Paradigm
Shifting and the Apologetics Debate
By Robert M.
Price
Of late, a new piece of jargon has
intruded itself into discussions of theological and religious language.
The newcomer is the “paradigm.” One may find this concept, borrowed from
the philosophy of science, in theological works as far removed from
each other as Thomas Torrance’s Theological Science and Charles
Kraft's Christianity in Culture. It seems safe to suggest that
the recent currency of this term and its attendant concept is in large
part due to the efforts of Thomas S. Kuhn. Though Kuhn himself is
a philosopher of science, the relevance of his work for other fields
such as theology has become apparent. We would like to suggest the
utility of his theory for the field of evangelical apologetics. More
specifically, his schema of “paradigm-shifting" will be shown to provide
the key for grasping the differences in the evidentialist vs.
presuppositionalist debate in apologetics.
In his The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, Kuhn takes issue with the common conception that
scientific advancement has proceeded mainly by way of "new discoveries.”
In fact, really new data is relatively seldom discovered. Scientific
progress has more to do with scientists coming to formulate new ways of
construing the same old information, new keys to solve the puzzles
presented by the data. One such paradigm will be accepted by scientists
as long as it seems to make plausible sense of most of the evidence.
Only when the paradigm starts to appear inadequate to the task of
explaining this or that phenomenon do scientists begin looking for an
alternative gestalt. The new paradigm will seek to incorporate
much of the explicative power of the old, yet starting from at least a
slightly different point, so as to deal plausibly with more of the
hitherto-troublesome data. When the cogency and comprehensiveness of a
new proffered paradigm becomes evident, a "paradigm- shift" occurs. The
new model for construing the data becomes the basis for the next stage
of theorizing and research. Of course the likelihood is that it, too,
will be superseded in time.
To give a famous example seen through
the lenses provided by Kuhn, we will look at the contest between the
geocentric paradigm of Ptolemy and the heliocentric paradigm of
Copernicus. Ptolemy's model of the planetary system functioned well
enough to predict the motion of the (apparently earth orbiting)
planets, but it ran into trouble when it came to the mysterious
retrograde motion of the planets. In order for the geocentric model to
predict accurately these erratic movements (hitherto considered to be
the "free will" of the planets), Ptolemaic astronomers had to postulate
myriad series of "epicycles,” or wheels within hypothetical wheels on
which the planets turned. Copernicus found that the whole system might
be simplified by postulating that the sun, not the earth, was the center
of planetary orbit. This way all the epicycles disappeared.
Eventually Copernicus’s view became
dominant. It wasn't that Copernicus had somehow “discovered” the earth
to be orbiting the sun instead of the other way around. Such a thing
would have been (and probably still is) incapable of observation.
Rather, he merely formulated a new gestalt for the data which
made its explanation less problematic, more natural, than before. And
this is basically the way all scientific progress comes about, by a
"conversion”1
from one paradigm to another.
But there is an important tension,
often unnoticed, in Kuhn's schema. Are paradigms self-sealing? That is,
do they carry their own criteria of plausibility of explanation? Mustn't
they, if they are truly comprehensive systems for understanding data (so
that only in light of them are the data "data for" anything)? But if
they do, then how is any shift from one paradigm to another ever
possible? In terms of our example, why should Ptolemaists have felt
ashamed of all those epicycles? Given the fundamental postulate,
geocentricity, there could be nothing embarrassing or implausible
about the resulting complexities. Why
should not things be complex? If the paradigm itself carries its own
criteria of plausibility, then any explanation assigned to “problematic”
(or “anomalous”) data must ipso facto be plausible.
But of course, the shift did occur.
This implies that paradigms do not contain within themselves their own
criteria of plausibility. And if they do not, they must be seen as
sub-paradigms, or subsets of a larger, all comprehensive paradigm. This
super-paradigm will be the field of presuppositions in which scientific
thought occurs. It will include criteria by which given sub-paradigms (geocentricity
or heliocentricity, Einsteinian or Newtonian physics, Big Bang or
steady-state cosmologies) can be preferred to one another. Included
among these criteria would probably be something like “economy and
inductivemess of explicability of the data.” Such criteria will be the
arbiters of which paradigm makes “better sense” of the evidence. They
will tell which sense is the “better” sense.
