, there would have been no reason to say it. What sane man ever denied a connection between kumquats and terrorism?

Muslim Crime in the UK: Part 3

A Consideration of Muslim Crime in the UK
and the Response of the British Authorities

Part 3

By Pike Bishop

V. Islam, Muslims, and Crime from the Perspective of a Psychologist

It is important to understand that the problems Britain faces with Muslims and their criminality are not anomalous in the wider European context. On the contrary, other Western European countries seem to have even worse Muslim crime problems than the UK.

In the Netherlands, the Muslim crime problem in Moroccan and Turkish form has been largely responsible for propelling the brilliant Geert Wilders to a position of political prominence. One can only conclude that the Dutch no longer have any interest in being attacked and robbed in, and in extreme cases driven off, their own streets. Those Britons feeling a sense of dismay over the type and scale of Muslim criminality in the UK can look to the Netherlands to see what happens when this particular cancer is allowed to metastasise even more freely than it is here, fostered by insane immigration policies and subsidised by a welfare state that acts as a magnet for the useless, the criminal and the indolent.

Casting our gaze further afield, the link between Islam and crime becomes ever clearer. In France, rioting on the part of Muslim youth of mainly Maghrebian and African origin has become uncontrollable and endemic, with the 2005 riots being only the most extreme example to date. In Sweden, the mass importation of Muslims, largely from Iraq and other parts of the Middle East, combined with consequent white flight, threatens to turn Malmö, the third largest city in the country, into a Muslim-majority city in the not-too-distant future, with everything that implies for crime (which is surging), the rule of law (which is disintegrating), and the general character of the city (which is deteriorating). Jews are already fleeing due to the constant intimidation they experience there, and arson, rioting, and the stoning of representatives of the state are daily occurrences in the worst-afflicted parts of the city.

In Norway, the police report that in the period 2007-2009, all 41 assault rapes in the city of Oslo, all of them, were committed by non-Western immigrants, and overwhelmingly by Muslims. And in Germany, a police union has suggested that Turkish police, which is to say Turkish police from Turkey, not German police of Turkish origin, be asked to patrol immigrant (and, one assumes, heavily Turkish) ghettos in North-Rhine Westphalia, due to the inability of the German police to maintain law and order in these areas themselves. Such is the scale of the problems European countries now face in the form of Muslim criminality.

We cannot do justice to this subject here, but we can share with readers the insights of a man all too familiar with the Muslim crime problem currently tearing apart the social fabric of his own country. Nicolai Sennels1 is a Danish psychologist who has very generously contributed a key section of this document. We will let him share his insights with readers in his own words.

Islam, Muslims, and Crime from the Perspective of a Psychologist (by Dr. Nicolai Sennels)

As a psychologist in a youth prison in the municipality of Copenhagen I had around 150 Muslim and 100 non-Muslim clients (seven out of ten inmates in Danish youth prisons are of Muslim backgrounds). All the clients were in the same age group, and had similar backgrounds with respect to family incomes and parents’ educational backgrounds. Having hundreds of therapy sessions both individually and in groups (Muslim, non-Muslim and mixed) was an excellent opportunity to compare the two groups. On the basis of these sessions, I concluded that Islam itself is the main reason for the unsuccessful integration of Muslims, the creation of lawless and hostile Muslim parallel societies, and the high crime rates that prevail among Muslim immigrants.

Though some will no doubt consider it controversial to include people’s religious and cultural backgrounds when analysing the causes of anti-social behaviour, it is actually an expression of true humanism. We have to look at the whole person, including his culture and religious beliefs, if we want to understand what motivates his actions. The argument that poverty and stigmatisation are the only reasons for destructive behaviour among Muslims reveals a very one-dimensional view of the human being. In reality, our actions are influenced by far more, and far stronger, factors than simply the amount of money in our bank account or what other people think of us and say about us. Cultural and religious values are much more important factors than these.

Unfortunately, many people are unable to recognize the obvious; that different cultures cultivate different characteristics in people. All families develop certain patterns, a specific culture even, within themselves, and these patterns have great influence over the development of the children. Some families manage to produce self-confident, empathetic, and responsible offspring, while others do not. In the same vein, the different cultures of the world influence people in different ways, and they are not all equally good at inculcating characteristics conducive to productive and law-abiding behavior in Western societies.

On the basis of my years as a professional psychologist treating Muslims, I will try to explain how Islam tends to inculcate certain psychological characteristics amongst its followers.


One of the most important of my findings is that Muslim cultures have an opposite view of anger to the one that prevails in Western societies. We see anger as an expression of weakness. In Denmark we have a saying: ‘Only small dogs bark. Big dogs don’t have to.’ Sudden outbreaks of anger result in the loss of face and social status. As people who have engaged in such embarrassing behaviour (such as at work, or at a family dinner) know, it takes time and a conscious effort to allow people to regain their trust in us.

In Muslim cultures, anger, threats, and violence are much more socially accepted as ways of handling conflicts or showing power. As a Muslim, your family and friends expect you to react aggressively if you, or what you represent, are challenged in any way. If you, as a Muslim, fail to do this, doubts will immediately be sown as to whether you are able to shoulder your share of responsibility in defending your family, ethnic group, territory or religion. A recent study involving in-depth interviews with 45,000 teenagers in Germany supports this conclusion.2

One does not have to be a psychologist to see that this attitude towards anger is one of the main causes for the high violent crime rates amongst Muslims. And the problem is exacerbated immensely by the Muslim concept of honour. This creates fragile, glass-like personalities, and makes male Muslims in particular sensitive to the slightest criticism. What Muslims call ‘honour’, we in the West tend to refer to as low self-confidence.

