Muslim Crime in the UK
A Consideration of Muslim Crime in the UK
and the Response of the British Authorities
By Pike Bishop
I. Introduction
Why we decided to produce this document
This document is an attempt to accomplish the following three objectives:
| 1. | | To
draw public attention to the serious and worsening problem of Muslim
crime, in the UK specifically, and throughout Western Europe more
generally. |
| 2. | | To draw attention to problematic aspects of the response of the UK authorities to Muslim crime. |
| 3. | | To promote a public debate on the implications, short- and long-term, of Muslim crime for Britain and its people. |
Who we hope will read this document
We
hope that any and all interested parties will read this dossier.
However, we particularly hope that people in the media, academia, the
government, and the police force will engage with the serious issues it
raises.
What do we mean by ‘Muslim crime’?
Muslim
crime is simply crime committed by Muslims. That said, we have a
particular concern with violent crime (up to and including terrorism),
sexual crime, property crime, and organized crime as committed by
Muslims. By the word Muslim, we simply mean all people of Muslim
background and upbringing who have not explicitly renounced Islam,
irrespective of how devout they are, or how observant of the
requirements of their religion.
Why focus on Muslim crime?
Of
course, no single type of crime becomes any worse in and of itself
simply by virtue of having been committed by a Muslim. Nonetheless,
there are good reasons to be concerned about Muslim crime in its own
right. These include the following:
1
| Muslims
appear to be overrepresented as the perpetrators of serious crime to an
extent which is far from trivial (this claim will be justified in
greater detail later). |
| Terrorism and
terrorism-related offences, a crime category in which Muslims manifestly
make up a massively disproportionate fraction of all convictions,
impose enormous indirect costs on millions of people for long periods of
time. |
| Muslims throughout the West have
pronounced and undeniable separatist, supremacist, and subversive
tendencies. This being the case, Muslim crime acquires a significance
above and beyond that which might be expected, due to the possibility of
it being — and being perceived as being — motivated by these
tendencies. To rephrase, some crime is ‘just’ crime, whereas other crime
will be perceived as being part of an ongoing inter-group conflict, and
therefore possess the potential to further provoke that conflict. How
much Muslim crime (or white crime, or black crime, or any crime, for
that matter) is actually motivated by inter-group conflict is, of
course, an empirical question. |
| The rate of
growth of the Muslim community in the UK is extremely rapid, in both
absolute and relative terms. Unusually high crime rates amongst this
population therefore take on a significance they would not otherwise
have. |
|
What qualifies us to talk about crime at all?
This document has not been produced by professional criminologists. However, it has been produced on the basis of a belief that:
| 1. | | Citizens
engaged in the civic life of their country have both a right and an
obligation to consider such key topics as crime and community cohesion. |
| 2. | | Educated
people of good will are perfectly well-positioned to draw some
provisional conclusions on these subjects on the basis of their own
carefully-considered interpretation of information available in the
public domain. |
We do not pretend to have
all the answers to the questions we pose in this document. Indeed, it is
precisely those areas where data are poor, understanding limited, or
interpretation difficult that we hope will draw increased attention in
the future from criminologists, police officers, and politicians, as
they attempt to address the serious problems that now afflict this
country.
Given that this document is not academic in nature, we
have not felt the need to include all the sources for the facts and
figures herein. The more important or contentious the claim in question,
the more likely it will be to have a source. More general information
may be unsourced. Those who are sceptical about any of our claims are
invited to do their own research and make up their own minds. Either
way, we are confident that the factual claims made in this document are
accurate.
Why do we not discuss terrorism in this document?
With
apologies to the Muslim Council of Britain for the hate crime no doubt
implicit in our use of the term, Muslim terrorism has been a key public
concern for so long now that we consider it to be a fairly well-worked
seam. There is little we feel we can add to the discussion on terrorism,
so we propose to largely ignore it in this document. We will reiterate,
however, what we said above about how the indirect costs of terrorism
(police budget, security services budget, airport security budgets,
indirect costs through productivity losses, etc.) have not, to our
knowledge, ever been calculated with any accuracy. This research should,
in our opinion, be conducted so as to enable a better understanding of
the costs of the presence of so many Muslims in our country.
II. A Bird’s Eye View of Muslim Crime in Britain
Obtaining
a statistical overview of Muslim crime in the UK is very difficult, due
to the extremely low quality of the data available, and the problems
involved in their interpretation. Every three years the government
releases a breakdown of criminal convictions by race. These summaries
offer a significant amount of information to the student of crime, but
not, sadly, information that is useful in a consideration of Muslim
crime. As such, we must look to other sources.
As far as one can
tell, there is no breakdown of crime rates or convictions by religion.
This is the first hurdle we face in trying to gain an overview of Muslim
crime in a broad, statistical sense. A breakdown for crimes such as
terrorism-related offenses could undoubtedly be put together relatively
easily, but it would fail to give us any insight into any other type of
crime.
Given the lack of crime rate data, the most natural step
is to look at the incarceration data for different religious groups. The
Home Office figure of a Muslim prison population of 11% in 2008 is the
obvious place for this discussion to start.
2
Comparing Muslims to non-Muslims, and taking the Muslim population of
the country to be approximately 4% (2.4 million out of 62 million), we
calculate a disproportionality of three for the Muslim population, which
is to say that three times more Muslims are in prison than we would
expect given the number of Muslims in the country.
More
disturbingly, it appears that this disproportionality may grow
significantly if we look at high-security prisons. Four high-security
prisons seem to have even larger Muslim populations than one would
expect from the 11% figure. HMP Whitemoor has a Muslim population of
34%, HMP Long Lartin of 24%, HMP Full Sutton of 15%, and HMP Belmarsh of
22%. However, HMP Frankland has a Muslim population of only 3%, and
there are other high-security prisons in the UK (HMP Strangeways, HMP
Woodhill, HMP Wakefield, etc.) whose Muslim populations we have not been
able to ascertain. Taking a weighted average of these figures to
reflect different population sizes at each prison, we arrive at a figure
of 18% for mid-2008.
3 This figure
could well go down if it were recalculated for all high-security
prisons, as those for which we do not have data include one in Scotland
and one in Northern Ireland, which we do not expect to have large Muslim
populations. Nonetheless, the figure is a cause for concern, meaning as
it does that, in the high-security prisons for which we have figures,
nearly 1 in 5 inmates is a Muslim.
A complicating factor in all
this analysis is that the phenomenon of conversion to Islam on the part
of inmates makes it difficult to know exactly what fraction of the
prison population was Muslim at the point of incarceration. According to
one estimate, 30% of all people who identify as Muslims in prison
converted after being incarcerated, but the accuracy of this figure is
difficult to ascertain. It is also difficult to know how many people
meeting our earlier definition of Muslim (i.e. being of Muslim
background and upbringing and not having renounced Islam) do not
identify themselves as Muslim in prison. These factors make it difficult
to draw firm conclusions, but it may well be the case that the
disproportionality in ‘real’ Muslim incarceration is slightly less than
the factor of three calculated above.
There is a great deal more
to say on this subject, but we feel that it will be more profitably
said subsequent to other discussions. Accordingly, we will take this
theme up again in Section VI.
Notes:
| 1 | | The
reasons for this definition will become clear later on, in Section V,
which features a contribution from Dr. Nicolai Sennels, a psychologist
from Denmark. To summarise here, the psychological attributes inculcated
by Islam appear to be at least as significant in causing Muslim crime
as conscious religious feeling on the part of Muslims. |
| 2 | | In
actual fact, this figure was for England and Wales, not the whole of
the UK. However, other sources suggest that the figure for England and
Wales is now 12%, so taking 11% as our figure for the whole UK will keep
our calculations acceptably accurate. |
| 3 | | Of
course, this figure is liable to change. Moreover, the estimates it is
based on were not all made at the same point in time in 2008.
Accordingly, it should be taken as a representative figure rather than
an exact figure for an exact moment in time. The current figure could be
somewhat higher or lower. |
---------------------
A Consideration of Muslim Crime in the UK
and the Response of the British Authorities
Part Two
By Pike Bishop
III. Two Rhapsodies on the Theme of Muslim Crime
Pimping
Among
the most disgusting examples of dereliction of duty on the part of our
‘law enforcement’ apparatus is that which pertains to the pimping of
underage white girls. Of course, the usual disclaimers must be made
here: it is not only Muslims that pimp out these unfortunate white
girls, and not all Muslims do pimp them out. However, insofar as one can
discern from the limited amount of information that makes its way into
the mainstream media, there are certain groups of Muslims who appear to
be particularly culpable in this regard. We acknowledge the
uncertainties here, and the great difficulty in trying to develop any
accurate picture of exactly what is going on. As we will see, however,
this lack of information is unlikely to be an accident.
Though
we use the term ‘pimping’ to describe the practice under examination
here, the fact of the matter is that it consists of the dragging of
underage white girls into a life of sexual slavery and violence. Those
who are interested in learning about it in more detail are invited to
read the September 2007 Times article
Mothers of Prevention by Julie Bindel
4 and to watch the March 2008 edition of Panorama, ‘Teenage Sex for Sale’.
5
We urge all those who read this document to familiarize themselves with
the relevant material, the better to understand the nature of the
multicultural paradise and glittering rainbow nation that is modern
Britain.
Here, we will content ourselves with a brief summary
of the essentials. Pakistani drug-dealing gangs concentrated in the
north of England are orchestrating a system in which underage white
girls ‘just happen’ to make friends with Pakistani boys of roughly their
own age. They are then introduced to older ‘cousins’ of these boys, who
are the actual pimps, and who, in time, become their new ‘boyfriends’.
These men use a wide variety of techniques to control the girls and
induce them to prostitute themselves out to the Pakistani community.
These techniques include, but are not limited to, pretending to need
money, threatening the girls, drugging them, and beating them with iron
bars. Through a combination of a reluctance to appear ‘racist’ and fears
of race riots of unspecified type, the British police seem to have
devoted rather less than their full energies to this matter, with the
result being that the Pakistani Muslim criminals in question are
essentially engaging in all these criminal activities with impunity.
It
is hard to avoid the impression that there is a slice of the vibrant,
bustling Pakistani Muslim community of the UK that simply considers the
native British population to be a resource, existing for no other reason
than to be chewed up and spat out by vibrant, bustling Pakistani Muslim
predators like themselves, for their sexual pleasure and financial
gain. And it is far from obvious that this slice is some sort of anomaly
in this population. On the contrary, the Pakistani organized crime
gangs in question and their Pakistani customers seem to range from the
very young (the teenage boys used to befriend the girls), to their
slightly older ‘cousins’ (used to start pimping the girls), to older men
still (those orchestrating these activities in the background), with
the girls’ clients presumably running the gamut from young to old.
That
is the depth of the slice. What of its breadth? Well, let us consider
the matter. There are approximately one million people of Pakistani
origin in the UK. Let us assume, not unreasonably, that half of them are
male. If 5,000 child prostitutes exist in the UK,
6
and the problem is particularly bad in the north of England, which
appears to be the epicentre of the phenomenon, then there are perhaps
2,000 girls being prostituted there by Pakistanis (we will not dignify
them by calling them Britons of Pakistani descent). How many times, on
average, has each of these girls been raped by Pakistani ‘clients’? 400?
