| What Begin and Reagan Didn't Want You to Know |
| Secret CIA Documents on Mossad |
| CounterSpy, May-June 1982 pp. 34-54 |
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CounterSpy Introduction
The
secret CIA and State Department documents printed here have come a long
way. They were discovered by the Iranian students who took over the
U.S. Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979. Some were complete, others
which had gone through a shredding machine were painstakingly pieced
together.
These documents, made available to
CounterSpy by
journalists Randy Goodman, Terri Taylor and William Worthy, are only a
fraction of a 13 volume paperback set (complete with commentary) readily
available for sale in Iran. The three journalists picked up a set at an
airport on their way to Shiraz. In late November 1981 they had
completed their assignment for CBS and flew home. The FBI and Customs
officials seized their luggage and confiscated the documents — with the
active assistance of Lufthansa (West German) Airlines.
But a second set of the books — sent by another route — was
overlooked by customs and reached the U.S. intact. (Some of the volumes
were supplied to the
Washington Post which analyzed them in a series running from January 31 to February 6, 1982.)
The 13 volumes of documents are a goldmine. They expose covert
CIA operations in Iran (an attempt to recurit former Prime Minister Bani
Sadr, for example), reveal the CIA's use of corporate covers, and
detail former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan's attempts to establish ties
with U.S. intelligence.
The documents supplied to
CounterSpy deal with the triangle of U.S.-Israeli-Iranian relations. A careful reading of the documents illustrates that the
Washington Post's
analysis was narrowly focussed on the "U.S. angle." Other disclosures
were simply glossed over — systematic Israeli suppression of domestic
dissent, for example, or Mossad (Israel's CIA) and Israeli military
intelligence support for repressive regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin
America, and even Mossad's "psycholgical warfare projects."
The main document reprinted here is an in-depth CIA analysis of
Israeli intelligence, written in March 1979 and classified secret. Other
documents [not included in this online version] are cables between the
State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, most of them discussing
U.S.-Israeli-Iranian relations (documenting the close collaboration
between Mossad and the Shah's intelligence agency SAVAK).
TABLE OF CONTENTS
General
Background and development of services
Objectives and structure
Political Aspects
Relationship between the government and the services
Relationship between the services and the populace
Professional Standards
Integrity
Efficiency
Security
Morale and disciplinary methods
Mossad — Secret Intelligence Service
Functions
Organization
Administrative practices
Training
Funds and salaries
Methods of operation
Relationship with other services
Liaison with foreign services
Shin Beth — Counterespionage and Internal Security Service
Functions
Organization
Administrative practices
Methods of operation
Military Intelligence
Functions
Organization
Air Force Intelligence
Naval Intelligence
Administrative practices
Methods of operation
Relation with other services
Research and Political Planning Center
The National Police
Key officials
Comments on principal sources
Source Materials
Supplementary overt publications |
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Intelligence and Security
A. General
Israel's principal intelligence and security authority is the
Va'adat Rashei Hasherlim
(the Committee of the Heads of the Services), generally know as the
Va'adat. It coordinates the operations and activities of its members.
Mossad Letafkidim Meyouchadim
(the Secret Intelligence Service) or Mossad, its common name, has the
primary responsibility for foreign operations and is subordinate to the
Prime Minister.
Sherut Bitachon Kiali (Counterespionage and
Internal Security), popularly known as Shin Beth, is responsible for
security and is directly subordinate to the Prime Minister.
Agaf Modiin
(Military Intelligence) has the main responsiblity for strategic
militrary intelligence and communications intelligence and is under the
command of the Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides support in research and political
planning to the Israel intelligence community. The Ministry of Interior
assists the National Police with police investigations and the
maintenance of border security.
1. Background and development of services
In 1948, when the British Mandate ended, the Jewish population of
Palestine established the State of Israel. Among the agencies of
government to emerge was the intelligence and security unit known as the
Information Service (
Sherut Yedioth — popularly known as Shay).
This organization, which was the intelligence arm of the Zionists'
underground resistance force, the Haganah, during the years of the
British Mandate, had begun to engage in operations on a worldwide scale
with the founding of the Jewish Agency in 1929 at the Zionist Congress
in Zurich, Switzerland. At that time, the Jewish Agency was composed of
both Zionists and non-Zionists, including a strong American
participation. The Jewish Agency, which was created to aid and support
distressed Jews and to sustain the Palestine Jewish community, has been
effectively under Zionist control over the years. It has also served as a
cover for Shay, which extended its covert operations into Western
Europe and the United States.
From 1923 to 1948, Shay's objectives were to promote the
establishment of an independent State of Israel; infiltrate Mandatory
installations in order to apprise Zionist leadership of British
attitudes and proposed actions; collect political intelligence that
could be used in Zionist propaganda; penetrate Arab and anti-Zionist
factions in Palestine and peripheral nations; monitor and control all
extremist groups — left and right — among Jewish communities in
Palestine and abroad; provide security for the arms smuggling and
illegal immigration programs of the Haganah; and finally collect
information on Nazi Germany to guarantee the security of the Jewish
underground and escape channels throughout Europe before, during, and
after World War II.
Shay consisted of the following components: Political Intelligence (
Machlakit Medinit); Counterespionage and Internal Security (
Sherut Bitachon Klali); Military Intelligence (
Sherut Modiin); Police Branch of Military Intelligence (
Sherut Modiin Shel MateArtzi); and Naval Intelligence and Security (
Sherut Modiin ve Betachon Kohoi Ha Yam).
These services worked independently on behalf of the different
ministries to which they were individually responsible. This
intelligence and security community was competitive and frequently acted
on its own, a product of the general postwar chaos which required the
accomplishment of many urgent tasks wherever and whenever they might
arise. In some of the West European capitals all services were
represented and competed for the same agents and sources.
By April 1951, the Prime Minister and cabinet, seriously alarmed
by the atmosphere of mutual jealousy and mistrust prevalent among the
services at the increasing cost of their uncoordinated efforts in the
field, decided to reorganize completely the basic structure of Israel's
intelligence and security community. The dynamic force behind the plan
was the late Reuven Shiloah, who reorganized the services according to
functions and responsibilities and established a mechanism to coordinate
their activities. Shiloah was chairman of this authority, the Committee
of the Heads of Services (
Va'adat Rashei Hasheruiim, called
Va'adat). He integrated the Naval Intelligence and Security Service and
the embryonic air intelligence unit into Military Intelligence (
Agaf Modiin).
The Political Intelligence Service was made independent of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and reorganized as the Secret Intelligence Service (
Mossad Letafkidim Meyouchadim or Mossad). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs retained Research Division (
Machleket Hackeker).
Shin Beth remained intact except for internal changes. The Special
Tasks Division in the Investigation Department of the police became a
part of the new apparatus. Shiloah's reorganization of the intelligence
and security structure produced an efficient and well-coordinated
community.
The Israeli intelligence and security services retained this
structure relatively unchanged throughout the Arab-Israel War in
October-November 1956, the Six-Day War in June 1967 and the Yom Kippur
War in Octobeer 1973. During the early and mid-1960s, hovever, the
Israeli Goverment had considered changes in the structure and duties of
the components of the intelligence and security community. Despite
Shiloah's earlier reorganization, much of what happened in the Israeli
services at this time depended on the personal relationships between Ben
Gurion and the directors and chiefs. In early 1963, just before his
retirement, Ben Gurion appointed a committee to review the situation. He
was concerned that the intelligence and security establishment which by
virtue of his serving both as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense,
usually functioned satisfactorily, might deteriorate when he left
office. He also was reported to be dissatisfied with the lack of clarity
in the community's chain of command and functions and ordered the
committee to define the subordination and tasks of these bodies.
In July 1963 the committee submitted its report to a new Prime
Minister, the late Levi Eshkol. The committee stated that, while the
functions of Prime Minister and Minister of Defense did not necessarily
have to be concentrated in the hands of one person, the Prime Minister
must know about all the activities of the national intelligence and
security services and be given objective intelligence evaluations
balanced and based on different viewpoints from more than one source. To
accomplish these aims the committee recommended that the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Research Division be strengthened so that it would be
capable of presenting independent political evaluations, both on Middle
East issues and other political subjects. By upgrading the Research
Division, the committee believed that a certain balance would be created
for security and political evaluations, which were handled almost
solely by the Military Intelligence Production Department. The committee
also observed that the existence of Mossad, which controls secret
foreign information gathering assets, facilitated to some extent the
possible formulation of another independent evaluation unit. The
committee also regarded as a matter of vital importance the appointment
of a special adviser, subordinate only to the Prime Minister. He would
be a person of high caliber who would aid the Prime Minister in keeping
in touch with and monitoring the activities of the intelligence and
security services. The committee's principal recommendations were not
implemented at the time except for the extablishment of the adviser
position and the shift of responsibility for Shin Beth from the Minister
of Defense to the Prime Minister. There was a brief interlude from
September 1965 to July 1966 when Isser Harel, the former Chairman of the
Va'adat and Director of Mossad, served as a special adviser to Prime
Minister Eshkol on intelligence and security matters. Harel resigned as a
result of internal policy disputes within the community and he was not
replaced at the time.
Following the alleged "intelligence failure" in the Yom Kippur
War, the Israeli Governement established the Agranat Commission in
November 1973 to investigate matters relating to the hostilities and the
performance of the intelligence and security services. The commission
in its
Partial Report in April 1974 proposed reactivating and
strengthening the post of special adviser to the Prime Minister on
intelligence and security matters. The commission also recommended
changes in the intelligence and security forces through the
establishement of a reseach and evaluation unit in Mossad and the
elevation of the Research Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The object of this modification was to avoid relying exclusively on
Military Intelligence for major estimates and assessments. The
commission also emphasized the need for better operational coordination
in the field of collection between the services but it opposed the
coordination of their finished intelligence judgments. A full or final
commission report, if there ever was one, was never made public.
From 1974 to 1976 the recommendations of the
Partial Report
of The Agranat Commission were implemented. The Prime Minister
appointed Reserve General Rehavam Zeevi as his intelligence adviser, a
postion that was purely advisory and carried no executive authority.
Zeevi assumed this new job in addition to serving as the Prime
Minister's adviser on counterterrorism. Zeevi was also to be the Prime
Minister's liaison with the Director of Military Intelligence and was
also to keep the Prime Minister alerted to differences of views among
the intelligence and security services. In October 1976, however, Zeevi
resigned from this post and was replaced by Brigadier (Ret.) Yehoshafat
Harkabi, a former Director of Military Intelligence. The Research and
Political Planning Center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came into
operation in January 1975. Changes in the Military Intelligence
structure were being carried out. A new research and evaluation unit for
assessing information was established within Mossad. New appointees had
taken over in most of the intelligence and security components. In June
1977 the Israeli Goverment established a Ministerial Committee on
Security Affairs.
2. Objectives and structure
The principal targets of the Israeli intelligence and security
services are: (1) the Arab states — their capabilities and intentions
toward Israel, their relations with the USSR and other powers, their
official installations and representatives throughout the world, their
leaders, internal and inter-Arab politics, morale, military preparedness
and other order of battle; (2) collection of information on secret US
policy or decisions, if any, concerning Israel; (3) collection of
scientific intelligence in the US and other developed countries; (4)
determination of government policy toward Israel in the USSR and East
European nations and the problem of Jewish emigration from these areas;
(5) close monitoring of anti-Zionist activity throughout the world; and
(6) collection of political, and economic intelligence in other areas of
interest to them, such as Africa. The Israeli services also make
special efforts to counter Arab propaganda and to neutralize
anti-Zionist activity. Within recent years the Israelis have devoted
much operational activity to combating Arab terrorism, which has grown
over the years from isolated cross-border raids by Palestinian Fedayeen
to daring and deadly attacks, often international in scope, on Israeli
personnel and property. The Israelis also have undertaken widescale
covert political, economic and paramilitary action programs —
particularly in Africa.
Authorization for foreign intelligence and internal security
organizations, while not defined by specific charter, is in Israeli
legislation. Paragraph 29 of the Basic Law states: "The Government is
authorized to carry out on behalf of the State, in accordance with any
law any act whose implementation is not lawfully entrusted to any other
authority." This implies that the goverment is entrusted with the
management of intelligence and state security affairs since no other
authority is empowered to act in this sphere by any other law. Attempts
have been made over the years by officials within the government and the
community to have an act passed defining the status of foreign
intelligence and security organizations and their operations, but
nothing has come of these efforts.
Internal security, on the other hand, is more clearly defined in
law. The Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 (established during the
British Mandate), the Military Law of 21 June 1955 and the Penal
Revision (State Security) Law of 31 July 1957, the Israeli equivalent of
the British Official Secrets Act, all are concerned with internal
security. The Emergency Regulations of 1945 gave the military
administration the power to arrest and deport troublesome elements and
to designate certain locations as "closed areas," thus requiring local
inhabitants to possess travel permits to transit such places. While the
regulations originally applied to both Jews and Arabs in Palestine, they
are now used largely to monitor the Arab community in Israel.
Administration of the regulations was transferred from the military to
the police in 1966. Internal security organs reportedly increased their
agent activity to meet this responsibility.
Israeli laws require severe punishment ranging from the death
penalty or life imprisonment for treason or assistance to the "enemy,"
to terms of incarceration from three to 15 years for espionage, contact
with foreign agents, aiding and abetting a crime against state security
and unauthorized disclosure of information by a public servant. There is
no statute of limitations regarding the unauthoized disclosure of
classified information.
The central body in Israel's intelligence and security community
is the Va'adat, which has as its primary function the coordination of
all intelligence and secrurity activities at home and abroad. The
Va'adat consists of the Director of Mossad, the Director of Military
Intelligence, the Director of Shin Beth, the Inspector General of
Police, the Director General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the
Director of Research and Political Planning Center of the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, and the political, military, intelligence and
antiterrorist advisers of the Prime Minister. The Head of the Special
Tasks Division in the Investigations Department of the Police also
occasionally attends the meetings with, or in place of, the Inspector
General of Police. Meetings must be held biweekly but may be held more
frequently. At these meetings each director usually provides a briefing
on the key activitiies of his service during the preceding two weeks.
The Director of Mossad chairs Va'adat and in this capacity is directly
responsible to the Prime Minister. The members of Va'adat are
quasi-equal in status and the term
memune referring to the
Director of Mossad as chairman is designed to denote a concept of
preeminence among equals. In actuality, however, the Director of
Military Intelligence now overshadows the Director of Mossad in power
and importance. This development resulted from the continuing Israeli
reliance on military preparedness for national survival.
Mossad is charged with the collection of foreign intelligence and the conduct of covert action programs outside Israel.
Shin Beth is responsible for counterintelligence and internal
security. It functions as the governmental authority on personnel
security matters. It is also responsible for the personal safety of the
Prime Minister and other high ranking Israeli officials. Shin Beth is in
charge of physical security for ports, airports and key
military/industrial installations in Israel and for Israeli missions and
El Al operations outside Israel. Shin Beth does not have the power of
arrest, this function being performed by the Special Tasks Division of
the Investigations Department of the Police, which works in close
collaboration with Shin Beth in Israel. Within the Administered
Territories, which are controlled by the Israeli Defense Forces, Shin
Beth applies to the military to undertake arrests and searches.