Locus of Control

Another important finding from my therapy room concerns the so-called ‘locus of control’. Our locus of control determines whether we experience our life as mainly influenced by inner or outer factors. In the West, we learn throughout our lives that our own attitudes and decisions shape our lives and influence our states of mind. The same goes for our way of handling our thoughts and feelings, and our ability to handle difficult experiences and situations constructively. Thus our locus of control is largely internal. Muslims, on the other hand, are primarily brought up to have an external locus of control, consisting of strict external cultural and religious rules, and immediate and heavy consequences for individual thinking or stepping outside the “box”. Our Western societies are built on the assumption of individual free will, and the notion that we are masters of our own fate. In contrast, the Islamic term ‘inshallah’ (Allah willing) follows every wish or plan Muslims make about the future.

Our Western sense of responsibility for self hugely increases our ability to solve our own problems. Muslims, on the other hand, and as we have seen, have an external locus of control and therefore tend to blame others, with non-Muslims and non-Islamic authorities being the usual scapegoats. While Westerners tend to think ‘what can I do differently?’ when experiencing difficulties, Muslims tend to think ‘who did this to me?’.

This feeling of an outer locus of control is the basis of, and the fuel for, a lot of the anger among Muslims everywhere towards non-Muslims and the non-Muslim world in general. They see us as the cause of their (usually self-created) emotional misery, financial woe, and lack of social status. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that many Muslims see the hostile attitudes and destructive behaviour they so often direct at their ‘oppressors’ as being natural and justified. The resulting violent hostility towards non-Muslims and non-Islamic authorities is an ever-prevalent consequence of this, and one that is entirely explicable and predictable.

Unfortunately, the problems caused by the Muslim external locus of control are exacerbated by the broadly accepted but mistaken view that anti-social people are victims of some unjust external factor with respect to which they are powerless. This interaction reinforces the childlike victim mentality that is the natural consequence of having an external locus of control. No experienced psychologist will accept such attempts at self-justification. If we do not dare to show people how they create and perpetuate their own problems, how will they ever mature, take responsibility for themselves, and stop being a burden on those around them?

As a psychologist for criminal Muslims, I found that they often felt no remorse whatsoever for their harmful actions. The external reasons they provided for their harmful behaviour (such as being ‘provoked’ or treated ‘unfairly’, and thus ‘forced’ to ‘retaliate’) resulted in there being no possibility of them feeling personally responsible. In some professional circles, there is currently much discussion as to whether Islam might actually inculcate psychopathic character traits (such as lack of empathy) in its followers.


A third finding during the hundreds of hours with Muslim clients on my couch is that the extent to which they identify with being Muslims, and as belonging to the Muslim community, is very great indeed. It is something they feel far more strongly than most Westerners would identify with being, for example, Christian. Most of these clients were not practising Islam, and in many cases they had had sex before marriage and had drunk alcohol, things antithetical to being a ‘good Muslim’. Despite their often less-than-holy behaviour, they felt a strong loyalty towards Islam nonetheless. Thus many of my Muslim clients had ended up in the prison I worked at precisely because of the obligation they felt to defend their religion against any kind of criticism, by any means necessary (starting riots, attacking the authorities, threatening people who criticise Islam, etc.).

Muslims’ strong identification with their cultural and religious background is the cause of a powerful and dangerous us-and-them mentality. Thus I experienced far more racism among the Muslim inmates than among any other group. While our societies try to inculcate tolerance and equality, Muslim culture and Islamic teachings insist on the importance of the difference between believers and infidels. I had dozens of Muslim clients that had been involved in serious riots against the Danish authorities, and the general picture is very clear. The victim mentality and acceptance of anger that are part of Muslim culture, combined with Muslims’ loyalty towards Islam and their strong discrimination between Muslims and non-Muslims, are the main reason that — while police, firemen and other representatives from our non-Islamic authorities are being met with hostility and violence when entering Muslim-dominated areas in our cities — Islamic authorities such as imams, patrols of older Muslim men, and Sharia courts are free to exert their power.

Unless it concerned rival Muslim gangs or ‘honour’-related crimes, all violence committed by my Muslim clients had been against non-Muslims. When I talked with my Muslim clients about this fact during therapy, and especially during anger management sessions, they told me that non-Muslims were a more legitimate target. It emerged that they see our society’s lack of meaningful response and Europeans’ non-aggressive ways of handling conflicts as signs of exploitable weakness. Alarmingly, I also discovered that there exists amongst Muslims a demonisation of non-Muslims that has many similarities to the propaganda countries disseminate against their enemies during wartime, propaganda that serves to strengthen the hatred soldiers feel for their enemies, killing off all empathy and enabling them to fight without mercy.

It is worth mentioning in closing that there is an interesting phenomenon amongst Muslim prisoners, in that the greatest social status and respect always accrue to the more extreme Muslims. This is a dangerous tendency indeed.

Islam, Muslims and Crime

Seen from the perspective of Western psychology it is without doubt unhealthy for the development of one’s personality to grow up in an Islamic environment. Its high acceptance of anger and lack of self-responsibility and tolerance produces a relatively high number of anti-social and psychologically immature individuals.

