Inside the Soviet Army
Viktor Suvorov
Viktor Suvorov. Inside the Soviet Army
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
Copyright (C) 1982
by Viktor Suvorov
Macmillan
Publishing Co., Inc. 866 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022
Library of
Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Suvorov, Viktor.
Inside the Soviet Army. Includes index.
1. Soviet Union.
Armiia. I. Title.
UA770.S888 1983
355'.00947 82-22930
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
1
Printed in the
United States of America
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
To Andrei Andreevich
Vlasov
Contents
Foreword by
General Sir John Hackett
Part I: The higher
military leadership
Why did the Soviet
Tanks not threaten Romania?
Why was the Warsaw
Treaty Organisation set up later than NATO?
The Bermuda
Triangle
Why does the
system of higher military control appear complicated?
Why is the make-up
of the Defence Council kept secret?
The Organisation
of the Soviet Armed Forces
High Commands in
the Strategic Directions
Part II: Types of
armed services
How the Red Army
is divided in relation to its targets
The Strategic
Rocket Forces
The National Air
Defence Forces
The Land Forces
The Air Forces
Why does the West
consider Admiral Gorshkov a strong man?
The Airborne
Forces
Military
Intelligence and its Resources
The Distorting
Mirror
Part III: Combat
organisation
The Division
The Army
The Front
Why are there 20
Soviet Divisions in Germany but only 5 in Czechoslovakia?
The Organisation
of the South-Western Strategic Direction
Part IV:
Mobilisation
Types of Division
The Invisible
Divisions
Why is a Military
District commanded by a Colonel-General in peacetime, but only by a
Major-General in wartime?
The System for
Evacuating the Politburo from the Kremlin
Part V: Strategy
and tactics
The Axe Theory
The Strategic
Offensive
«Operation
Detente»
Tactics
Rear Supplies
Part VI: Equipment
What sort of
weapons?
Learning from
Mistakes
When will we be
able to dispense with the tank?
The Flying Tank
The Most Important
Weapon
Why are Anti-tank
Guns not self-propelled?
The Favourite
Weapon
Why do Calibres vary?
Secrets, Secrets,
Secrets
How much does all
this cost?
Copying Weapons
Part VII: The soldier's
lot
Building Up
How to avoid being
called up
If you can't,
we'll teach you; if you don't want to, we'll make you
1,441 Minutes
Day after day
Why does a soldier
need to read a map?
The Training of
Sergeants
The Corrective
System
Part VIII: The
officer's path
How to control
them?
How much do you
drink in your spare time?
Drop in, and we'll
have a chat
Who becomes a
Soviet officer and why?
Higher Military
Training Colleges
Duties and
Military Ranks
Military Academies
Generals
Conclusion
Index
Foreword
The book, Inside
the Soviet Army, is written under the name of «Viktor Suvorov.» As a
defector, under sentence of death in the USSR, the author does not use his own
name and has chosen instead that of one of the most famous of Russian generals.
This is a book that should command wide attention, not only in the armed forces
of the free world, but among the general public as well. It is an account of
the structure, composition, operational method, and general outlook of the
Soviet military in the context of the Communist regime in the USSR and the
party's total dominion, not only over the Soviet Union, but over the client
states of the Warsaw Pact as well.
The book starts
with a survey of the higher military leadership and an analysis of the types of
armed services, and of the organization of Soviet Army formation. An
examination of the Red Army's mobilization system that follows is of particular
interest. The chapters that follow on strategy and tactics and on equipment are
also of high interest. The first, on operational method, emphasizes the supreme
importance attached in Soviet military thinking to the offensive and the swift
exploitation of success. Defensive action is hardly studied at all except as an
aspect of attack. The second, on equipment, examines Soviet insistence on
simplicity in design and shows how equipment of high technical complexity (the
T-72 tank, for instance) is also developed in another form, radically
simplified in what the author calls «the monkey model,» for swift wartime
production. The last two chapters on «The Soldiers' Lot» and «The Officer's
Role» will be found by many to be the most valuable and revealing of the whole
book. We have here not so much a description of what the Red Army looks
like from the outside, but what it feels like inside.
This book is based
on the author's fifteen years of regular service in the Soviet Army, in troop
command and on the staff, which included command of a motor rifle company in
the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. About this he has written another book,
The Liberators, which is a spirited account of life in the Red Army,
highly informative in a painless sort of way and often very funny. There is rather
less to laugh at in this book than in that one: Viktor Suvorov writes here in
deadly earnest.
There is no doubt
at all of the author's right to claim unquestioned authority on matters which
he, as a junior officer, could be expected to know about at firsthand and in
great detail. Nevertheless, not everyone would agree with everything he has to
say. Though I know him personally rather well, Viktor Suvorov is aware that I
cannot myself go all the way with him in some of his arguments and I am
sometimes bound to wonder whether he is always interpreting the evidence
correctly.
Having said this,
however, I hasten to add something that seems to be of overriding importance.
The value of this book, which in my view is high, derives as much from its
apparent weaknesses as from its clearly evident strengths--and perhaps even
more. The author is a young, highly trained professional officer with very
considerable troop service behind him as well as staff training. He went
through the Frunze Military Academy (to which almost all the Red Army's elite
officers are sent) and was thereafter employed as a staff officer. He tells the
reader how he, being what he is--that is to say, a product of the Soviet Army
and the society it serves--judges the military machine created in the Soviet
Union under Marxism-Leninism, and how he responded to it. He found that he
could take no more of the inefficiency, corruption, and blatant dishonesty of a
regime which claimed to represent its people, but had slaughtered millions of
them to sustain its own absolute supremacy.
It would be unwise
to suppose that what is found in this book is peculiar only to the visions and
opinions of one young officer who might not necessarily be typical of the group
as a whole. It might be sensible to suppose that if this is the way the scene
has been observed, analyzed, and reported on by one Red Army officer of his
generation, there is a high probability that others, and probably very many
others, would see things in much the same way. Where he may seem to some
readers to get it wrong, both in his conclusion about his own army and his
opinions on military matters in the Western world, he is almost certainly
representing views very widely held in his own service. Thus, it is just as
important to take note of points upon which the reader may think the author is
mistaken as it is to profit from his observation on those parts of the scene
which he is almost uniquely fitted to judge.
This book should
not, therefore, be regarded as no more than an argument deployed in a debate,
to be judged on whether the argument is thought to be wrong or right. Its high
importance lies far more in the disclosure of what Soviet officers are taught
and how they think. This window opened into the armed forces of the Soviet
Union is, up to the present time, unique of its kind, as far as I am aware.
Every serving officer in the Western world should read it, whether he agrees
with what he reads or not, and particularly if he does not. All politicians
should read it, and so should any member of the public who takes seriously the
threat of a third world war and wonders about the makeup and outlook of the
armed forces in the free world's main adversary.
General Sir John
Hackett
Part One
The Higher
Military Leadership
Why did the Soviet
Tanks not threaten Romania?
1
It looked as
though the soldiers had laid a very large, very heavy carpet at the bottom of
the wooded ravine. A group of us, infantry and tank officers, looked at their
work from a slope high above them with astonishment, exchanging wild ideas
about the function of the dappled, greyish-green carpet, which gleamed dully in
the sun.
`It's a container
for diesel fuel,' said the commander of a reconnaissance party confidently,
putting an end to the argument.
He was right. When
the heavy sheeting, as large as the hull of an airship, was finally unfolded, a
number of grubby-looking soldiers laid a network of field pipelines through our
battalion position.
All night long
they poured liquid fuel into the container. Lazily and unwillingly it became
fatter, crushing bushes and young fir trees under its tremendous weight.
Towards morning the container began to look like a very long, flat, broad hot
water bottle, made for some giant child. The resilient surface was carefully
draped with camouflage nets. Sappers hung spirals of barbed wire around the
ravine and a headquarters company set up field picquets to cover the
approaches.
In a neighbouring
ravine the filling of another equally large fuel container was in progress.
Beyond a stream, in a depression, worn-out reservists were slowly spreading out
a second huge canopy. Struggling through bogs and clearings, covered from head
to foot in mud, the soldiers pulled and heaved at an endless web of field
pipelines. Their faces were black, like photographs negatives, and this made
their teeth seem unnaturally white when they showed them, in their enjoyment of
obscenities so monstrous that they made their young reserve officer blush.
This whole affair
was described, briefly, as «Rear Units Exercise». But we could see what was
going on with our own eyes and we realised that this was more than an exercise.