A special component under the Inspector General of Police is the Border
Guard, whose mission is that of guarding the cease-fire lines against
Arab infiltration and of detecting and running down Fedayeen terrorists.
In recent years Border guard units have been used increasingly to
control and suppress riots and demonstrations in the West Bank area.
Military Intelligence, in additon to its responsibility for
strategic and tactical intelligence, prepares the national intelligence
estimates and evaluates all information dealing with the Arabs. It also
is responsible for developing and protecting communication codes and
ciphers for all the services and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and
for communications intelligence.
The Research and Political Planning Center, which was formerly
the Research Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, analyzes raw
intelligence from various sources for officials on the policy making
level.
Other Israeli governement organizations that provide support to
the intelligence and security community are the Ministries of Finance
(Customs and Excise, Investment and Securities) and Tourism, the
national airline, El Al, and the national shipping line, Zim. Unofficial
Zionist organizations based in Israel and Jewish communities throughout
the world also give aid to Israeli operations when needed.
There are between 1,500 and 2,000 personnel in Mossad, of whom
about 500 are officers. Shin Beth has about 1,000 members of whom some
550 hold officer rank. In Military Intelligence there are about 7,000
personnel, of whom 450 are officers, the others being enlisted personnel
and civilian clerks. The number of officials in the Research and
Political Planning Center of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs ranges
between 75 and 100. The police number about 12,000 and the Border Guards
around 6,000.
Since the financing of the intelligence and security services is a
closely held secret, it is very difficult to get accurate information
on the total amounts expended for these purposes. The funds are
concealed in the defense budget, and known to the Prime Minister, the
Minister of Defense, one or two of their top assistants, the Minster of
Finance, the State Comptroller and his Defense Services Inspectorate.
The Comptroller deals directly with the directors of the services, who
request funds at the beginning of the fiscal year in April. The
estimates of expenses by the directors, who have established reputations
for honesty and integrity are usually acceptable as a starting point
for budget negotiaions. The Ministry of Finance however, does require a
10-year projection of expended financial needs (an impossible task which
is not taken seriously). The Comptroller holds a series of meetings
with the various service directors and their staffs, reviewing their
programs in detail. These sessions continue throughout May and result in
a careful redefinition of the entire intelligence and secrurity effort
and its cost. By October, the determination of specific budget needs is
completed, based on the program analysis completed in May. This is then
submitted for higher approval and the planning and budgeting cycle is,
upon budget approval, completed just in time to begin again.
Much of the administrative support for the services is handled by
the Ministry for Defense. Various types of cover are provided for and
funded by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). There is close professional
cooperation between the civilian intelligence and security services and
military intelligence. These services, like all goverment offices, are
subject to inspection by the State Comptroller's office. An Assistant
Director-General is in charge of inspecting the defense and security
services, the Ministry for Foreign affairs, and the police. The annual
inspection covers bookkeeping, financial management and handling of
administration. The Comptroller is required to see that the services are
operating economically, efficiently and with irreproachable morality.
Israeli governmental offices and departments are continuously
borrowing money, personnel, equipment and material from one another and
salaries are paid by the office to which the individual is assigned. An
intelligence officer or a Ministry for Foreign Affairs official
stationed in New York and assigned to the Jewish Agency is paid salary
and allowances by the Agency but loses neither seniority nor retirement
status while serving in that capacity.
3. Political Aspects
3a. Relationship Between the Government and the Services
The intellligence and security community enjoys a strong position in
the government, and their affairs are well integrated into more general
operations. Members of the generation which worked for the establishment
of the state were companions of longstanding and joint veterans of such
enterprises as illegal immigration and arms-running. Many of the
current leaders came up through the ranks of the military in a series of
wars with the Arabs and entered politics through affiliation with one
of the major political parties. All of them had some experience in
clandestine matters and have been personally convinced by stern lessons
of the value of good intelligence and security.
The intelligence and security services receive excellent support
from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Many senior diplomats are former
intelligence officers and therefore conversant with intelligence
problems and operations. With their experienced observations and
manifold talents, they serve as valuable auxiliaries to their covert
colleagues, whose diplomatic cover is diligently sustained by the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, almost every Israeli diplomat
abroad has good foreign language and area knowledge or some
specialization which enables him to pursue a much broader social life,
with its resultant contacts, than is the case in most foreign services.
In many instances, embassy officers, including chiefs of diplomatic
missions, were former citizens of the countries to which they are
accredited. Information developed by Israeli diplomats is made available
to the intelligence and security community for immediate use of
operational intelligence or inclusion in archives. As a final boon to
covert intelligence personnel, the vigor and variety of a normal Israeli
diplomat's life outside his installation usually renders detection of
intelligence officers by the host country extremely difficult. The same
kind of effective support regarding operations is given by the Ministry
of Defense and the Jewish Agency.
The Israeli intelligence and security services play an important
role throughout the government and private sector. Many leaders in both
the civil service and industry have at some time in their careers been
directly or indirectly involved with the intelligence community. Service
assignments are not regarded as the end of a career, as persons with
intelligence and security backgrounds frequently are selected for other
jobs in the government. Thus the services are supplemented by persons
who know and continue to relate their missions to intelligence and
security responsibilities, in senior posts in both the public and
private sectors. Officially, the services are nonpolitical and members
of the community are not encouraged to enroll in any party or engage in
political activity. The Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee of Knesset
is normally the government's point of discussion for the review and
resolution of sensitive policies and activities. The Director of Mossad
and the Director of Shin Beth are often present at sessions which are of
concern to them.
3b. Relationship Between the Services and the Populace
The current state of relations between the services and the populace
is good as a result of the present position of the services as
protectors of the Israeli state and people in the forefront of the
struggle against Arab terrorists and military forces. Most Israelis are
acutely aware of this situation and therefore support the services and
their operations. The historical development of Israel and the long
continuing struggle against the Arabs have contributed to this
harmonious atmosphere.
At times in the past as a result of political rivalries and
disagreements on the kind of order that was to prevail in Israel, there
have been occasional verbal and journalistic attacks against the
services as instruments of a police state. In several instances, service
representatives had to appear in closed court sessions to defend the
intelligence and security community against accusations of kidnapping,
brutality and illegality. Although debates in the Knesset occasionally
have reflected probably illegal practices or procedures by the services,
the intelligence and security community is completely loyal and if the
government requested the execution of a certain task, legal and illegal,
it would be accomplished.
Confidence in the intelligence and security community also
received a boost after the Six-Day War in 1967. The part played by
Military Intelligence, Shin Beth and the police in contributing to the
victory and controlling the newly-occupied Arab areas taken by Israel
was followed by a plethora of praise in all Israeli media. The so-called
"intelligence failure" in the Yom Kippur War in 1973, however, weakened
popular trust in the services. The subsequent work of the Agranat
Commission, undertaken to evaluate the community and its shortcomings
and to improve cooperation among its members, contributed to a partial
renewal of public confidence. The continuing battle by the services
against terorism has also kept Israelis loyal to the community. The
Entebbe raid in July 1976, which resulted in the rescue of hijacked
Israeli hostages, was one action in recent years which fired the public
imagination and served as an example of a well-coordinated and
well-executed Israeli operation. This raid and its success buoyed up the
moral of the Israelis as nothing else has in recent years and certainly
showed the intelligence and security community in a good light.
4. Professional Standards
4a. Integrity
The directors and senior staff members of the intelligence and
security community conform to the highest professional standards of
integrity and honesty and impose these standards on the lower echelons.
There is relatively little difference between the basic salary of a new
employee and the staff member who enjoys a top position. The
insignificant disparity has resulted in the granting of compensatory
amenities and privileges such as expense accounts, purchasing of foreign
goods that enter the country through devious tax-free channels, and "
protektsia",
a magic word in Israel, which means that one can get items, housing or
privileges at low cost through influential governmental connections.
This is common practice throughout the government establishment,
however. Because the intelligence and security services, especially Shin
Beth, maintain a very tight cover within their own community,
information on personnel, budgets and accounts is closely held by a few
top people in the government and not subjected to widespread
bureaucratic perusal and control. The higher echelons scrutinize the
expenditure of funds by the lower ranks, and if financial dishonesty is
discovered, the guilty individual receives very severe treatment.
4b. Efficiency
Israel's intelligence and security services are among the best in the
world. Their expert personnel and sophisticated techniques have made
them highly effective, and they have demonstrated outstanding ability to
organize, screen and evaluate information obtained from recruited
agents, Jewish communities, and other sources throughout the world.
Israel's intelligence capabilities give it a significant advantage over
the Arab states — an advantage which was an important factor in the 1967
war.
Those members of the intelligence and security community who were
identified with the Information Service and other components of the
Haganah, before and during World War II, developed a high standard of
efficiency and level of competence. The organizations succeded in
recruiting a core of capable and highly-educated individuals from Europe
and the Middle East whose equal has been difficult to find, let alone
attract, since the founding of the state. The corps of the "old guard,"
for example, is fluent in four or five languages, an accomplishment
which alone raises their general average of efficiency. The younger
generation has been given intensive training, including study abroad, to
assist them in gaining these qualifications. It is not uncommon for
students to engage in clandestine operations while pursuing their course
of studies.
Israeli signal intelligence successes against the Arabs in the
past were of such high order that the Israelis had less need than at
present for good agent operations against the enemy. Part of this
success was due to poor Arab communications security. The Israelis now
face some problems since Arab communications security is gradually
improving. The Yom Kippur War intelligence failure is an example of
inadequacies in their communications intelligence capability at that
time. In recent years, as well, there also have been indications that
Israeli intelligence on the Arabs, other that communications
intelligence, has been somewhat inadequate in quality and their agent
operations lacking in success.
One of the principal weaknesses of Israeli's intelligence and
security system appears to be that the production of most finished
intelligence and the preparation of national estimates is done by
Military Intelligence rather than by an independent service. Inherent in
such an organizational arrangement is the danger that the armed
services will not be objective in observing and reporting foreign
developments and in making national intelligence estimates — a major
problem in the Yom Kippur War — and their vested interest in military
operations will influence intelligence assessments. The Agranat
Commission has recognized this problem and recommended changes.
4c. Security
The physical security of the civilian and military intelligence and
security headuarters in Tel Aviv is reported to be excellent. Two
services — Mossad and Military Intelligence — were formerly located
within a general army compound in the heart of the city. The buildings
were protected by high wire fences and military guards. Military
Intelligence remains in this location but Mossad now occupies a wing of a
multistory commercial office building across the street from the
compound. Shin Beth, which was formerly located in a rundown building in
Jaffa, occupied new quarters just north of Tel Aviv in June 1970. This
new building, which was designed for their use, is fenced in and
contains a technical laboratory as well as regular offices. Guards
control the entrance and badges bearing a photograph of the employee are
worn within the compound.
There is an elaborate protected government "guest house" for the
training and accommodation of visiting foreign intelligence officers,
foreign dignitaries and sensitive agents.
There are a little over 1,000 persons working as staff officers
for Mossad and Shin Beth, all of whom have been given a long, thorough
security check. If there is the slightest doubt raised against an
individual, the application is rejected. Personnel with leftist
backgrounds generally are not trusted by leading members of the
intellligence and security services. This attitude did not always apply
to former members of European Communist parties, some of whom were
eminently qualified for clandestine service, especially if they had
renounced their Communist ideology and affiliated with the Israeli Labor
Party. This exemption, however, has not applied since the exposure of
several high-level espionage cases in governmental and political circles
in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The cases of Aharon Cohen, a MAPAM
party expert on the Middle East, and Israel Beer (Figure 1), a Defence
Ministry contract employee and IDF Reserve lieutenant colonel, who spied
for the USSR, and Dr. Kurt Sitte, a Gentile professor of physics at
Haifa Technion, who worked for the Czech Service, caused Shin Beth to
reconsider its own security procedures while stimulating considerable
doubt about the reliability of recanted Marxists. The services have
devised internal security systems to expose ideological weaklings by
more thorough periodic security checks. The Israelis believe such
individuals constitute a possible long-term security threat. Israeli
citizens are subjected to stringent registration requirements and must
carry identification papers. Within the intelligence and security
community great pains are taken not to reveal the identities of
personnel even to the average Israeli employed in the government at
large. Compartmentation is strictly maintained between services with
only designated individuals, usually members of the "hardcore," crossing
lines. Intelligence and security personnel widely use and frequently
change pseudonyms. The national practice of Hebraicizing European or
Yiddish birth names also makes the identification of some Israelis
difficult. Visiting foreign officials and agents never use the same car
twice when meeting clandestinely with Israeli officers within the
country. Certain unlisted official and personal telephone numbers are
known only to relatively few people. This type of professional demeanor
at home provides excellent daily training for intelligence and security
personnel before receiving foreign assignments.
Classified information may not be discussed over the telephone.
Despite their relatively high standards of security, however, Israeli
officials reportedly are occasionally careless in observing this
restriction. They also have "an old boy network" much like the British.
Israelis in the "network" are willing to discuss classified subjects
whether or not there is a need to know. The Israelis also have problems
dealing with overseas Jewry whose support they need but whose security
is questionable because of the possibility of divided loyalty.
Installations and storage containers must conform to rigorous
security standards. Classification terms Top Secret, Secret,
Confidential and Restricted (comparable to For Official Use Only) are
used. Top Secret and Secret documents are transmitted by courier only in
double envelopes and two receipts are required — one for the package,
and one for the contents. These documents are logged in and out by date,
document number, title or subject, and the office accepting
responsibility for them. At least three periodic inventories are held
each year. A registry produces a computer printout four times a year
listing all Top Secret material for which each unit is responsible.
Electrical communication is handled entirely by teleprinter and other
communication security devices. A record is made of documents to be
destroyed and security officers must witness the destruction of all Top
Secret and Secret material.
All personnel requiring a clearance must complete a personal
history statement and undergo a routine investigation. For higher
clearances the investigations could include the applicant's entire
family and a full field investigation. New immigrants from the USSR and
East European countries are normally denied access to classified
information for a minimum of four or five years. This ruling is not
always possible to enforce because of "protektsia." Within the IDF
security risks are reported to Shin Beth and are closely supervised by
the unit security officer, who is required to make periodic reports on
the individual's activities. To stimulate and evaluate the security
consciousness of the IDF cadre, Field Security personnel circulate among
the troops and attempt to elicit military information.
4d. Morale and Disciplinary Methods
Mossad and Shin Beth are components of the Israeli civil service
structure and applicants must pass a civil service examination. Those in
their twenties with a university degree are preferred, although other
individuals who have especially desirable qualifications are accepted.
The intelligence and security services, in direct competion with the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the rapidly expanding business
community, are at a disadvantage. Most young Israelis do not like the
anonymity of the secret service and prefer the more remunerative pay
scales of the business world.
Intelligence and security personnel who do not or cannot
subscribe to the circumscribed life limited by security restrictions and
operational considerations are either dropped or, if their actions
should jeopardize the service or the state, are severely punished. To
boost the morale of staff intelligence officers, the services in the
early 1960s sought and secured from the Knesset a 30 percent annual
bonus for their personnel to compensate for the risks and the anonymity
involved (
Figure 2).