Having had a closer look at Muslim cultures than most, I have no doubts whatsoever that the integration of Muslims into our Western societies will never happen to any useful extent. Muslim pressure for the Islamization of our societies will therefore never end and there will be constant and growing violent conflicts between Muslims and their non-Islamic surroundings.

I believe the solution to this problem will consist of the following steps. Firstly, we must bring a complete halt to Muslim immigration and the awarding of citizenship to Muslim immigrants and refugees, at least until the feasibility of Muslim integration is established. Secondly, we have to make non-integration so impractical and financially detrimental that immigrants who cannot or will not integrate feel that repatriation (state-sponsored emigration) is, for them, the better option. Thirdly, we have to limit the state child support so that families only receive financial support for a number of children equal to the average in a given country. Parents that work, which is to say natives and well-integrated immigrants, will still have the necessary financial means to have large families if they wish. There is nothing wrong with making unpleasant guests feel unwelcome!

VI. The Dark Figure and Other Subtleties

We have already pointed out that official crime statistics are not available by religion of perpetrator, which makes it impossible to say what the official Muslim crime rate is for any particular crime. However, even if such statistics were available, there would still be questions as to their reliability.

For any crime to enter the official statistics, it must first be reported, and then recorded. Let us consider each of these processes in turn. The first, reporting, is fairly self-explanatory, but still requires a little thought. For a crime to be reported, there must be:

1. An awareness on the part of the victim that a crime has taken place at all.
2. A willingness to report the crime.

Staying with our two examples from Section III, it is far from obvious that a seven-year-old who has just undergone FGM knows she has had a crime committed against her. Similarly, it is far from obvious that a 14-year-old girl who is being drugged, threatened, beaten, and pimped will be prepared to go to the police to report these various crimes. These two factors both force down the reporting rate to an extent that varies widely as a function of the crime in question, though not necessarily its seriousness.

Nearly all burglaries are reported, as reporting a burglary to the police is necessary to make an insurance claim. However, rape — a much more serious crime — is reported much less frequently due to such factors as shame and a reluctance to have it made public that one was raped.

Next, there is the question of whether or not the report in question will result in the police recording it as a crime. If the police are not satisfied that a crime has actually taken place as reported, they will simply not record it, and it will effectively disappear from the official viewpoint. Taken together these two processes constitute attrition, that process whereby the number of actually-committed crimes is, in effect, whittled down to the official figure. The difference, i.e. the number of crimes that have ‘gone missing’, is referred to as the dark figure. This dark figure is the source of many of the difficulties that bedevil the discipline of criminology, and criminologists have developed various methods for trying to address it. However, none of these methods will be useful for addressing the dark figure for those Muslim crimes most likely to escape the attention of the authorities.3

We have now established a number of key points:

1. Trying to establish the amount of any given crime taking place is a very difficult endeavour due to fundamental methodological difficulties.
2. This is particularly true for certain categories of crime. Most obviously, these include those that the victims do not consider to be crime, and those that they refuse to report, for whatever reasons. Other studies can help fill in the blanks in some cases, but not with respect to the crimes we are most interested in here.
3. A significant fraction of the most depraved and damaging Muslim crime (FGM, pimping, etc.) is of a type that is unlikely ever to show up in official statistics, and therefore, by definition, cannot result in police action, much less appropriate convictions.
4. Any official statistics that exist on these crimes are therefore likely to be hopelessly inaccurate. This means that only unofficial estimates can be given, and these are always of doubtful reliability, especially with respect to crimes such as pimping.
5. Any official statistics that could, in principle, exist are not broken down by the religion of perpetrator anyway.

As a consequence of the above, we are concerned by the impossibility, at present, of a member of the general public really gaining any sort of idea at all as to how prevalent Muslim crime is, or how disproportionately involved in crime Muslims are. Of course, this impossibility also obtains with respect to Chinese crime, or Armenian crime, or any other sort of crime. However, there is no reason to believe that these groups are particularly criminal, or that the police tend to turn a blind eye to their criminal activities. Neither claim can be made with respect to Muslims.

We would seem to have no option but to look at the disproportionality in incarceration to give us a general idea, as noted in Section II of this document. But there are problems here too. Even if we ignore the conversion problem outlined earlier, we still have great difficulties in this regard:

  • Is the threefold overrepresentation of Muslims in the prison system evidence of crime rates three times higher across the board, with an identical probability of post-crime incarceration for Muslims and non-Muslims?
  • Are Muslim crime rates perhaps ten times higher, with the probability of incarceration for Muslims somehow having moved down lower than for non-Muslims?
  • Or are Muslims no more criminal than anyone else, their greater incarceration rates simply being the consequence of a biased criminal justice system?

So far in this document we have discussed two different metrics that could, in principle, shed some light on the true nature and scale of the Muslim crime problem: crime rates and incarceration rates. The first, as we have noted, do not exist for Muslims as a group, and the second are not easy to interpret. We consider it worth pointing out here that the relationship between them may also be somewhat counterintuitive. We expect, intuitively, that a group with disproportionately high crime rates will also have disproportionately high incarceration rates. But the extent to which the law enforcement apparatus is actually brought to bear on a given group is also of relevance to this analysis.