500? How many individual ‘clients’ have they been raped by? 100, with
each having raped them 4 or 5 times, on average? What is 100 multiplied
by 2,000? 200,000? Does that mean that 200,000 Pakistani males, or 40%
of the total, have raped underage white girls in the UK? Well no,
probably not, as some Pakistani males have presumably raped more than
one girl. So shall we reduce our estimate by a (fairly arbitrary) factor
of two to take into account this redundancy in the Pakistani raping of
underage white girls? Why yes, let us do that, and generously conclude
that only 100,000 Pakistani males have raped an underage white girl.
7
Now,
100,000 is one fifth of 500,000. This means that, according to our
estimate, one in five of the male Pakistani population of the UK is the
rapist of an underage white girl. Bearing in mind that the fraction of
the Pakistani population under the age of 18 is very large, and that
these rapes will be predominantly committed by the population aged 18
and over (who number approximately 330,000), we must conclude that
somewhere in the region of one in three adult Pakistani males is the
rapist of an underage white girl. Having concluded this, and bearing in
mind the various other forms of criminality and sedition that seem to be
prevalent amongst ‘British’ Pakistanis that we have not even considered
here, would it be unreasonable to suppose that the Pakistani Muslim
population of the UK is in fact,
taken as a whole, an enemy of the British people?
We
seem to have arrived at a rather unfortunate conclusion. Surely there
must be a mistake in our reasoning, or a mistaken premise? Very well,
let us take a stab at this puzzle from a different angle. According to
the information available in the mainstream media, pimping out one
underage girl for one year can bring in £300,000 to £400,000. Let us
take the low end of the estimate (£300,000) and see what we can conclude
from it. How much does one have to pay to a pimp to be able to rape the
girl under his ‘care’? Let us assume it costs £100 a time. This means
that a girl being pimped out is being raped 3,000 times a year, or
roughly 60 times a week. Returning to our earlier estimate of 2,000
girls being pimped out by Pakistanis, we see that there are six million
occasions each year upon which a Pakistani male rapes an underage white
girl in this fashion. Now, we established above that the population of
adult Pakistani males in the UK will be in the region of 330,000. Six
million divided by 330,000 gives us a rounded-down figure of 18, which
means that the average adult Pakistani male in the UK rapes an underage
white girl or girls 18 times a year. But surely there must be many adult
Pakistani males who are not involved in this crime? Why yes, there
must. Let us be generous and assume that half of all such people are not
involved. We must therefore conclude that the remaining 50% are
perpetrating an average of 36 such rapes a year. Perhaps two thirds of
all adult Pakistani males are uninvolved, leaving the remaining one
third to rape underage white girls on an average of 55 occasions
8 a year, or more than once a week.
Try as we might, we cannot refrain from concluding that the male Pakistani population of the UK,
as a whole,
9
views the native female children, and presumably the native population
in and of itself, as a barbarian horde might view the abject and
downtrodden people of a country it had just devastated. One need not be a
goose-stepping, sieg-heiling, supporter of a future Fourth Reich to
think that something rather unfortunate is happening here, or that the
unwillingness of the authorities to shed much light on this problem is
motivated by a desire to keep certain uncomfortable truths under lock
and key. For which government will freely acknowledge that a minority
population imported against the wishes of the natives is, in effect,
waging an underground war against them, a war in the face of which the
apparatus of state appears to be helpless?
Are any of the above
estimates likely to be accurate? Well, the uncertainties being so great
at each step of the calculation, it is impossible to know for sure. But
given that there is reason to believe that both the pimping and
consequent raping of underage white girls are low-risk activities (at
least if one is a Pakistani), it is hard to see what deterrents could
exist to persuade Pakistani males not to engage in them. And given
further that no one else seems to have generated any estimates as to
just what fraction of the Pakistani population of the UK
is
involved in this activity, who is there to gainsay us in this regard?
Are there better figures out there? Can they be revealed? In the absence
of real information, those who are concerned about the problem will
have to generate their own estimates of its severity. Those concerned,
in turn, about these estimates need to plug the gap with credible data.
Until this is done, we see no reason to consider the above analysis
particularly implausible.
Ideally, of course, amateur
criminologists such as ourselves would not have to engage in such
speculative calculation. But we can hardly rely on the police to do it
for us, as they appear to have already established (with certain
honourable exceptions) such a record of willful uselessness in this
regard as to make Clouseau look like Columbo. Nothing illustrates better
than this sickening saga of professional malfeasance
10
just how mistaken we are if we persist in seeing the UK police as being
some sort of relatively neutral law enforcement tool, that, like, hears
about a crime, then, like, investigates it, and then, like, brings the
perpetrators to justice. We are talking about a police force that once
arrested a man for ostensibly homophobic comments made to a
horse.
Does anybody really believe that the UK police force, in the
21st-century, is some sort of unbiased, apolitical enforcer of the law?
No, our police force has become contaminated by:
| 1. | | A concern not to appear politically incorrect, let alone ‘racist’. |
| 2. | | A fear of the implications of actually enforcing the law with respect to large, hostile, and unassimilated Muslim populations. |
It
is hard to say which of these factors is the more important in
explaining the criminal negligence of the police vis-à-vis pimping.
Perhaps they can tell us themselves. But one thing should be understood.
If the Pakistani Muslim populations of many towns in the north of
England are now large enough to force the police to refrain from
enforcing the law concerning a matter of this gravity, then, short of
massive ethnic cleansing or a radical change in law enforcement policy,
this state of affairs will exist in perpetuity,
as the rapid growth of these populations can only stack the deck ever
more against the apparatus of state. Have the British people given their
consent to the effective expulsion
11
of the police from vast swathes of urban Britain? If not, they need to
ask themselves whether the state is even attempting any longer to
fulfill its obligations under the social contract that exists between
itself and the people, and what they will eventually be required to do
if it is not.
We are reminded of fairy tales in which, once a
year, a dragon descends upon some unfortunate village, and demands a
fair young maiden to devour in return for not destroying the villagers’
homes with its fiery breath. The main difference with our situation is
that rendering up the maiden to the dragon
at least buys the villagers a year of peace and quiet.
What,
precisely, is being purchased by the disgraceful, despicable,
degenerate behaviour of those police forces that have, it seems,
‘de-emphasised’ the pursuit of the systematic rapists, pimpers,
druggers, and destroyers of white girls? An extra hour’s kip, feet up on
the desk, snoring away? Or something even more important? Can we be
told?
Of course, many will protest that it is really terribly,
terribly, difficult to crack down on a crime of this sort. This is
presumably why the authorities have had to resort to ‘educational
campaigns’ and the writing of warning letters to suspected pimps (yes,
really). Jack Straw’s Blackburn constituency is one of those afflicted
with a Pakistani pimping problem,
12 and Mr. Straw is quoted in
Mothers of Prevention talking about how he has undertaken only various vague and unquantifiable activities to address the problem.
We
do not intend here to cast aspersions upon Mr. Straw himself. Quite the
contrary, in fact. Of all the Stalinist, dhimmi-by-choice,
pointlessly-spacefilling, turnips-on-a-stick to have sat in the House of
Commons in the last five years, he is by some margin the most
distinguished. But if he really believes that discussing matters with
‘community leaders’ might help him address the sexual destruction of the
children of his own country by recklessly imported Muslim savages, then
one rather wonders what could possibly be the point of him.
Given
that the police find it so frightfully, frightfully hard to deal
properly with the pimping problem, there are only two ways this matter
can develop. The first is that this blight on the face of our country
continues, with vibrant, bustling Pakistanis destroying staid,
non-bustling white girls with impunity. The second is that non-state
actors respond as they see fit, paying no heed to the law. If the former
is unacceptable, where does that leave us? And does it not seem
probable that,
if faced with a realistic threat of the latter occurring, the police would suddenly discover that the problem was not so terribly difficult to deal with after all?
If
there is a better reason than the above-outlined Pakistani Muslim
depravity for lighting torches, grabbing pitchforks, and launching a
tribal civil war that burns down the entire country and leaves it
populated only by seagulls and hedgehogs, so that, before too long,
people in mainland Europe talk only of a legendary country called
Brittaine that existed, it is rumoured, in the days of yore, then it has
not yet occurred to the authors of this document. And we have thought
about it
jolly hard.
If it proves to be the case that the apparatus of state has
chosen
not to protect the female children of this country from the
depredations of hostile, rapacious aliens, then a great number of heads
of all different shapes and sizes will have to be observed to roll
before justice can be considered to have been done.
In closing, I
invite readers of this document, kafir and believer both, to reflect
with the utmost seriousness on what the future could hold for this
country if these matters are not dealt with to the satisfaction of
British patriots, who see no reason to be colonized and preyed upon by
Pakistani Muslims, a people so hopeless as to have turned their own
country into a byword for national collapse, civilizational failure, and
religiously-inspired psychopathy. On this matter, we demand
satisfaction.
Female Genital Mutilation
Female
genital mutilation is by no means a cultural practice engaged in by all
Muslims around the world. Nor, indeed, is it one engaged in only by
Muslims, there existing many places in Africa where it is practiced by
non-Muslim peoples. Nonetheless, it provides us with a specific example
of a very disturbing phenomenon, and one which threatens to discredit
the law and with it the legitimacy of the apparatus of state. The
disturbing phenomenon in question is not the removal of certain parts of
the sexual organs of young girls, disgusting, dangerous, inhumane, and
repugnant though this is. Rather, it is the conversion of enforceable
laws into unenforceable laws through the importation of culturally alien
peoples.
To make this point properly, we need to understand
what is meant by an unenforceable law. Consider the law prohibiting the
possession of ecstasy, a Class A drug. Strictly speaking, possession of
ecstasy is punishable by up to seven years in prison, which makes it a
serious criminal offence. Nonetheless, it was once estimated that, every
weekend in the UK, a million people take this drug. Assuming for the
sake of illustration that this figure is still accurate, this means that
one million people, give or take, are breaking the law in this regard
every week.
Now, what steps could the British government take if
it were to suddenly to decide that this state of affairs were
unacceptable, and that ecstasy use must be eradicated? In principle, the
police could start raiding nightclubs across the country on Friday and
Saturday nights, slamming punters up against the wall, and going through
their pockets. Some number of unfortunate clubbers would, as a
consequence, find themselves facing seven years (reduced, of course, to
three and a half) inside. But the British prison population is already
about 95,000-strong, and incarcerating people is a fantastically
expensive thing to do.
In addition, the political fallout that
would greet a government using such heavy-handed tactics and consuming
such massive resources in a ‘war’ against a drug that seems to be
essentially harmless (we ignore here the many other considerations a
full discussion of this matter would require) would make the whole
affair prohibitively expensive in that regard too. Even dragging 2,000
people off to jail on a single weekend would leave the other 998,000 (or
99.8% of the total) unmolested by the long arm of the law. If we assume
three and a half years incarceration each, multiply by 2,000 people,
and then multiply by £40,000 for the costs of one year of incarceration,
then we have a cost of £280 million for the incarceration of these
wrongdoers. Adding in police costs, court costs, and the opportunity
costs of the incarcerated not being able to work, we are surely looking
at a bill in excess of £500 million to remove 0.2% of all ecstasy users
from the streets of the UK for three and a half years.