This issue, merely implicit in Kuhn's
discussion, is raised explicitly (albeit in different terminology) in
the long-standing debate between "evidentialist" apologists (Clark
Pinnock, John Warwick Montgomery, Josh McDowell, etc.) on the one hand,
and their "presuppositionalist" rivals (Cornelius Van Til, Gordon Clark,
etc.) on the other. In this context, the issue is that of "common
ground," i.e., does any exist between believers and non-believers?
Evidentialists build their whole enterprise on a positive answer to this
question. Indeed, they say, there can properly be no apologetics at all
unless some commonly-acknowledged criteria exist, whereby the
evangelical position may be rendered probable or compelling to the
fair-minded non-believer. Before examining the presuppositionalist
objection to this belief, let us analyze the evidentialist position
further in the light of Kuhn's categories. In effect, the evidentialists
assume that they and their imagined non-Christian partners in dialogue
both assent to a "super-paradigm" of criteria for plausibility and
explicability. The same kinds of grounds will determine which is the
"better" sense made of the evidence. By their amassing of evidence, what
McDowell, Montgomery, Pinnock, et. al., seek to do is to show that the
secular naturalists' paradigm cannot adequately (plausibly) explain
"anomalous data" like, e.g., the empty tomb. This is the point of the
stock rehearsals of how "no explanation fits the facts of Easter Morning
as well as the Resurrection does." The naturalists' explanations "demand
more faith than the Resurrection itself" (Montgomery)2
That is, the “Swoon theory," the “wrong tomb theory," etc., are like
epicycles. They are implausible. What makes them implausible? A common
set of criteria including the notion that eyewitness reporting is valid,
that crucified but surviving men are not likely to be able to roll away
stones and stagger into Jerusalem, etc. So no matter how much the
skeptic cherishes his naturalistic paradigm, he really should admit its
inadequacy to explain the evidence of Easter Morning. He should convert
his paradigm (and with it, in this case, his eternal destiny).
Presuppositionalists, of whom we may
take Van Til as the paramount example, repudiate this whole approach.
There can be no common ground, he insists, because of the "noetic
effects of the fall.” It is a fundamental mistake to imagine that
(Christ- rejecting) unregenerate persons can perceive enough of the
facts correctly to be led from them (the common ground) to faith in
Christ.3
No, “all things hold together in Him” (Colossians 1:17). Since every
single fact is to be properly construed only in the light of faith in
Christ, then any perception by a Christ-rejecting (or
Christ-blind) person is a misapprehension, even a delusion. Leaving
aside the fact that this is pretty much the same rationale that has led
historically to the branding and treatment of religious dissidents as
insane, we will proceed to develop our interpretation of this view in
Kuhn’s terms. Van Til is essentially arguing that paradigms are
self-sealing. They must carry their own criteria for plausibility within
themselves, so that whatever explanation assigned to a datum is ipso
facto plausible and natural. The apologetical / epistemological
meaning of this is that religious certainty may be achieved only if it
is defined into the system from the start. One can never reason his way
to certain faith in Christ; he may only have certainty if he begins by
defining Christ (the Logos) as the ground of reason. Then by
definition faith in Christ is not only "a reasonable option," it
becomes the only rational option.
The evidentialist approach is
unsatisfactory at least partially because it makes the Christ-Logos
posterior rather than anterior to the reasoning process. In Kuhn's
terms, evidential apologetics makes the evangelical Christian
subparadigm subordinate to the larger paradigm of neutral, common
criteria. And if it does this, then the same bridge from one
sub-paradigm to the
evangelical one, could as easily one day be the bridge to still a third
subparadigm. The facts might lead the Christian elsewhere.
Theoretically, this possibility must be left open. And what kind of
faith-certitude would this be?