If all Muslims in prison were to be let out of prison, then the Muslim incarceration rate would fall to zero, so this indicator would suggest a complete lack of criminality on the part of Muslims. But the release of approximately 10,000 Muslims with criminal records into the country at large would, fairly obviously push up the Muslim crime rate by some margin, making Muslims appear more criminal as seen via this metric (however it were deduced). Conversely, putting all Muslims in prison permanently would see the Muslim crime rate fall to zero, suggesting zero Muslim criminality with this metric, but pushing the Muslim prison population to 2.4 million, suggesting absolute criminality with the other.

The point of this slightly odd thought experiment is to suggest that, if the policing of a given community starts to weaken and become more permissive in some regard, then, all other things being equal, its incarceration rate will fall while its crime rate rises. And, as we have argued above, there are already good grounds for believing that the police have become less than completely assiduous in pursuing Muslim criminals, at least in certain respects. As such, we may surmise that the only concrete indicator we have of relative Muslim criminality (their relative incarceration rate) is lower than it would be if the law were applied evenly, and that the one that is invisible to us (their relative crime rate) is higher than it would otherwise be.

Let us put the point more concretely. If the British police dropped all their concerns about appearing ‘racist’, and were given the powers they need to adequately address FGM, pimping, and other crimes that are ‘culturally sensitive’, and that they have therefore edged away from until now, how many more criminal Muslims would be in prison, and how much lower would Muslim crime therefore be? There is no way of answering this question precisely, and we do not propose to try. But there is clearly a strong possibility that huge amounts of Muslim crime are simply not registered by the criminal justice system at all, as they are not reported, offenders are never brought to justice, and the crimes themselves simply disappear into the unknowable Muslim-specific ‘dark figure’, which, we suggest, is almost certainly much greater than for other communities.

Note that we do not imply by the foregoing that the police are bringing all wrongdoers to justice when the wrongdoers in question happen to be non-Muslims. Rather we suggest that a relative slackness with respect to the application of the law to certain Muslim groups will result in the one firm, quantitative indicator of Muslim crime we have (incarceration rates) underestimating the scale of the problem. Coupled with an admittedly impressionistic perception of the prevalence of Muslim crime picked up, rightly or wrongly, from the mainstream media, it is hard to resist concluding that Muslim crime is a) rampant and b) substantially unaddressed. The absence of any reliable relative crime rate data for Muslims, their already-high incarceration rate, and the existence of good reason to believe that they enjoy, in some respects at least, an ill-deserved legal impunity with respect to extremely serious crimes: all these factors serve to strengthen this conclusion. The disproportionality in incarceration rates for Muslims is, at present, a factor of three.4 But perhaps it should be a factor of five, or ten, or twenty. How can we possibly know?

We must maintain a position of agnosticism here. As already stated, we strongly suspect that, though overrepresented in the prison population by a large margin, Muslims are almost certainly still underrepresented relative to what we will call their ‘true state’, i.e. that which would obtain if they enjoyed no special treatment. However, this should not be taken to imply that all Muslims are criminals destroying our society from within. It is, rather, a friendly shot across the bows of the relevant authorities. Nature abhors a vacuum, and an informational vacuum that pertains to the criminality of a problematic religious minority, whose relationship with the rest of the country is already rather strained, cannot be in anyone’s best interests, theirs or ours.

Let us reiterate here that the types of crime with respect to which Muslims enjoy a certain degree of impunity are hardly trifling matters. FGM, sexually enslaving underage girls, the dealing of hard drugs and associated crimes of violence, ‘honour’ violence, and a constellation of offences relating to inciting violence and/or insurrection against the British state, people, and armed forces: these crimes are not exactly on a par with parking on double-yellow lines or casually throwing away a crisp packet. Even if we turn to terrorism itself, there are undoubtedly Muslims in the UK today whom the security services could pull in and have charged for terrorism-related offences if keeping them under surveillance and building up intelligence on their networks were not deemed to be of greater value. How many such Muslims might there be? 10? 50? 100? We have no way of knowing, but the point is that even with respect to terrorism (for valid reasons, in this case), we cannot assume that the numbers we see in prison are reflective of the true scale of the problem. Hence the informational vacuum to which we have already alluded.

Next: “Some Pre-Emptive Responses to Predicted Objections” and “Conclusions”


1 Nicolai Sennels (born 1976) is a psychologist and the author of ‘Among Criminal Muslims: A Psychologist’s Experiences from Copenhagen Municipality’ (Free Press Society, 2009). The book describes the psychological mechanisms leading to high Muslim crime rates and hostile, parallel Muslim societies. It also explains why integration of Muslims into Western societies is doomed to failure. His work is based on his experience in Copenhagen youth prison where he had around 150 Muslim and 100 Danish clients. It is on the basis of the comparisons this client pool allowed that he draws a psychological profile of the Muslim mind. His controversial work was well received by the Danish magazine for professional psychologists, which stated that the book was ‘a provoking eye-opener, convincing and with concrete examples,’ and the magazine for professional teachers of teenagers stated that ‘Nicolai Sennels’ conclusions and critical analysis concerning our effort to help criminal youth deserve wide attention.’ Sennels regularly writes articles for Danish newspapers and internet magazines, of which ‘Muslims and Westerners: The Psychological Differences’ and ‘Sexual Abuse Widespread among Muslims’ (both available online) are the best known. Sennels can be contacted through his homepage: www.nicolaisennels.dk.
2  “Religious Muslim boys more violent”
3 The methods in question are victim surveys (crime viewed from the victim’s perspective) and self-report studies (crime viewed from the perpetrator’s perspective). Both are useful criminological tools in certain contexts and to certain extents, particularly the former. A discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of these studies is beyond the scope of this document, but suffice it to say here that there is no reason to believe that they currently shed any light on that part of the dark figure that concerns us, or even that they are ever likely to do so.
4 A figure which is already difficult to interpret, as we have noted.