If these
exertions were repeated every weekend for a year, at a total cost
including incarceration of, say, £26 billion, 89.6% of the original one
million users would still be at large at the end of the year, despite
having broken the law a grand total of 52 times. It is hard to envisage a
scenario in which such massive exertions could possibly be considered
to have any net benefits, which is why they do not occur. Trying to stop
the flow of ecstasy into the UK in the first place might seem like a
better idea, but the slightest familiarity with the U.S. War on Drugs
suggests that such things are not easily accomplished.
This is
not to suggest that the possession (and therefore the use) of ecstasy
could not be prevented in principle. Paramilitary death squads could be
created and equipped with on-the-spot ecstasy blood tests to dispense
‘justice’ to those having indulged in the drug. But this would be
politically impossible in the UK, and the cost-benefit analysis would
still, to put it mildly, edge towards the unfavourable. What this means
is that the laws on ecstasy possession are
completely unenforceable in any meaningful sense, as the takers of this drug understand very well.
The
reader will now be wondering what, if anything, any of this could
possibly have to do with FGM, and the answer is simply that the British
government is already in an essentially identical position with respect
to this hideous crime. It is estimated that several hundred female
genital mutilations take place every year in the UK, mainly within the
UK Somali population. Let us put this figure at 500, and assume that
both the mother and the father of the mutilated child are implicated in
the crime. That means that 1,000 people, mainly Somalis and all
immigrants, are implicated every year in the crime of mutilation.
If,
on the last day of 2010, the police were to build irrefutable cases
against 100 of them, who were then arrested, tried and sentenced to long
prison sentences, a great blow would have been struck for justice and
the British way of life, and our political overlords would be thrilled.
Correct? Actually, no. Incorrect. There is nothing our political
overlords would like less than this. Let us explain.
Consider
what putting 100 Somalis (fifty Somali couples) in prison will involve.
Under the Female Genital Mutilation Act, someone found guilty of female
genital mutilation can receive a sentence of up to 14 years. Let us
assume they receive average sentences of ten years each, of which they
serve five. Let us also bear in mind that:
| 1. | | Such convictions could only be secured via compulsory medical examinations, against the wishes of the parents. |
| 2. | | Convicting two Somali parents of this crime will mean that all their children will have to be taken away from them, permanently, and placed in care, at great public expense. |
| 3. | | There
is no guarantee that other Somali parents will be deterred by this,
making it overwhelmingly likely that the whole process will have to be
repeated, perhaps in perpetuity. |
Taking
hundreds of Somali children into care, and therefore out of their
communities, every year would itself result in accusations of cultural
genocide or the like. Accusations of ‘stigmatisation’ would fly through
the air thick and fast. After a few short years, there would already be
facilities somewhere full of Somali children in care where, presumably,
the staff would have to be Somali so as to allow the children to
preserve the oh-so-precious cultural heritage from which they had to be
rescued in the first place.
It is fairly clear that no one is
going to walk into the expensive, nasty, grueling, polarising minefield
such an endeavour would turn out to be without good reason. And if the
welfare of the children in question constituted such a reason, it would
already have happened. Besides, they would have been cut in Somalia,
would they not? Now they are being cut here instead. What of it?
Anyone
who is unconvinced by this analysis needs to present an alternative
explanation for the way in which, despite the Female Genital Mutilation
Act having been passed in 2003, there have been, to date, no convictions
at all. Life peer Ruth Rendell would certainly appreciate such an
explanation. As quoted in December 2009 in the Independent
13:
“When
I helped take the Bill [the FGM Act] through Parliament seven years
ago, I was very hopeful that we’d get convictions and that would then
act as a deterrent for other people. But that has never happened
and my heart bleeds for these girls. [...] I have repeatedly asked
questions of ministers from all departments about why there has never
been a prosecution and why we still do not have a register of cases. But
while they are always very sympathetic, nothing ever seems to get done.“ [Italics added]
We
do not wish to scorn the efforts of Ruth Rendell, who is clearly a
compassionate woman, and one who has committed a good deal of time and
energy to opposing the horrible barbarity of FGM. But expressions of
sympathy are cheap, and she is reading too much into those made by the
empty suits with whom she discusses these matters.
Given that
incontrovertible evidence of FGM can be obtained by medical examination,
the failure of all these supposedly titanic efforts to address it must
indeed seem odd to some. But it will only do so as long as one continues
to look it at from the wrong perspective, in which those in government
are genuinely trying to bring this barbarity to an end. The correct
perspective is built on the insight that to date, our governing elite
has introduced useless smokescreen legislation to give the impression
that it is doing something, whilst making
absolutely sure that
the police do not have the powers they need to address this crime
properly, i.e. the power to perform, or have performed, medical
examinations.
To rephrase, this lack of police power is not a
bug, but a feature, in this system, a system whose architects are
doubtless relieved that the mutilation in question does not consist of
plucking out an eyeball — that would oblige them to actually
do something about it, as empty eye sockets are not so easily hidden.
Certain
anti-FGM campaigners argue for a tactic of targetting the ‘cutters’ who
are responsible for the mutilation. They present this as a more moral
course of action, targetting those profiting from the work rather than
confused and uneducated parents doing what they think is best for their
children. But this makes no sense, as the cutters themselves are of the
same culture, and are doubtless just as ‘confused’ and uneducated as the
parents, sharing as they do their beliefs about the necessity of the
procedure. Indeed, they have probably all already been ‘cut’ themselves.
We suspect these campaigners understand all too well that the
problem is hopeless within extant political paradigms, under which FGM
has become
de facto legal, for the reasons outlined above.
Targetting the cutters is their only remaining option, as it would, in
principle, allow them to address the problem by targetting people whose
incarceration would not pose the insoluble political problems described
above. However, we must observe that this approach, roughly analogous to
targeting drug dealers instead of drug users in the ‘War on Drugs’,
would likely prove similarly ineffective for the same reasons, even
supposing that it managed to secure one of the convictions that have so
far eluded it. Cutting down on the supply of cutters will only increase
the price of their service, and with it the incentives to provide it.
Can
the grotesque contamination of our country that FGM constitutes be
tolerated? Most of us are probably relatively unconcerned about the
de facto
legality of ecstasy consumption. But can we look at each other, shrug,
and say that, for some groups in 21st-century Britain, cutting pieces of
the sexual apparatus out of one’s daughters is an entirely risk-free
undertaking with respect to the law?
Even if, appallingly, we
thought we could stomach the occasional clitoridectomy, we should not
delude ourselves that this is the only type of crime that has slipped
off the radar of the criminal justice system, and therefore, in effect,
out of existence. Forced marriages (often of underage girls) and
attendant abductions, beatings, and threats; honour killings; the
drugging, pimping, and raping of underage white girls; violence towards
and the forced confinement of female family members: what reason do we
have to believe that the authorities really have the slightest interest
in enforcing the law with respect to ‘culturally sensitive’ matters? And
why is it that so many culturally sensitive crimes are committed
overwhelmingly, if not entirely, by Muslims? Is this a coincidence?
Ultimately,
we have to ask ourselves one key question. Is British law to be
determined by our democratically elected representatives in Parliament?
Or is it to be determined, in practice if not in principle, by the
cultural standards of whatever random assembly of unassimilable aliens
has been allowed to congregate on our shores, through immigration
policies which have long since ceased to reflect the desires of the
British people?
We end this discussion by including the closing paragraph of the Independent article mentioned above:
“A
Home Office spokesman said: ‘We have appointed an FGM co-ordinator to
drive forward a co-ordinated government response to this appalling crime
and make recommendations for future work.’”
‘Future work’ that will have no effect on anything at all. A slow, slow train coming.
IV. A Critique of Police Priorities in the Face of Muslim Crime
There
is criticism aplenty of the apparatus of state in the previous section,
both explicit and implicit. However, there is one particular issue that
needs to be addressed here directly. If one were to ask a thousand
people at random what the primary objective of the police is, nearly all
would surely reply that it is to enforce the law, bring criminals to
justice, and thereby deter to some extent future crimes. Intriguingly,
there does not seem to be any consensus amongst criminologists or other
students of these matters that this answer would be correct.
Of course enforcing the law is
one
of the primary objectives of the police, but there is a body of thought
that insists that, in actuality, the maintenance of public order is (or
at least ought to be) their main concern. Many otherwise
incomprehensible phenomena can be understood once one realizes that this
second objective vies with the first.
It is far from
contemptible that the police should be required to attach great
importance to the maintenance of public order, for frequent,
uncontrolled disorder in the public sphere will have seriously
detrimental effects on any country in short order. However, we are
troubled by the way in which the relative importances attached to the
maintenance of public order and the enforcement of the law appear to
vary as a function of the ethnic/religious group being policed. A great
many examples of this disturbing trend already exist, but we will
examine a single one here to establish the point.
We are
confident that all readers of this document will remember the
now-infamous demonstration outside the Danish Embassy in London, in
February 2006. During the Mohammed Cartoon Crisis, the Saviour Sect and
Al-Ghurabaa, two of the most unsavoury of the many unsavoury Muslim
groups in the UK, held a protest outside this embassy. The protest
showcased the global ummah at its most unappealing, consisting as it did
of several hundred deranged, frothing, homicidally-inclined Muslims
loosing a volley of outrageous threats and abuse towards the Danish
cartoonists and Europeans in general.
The photos of these
protesters and their placards — in our capital city — have sullied, in
perpetuity, the reputation of our country. Given that the protest was
illegal irrespective of content (in that the organizers had not obtained
a permit) and given further that it was illegal in terms of its content
too, involving as it did a large number of psychopathic Muslims openly
and unashamedly inciting murder against the entirely innocent citizens
of a friendly country, would it really have been too much to expect the
police to break it up, with force if necessary? Clearly, the answer to
this question was yes,
because the maintenance of public order took precedence over the enforcement of the law.
According to an article
14 in the
Telegraph which provides a serviceable summary of the police and public response to the demonstration:
Scotland
Yard, which has received at least 100 complaints from members of the
public so far, defended the decision not to make arrests. It said the
officer in charge at such scenes had to weigh the need to make arrests against the likelihood of provoking more serious unrest. [Italics added]
This
may seem innocuous enough on first reading, but it contains the seeds
of something terribly destructive. If the likelihood of arrests being
made is inversely proportional to the potential for serious disorder,
then those more likely to cause serious disorder will be extended
greater leeway to break the law in public. And this fact is unlikely to
be lost on them.
Sadly,
it was most certainly lost on the Metropolitan Police, who made the
decision to allow the protest to go ahead unmolested. Having seemingly
forgotten that prevention is better than cure, they decided that, rather
than actually stop the crimes being committed, they would
gather evidence
to be used later, in their assiduous pursuit of the perpetrators of the
crimes they had proven so unwilling to prevent in the first place.
According to a police spokesman quoted in the
Telegraph:
Specialist officers were deployed to record any potential event, should it be needed at any point in the future.
They
would deploy some of their specialist officers, no less, to bring
justice to the wrongdoers. We can reveal here for the first time, after
extensive independent investigation, that said specialists were not
bog-standard peelers with video cameras. Far from it, in fact. Every
single one of the specialists deployed by those tasked with our
protection had spent the last ten years on a mountain top in China,
training in the arcane art of
‘filming-criminals-whilst-they-are-breaking-the-law-but-not-actually-doing-anything-about-it-because-they-might-lose-their-tempers.’