It was all too serious. On too large a scale. Too unusual. Too risky. Was it
likely that they would amass such enormous stocks of tank fuel and ammunition,
or build thousands of underground command posts communications centres, depots
and stores on the very borders of the country just for an exercise?
The stifling
summer of 1968 had begun. Everyone realised quite clearly that the sultriness
and tension in the air could suddenly turn into a summer storm. We could only
guess when and where this would happen. It was quite clear that our forces
would invade Romania but whether they would also go into Czechoslovakia was a
matter for speculation.
The liberation of
Romania would be a joy-ride. Her maize fields suited our tanks admirably.
Czechoslovakia was another matter. Forests and mountain passes are not good
terrain for tanks.
The Romanian army
had always been the weakest in Eastern Europe and had the oldest equipment. But
in Czechoslovakia things would be more complicated. In 1968 her army was the
strongest in Eastern Europe. Romania had not even a theoretical hope of help
from the West, for it had no common frontier with the countries of NATO. But in
Czechoslovakia, in addition to Czech tank divisions, we risked meeting
American, West German, British, Belgian, Dutch and possibly French divisions. A
world war might break out in Czechoslovakia but there was no such risk in
Romania.
So, although
preparations were being made for the liberation of Romania, we clearly would
not go into Czechoslovakia. The risk was too great....
2
For some reason,
though, despite all our calculations and in the face of all common sense, they
did send us into Czechoslovakia. Never mind, we reassured ourselves--we'll deal
with Dubcek and then we'll get around to Ceaucescu. First of all we'll make the
Czech people happy and then it'll be the turn of the Romanians.
But for some
reason it never was....
Elementary logic
suggested that it was essential to liberate Romania and to do so immediately.
The reasons for acting with lightning speed were entirely convincing. Ceaucescu
had denounced our valiant performance in Czechoslovakia as aggression. Then
Romania announced that henceforth no exercises by Warsaw Pact countries might
be held on her territory. Next she declared that she was a neutral country and
that in the event of a war in Europe she would decide for herself whether to
enter the war or not and if so on which side. After this she vetoed a proposal
for the construction of a railway line which was to have crossed her territory
in order to link the Soviet Union and Bulgaria. Each year, too, Romania would
reject suggestions by the Soviet Union that she should increase her involvement
in the activities of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.
Then there was a
truly scandalous occurrence. Soviet military intelligence reported that Israel
was in great need of spare parts for Soviet-built tanks, which had been
captured in Sinai, and that Romania was secretly supplying these spare parts.
Hearing of this, the commander of our regiment, without waiting for
instructions, ordered that a start should be made with bringing equipment out
of mothballing. He assumed that the last hour had struck for the stubborn
Romanians. It turned out to be his last hour that had come. He was rapidly
relieved of his command, the equipment was put back in storage and the regiment
fell back into a deep sleep.
Things became even
worse. The Romanians bought some military helicopters from France. These were
of great interest to Soviet military intelligence, but our Romanian allies
would not allow our experts to examine them, even from a distance. Some of the
more hawkish generals and their juniors still believed that the Soviet leadership
would change their mind and that Romania would be liberated or at least given a
good fright by troop movements of a scale befitting a super-power along her
borders. But the majority of officers had already given Romania up as a bad
job. We had got used to the idea that Romania was allowed to do anything that
she liked, that she could take any liberties she pleased. The Romanians could
exchange embraces with our arch-enemies the Chinese, they could hold their own
opinions and they could make open criticisms of our own beloved leadership.
We began to wonder
why the slightest piece of disobedience or evidence of free thinking was
crushed with tanks in East Germany, in Czechoslovakia, in Hungary or inside the
Soviet Union itself, but not in Romania. Why was the Soviet Union ready to risk
annihilation in a nuclear holocaust in order to save far-off Cuba but not
prepared to try to keep Romania under control? Why, although they had given
assurances of their loyalty to the Warsaw Treaty, were the Czech leaders
immediately dismissed, while the rulers of Romania were allowed to shed their
yoke without complications of any sort? What made Romania an exception? Why was
she forgiven for everything?
3
Many explanations
are put forward for the behaviour of Soviet Communists in the international
arena. The most popular is that the Soviet Union is, essentially, the old
Russian Empire--and an empire must grow. A good theory. Simple and easy to
understand. But it has one defect--it cannot explain the case of Romania. In
fact, none of the popular theories can explain why the Soviet rulers took such
radically differing approaches to the problems of independence in
Czechoslovakia and in Romania. No single theory can explain both the
intolerance which the Soviet leadership showed towards the gentle criticism
which came from Czechoslovakia and their astonishing imperviousness to the
furious abuse with which Romania showered them.
If the Soviet
Union is to be regarded as an empire, it is impossible to understand why it
does not try to expand south-eastwards, towards the fertile fields and
vineyards of Romania. For a thousand years, possession of the Black Sea straits
has been the dream of Russian princes, tsars and emperors. The road to the
straits lies through Romania. Why does the Soviet Union leap into wars for
Vietnam and Cambodia, risking collision with the greatest powers in the world
and yet forget about Romania, which lies right under its nose?
In fact the
explanation is very simple. The USSR is not Russia or the Russian Empire; it is
not an empire at all. To believe that the Soviet Union conforms to established
historical standards is a very dangerous simplification. Every empire has
expanded in its quest for new territories, subjects and wealth. The motivating
force of the Soviet Union is quite different. The Soviet Union does not need
new territory. Soviet Communists have slaughtered scores of millions of their
own peasants and have nationalised their land, which they are unable to
develop, even if they wished to. The Soviet Union has no need of new slaves.
Soviet Communists have shot sixty million of their own subjects, thus
demonstrating their complete inability to rule them. They cannot rule or even
effectively control those who remain alive. Soviet Communists have no need of
greater wealth. They squander their own limitless resources easily and freely.
They are ready to build huge dams in the deserts of Africa for next to nothing,
to give away their oil at the expense of Soviet Industry, to pay lavishly, in
gold, for any adventurous scheme, and to support all sorts of free-booters and
anarchists, no matter what the cost, even if this brings ruination to their own
people and to the national exchequer.
Different stimuli
and other driving forces are at work upon the Soviet Union in the international
arena. Herein lies the fundamental difference which distinguishes it from all
empires, including the old Russian version, and here too lies the main danger.
The Soviet
Communist dictatorship, like any other system, seeks to preserve its own
existence. To do this it is forced to stamp out any spark of dissidence which
appears, either on its own territory or beyond its borders. A communist regime
cannot feel secure so long as an example of another kind of life exists
anywhere near it, with which its subjects can draw comparisons. It is for this
reason that any form of Communism, not only the Soviet variety, is always at
pains to shut itself off from the rest of the world, with a curtain, whether
this is made of iron, bamboo or some other material.
The frontiers of a
state which has nationalised its heavy industry and collectivised its
agriculture--which has, in other words, carried out a «socialist
transformation»--are always reminiscent of a concentration camp, with their
barbed wire, watch-towers with searchlights and guard-dogs. No Communist state
can allow its slaves free movement across its frontiers.
In the world today
there are millions of refugees. All of them are in flight from Communism. If
the Communists were to open their frontiers, all their slaves would flee. It is
for this reason that the Democratic Republic of Kampuchea has set up millions
of traps along its borders--solely to prevent anyone from attempting to leave
this Communist paradise. The East German Communists are enemies of the
Kampuchean regime but they, too, have installed the same sort of traps along
their own borders. But neither Asian cunning nor German orderliness can prevent
people from fleeing from Communism and the Communist leaders are therefore faced
with the immense problem of destroying the societies which might capture the
imagination of their people and beckon to them.
Marx was right:
the two systems cannot co-exist. And no matter how peace-loving Communists may
be, they come unfailingly to the conclusion that world revolution is
inescapable. They must either annihilate capitalism or be put to death by their
own people.
There are some
Communist countries which are considered peace-loving--Albania, Democratic
Kampuchea, Yugoslavia. But the love of peace which these countries affect is
simply the product of their weakness. They are not yet strong enough to speak
of world revolution, because of their internal or external problems. But
regimes which can hardly be much more self-confident than these, such as Cuba,
Vietnam and North Korea, quickly plunge into the heroic struggle to liberate
other countries, of which they know nothing, from the yoke of capitalism.
Communist China
has her own very clear belief in the inevitability of world revolution. She has
shown her hand in Korea, in Vietnam, in Cambodia and in Africa. She is still
weak and therefore peace-loving, as the Soviet Union was during its period of
industrialisation. But China, too, faces the fundamental problem of how to keep
her billion-strong population from the temptation to flee from the country.