Muslim Crime in the UK: Part 4

A Consideration of Muslim Crime in the UK
and the Response of the British Authorities

Part 4

By Pike Bishop

VII. Some Pre-Emptive Responses to Predicted Objections

Given that many of the reflexive objections to this dossier and its contents are largely predictable in advance, we endeavour here to try to clear some of them up, so that people of good faith who genuinely wish to engage with the position herein need not waste their time with them.

Are We Stigmatising Muslims?

‘Stigmatisation’ is one of the accusations most frequently hurled at those who presume to draw attention to the undesirable characteristics of ideologically protected groups. Like many such charges, however, it has no real meaning. If we were to accuse the Orthodox Jewish community of the UK of being disproportionately represented amongst the ranks of armed robbers, would we be accused of stigmatising them? Obviously not. We would be accused, and deservedly so, of outright fabrication and slander, but not of stigmatisation. When a false claim is made about a group, the counterclaim of ‘stigmatisation’ serves no useful purpose, as defenders of the group in question can respond far more effectively by pointing out that the claim is false.

Once this simple point has been understood, it can be seen fairly clearly that the charge of ‘stigmatisation’ is only meaningful when directed at true claims. It will therefore only be made in response to true claims, and is, in essence, an implicit admission of their accuracy. If one points out that Muslims in the UK tend far more strongly to terrorism, sedition, and subversion than any other group, then one is making a claim which very few people acquainted with the facts could possibly deny. In response, many will accuse the claimant of ‘stigmatising’ Muslims. Despite their apparent belief that they are thereby saying something substantive and thought-provoking, they are in fact only saying that a) one’s claims are true, but that b) it is simply not cricket to point out such unpleasant truths. For my part, we are content to be correct, and will let loftier intellects concern themselves with what is, and what is not, cricket.

Note that the accusation that we are ‘fostering hatred’ would be essentially analogous to the claim that we are engaging in stigmatisation. The rebuttal is therefore simply a slight variation on the above theme.

Surely There Is No Such Thing as ‘Islam’?

It is often argued, when attention is drawn to unpleasant aspects of the way in which Muslims behave, whether in the UK or anywhere else, that there is no such thing as Islam. It is meaningless to try to generalize about Islam. There are many Islams. Why, there are as many Islams as there are Muslims.

We must not essentialise Islam, clever people tell us. Furthermore, there is huge ethnic, cultural, and linguistic variation amongst the Muslims in the UK, and throughout Western Europe in general. Surely it is meaningless to speak of Muslims as being one thing rather than another, and inflammatory to do so on a subject as controversial as crime?

If Islam and crime have nothing to do with each other, then we should not expect to observe any patterns, any regularities, when we look at crime through the prism of Islam. To rephrase, looking at crime from the perspective of Islam should impose no more order on the underlying data than doing so from the perspective of any other arbitrarily selected and irrelevant parameter.

Let us make the point with an example. If we were to trawl through every Crown Court conviction in the UK in the last twenty years, looking for a pattern between the first letter of the surname of the convicted and the type of offence they had been convicted of, what would we expect to discover? That all murderers had surnames beginning with the letter ‘G’ and all rapists surnames beginning with the letter ‘M’? Surely not. We expect, for reasons too obvious to need explaining, there to be no relationship at all between these two parameters.

But what if we did find a relationship? What if all murderers really did have surnames beginning with the letter ‘G’, and all rapists surnames beginning with the letter ‘M’? If we checked and double-checked our research and were confident of our results, then we would have discovered something very significant, and something that could not possibly be a coincidence. Even if we did not understand the relationship we had discovered, would it not be remiss to fail to draw attention to it and demand that it be studied? Objecting that we were ‘essentialising’ the letters of the alphabet would be neither here nor there. Regularities do not emerge at random from otherwise unordered data.

So it is with Islam. If it is observed that taking Islam as a parameter of interest allows patterns to be observed in crime rates and types throughout Western Europe, with its hundreds of millions of people and many millions of Muslims, and if it can further be established that Islam is not a proxy for some other variable such as poverty (more on this below), then Islam as a risk factor for crime must be taken seriously, even if the nature of the relationship between the two is not yet clear. Occam’s Razor is not easily blunted, least of all by the delicate sensibilities of multiculturalists.

The pioneering work and immense political courage of Nicolai Sennels in Denmark are already leading the way in unraveling the role that Islam plays in causing its adherents to perpetrate criminal acts. Do British psychologists and criminologists have a contribution to make in this regard? Or does putting quotation marks around the word crime (excuse us, ‘crime’) already consume all their intellectual energies?

Just a Tiny Minority?

Inevitably, when disproportionate criminality on the part of an immigrant group is observed and stubbornly refuses to be explained away by the self-appointed defenders of that group, the claim will eventually emerge that the perpetrators of the crime in the group in question are a ‘tiny minority’ of the whole, and that the ‘vast majority’ of the members of the group are law-abiding citizens. The woeful predictability and peculiarly seductive nature of this claim make it particularly important to unpack.