Given that the Metropolitan Police had decided to pull out all
the stops and use their ‘specialists’ to bring the guilty to justice
after the protest had ended, readers might be tempted to conclude that
they did not botch their response so badly after all. But, cruel, cruel
world! To the great dismay of these modern-day ninja warriors, certain
of the more technically savvy Muslims unleashed a devastating
countermeasure of their own: a high-tech cloaking device which rendered
them completely impervious to the long arm of the law. Needless to say,
the device does not bestow complete invisibility on its user. One can
still make out a vague, and vaguely human, silhouette. But it is,
nonetheless, a formidable weapon in the criminal armoury of the global
ummah. Readers are invited to study the accompanying image to see
exactly what the police were up against. Who said Muslims were
technological incompetents?
Such dastardly criminal brilliance,
in the face of which Holmes himself would have gnashed his teeth and
Moriarty swooned in admiration, seems to have confounded the best
efforts of the specialists deployed by our law enforcement
establishment. Consider their dilemma. There are people. They are
breaking the law. They are standing still, in public. But they have
covered their faces. How to proceed?
Thumbing desperately through their well-worn copies of
Law Enforcement for Dummies,
brows furrowed in concentration as they wrestled fiercely with
conceptual difficulties that would have reduced Newton himself to a
groaning wreck, they eventually admitted defeat. A thousand curses!
There was nothing to be done! We tried filming them, but the face
coverings worn by the criminals were visible not only in real life, but
in our footage too! Cameras are complicated! This was not covered in
training! Ten years on top of a mountain for nothing!
We are
reluctant to continue in this facetious vein in a document written in
deadly seriousness. Nor would we want our readers to jump to the
unwarranted conclusion that we have a low opinion of Sir Ian Blair, who
was commissioner of the Metropolitan Police during this disgraceful
fiasco.
Quite the contrary, in fact. Of all the useless,
insensate, dhimmi-by-choice, Hello-Kitty pieces of vegetable matter to
have ever been in charge of policing in our capital city, he was by some
margin the most intellectually distinguished. But if he really thinks
that responsible police work consists of filming people for the purposes
of subsequent identification despite the fact that the people in
question
are hiding their faces and cannot be identified, then it is rather hard to see what could possibly have been the point of him.
15
Anyway,
we have digressed shamefully and must return to the original subject of
our enquiry, to wit, Holocaust-inciters swathed in ACME cloaking
devices. Perhaps the Americans, or the Israelis, or some other such
group of serious people, could have devised a way to bring this woman to
justice. But not the British bobby. No, the despicable creature who
advised us to ‘Be Prepared for the
Real Holocaust’, is still at
large. What would the police have done if they had wanted, or needed, to
arrest her? Deployed their tactical Ouija board?
Of course,
this is not to suggest that the police let all the protesters get away
scot-free. On the contrary, the ‘film-first-arrest-later’ approach
resulted in a total of four (quatre, cuatro) protestors eventually being
convicted of a variety of offences relating to the incitement of
hatred. According to the Metropolitan Police, there were 450 protestors
present on the day, which means that a trifling 99.1% of them were able
to participate in the inciting of all kinds of death and damnation
against all manner of people without suffering any unpleasantness
themselves on the day itself or afterwards. Behold the majesty of the
law!
If the 450 Muslim protestors outside the Danish Embassy had
been 450 neo-Nazi protestors outside the Israeli Embassy, with
equivalent signs and rhetoric, screeching about holocausts and whatnot,
and with an identical ability to riot and cause public disorder, would
the same softly-softly approach to the policing of criminal scum still
have been adopted by the Metropolitan Police? Or would they have waded
in and given it, shall we say, a bit of welly? It is impossible to say
for sure. But we are fairly confident that their response would have
been quite different, and that, if a few heads had needed to be cracked
to make our hypothetical Nazis see the error of their ways, then they
would have been cracked good and hard.
There are many examples of this unfortunate wilting of the police in the face of Muslim anger or expected Muslim anger:
- The
last-minute cancellation of the legal SIOE (Stop the Islamization of
Europe) and EDL demonstration outside the Harrow mosque due to mass
Muslim violence and the threat of such violence.
- The
treacherous, pusillanimous behaviour of the despicable Anil Patani of
the West Midlands Police, who pursued the makers of Undercover Mosque
rather than the Muslims caught on camera within it.
- The refusal to properly investigate pimping as described above.
- The willingness of the police to tolerate vast numbers of Muslims calling, in public, for Salman Rushdie to be killed.
All
of this makes terribly clear the relationship that now exists between
the British state and the Muslim population of the UK. The degree of
tribalism, aggression, and contempt for this country, its people, and
its laws in the UK Muslim community is so great, and so ready to erupt
at any time, that the police have taken appeasing it as being one of
their chief objectives, the better to preserve public order.
We
need to be clear as to what exactly this means. A disproportionately
criminal, parasitic, terrorist, and seditious group of people, having
escaped the run-down hellholes that they or their recent ancestors hail
from, are doing their level best to convert our country, Britain, into
the same kind of hellhole, where the same moral standards and general
chaos obtain for the same reason (i.e. the dominance of those Muslims
who will engage in massive religiously-motivated violence and disorder
at the drop of a hat). And the police are letting them do it. For when
the maintenance of public order trumps all other considerations, those
who threaten it most effectively will be granted the most concessions.
In contrast, those who can be cracked down on without fear of
repercussions will find themselves on a much shorter leash.
The
Thin Blue Line is proving itself to be not only thin, but feeble to
boot, and more feeble by the day, at least vis-à-vis Muslims. The
British police are, like any other police force anywhere in the world,
not some sort of omnicompetent law enforcement mechanism, a magic wand
that can be waved over any infringement of our laws to make it go away.
They have evolved over the years, as has our entire criminal justice
system, to deal with the public order and law enforcement challenges of a
specific people, the British, in a specific country, Britain. They are,
in a fundamental structural sense, quite incapable of adequately
policing our Muslim population which, despite its diversity in terms of
national origin, is, in certain crucial ways, showing its ‘Muslimness’
in much the same way as the Muslim population of every other Western
European country.
Tribal, aggressive, implacable, and a strong
presence in every major urban area throughout the country; the British
police, indeed our criminal justice system as a whole, have not been
designed, trained, or equipped to deal with such operational challenges.
Those who are still sceptical on this point would do well to view the
footage available on Youtube of the aforementioned attempts of SIOE and
the EDL to stage a
legal demonstration outside Harrow mosque, and
the complete inability of the police to allow them to do so. The police
are, perhaps unwittingly, simply incentivising disorder and the threat
of disorder, and disincentivising law-abiding behaviour. Do we need to
point out that this cannot lead anywhere that we could possibly want to
be?
All this with a Muslim population of 4%! How will things be
when the Muslim population of the country is 6%, or 8%, and has taken
over an even greater fraction of virtually every part of the urban UK?
The fear of disorder on the part of our authorities and the willingness
of Muslims to threaten it are an unholy combination, setting up a
positive feedback loop which must be broken sooner rather than later.
For
the Danish Embassy protest was emblematic of a wider problem. If the UK
is not to eventually turn into a country dotted with a patchwork of
Muslim no-go zones in and around which British law barely obtains at
all, the authorities will eventually have to establish that the law
applies to Muslims as much as to anyone else.
Two things are patently obvious to the current authors:
| 1. | | That breaking out of this vicious cycle will be extremely painful and costly. |
| 2. | | That
there is no guarantee that the poltroons responsible for formulating
law enforcement policy vis-à-vis the possibility of Muslim disorder have
the courage required to endure this pain or these costs. |
We
wish to state here for the record that the potentially catastrophic
consequences of the hopeless short-termism that seems to prevail on the
part of our law enforcement establishment are not wreathed in mist. They
are, by and large, fairly obvious, and include the complete breakdown
of law and order in Muslim-dominated areas, as can already be seen in
parts of many European countries, and a descent into outright,
permanent, sectarian conflict between Muslims and their host societies,
conflict that the authorities will be powerless to control.
Let
those in positions of authority, whether in government or in the police,
not pretend to be unaware of this. Their culpability will not be
forgotten when British patriots are eventually forced to do what is
necessary to save their society from complete disintegration.
Next Installment: “Islam, Muslims, and Crime from the Perspective of a Psychologist” and “The Dark Figure and Other Subtleties”
Notes:
| 4 | | Times Online |
| 5 | | Link for the first of six parts. |
| 6 | | BBC |
| 7 | | Now all we need to do is add in the Pakistani taxi drivers,
shop-owners, security guards, and schoolboys aiding and abetting the
entire process. How many would there be? Five thousand? Ten thousand? |
| 8 | | Yes, 55, not 54. This is the rounding error coming back in. |
| 9 | | It is crucial to understand what this means. We are interested here in the properties of groups of individuals,
not of individuals themselves. Lions are more dangerous to human beings
than badgers, and this conclusion cannot reasonably be altered even if
we know that some lions are harmless and some badgers dangerous.
Similarly, the criminal and destructive behaviour of adult Pakistani
males in the aggregate requires us to draw certain conclusions.
Those who object to this way of conceptualizing the issue should ask
themselves whether they would rather walk through a cage full of lions
or a cage full of badgers. Few would choose the lions, and few would
consider themselves to have been discriminatory or prejudiced for having
done so. There are patterns in the world, and they do not go away just
because some choose to ignore them. |
| 10 | | We do not say what we say about the police to malign the rank and file,
well aware as we are of the fact that most people who join the police
do so to serve and protect the people of this country. These good people
will be just as horrified by the situation as we are. Our criticisms
are aimed at the politicians and the politically-motivated senior police
officers for whom protecting the public comes in a distant second
compared with sweeping thorny subjects under the carpet whilst mouthing
platitudes about how diversity has enriched us all. Has it enriched the
girls destroyed by one of its most despicable manifestations? |
| 11 | | By this, we do not mean that the police do not operate in the areas in
question but that, at least with respect to certain crimes, they might as well not due to their complete lack of interest in carrying out their responsibilities therein. |
| 12 | | By rights, white British people should be responsible for a majority of all crime types in all areas,
due to their massive numerical dominance. According to the detective
quoted in ‘Teenage Sex for Sale’, however, ‘Asians’ are mainly
responsible in the north of England, blacks in the West Midlands, and
whites, Turks and Kurds elsewhere (note that Turks and Kurds are also
overwhelmingly Muslim). That such small groups as the minorities in
question dominate this type of crime in any area at all makes it clear
just how big a problem their members are on a per-capita basis. If 20%
of the population of an area is responsible for 90% of all crime of a
certain type in that area, that means that the 20% in question is
overrepresented for that crime by a factor of fully thirty-six,
or one and a half orders of magnitude. This point must be understood, or
all too many people will shrug this matter off as a case of Pakistanis
dominating in one area, blacks and whites in others. To arrive at this
conclusion would be to misunderstand the matter entirely. |
| 13 | | The Independent |
| 14 | | The Telegraph |
| 15 | | It is worth remembering that his deputy, Brian Paddick, was a man of
great comedic talents. Subsequent to the 2005 London Tube and bus
bombings, he said that ‘Islam and terrorism are two words that do not go
together’. Of course, if this were true, there would have been no
reason to say it. What sane man ever denied a connection between
kumquats and terrorism? |
------------------
A Consideration of Muslim Crime in the UK
and the Response of the British Authorities
Part 3
By Pike BishopV. Islam, Muslims, and Crime from the Perspective of a PsychologistIt
is important to understand that the problems Britain faces with Muslims
and their criminality are not anomalous in the wider European context.