Traps along the borders, the jamming of radio broadcasts, almost complete
isolation--none of these produces the desired result and when China becomes an
industrial and military super-power she, too, will be forced to use more
radical measures. She has never ceased to speak of world revolution.
The fact that
Communists of different countries fight between themselves for the leading role
in the world revolution is unimportant. What is significant is that all have
the same goal: if they cease to pursue it they are, in effect, committing
suicide.
`Our only
salvation lies in world revolution: either we achieve it whatever the
sacrifices, or we will be crushed by the petty bourgeoisie,' said Nikolay
Bukharin, the most liberal and peace-loving member of Lenin's Politburo. The
more radical members of the Communist forum advocated an immediate
revolutionary war against bourgeois Europe. One of them, Lev Trotsky, founded
the Red Army--the army of World Revolution. In 1920 this army tried to force
its way across Poland to revolutionary Germany. This attempt collapsed. The
world revolution has not taken place: it has been disastrously delayed but
sooner or later the Communists must either bring it about or perish.
4
To the Soviet
Union Romania is an opponent. An enemy. An obstinate and unruly neighbour. To
all intents and purposes an ally of China and of Israel. Yet not a single
Soviet subject dreams of escaping to Romania or aspires to exchange Soviet life
for the Romanian version. Therefore Romania is not a dangerous enemy. Her
existence does not threaten the foundations of Soviet Communism, and this is
why drastic measures have never been taken against her. However, the first
stirrings of democracy in Czechoslovakia represented a potentially dangerous
contagion for the peoples of the Soviet Union, just as the change of regime in
Hungary represented a very dangerous example for them. The Soviet leaders
understood quite clearly that what happened in East Germany might also happen
in Esthonia, that what happened in Czechoslovakia might happen in the Ukraine,
and it was for this reason that Soviet tanks crushed Hungarian students so
pitilessly beneath their tracks.
The existence of
Romania, which, while it may be unruly, is nevertheless a typical Communist
regime, with its cult of a supreme and infallible leader, with psychiatric
prisons, with watch towers along its frontiers, presents no threat to the
Soviet Union. By contrast, the existence of Turkey, where peasants cultivate
their own land, is like a dangerous plague, an infection which might spread
into Soviet territory. This is why the Soviet Union does so much to destabilise
the Turkish regime, while doing nothing to unseat the unruly government in
Romania.
For the Communists
any sort of freedom is dangerous, no matter where it exists--in Sweden or in El
Salvador, in Canada or in Taiwan. For Communists any degree of freedom is
dangerous--whether it is complete or partial, whether it is economic, political
or religious freedom. `We will not spare our forces in fighting for the victory
of Communism:' these are the words of Leonid Brezhnev. `To achieve victory for
Communism throughout the world, we are prepared for any sacrifice:' these are
the words of Mao Tse-Tung. They also sound like the words of
fellow-thinkers.... For that is what they are. Their philosophies are
identical, although they belong to different branches of the same Mafia. Their
philosophies must be identical, for neither can sleep soundly so long as there
is, anywhere in the world, a small gleam of freedom which could serve as a
guiding light for those who have been enslaved by the Communists.
5
In the past every
empire has been guided by the interests of the State, of its economy, of its
people or at least of its ruling class. Empires came to a halt when they saw
insuperable obstacles or invincible opposition in their paths. Empires came to
a halt when further growth became dangerous or economically undesirable. The
Russian Empire, for example, sold Alaska for a million dollars and its colonies
in California at a similarly cheap price because there was no justification for
retaining these territories. Today the Soviet Communists are squandering
millions of dollars each day in order to hang on to Cuba. They cannot give it
up, no matter what the cost may be, no matter what economic catastrophe may
threaten them.
Cuba is the
outpost of the world revolution in the western hemisphere. To give up Cuba
would be to give up world revolution and that would be the equivalent of
suicide for Communism. The fangs of Communism turn inwards, like those of a
python. If the Communists were to set about swallowing the world, they would
have to swallow it whole. The tragedy is that, if they should want to stop,
this would be impossible because of their physiology. If the world should prove
to be too big for it, the python would die, with gaping jaws, having buried its
sharp fangs in the soft surface, but lacking the strength to withdraw them. It
is not only the Soviet python which is attempting to swallow the world but the
other breeds of Communism, for all are tied inescapably to pure Marxism, and
thus to the theory of world revolution. The pythons may hiss and bite one
another but they are all of one species.
The Soviet Army,
or more accurately the Red Army, the Army of World Revolution, represents the
teeth of the most dangerous but also the oldest of the pythons, which began to
swallow the world by sinking its fangs into the surface and then realised just
how big the world is and how dangerous for its stomach. But the python has not
the strength to withdraw its fangs.
Why was the Warsaw
Treaty Organisation set up later than NATO?
1
The countries of
the West set up NATO in 1949 but the Warsaw Treaty Organisation was created
only in 1955. For the Communists, comparison of these two dates makes excellent
propaganda for consumption by hundreds of millions of gullible souls. Facts are
facts--the West put together a military bloc while the Communists simply took
counter-measures--and there was a long delay before they even did that. Not
only that, but the Soviet Union and its allies have come forward repeatedly and
persistently with proposals for breaking up military blocs both in Europe and
throughout the world. The countries of the West have rejected these
peace-loving proposals almost unanimously.
Let us take the
sincerity of the Communists at face value. Let us assume that they do not want
war. But, if that is so, the delay in establishing a military alliance of
Communist states contradicts a fundamental tenet of Marxism: `Workers of the
World Unite!' is the chief rallying cry of Marxism. Why did the workers of the
countries of Eastern Europe not hasten to unite in an alliance against the
bourgeoisie? Whence such disrespect for Marx? How did it happen that the Warsaw
Treaty Organisation was set up, not in accordance with the Communist Manifesto
but solely as a reaction to steps taken by the bourgeois countries--and then so
belatedly?
Strange though it
may seem, there is no contradiction with pure Marxism in this case. But, in
trying to understand the aims and structures of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation,
the interrelationships within it and the delay in its establishment (which at
first sight is inexplicable), we shall not immerse ourselves in theory nor
attempt to follow the intricate workings of this unwieldy bureaucratic
organisation. If we study the fate of Marshal K. K. Rokossovskiy we shall come
to understand, if not everything, at least the essentials.
2
Konstantin Konstantinovich
Rokossovskiy was born in 1896 in the old Russian town of Velikiye Luki. At
eighteen he was called up by the Russian army. He spent the whole of the war at
the front, first as a private, then as an NCO. In the very first days of the
Revolution he went over to the Communists and joined the Red Army. He
distinguished himself fighting against both the Russian and Polish armies. He
moved rapidly upwards, ending the war in command of a regiment. After the war
he commanded a brigade, then a division and then a corps.
At the time of the
Great Purge the Communists tortured or shot those people who had miraculously
survived until then despite past connections with the Russian government, army,
police, diplomatic service, church or culture. Red Army Corps Commander
Rokossovskiy found himself among the millions of victims because of his service
with the Russian army.
During the
investigations he underwent appalling tortures. Nine of his teeth were knocked
out, three of his ribs were broken, his toes were hammered flat. He was
sentenced to death and spent more than three months in the condemned cell.
There is testimony, including his own, that, twice, at least, he was subjected
to mock shootings, being led to the place of execution at night, and made to
stand at the edge of a grave as generals on his right and left were shot, while
he was `executed' with a blank cartridge fired at the nape of his neck.
On the eve of the
war between Germany and the Soviet Union Rokossovskiy was let out of gaol and
given the rank of Major-General of Tank Forces and command of a mechanised
corps. However, the charge resulting from his service with the Russian army was
not dropped and the death sentence was not annulled. `Take command of this
mechanised corps, prisoner, and we'll see about your death sentence later....'
On the second day
of the war, Rokossovskiy's 9th Mechanised Corps struck an unexpected and
powerful blow against German tanks, which were breaking through in the area of
Rovno and Lutsk, at a moment when the rest of the Soviet forces were retreating
in panic. In a situation of confusion and disorganisation, Rokossovskiy showed
calmness and courage in his defence of the Soviet regime. He managed to
maintain the fighting efficiency of his corps and to make several successful
counter-attacks. On the twentieth day of the war he was promoted, becoming
Commander of the 16th Army, which distinguished itself both in the battle of
Smolensk and, especially, in the battle for Moscow, when, for the first time in
the course of the war, the German army was heavily defeated. During the battle
of Stalingrad Rokossovskiy commanded the Don front, which played a decisive
role in the encirclement and complete destruction of the strongest German
battle group, consisting of twenty-two divisions.