Evidentialists like Pinnock reply
that such absolute theoretical certainty is neither available nor
necessary to live any other area of life, so why here? We can have
practical certainty. As Gordon J. Allport observes,
The believer is often closer to the
agnostic than we think. Both, with equal candor, may concede that the
nature of Being cannot be known [with absolute certainty]; but the
believer, banking on a probability. . . finds that the energy engendered
and the values conserved prove the superiority of affirmation over
indecisiveness.4
However, as full of common sense as
the evidentialist position seems to be, the presuppositionalist critique
is still a good one. Acquaintance with the literature of evidentialist
apologetics makes it clear that their religious faith is more certain
than is allowed by their common-ground approach with its inherent
provisionality. For instance, John Warwick Montgomery writes of the
doctrine of the Trinity, "I believe it with all my heart. I believe it
because... it offers the best available ‘construct' or 'model' for
interpreting the biblical descriptions of God as Creator, Redeemer, and
Sanctifier.”5
Can one
appropriately cling to a (mere) "model" or paradigm with "all one's
heart"? Or to put it another way, can anyone reading such a statement
really envision any rival interpretation of the evidence changing
Montgomery's mind? Along the same
lines, it is clear from a reading of much evidentialist literature that
facts have been amassed to buttress beliefs already held on other
grounds, and by willpower.6
A subtle shifting of
ground occurs. The apologist's faith causes him to deem “best" the
reading of the data most in accord with his beliefs, even if it must be
harmonized. But he proceeds to offer this reading to the non-believer as
if it were the best reading of the facts in and of themselves. He
claims to appeal to "common ground!' (e.g., "economy and inductiveness
of explanation") but actually appeals to partisan criteria (e. g.,
"which reading of biblical criticism conforms to evangelical
beliefs?").This results in what James Barr has called "maximal
conservatism,” the serving of a hidden dogmatic agenda.7
The presuppositionalists, on the other hand, are quite open about their
dogmatic agenda. They drop the pretense of a "common ground" and admit
that the paradigm is self-sealing.
We have just suggested that, like
their presuppositionalist rivals, the evidentialists actually seem to
place their faith anterior to argumentation, though their principles
call for the placing of it posterior to argumentation. (Both then are
really in effect “presuppositionalists," though one side doesn't realize
it.) And this inconsistency is no accident. Indeed if one thinks to use
a truly evidentialist approach, he is dooming his apologetics from the
start. There is something inherent in the common-criteria approach that
makes its use in apologetics fundamentally wrong-headed.
Basically the trouble is that the
only common ground is contemporary human experience of the world. (In
terms of our discussion of paradigms, this is the same as "economic and
inductive explanation" of the data at hand, without recourse to
extraneous hypotheses.). Historical critics have a term for this: "the
principle of analogy," as formulated by Ernst Troeltsch.8
This principle, the basis of the historical-critical method's “denial of
the miraculous," is a red flag to evangelicals. Yet they use exactly the
same principle, only with a different name and applied to different
cases.
This is the common "empirical fit" argument
used by Francis Schaeffer and Os Guiness to write off Eastern religions
as failing to ring true to the depths of human experience.9
In both cases, the idea is that, though theoretically anything (ancient
miracle stories or modern philosophical worldviews) is
quite possibly true, there is
no available criterion for plausibility except present, shared
human experience. This is why users of electric lights and radio may
have trouble accepting the miracles of the New Testament. This is why
those who know suffering or love may find it difficult to accept the
Eastern denial of the reality of these things. If the "common-ground" or
“empirical fit" argument works at all, it works too well. Consistently
pursued, such an inductive approach could of course lead only to some
kind of natural theology, not to a "revealed religion" like evangelical
Christianity.
------
Now if "common ground" is a chimera
for apologetics, on what basis may the outsider opt for revealed
religion? The evangelistic appeal of a consistent presuppositionalist
must seem (from the human side) as a "leap of faith." And what the
prospective convert sees, that the apologist-evangelist may not, is that
this is only one of several invitations to leap in several directions.
And the leap is “known” (felt) to be the right one after the
choice has been made ("I once was blind, but now I see"). Before the
fact, how is he to decide which faith to leap into? Walter Kaufmann said
it well:
They say their doctrine is infallible
and true, but ignore the fact that there is no dearth whatsoever of
pretenders to infallibility and truth.... scores of other doctrines,
scriptures, and apostles, sects and parties, cranks and sages make the
same claim.... Those who have no such exalted notion of themselves have
no way of deciding between dozens of pretenders if reason is proscribed
[i.e., if common ground criteria are disallowed because of the “noetic
effects of. the fall"].10
-------------
Quite a dilemma! The common ground
approach can never lead to conviction, but the presuppositionalist “leap
of faith" could lead to Jim Jones as easily as to Jesus Christ! How
could one decide? "Revolutionary suicide” in a
Guyana
rainforest is quite reasonable once one accepts the proper
presuppositions. If one flinches because "obviously that's
pathological," isn't he holding out on his piece of common ground, just
like the unbelieving skeptic who judges the cross to be foolishness? If
we cast away everyday experience as our standard of judgment, there can
be no standard of judgment until after we make the leap of faith. But we
could make that leap in any direction. And after we made it, it would
seem right. The paradigm would carry with it its own criteria.