On the contrary, other Western European countries seem to have even
worse Muslim crime problems than the UK.
In the Netherlands, the
Muslim crime problem in Moroccan and Turkish form has been largely
responsible for propelling the brilliant Geert Wilders to a position of
political prominence. One can only conclude that the Dutch no longer
have any interest in being attacked and robbed in, and in extreme cases
driven off, their own streets. Those Britons feeling a sense of dismay
over the type and scale of Muslim criminality in the UK can look to the
Netherlands to see what happens when this particular cancer is allowed
to metastasise even more freely than it is here, fostered by insane
immigration policies and subsidised by a welfare state that acts as a
magnet for the useless, the criminal and the indolent.
Casting
our gaze further afield, the link between Islam and crime becomes ever
clearer. In France, rioting on the part of Muslim youth of mainly
Maghrebian and African origin has become uncontrollable and endemic,
with the 2005 riots being only the most extreme example to date. In
Sweden, the mass importation of Muslims, largely from Iraq and other
parts of the Middle East, combined with consequent white flight,
threatens to turn Malmö, the third largest city in the country, into a
Muslim-majority city in the not-too-distant future, with everything that
implies for crime (which is surging), the rule of law (which is
disintegrating), and the general character of the city (which is
deteriorating). Jews are already fleeing due to the constant
intimidation they experience there, and arson, rioting, and the stoning
of representatives of the state are daily occurrences in the
worst-afflicted parts of the city.
In Norway, the police report that in the period 2007-2009, all 41 assault rapes in the city of Oslo,
all of them,
were committed by non-Western immigrants, and overwhelmingly by
Muslims. And in Germany, a police union has suggested that Turkish
police, which is to say Turkish police
from Turkey, not German
police of Turkish origin, be asked to patrol immigrant (and, one
assumes, heavily Turkish) ghettos in North-Rhine Westphalia, due to the
inability of the German police to maintain law and order in these areas
themselves. Such is the scale of the problems European countries now
face in the form of Muslim criminality.
We cannot do justice to
this subject here, but we can share with readers the insights of a man
all too familiar with the Muslim crime problem currently tearing apart
the social fabric of his own country. Nicolai Sennels
1
is a Danish psychologist who has very generously contributed a key
section of this document. We will let him share his insights with
readers in his own words.
Islam, Muslims, and Crime from the Perspective of a Psychologist (by Dr. Nicolai Sennels)As
a psychologist in a youth prison in the municipality of Copenhagen I
had around 150 Muslim and 100 non-Muslim clients (seven out of ten
inmates in Danish youth prisons are of Muslim backgrounds). All the
clients were in the same age group, and had similar backgrounds with
respect to family incomes and parents’ educational backgrounds. Having
hundreds of therapy sessions both individually and in groups (Muslim,
non-Muslim and mixed) was an excellent opportunity to compare the two
groups. On the basis of these sessions, I concluded that Islam itself is
the main reason for the unsuccessful integration of Muslims, the
creation of lawless and hostile Muslim parallel societies, and the high
crime rates that prevail among Muslim immigrants.
Though some
will no doubt consider it controversial to include people’s religious
and cultural backgrounds when analysing the causes of anti-social
behaviour, it is actually an expression of true humanism. We have to
look at the whole person, including his culture and religious beliefs,
if we want to understand what motivates his actions. The argument that
poverty and stigmatisation are the only reasons for destructive
behaviour among Muslims reveals a very one-dimensional view of the human
being. In reality, our actions are influenced by far more, and far
stronger, factors than simply the amount of money in our bank account or
what other people think of us and say about us. Cultural and religious
values are much more important factors than these.
Unfortunately,
many people are unable to recognize the obvious; that different
cultures cultivate different characteristics in people. All families
develop certain patterns, a specific culture even, within themselves,
and these patterns have great influence over the development of the
children. Some families manage to produce self-confident, empathetic,
and responsible offspring, while others do not. In the same vein, the
different cultures of the world influence people in different ways, and
they are not all equally good at inculcating characteristics conducive
to productive and law-abiding behavior in Western societies.
On
the basis of my years as a professional psychologist treating Muslims, I
will try to explain how Islam tends to inculcate certain psychological
characteristics amongst its followers.
AggressionOne
of the most important of my findings is that Muslim cultures have an
opposite view of anger to the one that prevails in Western societies. We
see anger as an expression of weakness. In Denmark we have a saying:
‘Only small dogs bark. Big dogs don’t have to.’ Sudden outbreaks of
anger result in the loss of face and social status. As people who have
engaged in such embarrassing behaviour (such as at work, or at a family
dinner) know, it takes time and a conscious effort to allow people to
regain their trust in us.
In Muslim cultures, anger, threats, and
violence are much more socially accepted as ways of handling conflicts
or showing power. As a Muslim, your family and friends expect you to
react aggressively if you, or what you represent, are challenged in any
way. If you, as a Muslim, fail to do this, doubts will immediately be
sown as to whether you are able to shoulder your share of responsibility
in defending your family, ethnic group, territory or religion. A recent
study involving in-depth interviews with 45,000 teenagers in Germany
supports this conclusion.
2 One
does not have to be a psychologist to see that this attitude towards
anger is one of the main causes for the high violent crime rates amongst
Muslims. And the problem is exacerbated immensely by the Muslim concept
of honour. This creates fragile, glass-like personalities, and makes
male Muslims in particular sensitive to the slightest criticism. What
Muslims call ‘honour’, we in the West tend to refer to as low
self-confidence.
Locus of ControlAnother
important finding from my therapy room concerns the so-called ‘locus of
control’. Our locus of control determines whether we experience our life
as mainly influenced by inner or outer factors. In the West, we learn
throughout our lives that our own attitudes and decisions shape our
lives and influence our states of mind. The same goes for our way of
handling our thoughts and feelings, and our ability to handle difficult
experiences and situations constructively. Thus our locus of control is
largely internal. Muslims, on the other hand, are primarily brought up
to have an external locus of control, consisting of strict external
cultural and religious rules, and immediate and heavy consequences for
individual thinking or stepping outside the “box”. Our Western societies
are built on the assumption of individual free will, and the notion
that we are masters of our own fate. In contrast, the Islamic term
‘inshallah’ (Allah willing) follows every wish or plan Muslims make
about the future.
Our Western sense of responsibility for self
hugely increases our ability to solve our own problems. Muslims, on the
other hand, and as we have seen, have an external locus of control and
therefore tend to blame others, with non-Muslims and non-Islamic
authorities being the usual scapegoats. While Westerners tend to think
‘what can I do differently?’ when experiencing difficulties, Muslims
tend to think ‘who did this to me?’.
This feeling of an outer
locus of control is the basis of, and the fuel for, a lot of the anger
among Muslims everywhere towards non-Muslims and the non-Muslim world in
general. They see us as the cause of their (usually self-created)
emotional misery, financial woe, and lack of social status. It is hardly
surprising, therefore, that many Muslims see the hostile attitudes and
destructive behaviour they so often direct at their ‘oppressors’ as
being natural and justified. The resulting violent hostility towards
non-Muslims and non-Islamic authorities is an ever-prevalent consequence
of this, and one that is entirely explicable and predictable.
Unfortunately,
the problems caused by the Muslim external locus of control are
exacerbated by the broadly accepted but mistaken view that anti-social
people are victims of some unjust external factor with respect to which
they are powerless. This interaction reinforces the childlike victim
mentality that is the natural consequence of having an external locus of
control. No experienced psychologist will accept such attempts at
self-justification. If we do not dare to show people how they create and
perpetuate their own problems, how will they ever mature, take
responsibility for themselves, and stop being a burden on those around
them?
As a psychologist for criminal Muslims, I found that they
often felt no remorse whatsoever for their harmful actions. The external
reasons they provided for their harmful behaviour (such as being
‘provoked’ or treated ‘unfairly’, and thus ‘forced’ to ‘retaliate’)
resulted in there being no possibility of them feeling personally
responsible. In some professional circles, there is currently much
discussion as to whether Islam might actually inculcate psychopathic
character traits (such as lack of empathy) in its followers.
IdentityA
third finding during the hundreds of hours with Muslim clients on my
couch is that the extent to which they identify with being Muslims, and
as belonging to the Muslim community, is very great indeed. It is
something they feel far more strongly than most Westerners would
identify with being, for example, Christian. Most of these clients were
not practising Islam, and in many cases they had had sex before marriage
and had drunk alcohol, things antithetical to being a ‘good Muslim’.
Despite their often less-than-holy behaviour, they felt a strong loyalty
towards Islam nonetheless. Thus many of my Muslim clients had ended up
in the prison I worked at precisely because of the obligation they felt
to defend their religion against any kind of criticism, by any means
necessary (starting riots, attacking the authorities, threatening people
who criticise Islam, etc.).
Muslims’ strong identification with
their cultural and religious background is the cause of a powerful and
dangerous us-and-them mentality. Thus I experienced far more racism
among the Muslim inmates than among any other group. While our societies
try to inculcate tolerance and equality, Muslim culture and Islamic
teachings insist on the importance of the difference between believers
and infidels. I had dozens of Muslim clients that had been involved in
serious riots against the Danish authorities, and the general picture is
very clear. The victim mentality and acceptance of anger that are part
of Muslim culture, combined with Muslims’ loyalty towards Islam and
their strong discrimination between Muslims and non-Muslims, are the
main reason that — while police, firemen and other representatives from
our non-Islamic authorities are being met with hostility and violence
when entering Muslim-dominated areas in our cities — Islamic
authorities such as imams, patrols of older Muslim men, and Sharia
courts are free to exert their power.
Unless it concerned rival
Muslim gangs or ‘honour’-related crimes, all violence committed by my
Muslim clients had been against non-Muslims. When I talked with my
Muslim clients about this fact during therapy, and especially during
anger management sessions, they told me that non-Muslims were a more
legitimate target. It emerged that they see our society’s lack of
meaningful response and Europeans’ non-aggressive ways of handling
conflicts as signs of exploitable weakness. Alarmingly, I also
discovered that there exists amongst Muslims a demonisation of
non-Muslims that has many similarities to the propaganda countries
disseminate against their enemies during wartime, propaganda that serves
to strengthen the hatred soldiers feel for their enemies, killing off
all empathy and enabling them to fight without mercy.
It is worth
mentioning in closing that there is an interesting phenomenon amongst
Muslim prisoners, in that the greatest social status and respect always
accrue to the more extreme Muslims. This is a dangerous tendency indeed.
Islam, Muslims and CrimeSeen
from the perspective of Western psychology it is without doubt
unhealthy for the development of one’s personality to grow up in an
Islamic environment. Its high acceptance of anger and lack of
self-responsibility and tolerance produces a relatively high number of
anti-social and psychologically immature individuals.