B. Mossad — Secret Intelligence Service
1. Functions
Mossad is responsible for foreign intelligence collection, political
action and counterterrorism. In carrying out its mission to collect
positive intelligence, the principal function of Mossad is to conduct
agent operations against the Arab nations and their official
representatives and installations throughout the world, particularly in
Western Europe and the United States, where the national interests of
the Arabs in the Near East conflict with Israeli interest. Mossad
collects information on the disposition, morale, armaments, equipment
and state of leadership of every Arab Army that could be called into
action in the case of another round of fighting; and all the information
that illuminates Arab internal politics and relationships among the
principal Arab leaders and the diplomatic activity of all countries in
the Arab world. Mossad monitors Arab commercial activity, particularly
in the field of arms purchases in the West, and attempts to counteract
Arab recruiting of military, economic and political experts. In this
case the principal desire is to recruit these persons as intelligence
agents, or failing that, either to dissuade them from aiding the Arabs
or to discover their precise functions. Mossad also is charged with
inciting disturbances calculated to create mutual distrust among the
Arabs and to draw Western sympathy away from the Arab cause, and
monitoring and counteracting Arab propaganda and detecting and
countering Arab terrorism. In the area of counterterrorism, at times the
Israelis have carried the fight to Arab terrorists by taking executive
action against them, especially in parts of the Near East and Western
Europe. In particular, the fact that Lebanon has a mixed Christian,
Druze and Moslem populationn has made that country attractive for
intelligence projects. The Israelis have covert assets and run
operations in their northern neighbor. In the past they have mounted
paramilitary and executive action operations against Palestinian
terrorist leaders, personnel and installations in Lebanon. They have
also provided support to Christian rightists in the Lebanese civil war.
In addition to running operations against the Arabs, Mossad
collects political, economic and scientific intelligence in both the
Eastern and Western worlds for the protection of the State of Israel,
Zionism and Jews generally. Their collection efforts are especially
concentrated in the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as at
the United Nations, where policy decisions could have repercussions on
Israel and Zionist goals.
Objectives in Western countries are equally important to the
Israeli intelligence service. Mossad collects intelligence regarding
Western, Vatican, and UN policies toward the Near East, promotes arms
deals for the benefit of the IDF, and acquires data for use in silencing
anti-Israel factions in the West.
2. Organization
Mossad has eight departments: (1) Operational Planning and
Coordination; (2) Collection; (3) Political Action and Liaison; (4)
Manpower, Finance, Logistics and Security; (5) Training; (6) Research;
(7) Technical Operations; and (8) Technology (
Figure 3).
The Operational Planning and Coordination Department is concerned
with the management of Mossad resources and responsible for
interdirectorate operational and administrative coordination within the
organization and interservice liaison within the Israeli intelligence
and security community. This department also deals with requirements and
the development of overall collection plans.
The Collection Department is responsible for foreign covert
operations and the processing and production of reporting from
clandestine sources. This component is the largest unit in Mossad. The
department has offices abroad under Israeli diplomatic and nonofficial
cover and is active mainly in Europe, where it concentrates on Arab
targets through third-country operations.
The Political Action and Liaison Directorate is in charge of
political action and relations with friendly foreign services. This
component also maintains contact with those nations and political groups
with whom Israel does not have normal diplomatic relations (that is,
African countries, Lebanon and/or Lebanese Christian rightist factions
and Indonesia).
There is also a Psychological Warfare or Special Operations
Division, probably in the Political Action and Liasion Directorate,
which runs highly sensitive covert action operations against Arab
terrorists and ex-Nazis, and sabotage, paramilitary and psychological
warfare projects, such as character assassination and black propaganda.
In the absence of the Director of Mossad, the Director of the
Operational Planning and Coordination Department now becomes acting
Director, whereas in past years the Director of the Collection
Department acted for the Director of Mossad. With the drive for greater
and improved coordination within the intelligence and security
community, the Director of the Operational Planning and Coordination
Department has apparently taken precedence over the Director of the
Collection Department.
In headquarters, the department directors direct the various
area, functional, administrative, and financial controllers. The area
departments under the control of the Collection and Special Political
Action and Liaison Departments are: (1) Central America, (2) South
America, (3) Eastern Europe including the USSR, (4) Africa, (5) Asia and
Oceania, (6) the Mediterranean and Near East areas, (7) Europe, and (8)
North America. Under each controller there are branches or desks which
are responsible for one or more countries.
Positive intelligence and counterintelligence reports are sent
back to Mossad headquarters in Tel Aviv, evaluated by the Research
Department, and disseminated to various government offices. Intelligence
reports on the Arabs are forwarded by Mossad to the Research Department
of the DMI while counterespionage reports are sent through Mossad to
Shin Beth, where they are given special processing by
counterintelligence investigative departments.
Mossad controls Israeli foreign intelligence activities except
for operations launched from Israel against military objectives in
peripheral areas of surrounding Arab countries, which are under the
jurisdiction of DMI. Mossad operations abroad fall into two principal
categories: those in the Near East, as a first line of defense, and
those elsewhere. The Israelis have designated Egypt as the main target
area for establishing intelligence networks. In 1970 the Israelis
estimated that about 50 percent of their operational effort was directed
against Egypt. The next priority is Syria. Much of this activity
against the Arabs in the Near East is based on deep cover operations by
Israeli illegals or the recruitment of Arabs in third countries followed
by their dispatch or normal rotation back home to an Arab area. Two
good examples of Israeli deep cover illegal operations are the Cohen and
Lotz cases.
Elishu Ben Shaul Cohen was an Egyptian-born Jew who was involved
in Israeli sabotage operations against American and British
installations in Egypt in 1952. Cohen succeeded in escaping detection,
when most members of the ring were arrested by the Egyptians, and went
to Israel. Eventually, Mossad recruited Cohen for an illegal operation
designed to develop intelligence networks and acquire political and
military information in Syria. He received intensive training, adopted
the identity of the late Kamil Amin Thabet, a Syrian-born merchant, and
emigrated to Argentina, where he became an active member of the Arab
emigre community. Cohen eventually went to Syria, where he was assisted
by two Arabs who had previously been recruited by the Israelis. From
1961 until 1965 Cohen was active as an illegal in Damascus, where he
succeeded in making numerous contacts with political and military
personalities in the Syrian establishment. He made occasional trips to
Europe and Israel for extensive debriefings. Eventually, in January
1965, the Syrians did detect and locate Cohen while he was in the act of
transmitting information to Tel Aviv. One cause of his downfall was
that he was using hand morse radio equipment and had been on the air for
an hour when he was caught (Figure 4). A Syrian court tried Cohen and
found him guilty of espionage. He was publicly hanged in Damascus in May
1965.
Johann Wolfgang Lotz (also known as Zeev Gur Arieh), was an
officer in Military Intelligence. In 1959 during a Va'adat meeting,
Mossad announced its need for a man to be a new illegal resident agent
in Cairo under cover as a former Nazi officer. Lotz accepted the
assignment, which was directed primarily against special weapons
activity by German scientists in Egypt. He received intensive training
in Israel, went to Germany and surfaced as an East German refugee and
former African Corps officer. Although Lotz had a wife in Israel, he
eventually married a German woman to develop his legend. In 1961 he went
to Cairo, where he opened a riding academy. Through his activities Lotz
made a variety of contacts in the German community in the Egyptian
capital and in time made the acquaintance of a number of prominent and
well-placed Egyptians. He made a number of trips from Egypt to Western
Europe for debriefings. Finally, in 1964 Lotz began to mail threatening
letters to selected German experts in Egypt. In February 1965, he was
arrested by the Egyptians, who tried and imprisoned him. Eventually he
was released and returned to Israel in 1968. The Israelis have stated
that the operation cost them about $250,000. They have also admitted
that errors by Lotz in handling his communications and his use in
executive action operations may have led to his downfall. During his
captivity Lotz was also forced to reveal the whole operation (Figure 5).
Mossad stations outside of the Arab areas in the Near East are
generally under diplomatic cover within the embassies and consulates of
Israel. There are stations in the United States, most of the European
capitals, Turkey, Iran and strategic centers in Latin America, Africa
and the Far East. Operations range from formal liaison exchanges with
host services through unilateral projects to special executive actions
directed against Arab terrorists. There are also smaller stations, which
run mostly unilateral operations and handle local liaison on such
matters as Arab terrorists.
The Collection Directorate and the Political Action and Liaison
Directorate are separate components of Mossad and are carefully
compartmented at headquarters. Collection and Political Action and
Liaison maintain separate permanent staffs outside Israel in larger
stations. There are thus either two Mossad stations or two compartmented
components in each station in some countries — one for unilateral
clandestine collection and one for liaison. For example, at present in
Paris the Israelis have an Embassy, Consulate-General and Ministry of
Defense Mission. Under embassy cover, Mossad has a Collection
Directorate regional controller and a Political Action and Liaison
Directorate regional controller in the French capital, which has more or
less over the years remained the fulcrum of Israeli intelligence
activity on the continent of Europe.
In Switzerland the Israelis have an Embassy in Bern and a
Consulate-General in Zurich which provide cover for Collection
Department officers involved in unilateral operations. These Israeli
diplomatic installations also maintain close relations with the Swiss on
a local level in regard to overt functions such as physical security
for Israeli official and commercial installations in the country and the
protection of staff members and visiting Israelis. There is also close
collaboration between the Israelis and Swiss on scientific and technical
matters pertaining to intelligence and security operations. Swiss
officials have made frequent trips to Israel. There is a continual flow
of Israelis to and through Switzerland. These visits, however, are
usually arranged through the Political Action and Liaison regional
controller at the Embassy in Paris directly with the Swiss and not
through the officials in the Israeli Embassy in Bern, although the
latter are kept informed.
In Spain, on the other hand, there is no known offical or
semiofficial Israeli installation. There have been contacts, however
between Political Action and Liaison Directorate officials of Mossad and
the Spanish service for some time. The original meeting apparently
occured in Paris in the late 1960s, since then there have been contacts
in Madrid and Paris. There is a possiblity that Mossad may also have a
clandestine Collection Department station in Spain. In January 1973,
Baruch Asher Cohen, a Mossad officer, was assassinated in Madrid by
Arabs.
Special operations are mounted on an ad hoc basis. Headquarters
directs the effort from Israel and employs Mossad officers and agents on
special temporary duty. In July 1973, an Israeli assassination squad of
16 was involved in the murder of a Moroccan Arab in Lillehammer,
Norway. Norwegian authorities captured, tried and imprisoned six of the
group, the rest escaped. It became clear in the course of the trial that
the squad, which was composed of Israelis, who were Mossad officers,
and European Jews, who were recruited for the mission, did much of its
preparatory work in Paris and entered Norway on a specific assignment —
the elimination of Arab terrorists. After the murder, two of the squad
sought refuge with an Israeli Embassy security officer. The Norwegians
declared the officer personna non grata [sic], although he apparently
was not privy to the operation.
3. Administrative practices
The Israeli Prime Minister appoints the Director of Mossad. The Prime
Minister does not need the approval of the cabinet or the Knesset for
this appointment.
Chiefs of station and their staffs are Mossad career officers but
they function abroad on behalf of all the intelligence and security
services. If a member of Shin Beth or the IDF is considered the most
qualified individual in the community to do a particular foreign job, he
still belongs to his parent organization, but he is assigned to, and
subject to the control of Mossad as long as he remains outside the
borders of Israel. This rule does not apply, however, to military
attaches (army, air, navy) who remain subordinate to the Director of
Military Intelligence.
Mossad does not have a logical career progression program. The
organization promotes case officers who have been succcessful in the
field to top managerial jobs. The results of this arrangement are mixed
as some of the successful operators are often not necessarily the best
managers or administrators.
3a. Training
The Mossad training cycle encompasses a Basic Operations course for
recruits and lower ranking personnel, and [sic] Operations course and a
Field Operations course. All new officer candidates are required to take
the four-month Basic Operations course before actually entering on
duty. The entire training cycle takes almost two years and is generally
given to classes of 12. Most of the training takes place in the Tel Aviv
area. The instructors in these Mossad courses are teachers on permanent
assignment, intelligence officers on temporary tours of duty, and
headquarters personnel, including the Director of Mossad and department
directors, who give occasional lectures on their specialties.
The three services run a joint advanced school in Jersalem that
offers specialized courses of two to three months' duration on world
political affairs, Israel's political and economic objectives, new
technical operational aids, and the latest information on foreign
intelligence services. All officers who are midway in their careers are
required to attend this advanced school upon their return from a foreign
assignment. As many as 40 to 50 students are reported to have been
enrolled in a single running of this course. The faculty is composed of
representatives of the three services and is directly subordinate to the
Director of Mossad. The Prime Minister or some other high official has
addressed graduating classes.
Some younger Mossad officers, who may be weak in certain fields
of higher education or languages, are sent to universities abroad, where
their pursuit of an advanced degree simultaneously serves as cover for
their extracurricular operational activities. One of the established
goals of the intelligence and security services is that each officer be
fluent in Arabic. A nine-month, intensive Arabic language course is
given annually in the Tel Aviv area to students from each service. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs also sends two or three officials to each
course. Mossad officers who are going into Arab operations take the same
Arabic language training as Shin Beth officers. As further training,
these Mossad officers work in the Administered Territories for two years
to sharpen their language skills before being posted abroad. During
this period they usually serve in the Sinai and often run Bedouin agents
into Egypt in conjunction with Military Intelligence.
All Mossad officers are trained in the use of small arms and required to fire them at regular intervals.
3b. Funds and Salaries
The Director of Mossad is a civil service Class 1 officer. He
receives generous expense and entertainment allowances. There are
reported to be several Class 2 and Class 3 officers in Mossad as well.
The monthly take home pay of a ranking Mossad officer, after taxes but
including bonuses and cost-of-living and family allowances, is about
[unclear: 'IL4,000'?] per month (US$460). They also receive expense and
entertainment allowances and are provided with a car and gasoline
allowance as well. Higher academic degrees place intelligence officers
in a higher pay bracket, thus a directorate director with an advanced
degree makes the same as the Director. A middle-ranking officer with
allowances for a large number of dependents would receive more than his
seniors. In general, higher-grade civil service salaries are roughly
comparable to those of higher-ranking military officers. The rather
insignificant differential between grades is compensated by fairly
impressive perquisites, especially in the senior ranks. Officers abroad
are given generous cost-of-living allowances that conform to the
allotments of the regular Foreign Affairs officers. For cover purposes
these are paid by the Foreign Affairs Ministry. If, however, an
intelligence officer needs a larger apartment or house for
representation, operational purposes, or family requirements, his
service quietly pays the difference.
Officers and their families usually travel tourist class on
Israeli carriers whenever possible but the absence of a firm rule
permits them to travel on any air or steamship line at their discretion.
Clerical employees travel tourist class.
Each station abroad is granted funds for operational and
entertainment expenses. Responsible individuals do not entertain any
more than is necessary but when they do, it is done lavishly. Efforts to
extend hospitality unstintingly are made at headquarters in Israel when
favored agents or ranking foreign intellligence officers are guests.
4. Methods of Operation
Mossad over the years has enjoyed some rapport with highly-placed
persons and government offices in every country of importance to Israel.