During the battle
for Kursk, when weather conditions put the contestants on equal terms,
Rokossovskiy commanded the Central Front, which played a major part in smashing
Hitler's last attempt to achieve a decisive success. Thereafter Rokossovskiy
successfully commanded forces in operations in Byelorussia, East Prussia,
Eastern Pomerania and, finally, in Berlin.
Stars rained upon
Rokossovskiy. They fell on to his shoulder boards, on to his chest and around
his neck. In 1944 he was awarded the diamond Marshal's Star and a gold star to
pin on his chest. In 1945 he was awarded both the Victory order, on which
sparkle no less than one hundred diamonds, and a second gold star. Stalin
conferred the highest honour on Rokossovskiy by giving him command of the Victory
Parade on Red Square.
But what has all
this to do with the Warsaw Treaty Organisation? The fact that, immediately
after the war, Stalin sent his favourite, Rokossovskiy, to Warsaw and gave him
the title of Marshal of Poland to add to his existing rank as Marshal of the
Soviet Union. In Warsaw Rokossovskiy held the posts of Minister of Defence,
Deputy President of the Council of Ministers and Member of the Politburo of the
Polish Communist Party. Think for a moment about the full significance of
this--a Marshal of the Soviet Union as deputy to the head of the Polish
government!
In practice
Rokossovskiy acted as military governor of Poland, senior watchdog over the
Polish government and supervisor of the Polish Politburo. As all-powerful ruler
of Poland, Rokossovskiy remained a favourite of Stalin's, but a favourite who
was under sentence of death, a sentence which was lifted only after the death
of Stalin in 1953. A favourite of this sort could have been shot at any moment.
But, even if the death sentence had been lifted, would it have taken long to
impose a new one?
Now let us see the
situation from the point of view of the Generalissimo of the Soviet Union, J.
V. Stalin. His subordinate in Warsaw is Marshal of the Soviet Union
Rokossovskiy. This subordinate carries out all orders unquestioningly,
accurately and speedily. Why should Stalin conclude a military alliance with
him? Even to contemplate such a step would show a flagrant disregard for the
principles of subordination and would be an offence in itself. A sergeant has
no right to make an agreement of any kind with the soldiers under him or a
general with his officers. In the same way, a Generalissimo is not entitled to
conclude alliances with his own Marshal. It is the right and duty of a
commander to give orders and a subordinate is bound to obey these orders. Any
other kind of relationship between commanders and their subordinates is
entirely forbidden. The relationship between Stalin and Rokossovskiy was based
upon the fact that Stalin gave the orders and that Rokossovskiy carried them
out without question.
3
The fact that he
knew no Polish did not disturb Rokossovskiy in the slightest. In those glorious
days not a single general in the Polish army spoke Polish, relying instead on
interpreters who were constantly in attendance.
In Russia in 1917
a Polish nobleman, Felix Dzerzhinskiy, established a blood-stained
organisation; this was the Cheka, the forerunner of the GPU, NKVD, MGB, and
KGB. Between 1939 and 1940 this organisation destroyed the flower of the Polish
officer corps. During the war a new Polish army was formed in the Soviet Union.
The soldiers and junior officers of this army were Poles, the senior officers
and generals were Soviets. When they were transferred to the Polish army the
Soviets received joint Polish-Soviet nationality and Polish military ranks,
while remaining on the strength of the Soviet military hierarchy. Here is one
case history from many thousands:
Fyodor Petrovich
Polynin was born in 1906 in the province of Saratov. He joined the Red Army in
1928 and became a pilot. In 1938-39 he fought in China with the forces of
Chiang Kai-Shek. He used a Chinese name and was given Chinese nationality.
Although thus a Chinese subject, he was nevertheless made a `Hero of the Soviet
Union'. He returned to the Soviet Union and reverted to Soviet nationality.
During the war he commanded the 13th Bomber Division and then the 6th Air Army.
He became a Lieutenant-General in the Soviet Air Force. In 1944 he became a
Polish general. He never learned Polish. He was made Commander of the Air Force
of sovereign, independent Poland.
In 1946, while
still holding this high position in Poland, he received the rank of
`Colonel-General of the Air Force'. The Air Force concerned was, of course, the
Soviet one, for Polynin was also a Soviet General. The announcement that this
rank had been awarded to the officer commanding the Polish Air Force was signed
by the President of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Generalissimo of the
Soviet Union, J. V. Stalin.
After a further
short period in Poland, as if this was an entirely normal development, Fedya
Polynin resumed his Soviet rank and was given the post of Deputy to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Air Forces. During his years in command of the
Polish Air Force, he learned not a single word of Polish. Why should he bother
to do so? His orders reached him from Moscow in Russian and when he reported
that they had been carried out he did so in Russian, too. None of his
subordinates at the headquarters of the Polish Air Force spoke Polish either,
so that there was no point in learning the language.
Once again, why
should Stalin conclude a military alliance with Fedya Polynin, if the latter
was no more than a subordinate of Rokossovskiy, who was himself subordinated to
Stalin? Why set up a military alliance if a more reliable and simpler line of
direct command was already in existence?
4
The Polish Army,
which was set up in 1943 on Soviet territory, was simply a part of the Red
Army, headed by Soviet commanders, and it did not, of course, recognise the
Polish government-in-exile in London. In 1944 the Communists established a new
`people's' government, a large part of which consisted of investigators from
the NKVD and from Soviet military counterintelligence (SMERSH). However, even
after the `people's' government had been established, the Polish army did not
come under its command, remaining a part of the Soviet Army. After the war, the
`people's' government of Poland was quite simply not empowered to appoint the
generals in the `Polish' army or to promote or demote them. This was
understandable, since the generals were also Soviet generals and posting them
would amount to interference in the internal affairs of the USSR.
There was no
reason why the Soviet government should have had the slightest intention of
setting up any kind of Warsaw Treaty, Consultative Committee or other similarly
non-functional superstructure. No one needed a treaty, since the Polish army
was nothing more than a part of the Soviet army, and the Polish government,
brought up to strength with Soviet cut-throats and bully boys, was not allowed
to intervene in the affairs of the Polish army.
Nevertheless,
after the death of Stalin, the Soviet government, headed by Marshal of the
Soviet Union Bulganin, decided to conclude an official military agreement with
the countries it was occupying. Communist propaganda proclaimed, at the top of
its voice, as it continues to do, that this was a voluntary agreement, made
between free countries. But a single example from the time when the official
document was signed is an indication of the truth. The signatory for the Soviet
Union was Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov, and for free, independent,
popular, socialist Poland Marshal of the Soviet Union Rokossovskiy, assisted by
Colonel-General S. G. Poplavskiy--Rokossovskiy's deputy. Marshal of the Soviet
Union Bulganin, who was present at the ceremony, took the opportunity to award
Colonel-General Poplavskiy the rank of General of the Army. You have, of course,
guessed that Poplavskiy, who signed for Poland, was also a Soviet general and
the subordinate of Marshals Bulganin, Zhukov and Rokossovskiy. Within two years
Poplavskiy had returned to the USSR and become deputy to the Inspector General
of the Soviet Army. These were the sort of miracles which took place in Warsaw,
irrespective of the existence of the Warsaw Treaty. Rokossovskiy, Poplavskiy,
Polynin and the others were compelled by Soviet legislation to carry out the
orders which reached them from Moscow. The Treaty neither increased nor
lessened Poland's dependence upon the USSR.
However Poland is
a special case. With other East European countries it was much easier. In
Czechoslovakia there were reliable people like Ludwig Svoboda, who neutralised
the Czech army in 1948 and did so again in 1968. He carried out the orders of
the USSR promptly and to the letter and it was therefore not necessary to keep
a Soviet Marshal in Prague holding a ministerial post in the Czech government.
With the other East European countries, too, everything went well. During the
war all of them had been enemies of the USSR and it was therefore possible to
execute any political figure, general, officer or private soldier, at any given
moment and to replace him with someone more cooperative. The system worked
perfectly; the Soviet ambassadors to the countries of Eastern Europe kept a
close eye on its operation. What sort of ambassadors these were you can judge
from the fact that when the Warsaw Treaty was signed the Soviet Ambassador to
Hungary, for instance, was Yuriy Andropov, who subsequently became head of the
KGB. It was therefore understandable that Hungary should welcome the treaty
warmly and sign it with deep pleasure.