Having had a
closer look at Muslim cultures than most, I have no doubts whatsoever
that the integration of Muslims into our Western societies will never
happen to any useful extent. Muslim pressure for the Islamization of our
societies will therefore never end and there will be constant and
growing violent conflicts between Muslims and their non-Islamic
surroundings.
I believe the solution to this problem will consist
of the following steps. Firstly, we must bring a complete halt to
Muslim immigration and the awarding of citizenship to Muslim immigrants
and refugees, at least until the feasibility of Muslim integration is
established. Secondly, we have to make non-integration so impractical
and financially detrimental that immigrants who cannot or will not
integrate feel that repatriation (state-sponsored emigration) is, for
them, the better option. Thirdly, we have to limit the state child
support so that families only receive financial support for a number of
children equal to the average in a given country. Parents that work,
which is to say natives and well-integrated immigrants, will still have
the necessary financial means to have large families if they wish. There
is nothing wrong with making unpleasant guests feel unwelcome!
VI. The Dark Figure and Other SubtletiesWe
have already pointed out that official crime statistics are not
available by religion of perpetrator, which makes it impossible to say
what the official Muslim crime rate is for any particular crime.
However, even if such statistics were available, there would still be
questions as to their reliability.
For any crime to enter the official statistics, it must first be
reported, and then
recorded.
Let us consider each of these processes in turn. The first, reporting,
is fairly self-explanatory, but still requires a little thought. For a
crime to be reported, there must be:
| 1. | | An awareness on the part of the victim that a crime has taken place at all. |
| 2. | | A willingness to report the crime. |
Staying
with our two examples from Section III, it is far from obvious that a
seven-year-old who has just undergone FGM knows she has had a crime
committed against her. Similarly, it is far from obvious that a
14-year-old girl who is being drugged, threatened, beaten, and pimped
will be prepared to go to the police to report these various crimes.
These two factors both force down the reporting rate to an extent that
varies widely as a function of the crime in question, though not
necessarily its seriousness.
Nearly all burglaries are reported,
as reporting a burglary to the police is necessary to make an insurance
claim. However, rape — a much more serious crime — is reported much
less frequently due to such factors as shame and a reluctance to have it
made public that one was raped.
Next, there is the question of
whether or not the report in question will result in the police
recording it as a crime. If the police are not satisfied that a crime
has actually taken place as reported, they will simply not record it,
and it will effectively disappear from the official viewpoint. Taken
together these two processes constitute attrition, that process whereby
the number of actually-committed crimes is, in effect, whittled down to
the official figure. The difference, i.e. the number of crimes that have
‘gone missing’, is referred to as the dark figure. This dark figure is
the source of many of the difficulties that bedevil the discipline of
criminology, and criminologists have developed various methods for
trying to address it. However, none of these methods will be useful for
addressing the dark figure for those Muslim crimes most likely to escape
the attention of the authorities.
3We have now established a number of key points:
| 1. | | Trying
to establish the amount of any given crime taking place is a very
difficult endeavour due to fundamental methodological difficulties. |
| 2. | | This
is particularly true for certain categories of crime. Most obviously,
these include those that the victims do not consider to be crime, and
those that they refuse to report, for whatever reasons. Other studies
can help fill in the blanks in some cases, but not with respect to the
crimes we are most interested in here. |
| 3. | | A
significant fraction of the most depraved and damaging Muslim crime
(FGM, pimping, etc.) is of a type that is unlikely ever to show up in
official statistics, and therefore, by definition, cannot result in
police action, much less appropriate convictions. |
| 4. | | Any
official statistics that exist on these crimes are therefore likely to
be hopelessly inaccurate. This means that only unofficial estimates can
be given, and these are always of doubtful reliability, especially with
respect to crimes such as pimping. |
| 5. | | Any official statistics that could, in principle, exist are not broken down by the religion of perpetrator anyway. |
As
a consequence of the above, we are concerned by the impossibility, at
present, of a member of the general public really gaining any sort of
idea at all as to how prevalent Muslim crime is, or how
disproportionately involved in crime Muslims are. Of course, this
impossibility also obtains with respect to Chinese crime, or Armenian
crime, or any other sort of crime. However, there is no reason to
believe that these groups are particularly criminal, or that the police
tend to turn a blind eye to their criminal activities. Neither claim can
be made with respect to Muslims.
We would seem to have no
option but to look at the disproportionality in incarceration to give us
a general idea, as noted in Section II of this document. But there are
problems here too. Even if we ignore the conversion problem outlined
earlier, we still have great difficulties in this regard:
- Is
the threefold overrepresentation of Muslims in the prison system
evidence of crime rates three times higher across the board, with an
identical probability of post-crime incarceration for Muslims and
non-Muslims?
- Are Muslim crime rates perhaps ten times
higher, with the probability of incarceration for Muslims somehow having
moved down lower than for non-Muslims?
- Or are Muslims no
more criminal than anyone else, their greater incarceration rates simply
being the consequence of a biased criminal justice system?
So
far in this document we have discussed two different metrics that
could, in principle, shed some light on the true nature and scale of the
Muslim crime problem: crime rates and incarceration rates. The first,
as we have noted, do not exist for Muslims as a group, and the second
are not easy to interpret. We consider it worth pointing out here that
the relationship between them may also be somewhat counterintuitive. We
expect, intuitively, that a group with disproportionately high crime
rates will also have disproportionately high incarceration rates. But
the extent to which the law enforcement apparatus is actually brought to
bear on a given group is also of relevance to this analysis.
If
all Muslims in prison were to be let out of prison, then the Muslim
incarceration rate would fall to zero, so this indicator would suggest a
complete lack of criminality on the part of Muslims. But the release of
approximately 10,000 Muslims with criminal records into the country at
large would, fairly obviously push up the Muslim crime rate by some
margin, making Muslims appear more criminal as seen via this metric
(however it were deduced). Conversely, putting all Muslims in prison
permanently would see the Muslim crime rate fall to zero, suggesting
zero Muslim criminality with this metric, but pushing the Muslim prison
population to 2.4 million, suggesting absolute criminality with the
other.
The point of this slightly odd thought experiment is to
suggest that, if the policing of a given community starts to weaken and
become more permissive in some regard, then, all other things being
equal, its incarceration rate will fall while its crime rate rises. And,
as we have argued above, there are already good grounds for believing
that the police have become less than completely assiduous in pursuing
Muslim criminals, at least in certain respects. As such, we may surmise
that the only concrete indicator we have of relative Muslim criminality
(their relative incarceration rate) is lower than it would be if the law
were applied evenly, and that the one that is invisible to us (their
relative crime rate) is higher than it would otherwise be.
Let
us put the point more concretely. If the British police dropped all
their concerns about appearing ‘racist’, and were given the powers they
need to adequately address FGM, pimping, and other crimes that are
‘culturally sensitive’, and that they have therefore edged away from
until now, how many more criminal Muslims would be in prison, and how
much lower would Muslim crime therefore be? There is no way of answering
this question precisely, and we do not propose to try. But there is
clearly a strong possibility that huge amounts of Muslim crime are
simply not registered by the criminal justice system at all, as they are
not reported, offenders are never brought to justice, and the crimes
themselves simply disappear into the unknowable Muslim-specific ‘dark
figure’, which, we suggest, is almost certainly much greater than for
other communities.
Note that we do not imply by the foregoing
that the police are bringing all wrongdoers to justice when the
wrongdoers in question happen to be non-Muslims. Rather we suggest that a
relative slackness with respect to the application of the law to
certain Muslim groups will result in the one firm, quantitative
indicator of Muslim crime we have (incarceration rates) underestimating
the scale of the problem. Coupled with an admittedly impressionistic
perception of the prevalence of Muslim crime picked up, rightly or
wrongly, from the mainstream media, it is hard to resist concluding that
Muslim crime is a) rampant and b) substantially unaddressed. The
absence of any reliable relative crime rate data for Muslims, their
already-high incarceration rate, and the existence of good reason to
believe that they enjoy, in some respects at least, an ill-deserved
legal impunity with respect to extremely serious crimes: all these
factors serve to strengthen this conclusion. The disproportionality in
incarceration rates for Muslims is, at present, a factor of three.
4 But perhaps it should be a factor of five, or ten, or twenty. How can we possibly know?
We
must maintain a position of agnosticism here. As already stated, we
strongly suspect that, though overrepresented in the prison population
by a large margin, Muslims are almost certainly still
underrepresented
relative to what we will call their ‘true state’, i.e. that which would
obtain if they enjoyed no special treatment. However, this should not
be taken to imply that all Muslims are criminals destroying our society
from within. It is, rather, a friendly shot across the bows of the
relevant authorities. Nature abhors a vacuum, and an informational
vacuum that pertains to the criminality of a problematic religious
minority, whose relationship with the rest of the country is already
rather strained, cannot be in anyone’s best interests, theirs or ours.
Let
us reiterate here that the types of crime with respect to which Muslims
enjoy a certain degree of impunity are hardly trifling matters. FGM,
sexually enslaving underage girls, the dealing of hard drugs and
associated crimes of violence, ‘honour’ violence, and a constellation of
offences relating to inciting violence and/or insurrection against the
British state, people, and armed forces: these crimes are not exactly on
a par with parking on double-yellow lines or casually throwing away a
crisp packet. Even if we turn to terrorism itself, there are undoubtedly
Muslims in the UK today whom the security services could pull in and
have charged for terrorism-related offences if keeping them under
surveillance and building up intelligence on their networks were not
deemed to be of greater value. How many such Muslims might there be? 10?
50? 100? We have no way of knowing, but the point is that even with
respect to terrorism (for valid reasons, in this case), we cannot assume
that the numbers we see in prison are reflective of the true scale of
the problem. Hence the informational vacuum to which we have already
alluded.
Next: “Some Pre-Emptive Responses to Predicted Objections” and “Conclusions”Notes:
| 1 | | Nicolai
Sennels (born 1976) is a psychologist and the author of ‘Among Criminal
Muslims: A Psychologist’s Experiences from Copenhagen Municipality’
(Free Press Society, 2009). The book describes the psychological
mechanisms leading to high Muslim crime rates and hostile, parallel
Muslim societies. It also explains why integration of Muslims into
Western societies is doomed to failure. His work is based on his
experience in Copenhagen youth prison where he had around 150 Muslim and
100 Danish clients. It is on the basis of the comparisons this client
pool allowed that he draws a psychological profile of the Muslim mind.
His controversial work was well received by the Danish magazine for
professional psychologists, which stated that the book was ‘a provoking
eye-opener, convincing and with concrete examples,’ and the magazine for
professional teachers of teenagers stated that ‘Nicolai Sennels’
conclusions and critical analysis concerning our effort to help criminal
youth deserve wide attention.’ Sennels regularly writes articles for
Danish newspapers and internet magazines, of which ‘Muslims and
Westerners: The Psychological Differences’ and ‘Sexual Abuse Widespread
among Muslims’ (both available online) are the best known. Sennels can
be contacted through his homepage: www.nicolaisennels.dk. |
| 2 | | “Religious Muslim boys more violent” |
| 3 | | The
methods in question are victim surveys (crime viewed from the victim’s
perspective) and self-report studies (crime viewed from the
perpetrator’s perspective). Both are useful criminological tools in
certain contexts and to certain extents, particularly the former. A
discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of these studies is beyond
the scope of this document, but suffice it to say here that there is no
reason to believe that they currently shed any light on that part of the
dark figure that concerns us, or even that they are ever likely to do
so. |
| 4 | | A figure which is already difficult to interpret, as we have noted. |
----------------------------
A Consideration of Muslim Crime in the UK
and the Response of the British Authorities
Part 4
By Pike BishopVII. Some Pre-Emptive Responses to Predicted ObjectionsGiven
that many of the reflexive objections to this dossier and its contents
are largely predictable in advance, we endeavour here to try to clear
some of them up, so that people of good faith who genuinely wish to
engage with the position herein need not waste their time with them.