The tiny minority defence essentially makes four assertions:

1. That a given problem caused by a given ethnic/religious group in a given society is only committed by a ‘tiny minority’ of that group.
2. That the problem, though unpleasant, is therefore essentially manageable, at least in principle.
3. That it is unfair to blame the problematic group as a whole, as the vast majority of the members of that group are not engaging in the unfortunate behaviour in question.
4. That whether one blames the group as a whole or not, it is unfair to take any type of action against it as a whole, as such collective action/punishment will affect many innocent people.

The basic problem with this fallacious reasoning lies in the implicit assumption that, in a healthy and functional society, anything other than the very tiniest minority could be committing serious crime. Even in the most crime-ridden societies on Earth, serious crime is always committed by tiny minorities of the population. Let us consider why this should be so.

During the Troubles in Northern Ireland, there were approximately 3,500 sectarian killings of all sorts, including the killings of civilians (Catholic and Protestant), British soldiers, IRA members, and members of Loyalist paramilitaries. This is an average of about 121 per year for the 29 years of the conflict. If we take the mean population of Northern Ireland as being about 1.25 million throughout these years, then we have what is, for our purposes, an average sectarian murder rate (not an official murder rate) of 9.68 per 100,000 per annum (the UK murder rate in recent years has been approximately 1.2 per 100,000 per annum). Performing a similar analysis for Sri Lanka during its 27-year civil war (90,000 killings, 27 years, assuming an average population of 18 million people throughout the period), yields a sectarian murder rate of 18.52 per 100,000 per annum, nearly double that for the Troubles.

Now let us look at Jamaica.20 According to Wikipedia, Jamaica’s murder rate in 2009 was 58 per 100,000 per annum, a figure slightly higher than that obtained by adding the sectarian murder rates for Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka above and doubling them. This is not the result of a civil war. It is not an aberration, or a blip, or something that can be rectified by banging the side of the TV set. It is, for reasons the authors of this dossier will not pretend to understand, just how Jamaica happens to be. Now let us assume that, in any given year, a) every person who is murdered is murdered by a single person (which will artificially reduce the number of murderers) and that b) no murderer murders more than one victim, (which will artificially increase the number of murderers). This means that there are 58 people per 100,000 engaged in the act of murder in any given year, or 0.058% of the entire population. We have now established that only a tiny minority of Jamaica’s population is engaged in lethal violence in any given year, and the same would doubtless be true for every other serious crime as well.

But what of it? Who feels emboldened with respect to taking a late-evening stroll through a Kingston slum simply through the application of the tiny minority defence to Jamaica? The problem here is that, although that fraction of the population of Jamaica engaged in lethal violence in any given year is indeed a tiny minority, it is by no means tiny enough. A country can, to be blunt, fall to pieces well, well before those committing serious crime become anything more than a tiny minority. Should the South African authorities be unconcerned about the sky-high murder rate in their country simply because only a tiny minority commits murder in any given year?21

Only a tiny minority commits murder in any given year in Japan. But that tiny minority is approximately two orders of magnitude smaller than its counterpart in Jamaica. Hence some of the massive, qualitative differences between these two countries. And exactly the same analysis can be applied to different groups within the same country, rendering the tiny minority defence meaningless when the criminality of a specific group is being examined. One must understand crime for what it is, not through applying arbitrary and ill-considered numerical standards to it.

Are We Forgetting Poverty?

Arguably the most predictable and reflexive of all ‘rebuttals’ to the claim that Muslims are somehow predisposed to engage in criminal behaviour is that which makes reference to poverty. Are not Muslims disproportionately likely to live in poverty? Surely it is obvious that differences in crime rates between different populations are essentially functions of poverty?

Alas, things are not so simple. Though poverty is often treated as if it were some sort of magic wand which could explain away all sorts of social ills, this is certainly not true with respect to crime. There are two problems with this claim. The first is that it is far from obvious that there is a particularly strong positive correlation between crime and poverty at all if we are making between-group comparisons. The second is that such a positive correlation, even if it were to exist, would, in and of itself, establish nothing one way or the other about the existence or nature of a causal relationship between the two variables.

The first point can be made sufficiently well by reference to the incarceration rates of different ethnic groups in the UK. The incarceration rates of the white British population are higher than those for the Chinese, the Hindus, or the Sikhs in the UK. Yet both British Chinese and British Indians have higher poverty rates than white British people, which means they are more law-abiding despite being poorer. Similarly, black Britons appear to have higher incarceration rates than Pakistanis or Bangladeshis (both overwhelmingly Muslim groups), despite lower poverty rates.

The second point is a more subtle one. To say that differences in crime rates are due (or largely due) to differences in income is to say that, if we control for income between two different groups, the differences in crime rates would disappear (or be significantly attenuated) because differences in income cause differences in crime rates. But this is much more problematic than it seems.

Let us imagine that we compare Muslims and non-Muslims in the same income brackets and find that differences in crime rates between them are seen to shrink to nearly zero. Can we then assume that poverty is the most important causal factor underlying the crime rate differentials, and that the ‘Muslim’ crime problem is actually a poverty problem? The answer is no, and the reason is the age-old logical fallacy of confusing correlation with causation.22 To say that controlling for poverty reduces crime rate differentials is, in effect, to say that poverty and crime correlate with each other. But this is no more evidence that poverty causes crime than that crime causes poverty, which could equally well be true. Similarly, it could be true that crime and poverty are both caused by some as-yet-unconsidered variable, with neither actually causing the other at all.