Under Stalin,
Poland and the other countries of Eastern Europe were governed by a system of
open dictatorship, uncamouflaged in any way. The Warsaw Treaty did not exist
for one simple reason--it was not needed. All decisions were taken in the
Kremlin and monitored by the Kremlin. The Defence Ministers of the East
European countries were regarded as equal in status to the Commanders of Soviet
Military Districts and they came under the direct command of the Soviet
Minister of Defence. All appointments and postings were decided upon by the
Kremlin. The Defence Ministers of the `sovereign' states of Eastern Europe were
either appointed from the ranks of Soviet generals or were `assisted' by Soviet
military advisers. In Romania and Bulgaria, for instance, one such `adviser'
was Marshal of the Soviet Union Tolbukhin. In East Germany there was Marshal
Zhukov himself, in Hungary Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev. Each adviser had
at his disposal at least one tank army, several all-arms armies and special
SMERSH punitive detachments. To disregard his `advice' would be a very risky
business.
After Stalin's
death the Soviet leadership embarked on the process of `liberalisation'. In
Eastern Europe everything stayed as it was, for all that happened was that the
Soviet government had decided to conceal its wolf's jaws behind the mask of a
`voluntary' agreement, after the NATO model.
To some people in
Eastern Europe it really seemed as though dictatorship had come to an end and
that the time for a voluntary military agreement had arrived. But they were
quite wrong. Just one year after the signing of this `voluntary' alliance the
actions of Soviet tanks in Poland and Hungary gave clear proof that everything
was still as it had been under Stalin, except for some small, cosmetic
alterations.
5
Communist
propaganda quite deliberately blends two concepts; that of the military
organisation in force in the Communist states of Eastern Europe and that of the
Warsaw Treaty Organisation. The military organisation of the East European
countries was set up immediately after the Red Army arrived on their
territories, in 1944 and 1945. In some cases, for example Poland and
Czechoslovakia, military pro-Communist formations had been established even
before the arrival of the Red Army.
The armies of East
European countries which were set up by Soviet `military advisers' were fully
supervised and controlled from Moscow. The military system which took shape was
neither a multilateral organisation nor a series of bilateral defensive
treaties, but was imposed, forcibly, on a unilateral basis in the form in which
it still exists.
The Warsaw Treaty
Organisation is a chimera, called into being to camouflage the tyranny of
Soviet Communism in the countries under its occupation in order to create an
illusion of free will and corporate spirit. Communist propaganda claims that it
was as a result of the establishment of NATO that the countries of Eastern
Europe came together in a military alliance. The truth is that, at the end of
the Second World War, the Soviet Union took full control of the armies of the
countries which it had overrun, long before NATO came into existence. It was
many years later that the Communists decided to conceal their mailed fist and
attempt to present the creation of NATO as the moment when the military
framework of Eastern Europe was set up.
But the Communists
lacked the imagination to establish this purely ornamental organisation, which
exists solely to conceal grim reality, tactfully and with taste. During the
Organisation's first thirteen years the Ministers of Defence of the sovereign
states, whether they were pro-Soviet puppets or actual Soviet generals and
Marshals, were subordinated to the Commander-in-Chief, who was appointed by the
Soviet government and who was himself Deputy Minister of Defence of the USSR.
Thus, even in a legal sense, the Ministers of these theoretically sovereign
states were directly subordinated to a Soviet Minister's deputy. After the
Czechoslovak affair the similarly spurious Consultative Committee was set up.
In this committee Ministers of Defence and Heads of State gather supposedly to
talk as equals and allies. But this is pure play-acting. Everything remains as
it was several decades ago. Decisions are still made in the Kremlin. The
Consultative Committee takes no decisions for itself.
Any attempt to
understand the complex and fanciful structure of committees and staffs which
make up the Warsaw Treaty Organisation is a complete waste of time. It is
rather like trying to understand how the Supreme Soviet arrives at its
decisions or how the President of the Soviet Union governs the country--the
nature of his authority and the extent of his responsibilities. You know before
you start that, despite its great complexity, the organisation has absolutely
no reality. The Supreme Soviet neither formulates policy nor takes decisions.
It is purely decorative, like the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, there for show
and nothing more. In the same way, the President of the Soviet Union himself
does nothing, takes no decisions, and has neither responsibilities nor
authority. His post was devised solely to camouflage the absolute power of the
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
The Warsaw Treaty
Organisation, then, is a body of the same type as the Supreme Soviet. It is a
showpiece whose only function is to conceal the Kremlin's dictatorship. Its
Consultative Committee was set up solely to hide the fact that all decisions
are taken at the Headquarters of the Soviet Army, on Gogol Boulevard in Moscow.
The function of the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation is
purely decorative. Like the President of the Soviet Union he is without
authority. Although he is still listed among the first deputies of the Soviet
Minister of Defence, this is a legacy of the past, and is no more than an
honour, for he is remote from real power.
During a war, or
any such undertaking as `Operation Danube', the `allied' divisions of the
Warsaw Treaty Organisation are integrated in the Soviet Armies. None of the
East European countries has the right to set up its own Corps, Armies or
Fronts. They have only divisions commanded by Soviet generals. In the event of
war, their Ministers of Defence would be concerned only with the reinforcement,
build-up and technical servicing of their own divisions, which would operate as
part of the United (that is the Soviet) Armed Forces.
Lastly, a few
words on the ultimate goal of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation: the disbandment
of all military blocs, in Europe and throughout the world. This is the real
aspiration of our Soviet `doves'. It is based on a very simple calculation. If
NATO is disbanded, the West will have been neutralised, once and for all. The
system of collective self-defence of the free countries will have ceased to
exist. If the Warsaw Treaty Organisation is disbanded at the same time, the
USSR loses nothing except a cumbersome publicity machine. It will remain in
complete control of the armies of its `allies'. The military organisation will
survive, untouched. All that will be lost is the title itself and the
organisation's bureaucratic ramifications, which are needed by nobody.
Let us suppose,
for example, that France should suddenly return to NATO. Would this be a
change? Certainly--one of almost global significance. Next, let us suppose that
Cuba drops its `non-alignment' and joins the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. What
would this change? Absolutely nothing. Cuba would remain as aggressive a pilot
fish of the great shark as she is today.
6
There are millions
of people who regard NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation as identical
groupings. But to equate these two is absurd, because the Warsaw Treaty
Organisation has no real existence. What does exist Soviet dictatorship and
this has no need to consult its allies. If it is able to do so, it seizes them
by the throat; if not it bides its time---Communists do not acknowledge any
other type of relationship with their associates.
This is a truism,
something which is known to everyone, and yet, every year, hundreds of books
are published in which the Soviet Army is described as one of the forces making
up the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. This is nonsense. The forces of the Warsaw
Treaty Organisation are a part of the Soviet Army. The East European countries
are equipped with Soviet weapons, instructed in Soviet methods at Soviet military
academies and controlled by Soviet `advisers'. It is true that some of the East
European divisions would be glad to turn round and use their bayonets on the
Moscow leadership. But there are Soviet divisions who would be prepared to do
this, too. Mutinies, on Soviet ships and in Soviet divisions are far from rare.
A situation in
which Soviet propaganda stands the truth on its head and yet is believed by the
whole world is by no means a new one. Before the Second World War the Soviet
Communists established an international union of communist parties--the
Comintern. In theory, the Soviet Communist Party was simply one of the members
of this organisation. In practice, its leader, Stalin, was able to cause the
leader of the Comintern, Zinoviev, theoretically his superior, to be removed
and shot.... Later, during the Great Purge, he had the leaders of fraternal
communist parties executed without trial and without consequences to himself.
Officially the Soviet Communist Party was a member of the Comintern, but in
fact the Comintern itself was a subsidiary organisation of the Soviet Party.
The standing of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation is exactly similar. Officially
the Soviet Army is a member of this organisation but in practice the
organisation is itself a part of the Soviet Army. And the fact that the
Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation is an official deputy of
the Soviet Minister of Defence is no coincidence.
In the 1950s it
was decided that a building should be erected in Moscow to house the staff of
the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. But it was never put up because nobody needed
it--any more than they need the whole organisation. The Soviet General Staff
exists and this is all that is required to direct both the Soviet Army and all
its `younger brothers'.
The Bermuda
Triangle
1
A triangle is the
strongest and most rigid geometric figure. If the planks of a door which you
have knocked together begin to warp, nail another plank diagonally across them.
This will divide your rectangular construction into two triangles and the door
will then have the necessary stability.