Within Jewish communities in almost every country of the world, there
are Zionists and other sympathizers, who render strong support to the
Israeli intelligence effort. Surch contacts are carefully nurtured and
serve as channels for information, deception material, propaganda and
other purposes. Mossad directs clandestine operations throughout Europe,
including the USSR and East European countries; North and South
America; the Near East; Africa; and the Far East, including South East
Asia. Mossad activities are generally conducted through Israeli official
and semiofficial establishments, deep cover enterprises in the form of
firms and organizations, some especially created for, or adaptable to, a
specific objective, and penetrations effected within non-Zionist
national and international Jewish organizations.
The function of intelligence officers under cover of diplomatic
establishments is to arrange information exchanges with officials of
local services, manage communications, serve as accommodation addresses
and funding channels, and direct agents toward targets of interest.
Official organizations used for cover are Israeli Purchasing Missions
and Israeli Government Tourist, El Al and Zim offices, Israeli
constrution firms, industrial groups and international trade
organizations also provide nonofficial cover. Individuals working under
deep or illegal cover are normally charged with penetrating objectives
that require a long-range, more subtle approach, or with activities in
which the Israeli Government can never admit complicity.
Many Israelis have come from Arab countries where they were born
and educated and appear more Arab than Israeli in speech, demeanor, and
attitude. By forging passports and identity documents of Arab and
western countries and providing sound background legends and cover,
Mossad has successfully sent into Egypt and other Arab countries
Israelis disguised and documented as Arabs or citizens of European
countries.
There are numerous persons in Israel who have a thorough area and
language knowledge of any area of interest to the intelligence
services. These area experts can render extremely valuable assistance in
analyzing intelligence information and formulating country
requirements, thus contributing to the total operational potential since
they enable Israeli intelligence officers to estimate rapidly the
efficiency and reliability of their agents and informants. These persons
are also useful for their ability to pass completely for a citizen of
the nation in question. The Israeli talent for counterfeiting or forging
passports and documents ably supports the agent's authenticity.
The Israeli intelligence service depends heavily on the various
Jewish communities and organizations abroad for recruiting agents and
eliciting general information. The aggressively ideological nature of
Zionism, which emphasizes that all Jews belong to Israel and must return
to Israel, had had its drawbacks in enlisting support for intelligence
operations, however, since there is considerable opposition to Zionism
among Jews througout the world. Aware of this fact, Israeli intelligence
representatives usually operate discreetly within Jewish communities
and are under instructions to handle their missions with utmost tact to
avoid embarrassment to Israel. They also attempt to penetrate
anti-Zionist elements in order to neutralize the opposition. Despite
such precautions, the Israelis frequently experience setbacks and there
have been several cases where attempted recruitments of Americans of the
Jewish faith have been rejected and reported to US authorities.
Israel's program for accelerating its technological, scientfic
and military development as rapidly as possible has been enhanced by
exploiting scientific exchange programs. Mossad plays a key role in this
endeavor. In addition to the large-scale acquisition of published
scientific papers and technical journals from all over the world through
overt channels, the Israelis devote a considerable portion of their
covert operations to obtaining scientific and technical intelligence.
This had included attempts to penetrate certain classified defense
projects in the United States and othe Western nations.
The United Nations is a major target for Mossad penetration
because it is a major sponsor of international exchanges in all fields
and because of its importance in settling disputes between Israel and
the Arab states. Israeli agents operate at the UN under diplomatic and
journalistic cover.
Mossad recruitment, training and control of agents varies widely,
depending upon the target area of operation and the desk in
headquarters. While there is a certain amount of standardization in the
handling of operations, Israeli intelligence officers appear to have
considerable freedom in running operations. There is no hard rule
requiring specific headquarters approval prior to the recruitment of an
agent except in the case of Communist countries. Name traces are
requested of headquarter's voluminous files but this is not a consistent
routine. Contemplated operations against the USSR and the East European
countries, however, are approached very cautiously, and entail a great
deal of headquarters planning and control and a special branch composed
of area experts is responsible for authorizing and directing this
activity. Mossad is especially interested in early warning regarding
such developments as the dispatch of Soviet military units from the USSR
to the Near East. There also exists within, or affiliated with, Mossad a
small unit whose sole objective is to remind the Soviets through
propaganda and contacts about the Jewish question at any point throuout
the world. All sorts of people, even Cyrus Eaton, have been stimulated
to raise the subject. Israeli efforts must at times be effective because
the Soviets often attack the Israeli service in their propaganda with
detailed revelations of Israeli plots against allegedly innocent Soviet
citizens.
The Israelis select their agents almost exclusively from persons
of Jewish origin. However, there are security hazards involved in cases
of divided allegiance between dedication to the Zionist State of Israel
and loyalty to a homeland. The recruitment of Gentiles is comparatively
rare.
Many Arabs, especially walk-ins, have directly or indirectly
helped the services, usually as a result of monetary inducements, but
the Israelis do not consider these Arabs good sources of reliable
information. More often, they recruit Palestinians over whom they may
have more control because of bank assets frozen in Israel since the war
in 1948. In certain cases these bank assets have been released for
intelligence services rendered.
The Israelis are prepared to capitalize on nearly every kind of
agent motivation. A substantial effort is made to appeal to Jewish
racial or religious proclivities, pro-Zionism, dislike of anti-Semitism,
anti-Soviet feelings (if applicable) and humanitarian instincts.
Blackmail is also used. Other recruiting techniques include the proffer
of money, business opportunities, or release from prison. Among the
Arabs, money has been especially effective. Appeals have also been made
successfully to other Arab vulnerabilities such as jealousy, rivalry,
fear and political dissension.
The Israelis have used false-flag recruitment pitches extensively
and successfully. In several cases they approached citizens of Western
European nations under the cover of a national NATO intellegence
organization for operations in Arab target countries.
While intelligence officers in the field recognize the importance
of security, they tend to be careless. Although otherwise well trained,
Israeli intelligence officers occasionally have been lax in their use
of the telephone abroad. Also, they often have given away a considerable
amount of information by confiding in agents and contacts with whom
they have had only a slight relationship. Nonetheless, they periodically
recall the basic principles of their profession, and for awhile
complicate the lives of their agents with a welter of security
regulations that they themselves eventually transgress. Occasionally a
rendezvous arranged between an officer and an agent is countersurveilled
by two or more officers, both to spot possible surveillance of the
meeting and to protect the officer. In the recruiting process, the
officer generally uses a fictitious name, executes a secrecy agreement
with the prospective agent, and provides him with a pseudonym or alias.
Whenever money or other gratuity is given to an agent, an attempt is
made to secure a signed receipt in the agent's handwriting.
Although an agent occasionally may be sent to Israel for special
training, this course of action is neither easy nor inexpensive to
accomplish. Therefore, the intelligence officer himself is usually
responsible for training the agent in the fundamentals of tradecraft,
security measures, and the use of radio and code communications. If the
exigencies of the situation demand special training, the Israelis rent
an apartment for this purpose in places like Paris and New York. Agents
who have been so trained were taught to mix and use secret ink, conceal
documents and letters on the person, deliver information to secure
hiding places, and to communicate ortherwise with the case officer
and/or headquarters.
The methods of communication vary greatly depending on locations
and circumstances. Personal meetings between the agent and his case
officer are arranged by secret writing, open mail, or oral message by
couriers. The cities or towns to be used have code names and the meeting
places are at specified times with alternative times and places. In
case of emergency, the agent can alert the intelligence officer by use
of a prearranged open code in cables or letters, or if time permits, by
secret writing or courier.
The Israelis place considerable emphasis on personal
relationships with their agents. They have been known to be exceedingly
generous in granting personal concessions and monetary assistance to
keep their agents happy. One such individual, a journalist in Paris who
recruited French officials and elicited information from witting and
unwitting informants in the French political world, was paid the
equivalent of US$1,000 per month. After years of steady employment and a
succession of Israeli case officers, his services were gently but
peremptorily terminated. Severance pay was calculated at the rate of one
month's salary for each year of service to assuage any hard feelings.
On the other hand, the Israelis can be absolutely ruthlesss to both the
intelligence officer and the agent if the latter's disaffection or
treachery should threaten a sensitive operation or endanger the security
of the state. There are several cases of Jews in Europe who, while or
after working for the Israeli service, trafficked with the Egyptians for
substantial sums of money. These Jews were enticed into traveling to
Israel or abducted, tried in camera, and given stiff prison terms of 10
to 14 years.
Mossad headquarters controls the acquisition, flow and
dissemination of reports in a rigid manner, which contrasts with the
considerable freedom allowed in running operations. An Israeli
intelligence officer abroad must accept all information reported by an
agent and may not change a single word. The intelligence officer
receives detailed, prepared questions from headquarters and is allowed
little leeway in terms of what he submits. In a meeting with an agent,
many of whom are low-level, the intelligence officer debriefs him on the
basis of headquarters questions. The intelligence officer must then
forward all the agent says, even overt information. The intelligence
officer may if he wishes add his own remarks to the report.
Mossad headquarters does not disseminate agents reports to all
customer agencies. The overwhelming bulk of the reports goes to one
specific analytical unit, for example, usually reports on Arab affairs
are sent to Military Intelligence, counterintelligence reports to Shin
Beth. However, an exceptional agent report is disseminated to Israeli
policymakers. The Mossad intelligence officer abroad does not show
copies of his reports to the Israeli Ambassador but sends them only to
Mossad headquarters in Tel Aviv.
The Israeli services have a very keen interest in the use and
development of technical equipment. As far back as 1947-1948, the
Information Service conducted technical surveillance operations against
Arab and British delegates to the UN. Mossad with assistance from Shin
Beth has provided technical training to the Turkish and Ghanian security
and intelligence services. Exchanges of technical equipment and
information have also been carried out with the Japanese intelligence
and security services. Mossad receives support in external technical
operations from Shin Beth and Military Intelligence. The technical
capabilities of the Israeli services are adequate for normal demands.
Moreover, the very close coordination existing between the services and
the industrial concerns of the country ensure that technical equipment
to support continuing audio operations is supplied and developed as
needed. The existence of a limited research program, coupled with high
Israeli competence in technical matters, indicates that the Israelis
intend to remain abreast of advances in audiosurveillance and
countermeasures.
4a. Relationship with Other Services
Mossad has good relationships with Shin Beth, Military Intelligence,
the Research and Political Planning Center of the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, and the Special Tasks Division of the police. Successes like
the Entebbe raid are illustrative of well-coordinatated planning and
execution — a testimonial to good relations among the services.
The Agranat Commission advocated greater coordination between the
services and revived the post of intelligence adviser to monitor
interdirectorate disuputes. The exchanges between Mossad and the other
services through the coordinating mechanism of the Va'adat and the use
of ad hoc committees, however, continue to ensure coordination and
cooperation between the services.
4b. Liaison with Foreign Services
Mossad has liaison relationships with many of intelligence and
security services throughout the world. With a few exceptions, the
Directorate of Foreign Liaison and Politcal Action is responsible for
relations with most foreign organizations. In most instances the point
of contact is abroad in foreign capitals, although some foreign services
insist on liaison in Israel.
At present Mossad, in coordination with Shin Beth, maintains
liaison with foreign intelligence and security services through
membersihp in the Kilowatt group, an organization which is concerned
with Arab terrorism, and is comprised of West Germany, Belgium, Italy,
the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark,
France, Canada, Ireland, Sweden, Norway and Israel. The Israelis also
have informal connections regarding terrorism with other European
nations, including Spain, Portugal and Austria.
The Israelis have over the years made efforts to break the Arab
ring encircling Israel by involvement with non-Arab Moslem nations in
the Near East. A formal trilateral liaison called the Trident
organization was established by Mosssad with Turkey's National Security
Service (TNSS) and Iran's National Organization for Intelligence and
Security (SAVAK) in late 1958. Since the original agreement there has
been an addition to Mossad's bilateral relationship with each service.
The Trident organization involves continuing intelligence exchange plus
semiannual meetings at the chief of service level.
The general terms of the original agreement with the Turks, aside
from legitimizing Israeli liaison with Turkey, stated that Mossad would
furnish information on the activity of Soviet agents in Turkey and
those working against Turkey thoughout the Middle East. In return, the
Turks agreed to supply Israel with information on the political
intentions of the Arab countries which could affect the security of
Israel, and the activity and identification of UAR agents working
against Israel. The Israeli service has also given the Turks
counterespionage and technical training.
The main purpose of the Israeli relationship with Iran was the
development of a pro-Israel and anti-Arab policy on the part of Iranian
officials. Mossad has engaged in joint operations with SAVAK over the
years since the late 1950s. Mossad aided SAVAK activities and supported
the Kurds in Iraq. The Israelis also regularly transmitted to the
Iranians intelligence reports on Egypt's activities in the Arab
countries, trends and developments in Iraq, and Communist activities
affecting Iran.
Israeli liaison in Africa has varied considerably from country to
country, depending on the exigencies of the situration. Israeli
intelligence activities in Africa have usually been carried out under
the cover of military and police training, arms sales to national
military forces, and aid and development programs. The Arab nations, in
conjunction with the Organization of African Unity, have brought great
pressure to bear on most African nations to break all formal ties with
Israel. Despite the break in diplomatic relations between Israel and
many of the African nations, the Israelis still maintain good
intelligence liaison with certain African services. The Israelis also
have relations with the Kenyan Service. In Central Africa the Israelis
are still active in Zaire. In West Africa the Israelis trained the
Liberian Security Service and police. They also helped establish the
Ghanian Military Intelligence Service. In southern Africa the Israelis
have a relationship with the South African Intelligence and security
services.
The Israelis have been very active in Latin America over the
years. One of the greatest intelligence coups, the capture of Adolph
Eichmann, the former Nazi leader, occurred in Argentina. Recently, much
of their liaison activity in Latin America has centered on training and
antiterrorist operations. The Israeli Consulate in Rio de Janeiro, for
example, provides cover for a Mossad regional station responsible for
Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. Officers from this post have gone
to Buenos Aires to give training to the Argentines. In the course of
these contacts the Israelis recommended greater involvement in joint
antiterrorist operations. The Israelis also maintain liaison with
security services of Mexico, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama, the
Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Caracas is
the Regional Center for north and western Latin America and Central
America.
The Israelis have operated for sometime in East Asia. They have
provided intelligence training to the Government of the Republic of
China and maintain liaison with it. The Israelis also have relations
with the Japanese, Thai, Indonesian, and South Korean services,
especially on terrorist matters. The major Mossad regional center in
East Asia is in Singapore. The Israeli station chief there frequently
travels thoughout the neighboring nations. Indonesia as a Moslem nation
does not have formal diplomatic ties with Israel. The Mossad-Indonesian
relationship, therefore, is very discreet. The Mossad representative in
Singapore is accredited to the Indonesian service. There are also Mossad
officers in Jakarta under commercial cover. The primary reason for the
Indonesian liaison is to gain aid in counterterrorist efforts. The
Isaelis, on the other hand, are not only engaging in antiterrorist
operations but also have an opportunity to collect information and
engage in political action in another Moslem power.
C. Shin Beth — Counterespionage and Internal Security Service
1. Functions
Shin Beth has the responsibility in Israel for counterespionage and
internal security and the service is basically internally oriented. Shin
Beth is primarily responsible for collecting information on foreign
intelligence organizations, both hostile and friendly, and their
activities; protecting the security of Israeli officials and
installations abroad, and investigating all forms of subversion directed
by either internal or external forces, including sabotage and terrorism
in Israel and abroad. Shin Beth evaluates all information developed,
collates it with other material routinely and overtly available from
both Israeli and foreign sources, and submits evaluated reports to the
appropriate government agencies for action. Shin Beth operates to combat
two main adversaries: the Arabs and the Soviet and Eastern European
intelligence and security services.