Are We Stigmatising Muslims?‘Stigmatisation’
is one of the accusations most frequently hurled at those who presume
to draw attention to the undesirable characteristics of ideologically
protected groups. Like many such charges, however, it has no real
meaning. If we were to accuse the Orthodox Jewish community of the UK of
being disproportionately represented amongst the ranks of armed
robbers, would we be accused of stigmatising them? Obviously not. We
would be accused, and deservedly so, of outright fabrication and
slander, but not of stigmatisation. When a
false claim is made
about a group, the counterclaim of ‘stigmatisation’ serves no useful
purpose, as defenders of the group in question can respond far more
effectively by pointing out that the claim is false.
Once this
simple point has been understood, it can be seen fairly clearly that the
charge of ‘stigmatisation’ is only meaningful when directed at
true
claims. It will therefore only be made in response to true claims, and
is, in essence, an implicit admission of their accuracy. If one points
out that Muslims in the UK tend far more strongly to terrorism,
sedition, and subversion than any other group, then one is making a
claim which very few people acquainted with the facts could possibly
deny. In response, many will accuse the claimant of ‘stigmatising’
Muslims. Despite their apparent belief that they are thereby saying
something substantive and thought-provoking, they are in fact only
saying that a) one’s claims are true, but that b) it is simply
not cricket
to point out such unpleasant truths. For my part, we are content to be
correct, and will let loftier intellects concern themselves with what
is, and what is not, cricket.
Note that the accusation that we
are ‘fostering hatred’ would be essentially analogous to the claim that
we are engaging in stigmatisation. The rebuttal is therefore simply a
slight variation on the above theme.
Surely There Is No Such Thing as ‘Islam’?It
is often argued, when attention is drawn to unpleasant aspects of the
way in which Muslims behave, whether in the UK or anywhere else, that
there is no such thing as Islam. It is meaningless to try to generalize
about Islam. There are many Islams. Why, there are as many Islams as
there are Muslims.
We must not
essentialise
Islam, clever people tell us. Furthermore, there is huge ethnic,
cultural, and linguistic variation amongst the Muslims in the UK, and
throughout Western Europe in general. Surely it is meaningless to speak
of Muslims as being one thing rather than another, and inflammatory to
do so on a subject as controversial as crime?
If Islam and crime
have nothing to do with each other, then we should not expect to observe
any patterns, any regularities, when we look at crime through the prism
of Islam. To rephrase, looking at crime from the perspective of Islam
should impose no more order on the underlying data than doing so from
the perspective of any other arbitrarily selected and irrelevant
parameter.
Let us make the point with an example. If we were to
trawl through every Crown Court conviction in the UK in the last twenty
years, looking for a pattern between the first letter of the surname of
the convicted and the type of offence they had been convicted of, what
would we expect to discover? That all murderers had surnames beginning
with the letter ‘G’ and all rapists surnames beginning with the letter
‘M’? Surely not. We expect, for reasons too obvious to need explaining,
there to be no relationship at all between these two parameters.
But
what if we did find a relationship? What if all murderers really did
have surnames beginning with the letter ‘G’, and all rapists surnames
beginning with the letter ‘M’? If we checked and double-checked our
research and were confident of our results, then we would have
discovered something very significant, and something that could not
possibly be a coincidence. Even if we did not understand the
relationship we had discovered, would it not be remiss to fail to draw
attention to it and demand that it be studied? Objecting that we were
‘essentialising’ the letters of the alphabet would be neither here nor
there. Regularities do not emerge at random from otherwise unordered
data.
So it is with Islam. If it is observed that taking Islam
as a parameter of interest allows patterns to be observed in crime rates
and types throughout Western Europe, with its hundreds of millions of
people and many millions of Muslims, and if it can further be
established that Islam is not a proxy for some other variable such as
poverty (more on this below), then Islam as a risk factor for crime must
be taken seriously, even if the nature of the relationship between the
two is not yet clear. Occam’s Razor is not easily blunted, least of all
by the delicate sensibilities of multiculturalists.
The
pioneering work and immense political courage of Nicolai Sennels in
Denmark are already leading the way in unraveling the role that Islam
plays in causing its adherents to perpetrate criminal acts. Do British
psychologists and criminologists have a contribution to make in this
regard? Or does putting quotation marks around the word crime (excuse
us, ‘crime’) already consume all their intellectual energies?
Just a Tiny Minority?Inevitably,
when disproportionate criminality on the part of an immigrant group is
observed and stubbornly refuses to be explained away by the
self-appointed defenders of that group, the claim will eventually emerge
that the perpetrators of the crime in the group in question are a ‘tiny
minority’ of the whole, and that the ‘vast majority’ of the members of
the group are law-abiding citizens. The woeful predictability and
peculiarly seductive nature of this claim make it particularly important
to unpack.
The tiny minority defence essentially makes four assertions:
| 1. | | That
a given problem caused by a given ethnic/religious group in a given
society is only committed by a ‘tiny minority’ of that group. |
| 2. | | That the problem, though unpleasant, is therefore essentially manageable, at least in principle. |
| 3. | | That
it is unfair to blame the problematic group as a whole, as the vast
majority of the members of that group are not engaging in the
unfortunate behaviour in question. |
| 4. | | That
whether one blames the group as a whole or not, it is unfair to take
any type of action against it as a whole, as such collective
action/punishment will affect many innocent people. |
The
basic problem with this fallacious reasoning lies in the implicit
assumption that, in a healthy and functional society, anything other
than the very tiniest minority
could be committing serious crime.
Even in the most crime-ridden societies on Earth, serious crime is
always committed by tiny minorities of the population. Let us consider
why this should be so.
During the Troubles in Northern Ireland,
there were approximately 3,500 sectarian killings of all sorts,
including the killings of civilians (Catholic and Protestant), British
soldiers, IRA members, and members of Loyalist paramilitaries. This is
an average of about 121 per year for the 29 years of the conflict. If we
take the mean population of Northern Ireland as being about 1.25
million throughout these years, then we have what is, for our purposes,
an average sectarian murder rate (not an official murder rate) of 9.68
per 100,000 per annum (the UK murder rate in recent years has been
approximately 1.2 per 100,000 per annum). Performing a similar analysis
for Sri Lanka during its 27-year civil war (90,000 killings, 27 years,
assuming an average population of 18 million people throughout the
period), yields a sectarian murder rate of 18.52 per 100,000 per annum,
nearly double that for the Troubles.
Now let us look at Jamaica.
20
According to Wikipedia, Jamaica’s murder rate in 2009 was 58 per
100,000 per annum, a figure slightly higher than that obtained by adding
the sectarian murder rates for Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka above
and doubling them.
This is not the result of a civil war. It is not an aberration, or a
blip, or something that can be rectified by banging the side of the TV
set. It is, for reasons the authors of this dossier will not pretend to
understand, just how Jamaica happens to be. Now let us assume that, in
any given year, a) every person who is murdered is murdered by a single
person (which will artificially reduce the number of murderers) and
that b) no murderer murders more than one victim, (which will
artificially increase the number of murderers). This means that there
are 58 people per 100,000 engaged in the act of murder in any given
year, or 0.058% of the entire population. We have now established that
only a tiny minority of Jamaica’s population is engaged in lethal
violence in any given year, and the same would doubtless be true for
every other serious crime as well.
But what of it? Who feels
emboldened with respect to taking a late-evening stroll through a
Kingston slum simply through the application of the tiny minority
defence to Jamaica? The problem here is that, although that fraction of
the population of Jamaica engaged in lethal violence in any given year
is indeed a tiny minority, it is by no means tiny enough. A country can,
to be blunt, fall to pieces well, well before those committing serious
crime become anything more than a tiny minority. Should the South
African authorities be unconcerned about the sky-high murder rate in
their country simply because only a tiny minority commits murder in any
given year?
21Only a tiny
minority commits murder in any given year in Japan. But that tiny
minority is approximately two orders of magnitude smaller than its
counterpart in Jamaica. Hence some of the massive, qualitative
differences between these two countries. And exactly the same analysis
can be applied to different groups within the same country, rendering
the tiny minority defence meaningless when the criminality of a specific
group is being examined. One must understand crime for what it is, not
through applying arbitrary and ill-considered numerical standards to it.
Are We Forgetting Poverty?Arguably the
most predictable and reflexive of all ‘rebuttals’ to the claim that
Muslims are somehow predisposed to engage in criminal behaviour is that
which makes reference to poverty. Are not Muslims disproportionately
likely to live in poverty? Surely it is obvious that differences in
crime rates between different populations are essentially functions of
poverty?
Alas, things are not so simple. Though poverty is often
treated as if it were some sort of magic wand which could explain away
all sorts of social ills, this is certainly not true with respect to
crime. There are two problems with this claim. The first is that it is
far from obvious that there is a particularly strong positive
correlation between crime and poverty at all if we are making
between-group comparisons. The second is that such a positive
correlation, even if it were to exist, would, in and of itself,
establish nothing one way or the other about the existence or nature of a
causal relationship between the two variables.
The first point
can be made sufficiently well by reference to the incarceration rates of
different ethnic groups in the UK. The incarceration rates of the white
British population are higher than those for the Chinese, the Hindus,
or the Sikhs in the UK. Yet both British Chinese and British Indians
have higher poverty rates than white British people, which means they
are more law-abiding despite being poorer. Similarly, black Britons
appear to have higher incarceration rates than Pakistanis or
Bangladeshis (both overwhelmingly Muslim groups), despite lower poverty
rates.
The second point is a more subtle one. To say that
differences in crime rates are due (or largely due) to differences in
income is to say that, if we control for income between two different
groups, the differences in crime rates would disappear (or be
significantly attenuated)
because differences in income cause differences in crime rates. But this is much more problematic than it seems.
Let
us imagine that we compare Muslims and non-Muslims in the same income
brackets and find that differences in crime rates between them are seen
to shrink to nearly zero. Can we then assume that poverty is the most
important causal factor underlying the crime rate differentials, and
that the ‘Muslim’ crime problem is actually a poverty problem? The
answer is no, and the reason is the age-old logical fallacy of confusing
correlation with causation.
22 To say
that controlling for poverty reduces crime rate differentials is, in
effect, to say that poverty and crime correlate with each other. But
this is no more evidence that poverty causes crime than that crime
causes poverty, which could equally well be true. Similarly, it could be
true that crime and poverty are both caused by some as-yet-unconsidered
variable, with neither actually causing the other at all.