The triangle has
been used in engineering for a very long time. Look at the Eiffel tower, at the
metal framework of the airship Hindenburg, or just at any railway bridge, and
you will see that each of these is an amalgamation of thousands of triangles,
which give the structure rigidity and stability.
The triangle is
strong and stable, not only in engineering but in politics, too. Political
systems based on division of power and on the interplay of three balancing
forces have been the most stable throughout history. These are the principles
upon which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is built.
Enormous problems
and difficulties are said to lie before the Soviet Union. But Soviet leaders
have always been confronted by problems of considerable magnitude, from the
very beginnings of Soviet power. Then, too, the collapse of the regime was
thought to be inevitable. But it survived four years of bloody struggle against
the Russian army; it survived the mutiny of the Baltic fleet, which had itself
helped to bring about the Revolution; it survived the mass flight of the
intelligentsia, the opposition of the peasants, the massive blood-letting of
the revolutionary period, the Civil War, the unprecedented slaughter of
millions during collectivisation, and endless bloody purges. It also withstood
diplomatic isolation and political blockade, the starvation of scores of
millions of those it enslaves and an unexpected onslaught by 190 German
divisions, despite the unwillingness of many of its own soldiers to fight for
its interests.
So one should not
be in a hurry to bury the Soviet regime. It is still, fairly firmly, on its
feet. There are several reasons for its stability--the scores of millions of
corpses within its foundations, disinterested Western help, the reluctance of
the free world to defend its own freedom. But there is one other most important
factor which gives the Soviet regime its internal stability--the triangular
structure of the state.
Only three forces
are active in the Soviet political arena--the Party, the Army and the KGB. Each
of these possesses enormous power, but this is exceeded by the combined
strength of the other two. Each has its own secret organisation, which is capable
of reaching into hostile countries and monitoring developments there. The Party
has its Control Commission--a secret organisation which has almost as much
influence inside the country as the KGB. The KGB is a grouping of many
different secret departments, some of which keep an eye on the Party. The Army
has its own secret service--the GRU--the most effective military intelligence
service in the world.
Each of these
three forces is hostile to the others and has certain, not unreasonable
pretensions to absolute power but its initiatives will always fail in the face
of the combined opposition of the other two.
Of the three, the
Party has the smallest resources for self-defence in open conflict. But it has
a strong lever at its disposal--the appointment and posting of all officials.
Every general in the Army and every colonel in the KGB takes up his post and is
promoted or demoted only with the approval of the Administrative Department of
the Central Committee of the Party. In addition, the Party controls all
propaganda and ideological work and it is always the Party which decides what
constitutes true Marxism and what represents a deviation from its general line.
Marxism can be used as an additional weapon when it becomes necessary to
dismiss an unwanted official from the KGB, the Army or even the Party. The
Party's right to nominate and promote individuals is supported by both the Army
and the KGB. If the Party were to lose this privilege to the KGB, the Army
would be in mortal danger. If the Army took it over, the KGB would be in an
equally dangerous situation. For this reason, neither of them objects to the
Party's privilege--and it is this privilege which makes the Party the most
influential member of the triumvirate.
The KGB is the
craftiest member of this troika. It is able, whenever it wishes, to recruit a
party or a military leader as its agent: if the official refuses he can be
destroyed by a compromise operation devised by the KGB. The Party remembers,
only too clearly, how the KGB's predecessor was able to destroy the entire
Central Committee during the course of a single year. The Army, for its part,
remembers how, within the space of two months, the same organisation was able
to annihilate all its generals. However, the secret power of the KGB and its
cunning are its weakness as well as its strength. Both the Party and the Army
have a deep fear of the KGB and for this reason they keep a very close eye on
the behaviour of its leaders, changing them quickly and decisively, if this
becomes necessary.
The Army is
potentially the most powerful of the three and therefore it has the fewest
rights. The Party and the KGB know very well that, if Communism should
collapse, they will be shot by their own countrymen, but that this will not
happen to the Army. The Party and the KGB acknowledge the might of the Army.
Without it their policies could not be carried out, either at home or abroad.
The Party and the KGB keep the Army at a careful distance, rather as two
hunters might control a captured leopard with chains, from two different sides.
The tautness of this chain is felt even at regimental and battalion level. The
Party has a political Commissar in every detachment and the KGB a Special
Department.
2
This triangle of
power represents a Bermuda Triangle for those who live within it. The trio have
long ago adopted the rule that none of the legs of this tripod may extend too
far. If this should happen, the other two immediately intervene, and chop off
the excess.
Let us look at an
example of the way this triangle of power functions. Stalin died in 1953.
Observers concluded unanimously that Beriya would take command--Beriya the
chief inquisitor and head policeman. Who else was there? Beriya, his gang of
ruffians, and the whole of his organisation realised that their chance to lead
had arrived. The power in their hands was unbelievable. There was a special
file on every senior party functionary and every general and there would be no
difficulty in putting any one of them before a firing squad. It was this very
power which destroyed Beriya. Both the Army and the Party understood their
predicament. This brought them together and together they cut off the head of
the chief executioner. The most powerful members of the security apparatus came
to unpleasant ends and their whole machine of oppression was held up to public
ridicule. The propaganda organisation of the Party worked overtime to explain
to the country the crimes of Stalin and of his whole security apparatus.
However, having
toppled Beriya from his pedestal, the Party began to feel uncomfortable; here
it was, face to face with the captive leopard. The NKVD had released the chain
it held around the animal's neck and it sensed freedom. The inevitable outcome
was that the Army would gobble up its master. Marshal Zhukov acquired
extraordinary power, at home and abroad. He demanded a fourth Gold Star of a
Hero of the Soviet Union (Stalin had had only two and Beriya one). Perhaps such
outward show was unimportant, but Zhukov also demanded the removal from the
Army of all political commissars--he was trying to shake off the remaining
chain. The Party realised that this could only end in disaster and that,
without help, it was quite unable to resist the Army's pressure. An urgent
request for assistance went to the KGB and, with the latter's help, Zhukov was
dismissed. The wartime Marshals followed him into the wilderness, and then the
ranks of the generals and of military intelligence were methodically thinned.
The military budget was drastically reduced and purges and cuts followed thick
and fast. These cost the Soviet Army 1,200,000 men, many of them front-line
officers during the war.
The KGB was still
unable to recover the stature it had lost after the fall of Beriya, and the
Party began a new campaign of purges and of ridicule against it. 1962 marked
the Party's triumph over both the KGB, defeated at the hands of the Army, and
the Army, humiliated with the help of the KGB; with, finally, a second victory
over the KGB won by the Party alone. The leg of the tripod represented by the
Party began to extend to a dangerous degree.
But the triumph
was short-lived. The theoretically impossible happened. The two mortal enemies,
the Army and the KGB, each deeply aggrieved, united against the Party. Their
great strength brought down the head of the Party, Khrushchev, who fell almost
without a sound. How could he have withstood such a combination?
The era which
followed his fall provided ample evidence of the remarkable inner stability of
the triangular structure even in the most critical situations--Czechoslovakia,
internal crises, economic collapse, Vietnam, Africa, Afghanistan. The regime
has survived all these.
The Army has not
thrown itself upon the KGB, nor has the KGB savaged the Army. Both tolerate the
presence of the Party, which they acknowledge as an arbitrator or perhaps
rather as a second in a duel, whose help each side tries to secure for itself.
In the centre of
the triangle, or more accurately, above the centre, sits the Politburo. This
organisation should not be seen as the summit of the Party, for it represents
neutral territory, on which the three forces gather to grapple with one
another.
Both the Army and
the KGB are equally represented in the Politburo. With their agreement, the
Party takes the leading role; the Party bosses restrain the others and act as
peacemakers in the constant squabbles.
The Politburo
plays a decisive part in Soviet society. In effect it has become a substitute
for God. Portraits of its members are on display in every street and square. It
has the last word in the resolution of any problem, at home or abroad. It has
complete power in every field--legislative, executive, judicial, military,
political, administrative, even religious.
Representing, as
it does, a fusion of three powers, the Politburo is fully aware that it draws
its own stability from each of these sources. It can be compared to the seat of
a three-legged stool. If one of the legs is longer than the others, the stool
will fall over. The same will happen if one of the legs is shorter than the
others. For their own safety, therefore, the members of the Politburo, whether
they come from the Party, the KGB or the Army, do everything they can to
maintain equilibrium. The secret of Brezhnev's survival lies in his skill in
keeping the balance between the trio, restraining any two from combining
against the third.
Why does the
system of higher military control appear complicated?