Shin Beth at one time engaged in positive intelligence operations
and immigration affairs in the Balkan countries, particularly in
Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and in Hungary, but no longer does. Shin
Beth is the government's authority on personnel and physical security
matters, is responsible for the personal security of the President, the
Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense.
Shin Beth does not have the power of arrest, which is the right
only of the Special Tasks Division of the Investigations Department of
the Israeli Police, a national force with headquarters in Jerusalem.
When an arrest is desired, Shin Beth submits a detailed report on the
case plus a request for an arrest warrant to the Ministry of Justice.
The Legal Department transmits the request to the Special Tasks
Division, which issues the warrant and makes the arrest. When more
expeditious handling is justified, Shin Beth directly notifies the
Special Tasks Division, which is empowered to take the suspect into
temporary custody pending receipt of the warrant. On occasion a Shin
Beth officer will sit in court with the prosecution staff as a special
consultant.
2. Organization
Shinn Beth is organized into eight operational and functional
departments. (1) Arab Affairs; (2) Non-Arab Affairs; (3) Protective
Security; (4) Operational Support; (5) Technology; (6) Interrogation and
Legal Counsel; (7) Coordination and Planning; and (8) Administration.
Regional departments in the field are located in the Gaza/Sinai area
with headquarters in Ashqelon; the Northern area with headquarters in
Haifa; and the West Bank area with headquarters in Jerusalem. A unit
within Shin Beth national headquarters in Tel Aviv serves as the fourth
regional department. These regional departments are broken down into
subdivisions identical to but smaller than those of the parent
organization (
Figure 6).
The Arab Affairs Department is responsible for counterespionage,
antiterrorist operations, control of political subversion, research and
the maintenance of a counterintelligence index on Arabs. The components
handling these activities are organized into offensive and defensive
sections. This department operates through field offices controlled by
regional officers. These officers report to the regional commanders but
rely on the Arab Affairs Department for guidance and support, which
includes aid in counterespionage, countersabotage and surveillance as
well as research and records support. The overall headquarters function
is that of determining doctrine, systematizing work and supervising.
The Non-Arab Department handles counterintelligence operations
dealing with all other countries, countersubversion (one component
dealing with Communist subversion, the other with non-Communist New Left
subversion), foreign liaison and research. Each unit dealing with these
activities has offensive and defensive sections. The Non-Arab
Department investigates and counters espionage activity by foreign
powers, both hostile and friendly, by all known methods, including the
penetration of their intelligence services and diplomatic installations
in Israel. Operations against foreign missions within Israel were
formerly conducted by Military Intelligence, but with the evolution
towards greater centralization and professional specialization since the
reorganization of 1951, this function has been the responsibility of
Shin Beth.
The Non-Arab Affairs Department engages in the penetration of
extremist political parties such as MAKI (the Communist Party of
Israel); RAKAH (the new Communist List), a largely Arab-supported
splinter group; SIAH (the New Israel Left); and anti-Zionist and extreme
rightist organizations. The Department also investigates
counterfeiting, blackmarketing, the smuggling of money and goods in and
out of the country, and violations of the economic control laws. It is
responsible for tapping telephone lines and intercepting domestic and
diplomatic telephone conversations.
The Non-Arab Affairs Department is responsible for foreign
liaison and handles all correspondence by Shin Beth with other foreign
intelligence and security services. The interrogation of immigrants from
the USSR and Eastern European nations is also undertaken by this
department.
The Protective Security Department is responsible for the
protection of Israeli Government buildings and embassies, El Al and Zim
installations and craft, defense industries and scientific
establishments, and leading personalities. This department is also
charged with the security of all important industrial plants, especially
those of actual or potential military value, and is engaged in the
prevention of leakage of industrial secrets such as patents, processes,
statistics, etc. It also carries on liaison with security officers
throughout the Israeli Government. Although guards and security officers
are paid by the instituions to which they are assigned, their
recruitment, training, and control is a Shin Beth responsibility. The
Protective Security Department controls the security of internal
communications and the secrecy of information. A small unit within the
department, for example, handles all matters concerning espionage with
the Office of Mail and Telegraph Censorship.
The Protective Security Deparment directs Shin Beth security
activities overseas including the protection of Israeli personnel,
diplomatic and transport offices, facilities and equipment. Although
Mossad has responsibility for unilateral operations and liaison on
intelligence matters and Military Intelligence controls the attache
system and military liaison, Shin Beth handles protective security and
liaison with local security services abroad to safeguard Israeli
personnel and property. For instance, there is a regional Protective
Security office in Paris which is concerned primarily with El Al and Zim
security.
The Operational Support Department is responsible for assisting
the operational departments with surveillance, observation, airport
security, censorship, listening devices, special tasks and counteraudio
support. This department has tactical components, which aid in
counterintelligence operations, VIP protection and telephone taps. The
Department provides support in running a highly developed intercept
operation from a switchboard installed in Shin Beth offices. This
enables the service to avoid having to make taps either across pairs in a
local box or even in the telephone centrals under the jurisdiction of
the Ministry of Communications Telephone Services; and also avoids any
possible compromise by leftist employees of the Telephone Services.
The Technology Department lends support to the operating
departments in electronics, mechanics, and chemistry. It provides
technical support to operations in the following areas: audio and visual
surveillance, communications, photography, surreptitious entry,
telephone taps, mail censorship, security devices, etc.
The Interrogation and Legal Counsel Department handles all
counterintelligence and security interrogations for Shin Beth operating
departments not handed over to the Special Tasks Division of the police.
This department makes selective use of the polygraph. It also checks
the reliability of Mossad sources, fabricators, and suspect double
agents. Personnel in this component travel to the field as required to
give polygraph tests and conduct interrogations. The department also
assists in preparing cases for trial and provides other legal assistance
to operating departments as needed.
The Coordination and Planning Department has responsibility for
coordination of counterintelligence and security methodology, training,
security recruitment and the central registry. This department maintains
the Shin Beth card files, with the exception of those on Arabs. In
addition to ordinary carding procedures, there is an entry on every
individual in the country who has a police record. This enables all
government offices to make a quick check on the police record of present
or potential employees through Shin Beth. All tracing procedures are
channeled into this department, from name checks through neighborhood
investigations. This registry uses a military computer. The registry on
Arabs is not yet computerized because of the difficulty with Arabic
names.
The Administration Department performs the usual functions of
personnel management, finance, supply, transport, communications, and
security.
A policy body within Shin Beth is called the Directorate of the
Service. It normally meets once a month. Membership consists of
department directors (including the regional directors), all of whom are
of equal rank.
3. Administrative practices
The Director of Shin Beth is appointed by the Prime Minister who may
seek advice for the appointment but needs no approval from either the
cabinet or the Knesset.
Shin Beth is responsible for the security of all civilian
intelligence and security personnel. Furthermore, it also recruits and
selects personnel, according to specific requirements based on loyalty
to the state, education, capability and potential, and subject to the
approval of the individual civilian service. The military is somewhat
more autonomous in regard to security procedures relating to their
personnel because military security components handle most of their
cases. Shin Beth, however, sets the policies and standards for military
security controls.
Among the 500 officers in Shin Beth are some 100 individuals who
have been selected, screened, and trained to serve as security officers
throughout the governmental structure. These officers are stationed in
the Prime Minister' s office, intelligence and security components
including Mossad, scientific institutes, El Al installations, and
foreign service posts.
Most career employees, a few of whom are women, have broad
educational backgrounds and experience. About one-third of Shin Beth
officers are assigned abroad early in their careers as security officers
where they come under the operational and administrative control of
Mossad. Upon return to Israel from foreign assignment, Shin Beth
officers revert to the internal security service. Because senior Mossad
and Shin Beth officers are given identical training in a combined
advanced operational school, their modus operandi is similar.
There is a certain amount of personnel exchange among the
services. Shin Beth may accept an army major or colonel on temporary
assignment or recruit a retiring officer on a permanent basis. All
recruits are subject to a thorough background security investigation
culminating in a physical examination, polygraph tests, and psychiatric
screening. Security checks on native born Israelis are relatively easy
to do, for the young Israeli, whose life is well documented, rarely
enjoys the luxury of privacy. Police files, school records, university
professors, army records, youth movements, political affiliations,
voting records, family history, political persuasions, and friends are
scrutinized. If the applicant is foreign born, detailed immigration
records may reveal pertinent information which can be cross-checked.
Loyalty to Israel is the principal criterion. If the subject was a
Zionist from early youth, he belongs to a special category; if he has
never belonged to the leftist parties, MARAM, MAKI and RAKAH, or to
Herut, a rightist party, his employement opportunities are considerably
enhanced. It is almost impossible for a Jew to disguise his past when he
is once in the hands of the authorities since there are in Israel many
thoroughly reliable persons from every country which has or had a Jewish
community, who can be consulted for information on potential recruits.
The Director of Shin Beth is a civil service Class I officer. He
has an expense and entertainment allowance. There is a rather
insignificant differential between grades which is compensated by fairly
impressive perquisites, including living quarters, transportation and
travel, especially in the senior ranks.
4. Methods of Operation
Shin Beth operations within Israel can be broken down into the four
following categories: against foreigners in general, against Arabs,
against Communists, and against Israelis. There appears to be little
difference in the application of techniques, but a greater [sic] deal in
intensity, much of which is directed against the Arabs.
The activities and opinions of diplomats both witin and outside
their diplomatic establishments in Israel are of primary interest to
Shin Beth. Generally, the Israeli Government tends to regard diplomats
as being there to ferret information rather than to promote cordial
relations.
The degree of suspicion and intensity of operations against
diplomats is conditioned by the prevailing relations between countries
and their long-term diplomatic objectives. Shin Beth operations with the
police and Military Intelligence are well coordinated. The Israeli
police work very closely with Shin Beth in guarding foreign
installations such as embassies and consulates, and in surveilling
diplomats, foreign journalists, and tourists of special interest. Police
officers maintain a 24-hour watch in front of all embassies, legations,
consulates, and ambassadorial residences. They record the comings and
goings of foreign personnel, especially diplomatic officers who appear
after regular office hours or on weekends. They also record the license
numbers of vehicles in which the officers arrive and depart. Diplomatic
license plates differ in color from civilian plates and carry a
numerical prefix which identifies the country represented.
The security of the border areas and the occupied territories is
mainly the responsibility of Military Intelligence, the Border guard and
Shin Beth. Through the use of informants, who may be local Arabs or
Oriental Jews posing as Arabs, Shin Beth has penetrated subversive Arab
elements including communist cells and Arab nationalist groups. They
have also picked up local Arab espionage agents on their way back to
neighboring countries and doubled them in coordination with Military
Intelligence. Shin Beth is continually active in the fight against
terrorism.
Aside from the Arab target, Shin Beth is primarily concerned with
the subversive elements of the left. MAKI and RAKAH owe their
allegiance to the USSR but being legal parties, they have had
representatives in the Knesset. Shin Beth has thoroughly penetrated the
cells of the Communist apparatus, following its activities through
informants, surveillance, and technical operations. Shin Beth agents
attend many international Communist front meetings.
Since all foreigners, regardless of nationality or religion,
including Jews, are considered potential threats to the State of Israel,
Shin Beth employs a large number of informants among local Israelis who
are in contact with foreigners by reason of their employment or
activities. In this category are bartenders, hotel clerks, telephone
operators, secretaries, taxi drivers, caterers, maids, prostitutes,
chauffeurs, and waiters. It also includes trade unionists, scientists,
and others in the educational field.
There is an Israeli law that authorizes the police and the
security services to pick up and detain for questioning any Israeli
citizen who is in contact with foreigners without official persmission
or obvious reason such as employment or business. Since diplomats are
subject to surveillance, Shin Beth soon becomes aware of their contacts
with Israeli citizens. When a pattern develops, and suspicion is
aroused, attempts are made to develop further information using wire
tapping and other technical aids. It is not uncommon for representatives
of Shin Beth to call on the Israeli and attempt to enlist his
cooperation. If the individual refuses, the penal Revision Law (State
Security) is cited to him and he is threatened with dire consequences.
This usually evokes compliance. The Isaeli security authorities also
seek evidence of illicit love affairs which can be used as leverage to
enlist cooperation. In one instance, Shin Beth tried to penetrate the US
Consulate General in Jerusalem through a clerical employee who was
having an affair with a Jerusalem girl. They rigged a fake abortion case
against the employee in an unsuccessful effort to recruit him. Before
this attempt at blackmail, they had tried to get the Israeli girl to
elicit information from her boyfriend.
Two other important targets in Israel are the US Embassy in Tel
Aviv and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) with
headquarters in Jerusalem. There have been two or three crude efforts to
recruit Marine guards for monetary reward. In the cases affecting UNTSO
personnel, the operations involved intimidation and blackmail.
In 1954, a hidden microphone planted by the Israelis was
discovered in the Office of the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv. In 1956,
telephone taps were found connected to two telephones in the residence
of the US military attache. In 1960, a microphone was discovered behind
the wall plaster in what had been the office of the Operations Officer
in the Jordan Israel Mixed Armistice Commission Office.
Recently, the Director of the Shin Beth, in testimony before a
judicial committee of the Knesset, stated that Shin Beth makes entries
and taps telephones in Israel with some frequency. Reportedly, the only
concern of the committee members was with the disposition by Shin Beth
of acquired information which did not bear on national security. It is
noted that these activities have no basis in law and are conducted on
the authority of the Director of Shin Beth alone.
The Israelis have shown themselves to be most adept at
surveillance and surreptitious entry operations. Men and women
frequently are used together on surveillance teams in order to allay
suspicion. If a person under surveillance stops to use a public
telephone, the surveillance team reports the situation to the control
center which immediately notifies the telephone tapping unit and an
attempt is made to intercept the call. The conversation or pertinent
information is then related to the team on street. Shin Beth personnel
are experts at entering private quarters where they go through visitors'
luggage and personal papers. Special portable camera equipment is used
for this purpose and the results are processed in the Shin Beth
laboratory. Shin beth technicians have concealed radio transmitters in
phonograph cases, in the false bottoms of coffee cans, and in the
bottoms of portable cooking stoves which can be used as stoves without
removing the communication equipment.
D. Military Intelligence
1. Functions
Military intelligence is charged with the collection, production and
dissemination of military, geographic and economic intelligence,
especially on the Arab nations, and security in the Defense Forces and
Administered Territories. This component is an element of the Israeli
Ministry of Defense and a part of the Defense Forces General Staff. The
Director of Military Intelligence (DMT) is a member of Va'adat. Although
Air Force and Navy Intelligence officers are subordinate to their
respective commanders, they are members of the DMI's staff and attend
his staff meetings.
2. Organization
Military Intelligence headquarters consist of the following
departments: (1) Production; (2) the Intelligence Corps; (3) Foreign
Relations; and (4) Field Security and Military Censorship. The DMI also
directs Field Security Units, Territorial Command Combat Intelligence
and Air Force and Navy Intelligence through coordination with their
respective area commanders (
Figure 7).