To rephrase, even if crime and poverty are correlated, it is not clear why that should be. Perhaps the poor commit crime because they cannot afford to buy what they want, and are angry with the world (A and B correlate, A causes B). Perhaps the criminal are poor because their criminal and dysfunctional behaviour has disrupted their educational and professional development, and they cannot find gainful, remunerative employment (A and B correlate, B causes A). Perhaps there is a suite of psychological characteristics (impulsiveness, lack of ability to delay gratification, lack of self-discipline, low intelligence) that tends to cause crime and poverty (A and B correlate, but are both caused by a third factor, C, which correlates with both). Perhaps all these things are true to some extent, creating a much more complex and analytically difficult situation.

These questions on the subject of causality in the social sciences are not unanswerable, at least not in principle. But no consideration of the Muslim crime problem can expect to shed any light on it, or even begin to properly address it, as long as it is obstructed by the confused and confusing folk criminology that plagues so much discussion in modern political discourse.

Quite apart from the above considerations, it should be fairly obvious that crimes such as trying to blow up ten airliners simultaneously, plotting to poison British water supplies, blowing up trains, threatening to kill people for writing novels and drawing cartoons, stabbing people and throwing acid over them for sullying the family ‘honour’, cutting pieces of the sexual organs out of one’s own daughters, and beating up journalists investigating electoral fraud are not caused by poverty. Does anyone doubt this? Could anyone doubt this?

Are We Forgetting Age Profile Differences Between Muslims and Others?

Different groups within the same country often have different age distributions, and crime rates can vary as a function of age. As such, a crime rate differential between two different ethnic/religious groups can, in principle, be at least partly a function of that age difference.

If, for example, we discovered that vandalism rates were higher for the Muslim community in the UK, but also that vandalism was more common amongst the young, we would then be faced with the question of whether or not the crime rate differential was partly a function of age differences. This question could be investigated by comparing the crime rates between similar age groups drawn from the Muslim community and the rest of the country. We could discover, on so doing, that part of the variation in the crime rate disappeared as a consequence, that all of it disappeared, or even that, controlling for age, Muslims were less likely than others to commit vandalism. Alternatively, we might discover that the effect of controlling for age depended on the age group in question. All these questions are empirical questions, and therefore cannot be answered from first principles.

It should be noted that the causality problems that arise with respect to poverty do not arise here, as it is possible only for variation in age to cause variation in crime rates, not for variation in crime rates to cause variation in age. Accordingly, this is in general a far more legitimate objection to a superficial interpretation of crime rate differentials than that based on poverty, whether in this context or any other. Nonetheless, large crime differentials are exceedingly unlikely to be explained away in this fashion, though they may be somewhat attenuated. Until criminologists attack these questions rigorously, the most that those who would take issue with our arguments can say is that controlling for age could reduce some crime rate differentials between Muslims and non-Muslims to some extent. Given that Muslims in general exhibit the characteristics that disproportionately criminal groups always do (poor educational and professional achievement, heavy reliance on public assistance, etc., which cannot be explained away as age effects), we find it unlikely that crime rate or incarceration rate differentials are likely to be exposed as being age effects to any significant extent. And we are certainly not likely to discover that, for example, the Muslim tendency to plan acts of terrorism is a consequence of them being younger than other populations.

Are We Being Xenophobic?

The word xenophobia is frequently flung at those in the UK who object to any aspect of the behaviour of any group of foreign origin, implying as it does that the objections in question are less than genuine, and are actually motivated by nothing other than an animus towards the group in question. However, unless there are grounds for believing that no behaviour of any immigrant group can be legitimately objected to (which seems unlikely, to put it mildly), the burden of proof is surely on the accusers in this regard.

A question for those who believe that those who focus on Muslim crime do so only because they are xenophobes who simply dislike those of foreign origin: why do these xenophobes not focus their attention on the Chinese as well? Is it simply that they have not yet found some reasonably plausible pretext upon which to attack the Chinese and present them as a threat? Or could it be because the Chinese do not cause any particular problems? Could it be because the Chinese seem to be disproportionately likely not to commit crime, particularly violent crime, sexual crime, and property crime? Might that not have something to do with it? Might it not be that the significant ethnic and cultural differences that exist between the Chinese and other groups in the UK are simply not of any particular significance or interest to those concerned about Muslim crime, much less grounds for hostility? And might this not be rather difficult to reconcile with the claim that these people are merely an assembly of xenophobes and racists?

VIII. Conclusion

In conclusion, we feel that it is legitimate to make the following observations:

1. It is generally true that Muslims in the UK are substantially more criminal than the UK population as a whole, irrespective of national background, or what generation of immigrant they are (first, second, etc.).
2. This trend is a robust one, and can be seen in similar form throughout Western Europe. Indeed, a glance at the Muslim crime problem in countries such as France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and Sweden makes it clear that the UK, disturbingly, and despite its many problems in this regard, has a much less severe problem with Muslim crime than many of its European neighbours.
3. Certain non-Muslim immigrant groups in the UK are more law-abiding than the white British population, as is demonstrated by their lower incarceration rates and the prevailing perceptions of their law-abidingness. That this should be so, despite their higher poverty rates and the integration-related difficulties they no doubt experience, makes it very clear that the Muslim crime problem is not an ‘immigrant’ problem, a ‘race’ problem, a ‘poverty’ problem, or a ‘social exclusion’ problem.
4. It seems, therefore, to be a reasonable conclusion that there is something about Islam itself that, statistically speaking, induces people whose attitudes and behaviours derive from it to engage in criminal, aggressive, and violent behaviour more often than would otherwise be the case. Indeed, there is a gradually emerging body of evidence from modern criminologists and psychologists to suggest that this is so.
5. These Islam-induced behavioural discrepancies are not insignificant, and can be very large indeed. We in the UK are fortunate in that they appear to be, as yet, relatively small (though still large in an absolute sense). However, we do not consider this to be a reason for complacency, much less a reason not to attend resolutely to this troubling state of affairs sooner rather than later.
6. Given the serious Muslim crime problem that we already face, the rapid rate of growth of the UK Muslim community, the general lack of integration of the UK Muslim community, and the existence of strong separatist, supremacist, and subversive tendencies within that community, we feel that the possibility of a serious breakdown of civil order in heavily Muslim areas is a distinct possibility in the years to come. Note that we do not argue that such a breakdown is inevitable. We simply point out that allowing an ever-greater fraction of the population of the UK to consist of a disproportionately criminal, hostile, estranged, and self-estranging religious group (whatever divisions and fissures might exist within the group itself) cannot be accepted as being simply ‘inevitable,’ and therefore to be endured irrespective of the consequences.

On the basis of the foregoing, we make the following requests.

1. We ask that the Home Secretary make clear what sort of balance the police are required to maintain between law enforcement and maintaining public order. We also ask whether this balance is the same for all ethnic and religious groups in the UK, and, if it is not, why not. Answers to the effect that it ‘depends on the circumstances’ will be considered invalid.
2. We ask that the Home Secretary create an independent task force to study the relationship between Islam and crime, with said task force taking into account evidence not only from the UK, but from across Western European countries with similar experiences of Muslim immigration.
3. We ask that the Home Secretary calculate the total annual costs imposed on the British state (i.e. the publicly-borne costs) and people (i.e. the privately-borne costs) as a consequence of Muslim crime. These costs are to include both the direct costs of this crime (physical harm, property damage, etc.), and the indirect costs (expenditures on and by the police, prisons, and security services, productivity costs imposed by anti-terrorism measures, etc.).
4. We ask that the Home Secretary introduce much more finely-grained data-collection methods in all areas that bear on the Muslim crime problem, so as to enable analysts to enhance their understanding of the situation.
5. We ask that the Immigration Secretary clarify whether or not the Muslim crime problem has any influence on immigration policy vis-à-vis Muslims. If it does not, we ask the Immigration Secretary to explain exactly how he has concluded that the Muslim crime problem is so trivial, and will continue to be so trivial, as to be unworthy of being reflected in the relevant aspects of immigration law and policy (such as those pertaining to family reunification immigration, one of the major sources of growth for the UK Muslim community).
6. We ask that the Home Secretary take any and all measures to ensure that foreign criminals, Muslim or otherwise, are permanently deported from the UK upon completion of their sentences. We also ask that new legislation be introduced to permit particularly violent and/or serious criminals of foreign origin to be stripped of their British citizenship as and when possible, so as to facilitate their deportation to their countries of origin.
7. We ask that the Home Secretary consult with the police as to the likely long-term implications of having ever-larger, disproportionately criminal Muslim populations in the UK. The results of this consultation should be made available to the British public as and when they are ready.
8. We ask that the Home Secretary create an independent task force to conduct an in-depth study of forced child prostitution (‘pimping’) in the UK, with a particular emphasis on the situation in the north of England vis-à-vis the criminal activities of the Pakistani population there. We also ask that this task force investigate the relevant police forces to ascertain whether or not they have been engaged in gross professional malfeasance with respect to their responsibilities in this regard.
9. We ask that the Home Secretary conduct a full public inquiry into the likely long-term ramifications of allowing the Muslim population of the UK to continue to be able to import tens of thousands of spouses every year from its various countries of origin, thereby increasing its rate of growth to the current alarming and unsustainable level. 
10. We ask the Home Secretary whether he agrees:
a) That the legitimacy of the British state rests upon its ability to fulfill the obligations it has in accordance with the social contract that exists between it and the British people.
b) That said legitimacy will decline in direct proportion to the failure of the British state to fulfill these obligations.
c) That amongst the most important of these obligations is the protection of the persons and property of the British people against predation and destruction.
d) That the Muslim crime problem represents a rapidly growing (though still partial) failure to fulfill this obligation.
e) That continued failure on this front by the British state has the potential to dissolve the social contract in its entirety.
f) That dissolution of the social contract will both entitle and oblige the British people to take whatever steps they deem necessary to protect their persons and property against predation and destruction, quite irrespective of the wishes of the British state.

If the Home Secretary disagrees with any or all of these statements, we ask that he make the nature of and reasons for his disagreement clear, the better to allow the British people to understand the British state’s interpretation of the social contract that binds them.


20 We do not mean to pick on Jamaica here, but, according to Wikipedia, it had one of the world’s highest murder rates for 2009. This makes it a good example of the point we are trying to make.
21 This should not be taken as a suggestion that South Africa has fallen, or is falling, apart. We simply mention it here as an example of a country with a murder rate sufficiently high as to cast a shadow over the future, perhaps even the viability, of the country.
22 Perhaps the most seductive and ubiquitous of all logical fallacies, the ‘correlation-equals-causation’ fallacy crops up here in a slightly unorthodox form, which no doubt accounts for the blind spot otherwise intelligent and educated people have in this regard.