1
When Western
specialists talk about the organisation of Soviet regiments and divisions,
their explanations are simple and comprehensive. The diagrams they draw, too,
are simple. At a single glance one can see who is subordinated to whom. But,
once the specialists begin talking about the organisational system of control
at higher levels, the picture becomes so complicated that no one can understand
it. The diagrams explaining the system of higher military control published in
the West resemble those showing the defences of a sizeable bank in Zurich or
Basle: square boxes, lines, circles, intersections. The uninitiated might gain
the impression that there is dual control at the top--or, even worse, that
there is no firm hand and therefore complete anarchy.
In fact, the
control structure from top to bottom is simple to the point of primitiveness.
Why, then, does it seem complicated to foreign observers? Simply because they
study the Soviet Union as they would any other foreign country; they try to
explain everything which happens there in language their readers can
understand, in generally accepted categories--in other words, in the language
of common sense. However, the Soviet Union is a unique phenomenon, which cannot
be understood by applying a frame of reference based on experience elsewhere.
Only 3% of arable land in the Soviet Union is in the hands of private owners,
and not a single tractor or a kilogram of fertiliser. This 3% feeds practically
the whole country. If the private owners were given another 1/2 % there would
be no problem with food production. But the Communists prefer to waste 400 tons
of gold each year buying wheat abroad. Just try to explain this in normal
common sense language.
Thus, when
examining the system of higher military control, the reader must not attempt to
draw parallels with human society in other parts of the world. Remember that
Communists have their own logic, their own brand of common sense.
2
Let us take a
diagram explaining the system of higher military control, drawn by some Western
specialist on Soviet affairs, and try to simplify it. Among the maze of
criss-crossing lines we will try to pick out the outlines of a pyramid of
granite.
Our specialist
has, of course, shown the President at the very top, with the Praesidium of the
Supreme Soviet next and then the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet. But the
Party must not be forgotten. So there, together with the President, are the
General Secretary of the Party, the Politburo, and the Central Committee. Here
there is disagreement among the experts about who should be shown higher up the
page and who lower--the General Secretary or the President.
Let us clarify the
picture. Here are the names of past General Secretaries: Stalin, Khrushchev,
Brezhnev. Try to remember the names of the Presidents of the Soviet Union
during the periods when those three were in power. Even the experts cannot
remember. I have put other questions to these experts. Why, when Stalin went to
meet the President of the United States, did he not take the Soviet President
with him? When the Cuban rocket crisis was at its height and Khrushchev
discussed the fate of the world on the hot line with the American President,
why was it he who did this rather than the Soviet President? Surely it was the
two Presidents who should have talked the matter over? And why, when Brezhnev
talks about missiles with the American President, does he not give the Soviet
President a seat at the conference table?
In order to decide
which of the two--President or General Secretary--should be shown at the top,
it is worth recalling the relationship between Stalin and his President,
Kalinin. Stalin gave orders that Kalinin's wife and his closest friends should
be shot but that it should appear that the President himself had issued the
order. One Soviet historian tells us that, as he signed the death sentence on
his own wife, the President `wept from grief and powerlessness'.
In order to
simplify our diagram, take a red pencil and cross out the Presidency. It is
nothing but an unnecessary ornament which leads to confusion. If war breaks
out, no future historian will remember that standing by the side of the General
Secretary was some President or other now totally forgotten who was weeping
from grief and powerlessness.
As well as the
Presidency, cross out the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet and both of its
chambers. They are not involved in any way with either the government of the
country or the control of its armed forces. Judge for yourself--this Soviet
`parliament' meets twice a year for four or five days and discusses thirty to
forty questions each day. Bearing in mind that the Deputies do not overwork
themselves, one can calculate the number of minutes they spend on each
question. The Soviet parliament has fifteen or so permanent committees dealing
with such questions as the supply of consumer goods (where to buy lavatory
paper) or the provision of services (how to get taps mended). But none of these
committees concerns itself with the affairs of the armed forces, with the KGB,
with military industry (which provides employment for twelve separate
ministries), or with prisons. The Soviet parliament has never discussed the
reasons why Soviet forces are in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Cuba or Afghanistan.
During the Second World War it did not meet once. Why should such an
organisation be included among those concerned with questions of higher military
control?
* Illustration
Military and
Political Infrastructure of the Soviet Union
An example of
Western misunderstanding. But who runs the country?
But this is not
the most important point. The Soviet parliament is nothing but a parasite. All
its decisions are reached unanimously. The nomination of a new
President--unanimous. The removal and ignominious dismissal of his
predecessor--also unanimous. In reality, these nominations and dismissals took
place many months earlier. Parliament simply ratifies them subsequently--and
unanimously. When Parliament does not meet for several years, nobody knows the
reason and nothing changes as a result. If all its members were tried as
parasites and sent to prison under Soviet law nothing would change: Soviet
Presidents would continue to be appointed with great ceremony and chased from
office in disgrace. According to Soviet law, the rank of Marshal must be
conferred--and removed--by Parliament. But several Marshals have been shot
without any reference to Parliament. Just try and work out how many Marshals
have been appointed and how many shot without the knowledge or consent of
Parliament. And this did not only happen during the Stalinist Terror. It was
under Khrushchev that Marshal of the Soviet Union Beriya was shot, that Marshal
Bulganin was struck off the pay-roll, that eleven other Marshals were dismissed
from their posts. All this was done without the knowledge or consent of the
Soviet Parliament.
But, you will say,
if neither the President nor Parliament does anything or is responsible for
anything and is there only to approve any--absolutely any--decision
unanimously, why were their positions in the system ever created? The answer
is, as camouflage.
If all power were
seen to rest entirely in the hands of the Politburo, this might offend both the
Soviet people and the rest of the world. To avoid this, Soviet propaganda
compiles extremely complicated diagrams, as complicated as those for a
perpetual motion machine, which its inventor purposely makes more and more intricate,
so that no one will realise that hidden inside his brainchild there is a dwarf
who is turning the wheels.
It is a great pity
that many Western specialists, who know that during the war the Soviet
President was not allowed to attend the meetings of the military leadership,
nevertheless show him at the very top of their diagrams just where he is said
to be by Soviet propaganda.
There is one
situation in which the Soviet President can become a person of importance, and
this has happened only once in Soviet history. A General Secretary decided that
he should be President as well. Naturally, this was done without an election of
any sort. The name of this President was--and is--Brezhnev. However, it is only
abroad that he is honoured as President. Everyone at home knows that
`President' is completely meaningless and calls him by his real title--General
Secretary--which has, of course, the true ring of power.
3
We have removed
these useless embellishments from the diagram but that is not all we must do.
Do not cross out the Council of Ministers, but move them to one side. Why? you
may ask. Is the Minister of Defence not subject to the decisions of the Council
of Ministers? That is correct. He is not. The Council of Ministers only has
control over industry, which in the USSR is almost entirely military. The
Soviet Union uses more cloth, of much better quality, for the production of
parachutes than for the manufacture of clothes for 260 million people. However,
of these 260 million, very many receive military uniforms, of good quality; all
that is left, for the remainder, is material of appalling quality, and there is
not enough even of that.
In the Soviet
Union the number of cars in private ownership is lower, per thousand head of
the population, than the total owned by the black inhabitants of South Africa,
for whose freedom the United Nations is fighting so fervently. But, against
this, the number of tanks in the Soviet Union is greater than in the rest of
the whole world put together.
Twelve of the
Ministries which the Council controls produce nothing but military equipment.
All the remainder (coal, steel production, energy, etc.) work in the interests
of those which produce arms.
Thus, the Council
of Ministers is, essentially, a single gigantic economic organisation,
supporting the Army. It is, therefore, with all its military and auxiliary
industry, a sort of subsidiary rear organisation of the Army. It possesses
colossal power over those who produce military equipment but, against this, it
has not even the authority to send a new doorman to one of the Soviet embassies
abroad. This can be done only by the Party or, more accurately, by the Party's
Central Committee.
Why is the make-up
of the Defence Council kept secret?
1
By now much of our
diagram has been simplified. The summit of power has become visible--the
Politburo, in which sit representatives of the Party, the KGB, and the Army.
Decisions taken in the Politburo by the most senior representatives of these
organisations are also implemented by them. For instance, when Afghanistan was
suddenly invaded by the Army on the orders of the Politburo, the KGB removed
unsuitable senior personnel, while the Party arranged diversionary operations
and worked up propaganda campaigns at home and abroad.
The role of the
Council of Ministers is important but not decisive. The Council is responsible
for increasing military productivity, for the prompt delivery to the forces of
military equipment, ammunition and fuel, for the uninterrupted functioning of
the military industries and of the national economy, which works only in
support of the military industries and therefore in the interests of the Army.