The Production Department is responsible for preparing the
national intelligence estimates (versions of which appear as the Middle
East Review or Survey for distribution to friendly liaison services).
This department also produces daily finished intelligence reports and
daily bulletins, which contains [sic] raw or partially analyzed
information. Estimates are now prepared by Military Intelligence, Mossad
and the Research and Planning Center of the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs. The Production Department has about 40 percent (approximately
2,800) of the personnel of Military Intelligence. About 600, of whom 150
are officers and analysts, are involved in intelligence production. The
number of analysts, however, varies as specialists are coopted by the
department for special studies in technical and economic matters. This
department is under the command of a deputy director of Military
Intelligence.
The Production Department is divided into the following units (1)
Geographical (or Regional) Division; (2) Functional (or Technical)
Division and (3) Documentation (or Registry and Records) Division. The
Geographical Division evaluates information and compiles target studies
on the Arab countries. It is divided into three area desks: the Western,
consisting of Egypt, Sudan and Libya; the Eastern, consisting of Iraq,
Syria and Lebanon, and the Southern, consisting of Jordan and the
Arabian Peninsula. Every effort is made in this division to create the
narrowest type of specialist — a man who can devote himself to his
material for over a period of years. For example, in the middle 1960s
the Jordanian Desk Chief had held his job for 15 years and probably knew
more about the Jordanian military than most Jordanian Army officers.
The Functional Division is broken down into substantive units
which deal with such subjects as Near Eastern economics, inter-Arab
relations, Palestinian affairs and international activities in the Near
East. The division produces intelligence on technical and economic
matters, including weapons and electronics and production, and area
developments. The unit draws heavily on the knowledge of the IDF
technical services. There is close cooperation between the geographical
and functional divisions in producing accurate and timely intelligence.
The existence of a desk concerned with international activities in the
Near East, including Soviet affairs, indicates that the functional
division deals with the policies of other nations as they affect the
area.
The Documentation Division actually employs over half of the
personnel in the Production Department. All reports are sent first to
this component, which keeps a permanent record copy and numbers, cards,
indexes and cross-references documents as necessary. It then forwards
copies to appropriate offices. The Documentation Division reportedly has
now installed computers to aid in the dissemination and research
support process. The registry component of this unit services the entire
Military Intelligence establishment. This Division is the repository
for all Military Intelligence reports and publication and is responsible
for the dissemination of finished intelligence and also supervises the
intelligence operations center, which operates 24 hours a day. This
center is the terminal for all direct access field communications and
presumably is designed to provide rapid review and dissemination of
information in a crisis situation.
The Intelligence corps is responsible for overt and covert
collection operations, including all signal intelligence activities for
the Israeli intelligence community, and for operational support
functions. The Corps is subordinate to the DMI and is under the command
of the Chief intelligence Officer. This unit consists of a large
headquarters staff which supervises subordinate operational field
elements. Although it has no authority over area command assets, the
Corps may levy requirements on these field elements. The Corps
supervises the use of technical devices in operations. All requirements
levied on the Corps must be validated by the Deputy Director of Military
Intelligence.
The Corps is broken down into the following divisions: (1)
Collection, responsible for signals intelligence, agent operations,
overt sources and long distance obeservation units; (2) General
Headquarters which is in charge of the military intelligence school, the
Technical Development Institute, communications and cartography; (3)
Training; (4) Organization, Logistics and Personnel; and (5) Research
and Development.
The signals branch of the collection Division, which includes
communications and electronic intelligence and landline operations,
collects communications intelligence for the entire intelligence and
security community. The actual collection operation is performed by the
IDF Signal Corps. The Israeli Air Force also participates and maintains
liaison with other service components on electronic warfare. The
Israelis have been very successful in their COMINT and ELINT operations
against the Arabs. During the Six-Day War in 1967 the Israelis succeeded
in intercepting, breaking and disseminating a tremendous volume of Arab
traffic quickly and accurately, including a high level conversation
between the late President Gamal Abd-Nasser of the UAR and King Hussein
of Jordan. Over the years the Israelis have mounted cross-border
operations and tapped Arab landline communications for extended periods.
The Israelis have also on occasion boobytrapped the landlines.
The Agents Branch is in charge of all agent operations run by
Military Intelligence. The Branch is not permitted to run agent
operations abroad but it has sole jurisdiction over agent operations
across the borders of Israel into neighboring states. The Agents Branch
has executive authority over Shin Beth operations which are run against
the intelligence service of a neighboring Arab State. Egypt and Syria
are the prime operational targets. The Interrogation Unit of the Agents
Branch controls POW interrogation teams which are especially trained and
prepared to accompany any major IDF military operation beyond the
ceasefire lines. These teams are keystones in Military Intelligence
tactical operations. Interrogators use a variety of deception techniques
in questioning prisoners. Although prisoners are usually treated well,
interrogators may give the initial impression that other prisoners have
been mistreated or even executed for failure to cooperate.
Arabic-speaking IDF interrogators sometimes pose as Arab officers and
circulate among prisoners to elicit information. These techniques
usually produce a large quantity of information from captured enemy
personnel.
The Open Sources Division collects and collates all material from
overt sources. This component, however, does not evaluate the
information.
The Long Distance Observation Units are primarily concerned with
visual sightings of Arab activity along the borders and armistice lines.
These units also provide support to agent cross-border operations and
leads to signal intelligence units based on observations of Arab
movements across the borders.
The General Headquarters Division runs the Military Intelligence
School and the Technical Development Institute and is in charge of
communications and cartography. DMI has the largest technical capability
of any of the Israeli intelligence services. It has a highly competent
RD&E component which produces equipment needed for military
intelligence operations. Because it is the largest, and at one time the
only, engineering shop in the Israeli intelligence community, it takes
on some projects from other services.
The Communications Branch handles all matters involving wireless
communication for agent operations. Officials in this branch train agent
operators, draw up signal plans, and maintain radio contact with agents
in place. From time to time this branch also provides support for
Mossad and Shin Beth.
The Cartographic Branch has responsibility for map production and
works in close cooperation with the Director of the Survey Department
in the Ministry of Labor. There are approximately 300 personnel assigned
to the Map Survey Office (Survey of Israel). Offices are located near
the intersection of Lincoln and Yehuda Halevi streets in Tel Aviv.
The Training Division is responsible for the intelligence
doctrine taught in the Military Intelligence School and in troop units.
It has evidently absorbed the training responsibilities of Field
Security and Combat Intelligence units. The Military Intelligence School
curriculum includes combat intelligence, strategic intelligence and
"special studies." The school may provide some training for personnel of
other Israeli intelligence and security services.
The Organization, Logistics and Personnel Division is responsible
for administrative tasks. The head of this division functions as the
DMI's designee on all logistical and personnel matters. The division
consists of three components: Logistics, Personnel and Finance.
The Research and Development Division is primarily concerned with
computer operations and programming in support of Military Intelligence
production, operations and requirements.
The Foreign Relations Department is responsible for liaison
between the IDF and foreign military organizations and for Israeli
Defense Attache affairs. This department is reportedly divided into two
companies: the Foreign Intelligence Liaison Division and the Attaches'
Division. The Foreign Intelligence Liaison Division conducts liaison
with representatives of foreign intelligence services which have
agreements with Military Intelligence. This division also has control
over visits by officers and training of troops from foreign countries in
Israel. Foreign Intelligence Liaison is also the official point of
contact for all foreign defense attaches in Israel. Activities such as
visits to installations, exchanges of routine information, briefing
sessions, etc. must first be cleared with Field Security and submitted
to the DMI for a policy decision, if necessary. Attaches accredited or
otherwise working in Israel on intelligence matters can expect to
receive select information concerning other Near East and foreign
nations within perimeters set by the DMI, thus an attache seeking
information on specific questions of Israeli capabilities and materials
would receive the data through this division. It is considered a
"violation" of IDF "unwritten" policy for foreign military personnel in
Israel to collect this type of information in any other way. In the
past, Military Intelligence has provided much information on technical
equipment supplied to other Middle East nations by the Soviet Bloc. This
was especially true in the wake of the Arab-Israeli War in 1967, when
the Israelis captured vast quantities of Soviet material from the Arabs.
It is believed that Foreign Intelligence Liaison may be divided into at
least two components: General Intelligence and Technical Intelligence.
Within or attached to the Foreign Intelligence Liaison division
is a Secret Liaison unit which handles all operations outside the normal
charter of activities previously described. This unit may be involved
either directly or indirectly in bilateral intelligence operations
conducted by Military Intelligence with other services. Thus when a
special relationship between a foreign military establishment and the
IDF is arranged, this unit supplies the officers and controls the
activities. This unit was involved in the excellent liaison relationship
which at one time existed with France. Further, if Mossad decides that
an Israeli military officer is in the best position to carry out a
specific foreign operation, this unit will handle the matter. Operations
controlled from this office in all cases are coordinated with Mossad.
The Foreign Relations Department directs the activities of
Israeli ministry of Defense Missions and Defense Attaches abroad through
the Attaches' Division. Ministry of Defense Missions and Israeli
Defense Attaches are located in Washington, New York City, London,
Paris, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Ankara, Teheran, Bangkok, Buenos Aires,
Tokyo, Brasilia and Caracas. Several of these attaches are also
accredited to adjacent countries. The true role of most defense missions
and attache posts is to sell Israeli defense industry products and
purchase defense equipment for the IDF. There are few posts which are
actually attache offices in the traditional sense, the principal ones
being in Washington, London, and Paris. Israeli defense attaches abroad
advise their respective ambassadors, report on host country military
matters, keep abreast of all research and development in the host
country and in general, represent the IDF abroad. Attaches also do
operational support work for Mossad. Israeli military missions have been
sent to some countries for training and support purposes, but those
missions have not been officially accredited to the country concerned.
The Field Security and Military Censorship Department is
responsible for counterintelligence within the IDF, and conducts
physical and personnel security investigations. Field Security is also
responsible for security clearances of all personnel assigned to
Military Intelligence. This Department conducts daily liaison with Shin
Beth, which is responsible for IDF reserve personnel on inactive status
and has final responsibility in counterintelligence and security cases.
In the middle 1960s the Security Department included a Personnel
Security Division to assign personnel, supervise and coordinate
clearances and conduct surveillance. A Counterintelligence Division had
the responsibility of ensuring security regarding communications,
documents and installations. An Education and Training Division was
responsible for troop security indoctrination. A computerized document
checking office was set up in the early 1960s to control distribution
and disposal of all Top Secret documents originating within the IDF. The
field Security Department coordinates and monitors the activities of
Field Security units attached to the IDF territorial commands to
maintain order. Each territorial commander is responsible for security
in his area and uses Field Security units to preserve law and order.
Israel is divided into Northern, Central and Southern commands plus the
Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa districts. Both Tel Aviv District and the
Central Command, also located there, are separate from IDF General
Headquarters which is located in Tel Aviv. The Gaza Strip, although not
contiguous to the Central Command, has been placed under that Command
because pacification and antiterrorist operations in the past few years
have succeeded in bringing relative stability to the area. Sinai is
under the Southern Command, which has two Field Security units. In the
mid-1960s the Northern Command has three Field Security units.
Field Security officers serve in the territorial commands where
they direct the activities of various Field Security units and serve as
points of contact for the Commands Security Departments and the
territorial commanders. Field Security units are responsible for
implementing and supervising security directives, including
instructions, guidance and inspections. In the Administered Territories,
Field Security units cooperate with Shin Beth and the Border Guard to
preserve security, combat terrorism and run counterintelligence
operations. At brigade level in the three area commands, Field Security
has military intelligence majors serving as security officers (and known
as such) under the command of the Operations Section (G-3). Security
officers at battalion and company level are "coopted" from the infantry
but are known as security officers only to unit commanders on the
battalion level. At the company level, security personnel are sergeants.
The Military Censorship Office within the Field Security and
Military Censorship Department is responsible for all censorship. In
addition this component, by law, has extremely wide powers in dealing
with the Israeli press and other mass media. In practice, the IDF has
found it advisable to operate on a gentleman's agreement basis and
depend largely on the good intentions of editors and the like to refrain
from publishing stories about Israeli military secrets. This office
operates on behalf of the entire IDF. Directors of Military Intelligence
in the past have referred to Military Censorship as part of the
"ballast" that they would prefer to see in the Chief of Staff's own
office. The Chief of the Censorship Office is a member of the "Committee
of Three" which acts as a Board of Appeal and final arbiter in all
matters relating to censorship. The two other members are a
representative of the press and a representative of the public at large.
The last named must be agreed upon by both other parties. In effect all
information is broken down into three categories: (1) items that are
permitted without question, (2) items that are not permitted under any
circumstances, and (3) items that must be cleared before publication.
Blank spaces are found only infrequently in the press owing to a
regulation which forbids this practice; for example, an entire page must
be reset if a single item must be withdrawn from publication. All IDF
publications and press releases must be coordinated with and approved by
the Censorship Office. All information media, foreign and domestic,
must submit any item having a security or significant political
implication to the Censorship Office prior to its release. Most press
organizations have a teletype link with the IDF to expedite this
process; others must handcarry their items to the office. In the
mid-1960s, this office was staffed largely by female soldiers.
The Censorship Office is in charge of monitoring outgoing
communications from Israel to ensure that no information of military
value is transmitted. If the monitor hears a discussion involving
matters of military importance, he will cut off the conversation. On one
occasion a monitor reportedly listened in on a private conversation and
reported gleefully to his colleagues in the room what he heard. The
monitor was fired on the spot. Monitoring activity concentrates largely
on international telephone calls from foreign media personnel in Israel
to their home offices abroad.
The Public Relations Office of Military Censorship has
responsiblity for all IDF press releases and all official contacts with
the public. The Office handles relations with the press and the public
in coordination with the Censorship Office. The Office also hosts
foreign defense attaches in Israel in conjunction with the Foreign
Intelligence Liaison Division. As in the case of the Censorship Office,
Directors of Military Intelligence would prefer to see the Public
Relations Office directly under the command of the Chief of Staff.
The intelligence process within Military Intelligence operates
largely by means of three regularly scheduled meetings of the key
intelligence officers. First, there is a meeting twice a week or every
three days at which the Director of the Production Department holds a
briefing for the DMI and other top officers. Depending on the nature of
the intelligence discussed, other production officers may also be
present. On the basis of this meeting, the DMI issues instructions for
action or levies requirements for information to the assembled staff
officers. One half day after each of these biweekly meetings, the
directors of Production and the Intelligence Corps meet to work out
detailed planning and tactics on what each should do to follow up the
DMI's broad directives. Immediately after this, the director of the
Intelligence Corps gathers together his own division chiefs and gives
them guidelines for carrying out their immediate responsibilities. The
liaison officer assigned to Mossad sits in on this meeting.
The DMI is always given finished intelligence. Individual items
are summarized in not more than half a page and broken down into three
paragraphs: (1) the facts; (2) comments; and (3) evaluation. These are
put together on a "reading board" for selected top Israeli Government
officials with appropriate marginal comments from the DMI. There are in
addition daily, weekly, and monthly intelligence summaries which are
designed to provide a continuing insight into the development of events
or trends of interest to the government. These summaries, together with
spot reports on separate items, fulfill much of the DMI's
responsiblities as the Prime Minister's staff officer for intelligence.