To rephrase, even if crime and poverty are correlated, it is not clear
why
that should be. Perhaps the poor commit crime because they cannot
afford to buy what they want, and are angry with the world (A and B
correlate, A causes B). Perhaps the criminal are poor because their
criminal and dysfunctional behaviour has disrupted their educational and
professional development, and they cannot find gainful, remunerative
employment (A and B correlate, B causes A). Perhaps there is a suite of
psychological characteristics (impulsiveness, lack of ability to delay
gratification, lack of self-discipline, low intelligence) that tends to
cause crime
and poverty (A and B correlate, but are both caused
by a third factor, C, which correlates with both). Perhaps all these
things are true to some extent, creating a much more complex and
analytically difficult situation.
These questions on the subject
of causality in the social sciences are not unanswerable, at least not
in principle. But no consideration of the Muslim crime problem can
expect to shed any light on it, or even begin to properly address it, as
long as it is obstructed by the confused and confusing folk criminology
that plagues so much discussion in modern political discourse.
Quite
apart from the above considerations, it should be fairly obvious that
crimes such as trying to blow up ten airliners simultaneously, plotting
to poison British water supplies, blowing up trains, threatening to kill
people for writing novels and drawing cartoons, stabbing people and
throwing acid over them for sullying the family ‘honour’, cutting pieces
of the sexual organs out of one’s own daughters, and beating up
journalists investigating electoral fraud are not caused by poverty.
Does anyone doubt this?
Could anyone doubt this?
Are We Forgetting Age Profile Differences Between Muslims and Others?Different
groups within the same country often have different age distributions,
and crime rates can vary as a function of age. As such, a crime rate
differential between two different ethnic/religious groups can, in
principle, be at least partly a function of that age difference.
If,
for example, we discovered that vandalism rates were higher for the
Muslim community in the UK, but also that vandalism was more common
amongst the young, we would then be faced with the question of whether
or not the crime rate differential was partly a function of age
differences. This question could be investigated by comparing the crime
rates between similar age groups drawn from the Muslim community and the
rest of the country. We could discover, on so doing, that part of the
variation in the crime rate disappeared as a consequence, that all of it
disappeared, or even that, controlling for age, Muslims were less
likely than others to commit vandalism. Alternatively, we might discover
that the effect of controlling for age depended on the age group in
question. All these questions are empirical questions, and therefore
cannot be answered from first principles.
It should be noted
that the causality problems that arise with respect to poverty do not
arise here, as it is possible only for variation in age to cause
variation in crime rates, not for variation in crime rates to cause
variation in age. Accordingly, this is in general a far more legitimate
objection to a superficial interpretation of crime rate differentials
than that based on poverty, whether in this context or any other.
Nonetheless, large crime differentials are exceedingly unlikely to be
explained away in this fashion, though they may be somewhat attenuated.
Until criminologists attack these questions rigorously, the most that
those who would take issue with our arguments can say is that
controlling for age
could reduce
some crime rate differentials between Muslims and non-Muslims
to some extent.
Given that Muslims in general exhibit the characteristics that
disproportionately criminal groups always do (poor educational and
professional achievement, heavy reliance on public assistance, etc.,
which cannot be explained away as age effects), we find it unlikely that
crime rate or incarceration rate differentials are likely to be exposed
as being age effects to any significant extent. And we are certainly
not likely to discover that, for example, the Muslim tendency to plan
acts of terrorism is a consequence of them being younger than other
populations.
Are We Being Xenophobic?The
word xenophobia is frequently flung at those in the UK who object to any
aspect of the behaviour of any group of foreign origin, implying as it
does that the objections in question are less than genuine, and are
actually motivated by nothing other than an animus towards the group in
question. However, unless there are grounds for believing that no
behaviour of any immigrant group can be legitimately objected to (which
seems unlikely, to put it mildly), the burden of proof is surely on the
accusers in this regard.
A question for those who believe that
those who focus on Muslim crime do so only because they are xenophobes
who simply dislike those of foreign origin: why do these xenophobes not
focus their attention on the Chinese as well? Is it simply that they
have not yet found some reasonably plausible pretext upon which to
attack the Chinese and present them as a threat? Or could it be because
the Chinese
do not cause any particular problems? Could it be because the Chinese seem to be disproportionately likely
not to commit crime,
particularly violent crime, sexual crime, and property crime? Might
that not have something to do with it? Might it not be that the
significant ethnic and cultural differences that exist between the
Chinese and other groups in the UK are
simply not of any particular significance or interest to those concerned about Muslim crime,
much less grounds for hostility? And might this not be rather difficult
to reconcile with the claim that these people are merely an assembly of
xenophobes and racists?
VIII. ConclusionIn conclusion, we feel that it is legitimate to make the following observations:
| 1. | | It
is generally true that Muslims in the UK are substantially more
criminal than the UK population as a whole, irrespective of national
background, or what generation of immigrant they are (first, second,
etc.). |
| 2. | | This
trend is a robust one, and can be seen in similar form throughout
Western Europe. Indeed, a glance at the Muslim crime problem in
countries such as France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Germany,
and Sweden makes it clear that the UK, disturbingly, and despite its
many problems in this regard, has a much less severe problem with Muslim
crime than many of its European neighbours. |
| 3. | | Certain
non-Muslim immigrant groups in the UK are more law-abiding than the
white British population, as is demonstrated by their lower
incarceration rates and the prevailing perceptions of their
law-abidingness. That this should be so, despite their higher poverty
rates and the integration-related difficulties they no doubt experience,
makes it very clear that the Muslim crime problem is not an ‘immigrant’
problem, a ‘race’ problem, a ‘poverty’ problem, or a ‘social exclusion’
problem. |
| 4. | | It
seems, therefore, to be a reasonable conclusion that there is something
about Islam itself that, statistically speaking, induces people whose
attitudes and behaviours derive from it to engage in criminal,
aggressive, and violent behaviour more often than would otherwise be the
case. Indeed, there is a gradually emerging body of evidence from
modern criminologists and psychologists to suggest that this is so. |
| 5. | | These
Islam-induced behavioural discrepancies are not insignificant, and can
be very large indeed. We in the UK are fortunate in that they appear to
be, as yet, relatively small (though still large in an absolute
sense). However, we do not consider this to be a reason for complacency,
much less a reason not to attend resolutely to this troubling state of
affairs sooner rather than later. |
| 6. | | Given
the serious Muslim crime problem that we already face, the rapid rate
of growth of the UK Muslim community, the general lack of integration of
the UK Muslim community, and the existence of strong separatist,
supremacist, and subversive tendencies within that community, we feel
that the possibility of a serious breakdown of civil order in heavily
Muslim areas is a distinct possibility in the years to come. Note that
we do not argue that such a breakdown is inevitable. We simply point out
that allowing an ever-greater fraction of the population of the UK to
consist of a disproportionately criminal, hostile, estranged, and
self-estranging religious group (whatever divisions and fissures might
exist within the group itself) cannot be accepted as being simply
‘inevitable,’ and therefore to be endured irrespective of the
consequences. |
On the basis of the foregoing, we make the following requests.
| 1. | | We
ask that the Home Secretary make clear what sort of balance the police
are required to maintain between law enforcement and maintaining public
order. We also ask whether this balance is the same for all ethnic and
religious groups in the UK, and, if it is not, why not. Answers to the
effect that it ‘depends on the circumstances’ will be considered
invalid. |
| 2. | | We
ask that the Home Secretary create an independent task force to study
the relationship between Islam and crime, with said task force taking
into account evidence not only from the UK, but from across Western
European countries with similar experiences of Muslim immigration. |
| 3. | | We
ask that the Home Secretary calculate the total annual costs imposed on
the British state (i.e. the publicly-borne costs) and people (i.e. the
privately-borne costs) as a consequence of Muslim crime. These costs are
to include both the direct costs of this crime (physical harm, property
damage, etc.), and the indirect costs (expenditures on and by the
police, prisons, and security services, productivity costs imposed by
anti-terrorism measures, etc.). |
| 4. | | We
ask that the Home Secretary introduce much more finely-grained
data-collection methods in all areas that bear on the Muslim crime
problem, so as to enable analysts to enhance their understanding of the
situation. |
| 5. | | We
ask that the Immigration Secretary clarify whether or not the Muslim
crime problem has any influence on immigration policy vis-à-vis Muslims.
If it does not, we ask the Immigration Secretary to explain exactly how
he has concluded that the Muslim crime problem is so trivial, and will
continue to be so trivial, as to be unworthy of being reflected in the
relevant aspects of immigration law and policy (such as those pertaining
to family reunification immigration, one of the major sources of growth
for the UK Muslim community). |
| 6. | | We
ask that the Home Secretary take any and all measures to ensure that
foreign criminals, Muslim or otherwise, are permanently deported from
the UK upon completion of their sentences. We also ask that new
legislation be introduced to permit particularly violent and/or serious
criminals of foreign origin to be stripped of their British citizenship
as and when possible, so as to facilitate their deportation to their
countries of origin. |
| 7. | | We
ask that the Home Secretary consult with the police as to the likely
long-term implications of having ever-larger, disproportionately
criminal Muslim populations in the UK. The results of this consultation
should be made available to the British public as and when they are
ready. |
| 8. | | We
ask that the Home Secretary create an independent task force to conduct
an in-depth study of forced child prostitution (‘pimping’) in the UK,
with a particular emphasis on the situation in the north of England
vis-à-vis the criminal activities of the Pakistani population there. We
also ask that this task force investigate the relevant police forces to
ascertain whether or not they have been engaged in gross professional
malfeasance with respect to their responsibilities in this regard. |
| 9. | | We
ask that the Home Secretary conduct a full public inquiry into the
likely long-term ramifications of allowing the Muslim population of the
UK to continue to be able to import tens of thousands of spouses every
year from its various countries of origin, thereby increasing its rate
of growth to the current alarming and unsustainable level. | |
| 10. | | We ask the Home Secretary whether he agrees:
| a) | | That
the legitimacy of the British state rests upon its ability to fulfill
the obligations it has in accordance with the social contract that
exists between it and the British people. |
| b) | | That said legitimacy will decline in direct proportion to the failure of the British state to fulfill these obligations. |
| c) | | That
amongst the most important of these obligations is the protection of
the persons and property of the British people against predation and
destruction. |
| d) | | That the Muslim crime problem represents a rapidly growing (though still partial) failure to fulfill this obligation. |
| e) | | That continued failure on this front by the British state has the potential to dissolve the social contract in its entirety. |
| f) | | That
dissolution of the social contract will both entitle and oblige the
British people to take whatever steps they deem necessary to protect
their persons and property against predation and destruction, quite
irrespective of the wishes of the British state. |
|
If
the Home Secretary disagrees with any or all of these statements, we
ask that he make the nature of and reasons for his disagreement clear,
the better to allow the British people to understand the British state’s
interpretation of the social contract that binds them.
Notes:
| 20 | | We
do not mean to pick on Jamaica here, but, according to Wikipedia, it
had one of the world’s highest murder rates for 2009. This makes it a
good example of the point we are trying to make. |
| 21 | | This
should not be taken as a suggestion that South Africa has fallen, or is
falling, apart. We simply mention it here as an example of a country
with a murder rate sufficiently high as to cast a shadow over the
future, perhaps even the viability, of the country. |
| 22 | | Perhaps
the most seductive and ubiquitous of all logical fallacies, the
‘correlation-equals-causation’ fallacy crops up here in a slightly
unorthodox form, which no doubt accounts for the blind spot otherwise
intelligent and educated people have in this regard. |