-----
The upshot of all this is that the
evidentialist apologetic with its common ground approach finally
backfires. A really inductive approach to this- worldly evidence can
lead one only to this-worldly (i.e., non-revealed) religion. The
presuppositionalist apologetic is consistent but not at all compelling,
since the immunity from doubt that it wins for those inside the circle
of faith simultaneously cancels its attraction to those outside. It can
look neither more nor less plausible since there is no standard with
which it may be compared. And the same approach is amenable to every
sect. But the evangelical Christian (or believer in any sect) does not
need to trouble himself about this. If he is safely within the circle of
the truth himself, he can simply dismiss the other sects. And as for the
outsider, doesn't the believer trust in the Spirit's conviction--if not
actual predestination, then at least prevenient grace?11
Then why worry about common ground, or for that matter about apologetics
at all? Believers may plant the seed, but isn't it up to God to give the
harvest (1 Corinthians 3:6-7)? Shouldn’t faith rest on God's Spirit, not
the persuasive words of man's wisdom (1 Corinthians 2:4)? Shouldn't it
be revealed by the Father in heaven, not by flesh and blood
(Matthew 16: 17)?
And, finally, seen from the
outsider's perspective, it would have to be said that the way to certain
faith is an overwhelming "final experience," an enlightenment. Though
the question of rational certitude is not theoretically solved,
it is psychologically settled, since the new believer will no
longer care to ask it. Now he knows.
By raising the question of the
structure of paradigm-shifts and how they are possible, Thomas S. Kuhn
has provided a set of categories with which better to understand the
long-standing apologetics debate. When seen in terms of his theory, the
two apologetical strategies presently dominant in evangelical circles,
the evidentialist and the presuppositionalist, seem to be beset with
surprising difficulties. In fact, these difficulties run so deep as to
indicate that the only consistent apologetic is fideistic
presuppositionalism, which is in a sense no apologetic at all, since on
principle it removes any external standards by which its faith might be
“vindicated” or “defended.”
---------------------
NOTES
1 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969),
p. 150.
2 John Warwick
Montgomery,
The Suicide of Christian Theology (Minneapolis: Bethany
Fellowship, 1975), p. 39. This line of reasoning is to be found in a
large number of books, and with very little variation. See, for example,
John Stott's Basic Christianity; J. N. D. Anderson's The
Evidence for the Resurrection; Michael Green's Man Alive!;
Josh McDowell's Evidence That Demands A Verdict; Clark Pinnock's
Set Forth Your Case.
3 Among Van Til’s many works, see for
example The Protestant Doctrine of Scripture ([n.p.] Den Dulk
Christian Foundation, 1967), p. 11: "one must be a believing Christian
to study nature in the proper frame of mind and with proper procedure."
4 Gordon J. Allport, The
Individual and his Religion (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company,
1974), p. 83.
5
Montgomery in Robert Campbell (ed.),
Spectrum of Protestant Beliefs (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing
Company, 1968), p. 20.
6 This assertion, I realize, invites
a full-scale demonstration for which there is no space here. Basically,
let me say that much apologetic argumentation for, e.g., the total
reliability of the gospels as historical records, and for the
historicity of the resurrection, are totally out of date and do not come
to grips realistically with modern biblical criticism. This is true even
of such recent works as Josh McDowell's More Evidence That Demands A
Verdict and Buell and Hyder’s Jesus: God, Ghost or Guru? The
interested reader may find a full-scale treatment of these questions in
my Beyond Born Again.
7 See his incisive work
Fundamentalism (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1978).
8 For two clear and sympathetic
treatments of the principle of analogy, see Van A. Harvey, The
Historian & The Believer (New York: Macmillan Company, 1972); and
F.. H. Bradley, The Presuppositions of Critical History (Chicago:
Quadrange Books, 1968).
9 See, for example, Francis
Schaeffer's The God Who is There (Downer's Grove,
Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1968); Escape from Reason (Downer's
Grove, Illinois: Inter Varsity Press, 1968); and Os Guiness, The Dust
of Death (Downer's Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press; 1973).
Shaeffer's and Guiness's use of this argument, incidentally, shows them
to be less consistently presuppositionalist than Van Til.
10 Walter Kaufmann, The Faith of a
Heretic (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), p.
86.
11 Van Til certainly does: "And it is
only when the Holy Spirit gives man a new heart that he will accept the
evidence of Scripture about itself and about nature for what it really
is. The Holy Spirit's regenerating power enables man to place all things
in true perspective." (Protestant Doctrine of Scripture, pp.
10-11).
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