The Production Department may also generate special research or "think"
pieces. Special reports are also written in response to requirements
levied by Israeli agencies other than military intelligence.
One of the DMI's most important functions is to present the
annual intelligence estimate during the latter part of December. While a
precis is drawn up beforehand, the presentation is oral and is attended
by senior government officials headed by the Prime Minister. The DMI
uses the weekly summaries to a great extent in preparing his material.
At the end of his formal remarks, the DMI opens the floor to questions.
The minutes of the meeting are then put into finished form and
circulated to key government officers on a need-to-know basis.
The DMI's major aid in doing his job is a progress report drawn
up every three months by each of his department directors. He also reads
raw intelligence reports from time to time for the purpose of getting
the actual flavor of information presented to him in the special item
reports or to evaluate the usefulness or nature of agent operations.
Although the DMI has an elaborate computer capability to assist
in collating information, there is a need for more effective automatic
data-processing equipment for the storage and retrieval of information.
The DMI assigns intelligence officers to the three Area Commands,
where they are attached to the various intelligence staffs down to
brigade level. Territorial commanders direct the collection of
intelligence in their geographical areas and for some distance across
the border. The Northern Command is responsible for operations against
Lebanon and Syria while the Central Command controls operations against
Jordan, Egypt and perhaps Saudi Arabia. Information is collected through
border observation, reconnaissance patrols and cross-border operations.
Air Force and Navy Intelligence are small, highly specialized
units concentrating on items of immediate concern to only the Air Force
and Navy commands. The Directors of Air Force and Navy Intelligence
attend the staff meetings of the DMI. Officers from each of these
services are detailed to attend the regular meetings of the Research
Department in order to coordinate reporting responsibility. Officers
from both services are also permanently assigned to the Collection
Department to coordinate requirements which are of particular concern to
them.
2a. Air Force Intelligence
Israeli Air Force Intelligence is a relatively small but efficient
organization. Its main functions are to conduct intelligence operations
necessary to support air activities and to coordinate with the DMI
regarding its collection efforts. Air Force intelligence is concerned
almost exclusively with Arab air order of battle and the collection of
Arab serial target data. This information is largely collected by aerial
reconnaissance and SIGINT, with supplementary information provided by
agent reports and prisoner interrogations in hot war situations. The IDF
relies heavily on photoreconnaissance for order of battle information.
The Air Force has two photointerpretation facilities, but probably does
not have more than 20 imagery interpreters. In 1970, all Air Force
Intelligence facilities were permanent, although the Israelis planned to
acquire several mobile facilities. While Air Force Intelligence does
not produce estimates, it does prepare intelligence studies on air order
of battle, threats and capabilies. The Air Force administers its own
attaches abroad.
Air force procedures for handling imagery intelligence are highly
centralized yet flexible. Israeli photoreconnaissance capabilities,
however, are limited. Photgraphic coverage is not possible below 7,000
feet, and camera systems are not capable of revealing, for example,
whether SAM (surface to air missile) sites are occupied. Additionally,
Air Force photolaboratory quality control is almost nonexistent. Air
Force Intelligence, despite its high standards, did not have enough
imagery interpreters at the time of the Yom Kippur War and the overall
skill level of those few was rather low.
2b. Naval Intelligence
Naval Intelligence is a small, centralized service of approximately
110 people operating in support of Navy units. Most of the personnel are
located in the Navy headquarters building in Tel Aviv. The service
deals mostly with naval order of battle, foreign capabilities and
seaborne threats. Naval Intelligence operates as a semiautonomous unit
of Military Intelligence and is not obliged to provide personnel at the
national intelligence level. Naval Intelligence personnel are not
subordinate to the DMI except to give consultative assistance in naval
matters. In the table of organization, the Director of Naval
Intelligence falls under the Officer Commanding the Navy for operational
and reporting matters and supports the top navy commands. The service
is patterned after the Military Intelligence structure but is geared for
the requirements and scope of navy functions and missions. The
organization has a deputy director and Collection, Targeting, Production
(Research) and Security Departments. It assigns officers to the naval
bases at Haifa, Ashdod, Elat, Sharm el Shaykh and a commando unit based
in southern Sinai. There is also a Protocol Department, which deals with
foreign naval attaches in Israel, and a small organization and
administration department (
Figure 8).
The Collection Department, with about 17 personnel, is one of the
smaller components in the Naval Intelligence structure. It has few
integral operational resources and support for most of its collection
efforts must come from or be coordinated through the DMI. Exceptions to
this arrangement are Collection Department control of Israeli naval
attache activities abroad, small boat coastal operations, COMINT, ELINT
and aerial reconnaissance in cooperation with Air Force Intelligence,
and a merchant marine program. The post-World War II Israeli endeavor in
clandestine arms procurement and illegal immigration developed
important commercial and shipping contacts, some of which may still be
handled by or at least coordinated with Naval Intelligence.
The Targeting Department, with about 20 personnel, is divided
into two divisions: Syria/Lebanon and Egypt/North Africa. These
divisions are responsible for (1) preparing coastal studies for naval
gunfire missions; (2) preparing beach studies for amphibious assualts;
(3) preparing special target studies to support commando operations; and
(4) preparing and maintaining target folder [sic] on Lebanese, Syrian
and Egyptian ports. The Department has access to all sources of
information available to the DMI. In addition to levying requirements
for collection on the Military Intelligence Collection Department, the
Director of Naval Intelligence is on regular distribution for
information obtained by the DMI related to naval affairs.
The Production Department, with a staff of about 40, is the
largest component of Naval Intelligence. This unit is divided into two
divisions: (1) Arab Navies; and (2) the Soviet Navy. The Production
Department handles research, analysis, production and dissemination of
information on all mobile forces associated with Arab navies and the
Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean. This component is the primary user of
all source material which flows into the Naval headquarters, especially
SIGINT information. The work of this department is mainly in support of
units operating out of the four naval bases and the commando unit in
southern Sinai. Production is limited largely to studies on enemy order
of battle and special weapons. Those studies and others, including
target folders, identification manuals and enemy tactics outlines, are
disseminated to operational commanders and crews through the base
intelligence officers. The base intelligence officer disseminates such
information by briefing crews or updating a ship's intelligence library
through additions, updates and changes.
The Security Department, which has a staff of about 12, performs a
limited counterintelligence function within Navy headquarters at all
naval bases. Security Department personnel are navy officers and
enlisted men who have been specially trained by the Field Security
Department of Military Intelligence. They perform basic
countersubversion and countersabotage tasks at headquarters and at
subordinate bases. They do not, however, carry out base security or
personnel investigations, which are done by Military Intelligence Field
Security units.
The Organization and Administration Department with about six
personnel assigned, provides seccretarial support for the Director of
Naval Intelligence. These personnel handle routine administrative
duties.
Naval Intelligence, although small, is a well-trained and
evidently highly efficient service. Recruiting of personnel into Naval
Intelligence is done by means of a very efficient, informal system which
identifies individuals and matches them to the needs of the Director of
Naval Intelligence. (The system is apparently in force throughout
Israeli military intelligence organizations.) Naval Intelligence officer
personnel are recruited through several different channels. Most
younger junior officers enter directly from the universities while
others transfer within the navy from naval operations units to the
intelligence service. A third souce is enlisted personnel who have
displayed the necessary qualities and have indicated an interest in
following a career in naval intelligence. Once identified, such people
are sent to a university at Navy expense. Upon completion of their
training they are commissioned and pursue careers in Naval Intelligence.
Israeli Navy enlisted personnel, both male and female, are mostly
volunteers who have been screened by the Director of Naval Intelligence.
The Naval Intelligence women serve 20 months, while the men serve 36
months.
There are no special naval intelligence schools in Israel, and
naval intelligence officers and key enlisted personnel are trained at
the Military Intelligence School. In general women receive only
on-the-job training; however, if a woman shows an interest in a naval
intelligence career, she will be enrolled in the enlisted course of the
Military Intelligence School. Naval Intelligence enlisted men attend an
abbreviated course, enrollment in an expanded course depending on
motivation and intended utilization. There appears to be very little
problem with the retention of naval intelligence personnel. The primary
constraint on the Director of Naval Intelligence is the total number
(officer and enlisted) of slots assigned. The centralized system
combined with primary area of intelligence interest lends itself very
well to the Naval Intelligence personnel structure. The close knit
intelligence support system also works well considering the lack of
integral collection assets.
Intelligence, prior to and during the Yom Kippur War, was
received in the Operations Center at Naval headquarters. During the war,
the director of Naval Intelligence worked very closely with the Officer
Commanding the Navy in the Center during ongoing operations.
Information from SIGINT and other sources was received in the Center as
raw data. Correlation of all information was then done on the spot by
the Chief of Naval Intelligence and passed on to the Officer Commanding
the Navy. The information was disseminated in the form of orders or
reports to operational commanders and units. Processing and
dissemination of naval intelligence was accomplished in a highly
professional manner with no major deficiencies or Arab naval surprises
in the Yom Kippur War. Naval Intelligence also revealed a built-in
flexibility when the service shifted quickly to a hot war situation and
handled support for active naval opeartations including shore
bombardment missions. One major area where Naval Intelligence has
problems is the limited number of personnel. In case of continuous
operations, similar to the Yom Kippur War, quality naval intelligence
work would probably degenerate after a month of steady operations.
3. Administrative practices of the Directorate of Military Intelligence
There are approximately 450 officers plus a larger number of NCOs,
enlisted personnel and civilian clerical peronnel in the DMI. The
service has priority in the selection of qualified military personnel
for intelligence assignments. Military Intelligence prefers to bring
individuals into intelligence work while they are young and move them
upwards as they acquire experience and can assume greater responsiblity.
Recruiters seek promising young people who are studying foreign
languages or other subjects of interest to the service in secondary
school. Prior to graduation, Military Intelligence officers contact
selected young students — males and females — and offer them positions
as interpreters during the two years of compulsory military service
which follows at the completion of secondary education. Those who accept
are assigned to Military Intelligence when they join the IDF. Promising
young army personnel are then sent to the Military Intelligence School,
following which they may be commissioned and assigned as assistants to
intelligence officers in the field. When they attain the rank of
captain, having served as intelligence officers, some are assigned to an
area command headquarters or to the Directorate of Military
Intelligence to expand their experience and qualify them for more
responsiblity and eventual promotion to higher rank. Thus, many of the
officers now serving with Military Intelligence entered as young men and
moved up through the ranks.
Most Military Intelligence personnel are regulars, not reservists
because the IDF requires career intelligence officers. All personnel,
including conscripts, join Military Intelligence voluntarily. Female
enlisted members, who often serve as translators, usually serve only 20
months whereas male enlisted personnel serve 36 months.
Military Intelligence training is professional and extensive.
Officers and analysts are well-trained and competent in their fields.
The Military Intelligence School is located north of Tel Aviv on the
road to Sde Dov airport. This school trains both officers and
noncommissioned officers. Approximately 150 instructors and 90 support
personnel train between 2,000 and 3,000 students annually. The school's
usual course runs from September through February. This arrangement has
been made to take advantage of new groups of high school graduates. This
center is a relatively new facility which was established in the late
1960s. It was formerly part of the IDF Infantry School.
The commander of the Military Intelligence School is responsible
to the DMI for intelligence instruction and to the Intelligence Corps
for training in general. Course content is the responsiblity of the DMI.
The training staff supervises training aids and instruction methods.
A Combat Intelligence Branch provides instruction for operational
personnel and a General Subjects Branch trains specialists. The General
Subjects Branch, for example, teaches courses in field security,
censorship, military drafting, photo interpretation, research for order
of battle analysis, collection and serial observation. Other special
courses are taught as needed. Field Security counterintelligence
personnel, Air Force and Navy students also take courses at the Military
Intelligence School and Military Intelligence instructors are
responsible to the DMI for intelligence training at the schools of other
IDF branches. They are charged by the DMI for quality of intelligence
teaching. These instructors usually have wartime assignments with
tactical units. Military Intelligence personnel staff intelligence
positions down through brigade level; line officers with intelligence
training at the Infantry school staff the lower echelons.
Field Security personnel are selected on the basis of strict
criteria regarding personal security and loyalty to Zionism and the
Israeli State. They are trained by Shin Beth.
In general, Military Intelligence, although it has a good
training program and tries to offer career inducements, has difficulty
in retaining competent personnel because of low wages and slim
opportunities for advancement.
4. Methods of operation
Military Intelligence is responsible for cross-border operations into
the neighboring Arab states. Its operations rely heavily on the
exploitation of Arabs within Israeli and the Administered Territories;
Arab students, who though residents of Israel, attend universities in
the Arab nations; Arab travelers and visitors, Arabs in Israeli prisons;
and Arab military deserters, defectors, Bedouins and smugglers.
Military Intelligence collection requirements cover political and
economic subjects as well as military information and uses the
information acquired both for policy making purposes and as basic
intelligence. Military Intelligence is also active in collecting
information from sources outside Israeli terrorist and subversive
organizations and activities. Although SIGINT sources acquire some
information on these subjects, Military Intelligence officers believe
that only agent sources can really obtain the data needed on various
terrorist groups policies and plans, methods of operation, equipment,
training and relations with other groups. Primary Israeli interest in
terrorism is to obtain early warning of impending operations.
In each regional area of Israel, local citizens, in some cases
Arabs, who are Israeli agents, act as spotters for Military
Intelligence. Most of these spotters have long worked for Military
Intelligence, which alerts them to the type of sources desired. Once a
spotter has reported a potential source, he steps aside and leaves the
rest to Military Intelligence officers. Military Intelligence contacts
the potential source, assesses him and, if appropriate, attempts to
recruit him as an agent. This is described as the "direct method" of
recruiting agents for Military Intelligence. The "indirect method"
refers to recruiting sources by or through agents outside Israel. Both
Field Security and the police investigate the backgrounds of potential
agents for Military Intelligence.
The motives of the spotters and local support people are either
monetary or a desire for services in the form of aid in reuniting
families or representation on behalf of the spotter in some problem with
the Israeli Government. The basic agent motivation is generally
economic gain in the form of salaries, loans (which are seldom repaid),
and gifts. Another common incentive is a wish to move to Israel and
rejoin relatives who reside there. In some cases the agent may be a
Palestinian refugee, who believes that he still has a claim to property
in Israel and wants either recompense or a guarantee of the eventual
return of his property. Other agents are members of Arab minority groups
or opponents of Arab regimes.
Military Intelligence officers do have problems in handling Arab
agents, who tend to exaggerate and often fail to report accurate
details. Therefore, the Military Intelligence officers encourage their
Arab agents to provide photographs, maps, and other corroborating
documents. Military Intelligence officers also cross-check reports often
by using other agents in the same region. Despite Israeli warnings
during training, Arab agents tend to tell other members of their family
about their association with Military Intelligence. Occasionally an Arab
agent may recruit all the members of his immediate family as subagents
and try to get his case officer to pay them salaries. The Israelis refer
to these family subagents as "nonfunctionalist." These subagents
sometimes compromise a whole operation as a result of boasting about
their activities. Occasionally the Military Intelligence case officer
will order these unwanted"nonfunctionals" across the border into Israel
for security briefings but Military Intelligence has not solved this
problem completely.
Military Intelligence trains its agents in tradecraft, collection
methods, security and reporting procedures. Military Intelligence runs
its agents in networks or as singletons; the latter are referred to as
"lone wolves." For security reasons, Military Intelligence prefers that
an agent with good access remain a "lone wolf." Agent networks consist
of a primary source and subsources. Military Intelligence does not refer
to sources as such, instead calling both primary and subsource
"agents." Military Intelligence officers try to meet and train each
agent personally on the Israeli side of the border. Networks usually
include a radio operator and in some cases, a courier.
Military Intelligence also communicates with its agents by S/W
letters posted in third countries, by agent radio and by deaddrops.
Military Intelligence operations have been marked by flexibility,
economy in the use of assets and by responsiveness to requirements; the
system worked well prior to the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. Agents
reported early warning information which, in retrospect, contained
reliable indications of a coming Arab attack. Direct communication with
agents, however, virtually ceased during hostilities and what little
agent reporting there was during the war was of limited value to Israeli
Military headquarters and field commanders. The principal problem faced
by Military Intelligence in the acquistition and reporting of
intelligence by agents is the lack of modern equipment. Although many of
the agents have radios (mainly receivers) and cameras, and are familiar
with secret writing, the sophistication level of techniques and
equipment is low. This adversely affects the quality, security and
timeliness of collection operations. Military Intelligence employs a
SIGINT system that is modern, sophisticated and effective.
The DMI is responsible for providing technical support to other
directorates, but the technical services of the various military
intelligence directorates are inferior to the technical groups of Shin
Beth. The DMI's technical equipment, such as that used in audio
surveillance or that employed in work agent support is generally high
although it is less good in some special fields such as miniaturization.
In the use and application of infrared devices, however, the DMI
capability is usually good. Military Intelligence personnel are capable
of making ad hoc modifications of existing equipment and are up to date
on technical advances concerning remote control and activation of
transmitters, and in the field of low-light photography. Military
Intelligence relies heavily on aerial reconnaissance and SIGINT for
timely order of battle information. Aerial reconnaissance is apparently a
primary instrument for locating fedayeen groups, although such
organizations are well penetrated by field agents.
Military Intelligence is capable of providing timely and detailed
information on Israel's primary neighboring enemies through agent
operations that are well planned and highly imaginative.
The main purpose of Military Intelligence Field Security units is
to control the local Arab population in the Administered Territories
and to minimize their participation in terrorism. In this endeavor,
Field Security of the Administered Territories works closely with Shin
Beth and the Border Guard. Residents are required to carry ID cards,
curfews have been imposed, suspected resistors have been detained, and
the houses in the area of persons presumed to know of terrorist
activities have been demolished, even though the inhabitants were not
directly involved. In the early 1970s it was estimated that the Israelis
had some 900 residents of the Administered Territories under
administrative detention. Personnel of Field Security units have carried
out sweeps in searches for terrorists and arms caches through areas in
the West Bank where terrorism has occurred. On some occasions Israeli
operations have taken place at night, apparently intended at least in
part to intimidate the populace.
In December, 1969 the Defense Minister announced that 516
buildings had been demolished in the occupied territories since the 1967
war — 265 in the West Bank, 227 in Gaza and 24 in Jerusalem. While
these Israeli policies and actions have intimidated many Arabs who might
otherwise have engaged in resistance activities or in terrorism, in
many cases they have been counterproductive in that they have aroused
deep and widespread resentment among the residents of the Occupied
Territories. In areas where buildings have been destroyed, an atmosphere
of personal anger and resentment has been added to the natural
bitterness of a defeated people, particularly among the younger Arabs.
5. Relations with other services
There appears at the present time to be a very harmonious
relationship between Military Intelligence and the other Israeli
intelligence and security services. Most Israeli intelligence and
security personnel, especially on the policy and coordination level,
realize that their very national existence depends on an effective and
smoothly functioning intelligence and security community. In addition,
officers at the department chief and even more so at the division chief
level all have known each other personally for a long period of time.
These relationships have been forged during troubled times seldom
experienced by any other nation and now provide a framework for
cooperative teamwork and coordination among the services.
Liaison between Israeli Military Intelligence and foreign
organizations have varied over the years from good to poor, depending on
the exigencies of the situation and the demands of policy. In recent
years the Israelis have provided military and security aid and training
to various African nations, including Ethiopia, Uganda and Zaire. They
have also engaged in military and security training and equipment
exchanges with Latin American and Asian services.
The Israelis have maintained good relations with Turkey and Iran
in military and security matters. While the Israelis do not have full
diplomatic relations with Iran; they have an overt official mission
whose members have diplomatic titles, including that of military
attache.
E. Research and political planning Center
The Research and Political Planning Center, formerly the Research
Division in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, prepares analysis based on
raw intelligence for government policy makers. Its office is located in
a separate fenced compound within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
complex in Jerusalem. A guard at the compound gate prevents unauthorized
entrance into the Center, and photo ID cards are required for
admittance.
The Center presently employs fewer than 100 people, both analysts
and support staff, who were recruited from the Minstry of Foreign
Affairs and Israeli universities. The Center has six divisions: North
Africa; the Fertile Crescent; the Arabian Peninsula; other Geographic
Regions; Economic; and Strategic. Some 70 percent of the Center's
personnel are employed in the three Arab units. The Center prepares its
analyses on the basis of raw intelligence data available to the Israeli
intelligence community. The Center produces short papers on current
intelligence and longer analytical memoranda, as required. The Center's
products are disseminated to all ministries of the government.
The Foreign Minister uses the Center as his personal braintrust
to give hm an independent means of judging the products of Military
Intelligence and Mossad. Although its analyses are sent to Israel's top
decisionmakers, the Center's role in the Israeli intelligence and
security community probably is still a modest one. The Center reportedly
has few problems arising from competition within the community,
probably because of a lack of status in comparison with the established
and larger intelligence and security organizations.
F. The National Police
The Israeli Police Force is a national organization headed by an
Inspector General responsible to the Minister of the Interior. The
national headquarters moved in mid-1969 from Tel Aviv-Yafo to Jerusalem.
The force is comprised of the following departments: (1)
Administration, which is responsible for transport, supplies,
communications, property and finances; (2) Investigations, which is
concerned with criminal and fraud investigations and special tasks in
support of the intelligence and security community; and (3) Operations,
which is in charge of training, patrols and traffic. There are also
personnel, reasearch, planning and development offices. The Prison
Services and the Civil Guard are also part of the Police (
Figure 9).
The force is divided territorially into districts, subdistricts,
zones, police stations, and posts. The three police districts are:
Northern, including Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Southern, including Jerusalem.
Attached to the Haifa subdistrict is a small coast guard or marine
police force, which is based in the port of Haifa and patrols the whole
coastline to prevent smuggling, infiltration, and illegal fishing. This
unit also has patrol craft on Lake Tiberias and at Elat on the Gulf of
Aqaba. The Southern District includes a special unit at Ben Gurion (Lod)
airport (Figures 10 and 11).
A special component of the national police force is the Border
Guard, whose missions are to guard the ceasefire lines against Arab
infiltration and detecting and running down terrorists. It works closely
with the Army and patrols the Administered Territories and the border
area. The Border Guard also trains settlers in defense measures against
infiltrators, and schedules guard duty in border villages. Military
conscripts who elect to fulfill their term of service by joining the
Border guard are the principal sources of new recruits for this
component. The Border Guard, which number about 6,000, is integrated
into the Army in time of war.
The effective strength of the police force (not including the
Border Guard) reached about 12,000 at the end of 1969. Roughly 1,100 of
the police, including 768 Arabs, were employed in the Administered
Territories in 1969. Over half of the police force are Jews of Oriental
background and, in fact, the police force is a branch of government to
which the assignment of Oriental Jews has been particularly encouraged.
The police force is capable of maintaining public order and
safety under normal circumstances. It has, however, been troubled by a
manpower shortage caused by resignations resulting from low pay,
overwork and the attraction of higher paying jobs elsewhere. Despite the
persistent shortage of manpower, police discipline is generally
satisfactory and, in the case of the Border Guard, excellent. The public
attitude toward the police has improved since the early days of
statehood, despite scandals involving smuggling and the acceptance of
bribes. The police force has worked hard to overcome the traditional
Jewish fear of police authority stemming from the historic oppression of
Jews. The Israeli Police Force in effect acts as a very important
auxiliary to Shin Beth in the preservation of internal security
throughout the country. The police support Shin Beth in investigations,
by providing cover and making arrests.
G. Key Officials
Achi-Tuv, Avraham
Achi-Tuv became Director of Shin Beth in the summer of 1974. He
is a career security officer. His reputation was established as chief of
Shin Beth's Arab Affairs Department, where he was responsible for
conducting operations in the Administered Territories and within the
Arab community in Israel. He served briefly as Deputy Director of Shin
Beth prior to his appointment as Director. Achi-Tuv is of German
background. He is married and has a daughter. He earned a law degree at
the University of Tel Aviv in the early 1970s while serving in Shin
Beth. He is extremely bright, hard-working, ambitious and thorough. He
is also known to be headstrong, abrasive and arrogant.
Hoffi, Yitzhak
Major General (Ret.) Yitzak Hoffi became Director of Mossad on 1
September 1974. He was born in Tel Aviv on 25 January 1927. He joined
the Haganah in 1944 and commanded a company in the Arab-Israeli War in
1948. He continued to serve in the Israeli Defense Forces in a variety
of command, staff and training posts, including the command of the
Paratroop Brigade. Hoffi was Acting Chief of Staff for a brief period in
April 1974, but retired from the IDF at that time, apparently because
he was not appointed Chief of Staff. Hoffi attended the US Army Command
and General Staff College in the mid-1960s. He has also visited the US
on many occasions. In 1968 he inspected police units and participated in
army exercises in Uganda. He traveled as a tourist to Hawaii, Japan,
Hong Kong, Bangkok and Tehran in 1970 and went to Singapore on
undisclosed business. He inspected Israeli advisory efforts in Ethiopia
in 1972 and also went to other parts of Africa. Although not an
intelligence officer by background or training, Hoffi apparently
demonstrated his flair for intelligence analysis as Commander of the
Northern Command in the days preceding the Yom Kippur War in October
1973 by sensing the impending Syrian attack and requesting the Defense
Minister to reinforce the Golan Heights with an armored brigade. Hoffi
reportedly has expanded Mossad's role in the collection of intelligence
on Arab capabilities and the interpretation of such information.
Hoffi is reserved and quiet but can be warm and genial among
friends. He is married and has two daughters. He speaks English. Neither
as flashy nor as imaginative as some of his predecessors in Mossad, he
is reported to be meticulous and somewhat dour.
Sagi, Yehoshua
General Yehoshua Sagi, born 27 September 1933, Jerusalem,
Palestine (Israel), entered the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) in 1951 and
was commissioned in 1953. >From 1953 to 1964 he served in the
Southern Command, fulfilling field duties. During the Sinai Campaign he
served as an intelligence officer with the 7th Brigade and later as an
assistant intelligence officer, Southern Command. In 1965 he graduated
from the IDF Command and Staff College. Following his graduation he
served as commander of an Intelligence Officer Training Course, and as
an intelligence officer with the Southern Command before returning in
1971 as an instructor with the Command and Staff College. In 1972 he
became commander of the Intelligence School but left in 1973 to become
intelligence officer with the Armored Division, Southern Command. On 19
May 1974 Sagi was appointed Deputy Director, Military Intelligence,
Production and Estimates. On 2 February 1979 he assumed the Directorship
of Military Intelligence. Sagi is soft-spoken, direct and has a
no-nonsense outlook. He considers himself an Arab expert. He is married
and has three daughters. He speaks English.
H. Comments on Principal Sources
1. Source Materials
Most of the information in this publication has been derived from a
variety of sources including covert assets of the Central Intelligence
Agency, publications of the Israeli Government and reports prepared by
the United States Department of Defense. Research was basically
completed in December 1976.
2. Supplementary Overt Publications
- Aldouby, Zwy and Ballinger, Jerold. The Shattered Silence; the Eli Cohen Affair. New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1971.
- Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem. New York: Viking Press, 1963.
- Bar-Zohar, Michel. The Avengers. London: Arthur Barker, 1968.
- Bar-Zohar, Michel. Spies in the Promised Land; Iser Harel and the Israeli Secret Service. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972.
- Ben-Hanan, Elli. Our Man in Damascus. New York: Crown Publishers, 1969.
- Ben-Porat, Y. (Dan, Uri). Secret War. New York: Sabra Books, 1970.
- Ben-Porat, Y. (Dan, Uri). Spy from Israel. New York: Tower Publications, 1969.
- El-Ad, Avri and Creech III, James. Decline of Honor. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1976.
- Eytan, Steve. Repeated Triumphs Scored by Israeli Spy System. Washington: Joint Publications Research Service.
- Harel, Isser. The House on Garibaldi Street; the Capture of Adolph Eichmann. London: A Deutsch, 1975.
- Israel Government Year Book 5735-6 (1975-1976). Jerusalem, 1975.
- Lotz, Johann Wolfgang. The Champagne Spy. New York: Manor Books, 1973.
- Pearlman, Moshe. The Capture of Adolf Eichmann. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961.
- Pickalkiewicz, Janusz. Israel's Langer Arm. Frankfurt (Main): Goverts, 1975.
- Rabin, Jacob. Elie Cohen, L'espion de Damas. Paris: Flammarion, 1967.
- Shlaim, Avi. Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War. Princeton: World Politics, April 1976.
- Tadmar, Joshua. The Silent Warriors. Edited and translated by Raphael Rothstein. Toronto: MacMillan, 1969.
- Tinnin, David B. and Christensen, Dag. The Hit Team. Boston: Little Brown, 1976.
- Who's Who in Israel, 1976. Tel Aviv: Bronfman and Cohen, 1976.
CounterSpy Afterword
Mossad Responds
A number of Israeli officials have reacted sharply to the
Washington Post and
Boston Globe
articles on this document. A government spokesperson called the reports
on Israeli operations against the United States "ridiculous, not worthy
of comment." Intelligence sources quoted in Israeli papers said the CIA
document was a Soviet disinformation effort. The
Jerusalem Post,
quoting unnamed Israeli and American sources, stated that the U.S. had
conducted operations against Israel similar to those the document says
Israel conducted against the U.S.
The most reliable response to the
Post and
Globe articles came from former Mossad chief Isser Harel, who in a
Ma'ariv
interview called the assertions of the document "malicious,"
"dilletantish," "distortions ... but probably authentic." "The report is
one-sided and malicious, it ignores Israel's special position in its
struggle for survival," Harel said. He also complained about the CIA
document's style, calling it anti-Semitic. He told
Ma'ariv it was
"shockingly irresponsible" for the CIA to keep a document like this
"rolling around" in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Altogether, Harel
concluded, publication of the document had been a "nightmare" for him.
This is a reprint of an article originally published
in the magazine CounterSpy in their May-June 1982 issue.
Accordingly,
it seems as if the artillery commanders and IAF pilots that erased
northern Gaza were following Deuteronomy 20:16 as they indeed did “not
leave alive anything that breathes.” And yet, one question is left open.
Why should a secular commander follow Deuteronomy verses or any other
Biblical text?