The Chairman of the Council will certainly be present when decisions on these
subjects are taken but as one of the members of the Politburo, working for the
interests of the Army, rather than as the head of the Council.
What does the
highly secret organisation known as the Defence Council do at a time like this?
Officially, all that is known about this organisation is that it is headed by
Brezhnev. The identities of the other members of the Council are kept secret.
What sort of organisation is it? Why is its make-up given no publicity? Soviet
propaganda publishes the names of the head of the KGB and of his deputies,
those of the heads of ministries, of the heads of all military research
institutions, of the Defence Minister and of all his deputies. The names of
those responsible for the production of atomic warheads and for missile
programmes are officially known, so are those of the head of the GRU and of the
head of the disinformation service. Why are the names of those who are
responsible for overall decisions, at the highest level of all, kept secret?
Let us examine the
Defence Council from two different points of view. Firstly who sits on such a
council? Some observers believe that it is made up of the most prominent
members of the Politburo and the leading Marshals. They are mistaken. These
officials attend the Chief Military Council, which is subordinate to the
Defence Council. The Defence Council is something more than a mixture of
Marshals and Politburo members. What could be superior to such a group? The
answer is--members of the Politburo without any outsiders. Not all the members:
only the most influential.
Secondly, what is
the position of the Defence Council vis-a-vis the Politburo--higher, the same
or lower? If the Defence Council had more power than the Politburo its first
act would be to split up this group of geriatrics, so that they would not
interfere. If the Defence Council were equal in power to the Politburo we
should witness a dramatic battle between these two giants, for there is only
room for one such organisation at the top. A dictatorship cannot exist for long
when power is shared between two groups. Two dictators cannot co-exist.
Perhaps, then, the Defence Council is of slightly lower status than the
Politburo? But there would be no place for it in this case, either. Directly
below the Politburo is the Chief Military Council, which links the Politburo with
the Army, serving to bond the two together. Thus the Defence Council cannot be
either inferior or superior to the Politburo; nor can it hold an equal
position. The Defence Council exists, in fact, within the Politburo itself. Its
membership is kept secret only because it contains no one but members of the
Politburo and it is considered undesirable to give unnecessary emphasis to the
absolute power enjoyed by this organisation.
Neither the Soviet
Union nor its many vassal states contain any power higher than or independent
of the Politburo. The Politburo possesses all legislative, executive, judicial,
administrative, religious, political, economic and every other power. It is
unthinkable that such an organisation should be prepared to allow any other to
take decisions on the momentous problems produced by Soviet usurpations and
`adventures' throughout the world, problems of war and peace, of life and
death. The day when the Politburo releases its hold will be its last. That day
has not yet come....
2
Many Western
specialists believe the Defence Council to be something new, created by
Brezhnev. But nothing changes in the Soviet Union, especially in the system by
which it is governed. The system stabilised itself long ago and it is almost
impossible to change it in any way. New, decorative organisations can be
devised and added but changes to the basic structure of the Soviet Union are
out of the question. Khrushchev tried to introduce some and the system
destroyed him. Brezhnev is wiser and he makes no attempts at change. He rules
with the help of a system which was established in the early days of Stalin and
which has remained unchanged ever since.
Only the labels
change in the USSR. The security organisation has been known successively as
the VChK, GPU, OGPU, NKVD, NKGB, MGB, and KGB. Some think that these services
differed from one another in some way but it was only their labels which did
so. The Party has been called the RKP(B), the VKP(B), the KPSS. The Army began
as the Red Army, then became the Soviet Army and its highest overall council
has been successively labelled KVMD, SNKMVD, NKMVD, NKO, NKVS, MVS, and MO,
while remaining one and the same organisation.
Exactly the same
has happened with the Defence Council. It changes its name as a snake sheds its
skin, painlessly. But it is still the same snake. In Lenin's day it was called
the Workers' and Peasants' Defence Council or simply the Defence Council, then
the Council for Labour and Defence. Subsequently, since its members all
belonged to the Politburo, it became the Military Commission of the Politburo.
Immediately after
the outbreak of war with Germany, the State Committee for Defence was
established, which, entirely legally and officially, acquired the full powers
of the President, the Supreme Soviet, the Government, the Supreme Court, the
Central Committee of the Party and of all other authorities and organisations.
The decisions of the State Committee for Defence had the force of martial law
and were mandatory for all individuals and organisations including the Supreme
Commander, and the President. The State Committee for Defence had five members:
Stalin--its
President
Molotov--his first
deputy
Malenkov--the head
of the Party's bureaucracy
Beriya--the head
of the security organisation
Voroshilov--the
senior officer of the Army
These five were
the most influential members of the Politburo, so that the State Committee for
Defence consisted not of the whole Politburo, but of its most influential
component parts. Take another look at its composition and you will recognise
our triangle. There are the Supreme Being, his Right Hand and, below them, the
triangle--Party, KGB, Army. Note the absence of the President of the Soviet
Union, Kalinin. He is a member of the Politburo, but a purely nominal one. He
possesses no power and there is therefore no place for him in an organisation
which is omnipotent.
Before the war the
same powerful quintet existed inside the Politburo but at that time they called
themselves simply the Military Commission of the Politburo. Then, too, these
five were all-powerful but they worked discreetly behind the scenes, while the
stage was occupied by the President, the Supreme Soviet, the Government, the
Central Committee and other decorative but superfluous organisations and
individuals. When war began nothing changed, except that the quintet took over
the stage and were seen in their true roles, deciding the fate of tens of
millions of people.
Naturally, this
group did not allow power to slip from their grasp when the war ended; they disappeared
back into the shadows, calling themselves the Military Commission of the
Politburo once again and pushing to the front of the stage a series of pitiable
clowns and cowards who `wept from grief and powerlessness' while this group
slaughtered their nearest and dearest.
The Second World
War threw up a group of brilliant military leaders--Zhukov, Rokossovskiy,
Vasilevskiy, Konev, Yeremenko--but not one of them was allowed by the `big
five' to enter the sacred precincts of the State Committee for Defence. The
Committee's members knew quite well that in order to retain power they must
safeguard their privileges with great care. For this reason, throughout the
war, no single individual, however distinguished, who was not a member of the
Politburo, was admitted to the Committee. All questions were decided by the
Politburo members who belonged to the Committee and they were then discussed
with Army representatives at a lower level, in the Stavka, to which both
Politburo members and leading Marshals belonged.
Precisely the same
organisation exists today. The Defence Council is yesterday's State Committee
for Defence under another name. Its membership is drawn exclusively from the
Politburo, and then only from those with the greatest power. It is they who
take all decisions, which are then discussed at the Chief Military Council
(otherwise known as the Stavka) which is attended by members of the Politburo
and by the leading Marshals.
Brezhnev is the
old wolf of the Politburo. His long period in power has made him the equal of
Stalin. One can see why he is disinclined to experiment with the system by
which power over the Army is exercised. He follows the road which Stalin built,
carefully adhering to the rules laid down by that experienced old tyrant. These
are simple: essentially, before you sit down at a table with the Marshals at
the Chief Military Council decide everything with the Politburo at the Defence
Council. Brezhnev knows that any modification of these rules would mean that he
must share his present unlimited powers with the Marshals--and that this is
equivalent to suicide. This is why the Defence Council--the highest institution
within the Soviet dictatorship--consists of the most influential members of the
Politburo and of no one else.
The Organisation
of the Soviet Armed Forces
1
The system by
which the Soviet Armed Forces are controlled is simplified to the greatest
possible extent. It is deliberately kept simple in design, just like every
Soviet tank, fighter aircraft, missile or military plan. Soviet marshals and
generals believe, not unreasonably, that, in a war, other things being equal,
it is the simpler weapon, plan or organisation which is more likely to succeed.
Western
specialists make a careful study of the obscure and intricate lay-out of Soviet
military organisation, for they see the Soviet Army as being similar to any
other national army. However, to any other army peace represents normality and
war an abnormal, temporary situation. The Soviet Army (more accurately the Red
Army) is the striking force of world revolution. It was brought into being to
serve the world revolution and, although that revolution has not yet come, the
Soviet Army is poised and waiting for it, ready to fan into life any spark or
ember which appears anywhere in the world, no matter what the consequences
might be. Normality, for the Soviet Army, is a revolutionary war; peace is an
abnormal and temporary situation.
In order to
understand the structure of the military leadership of the Soviet Union, we
must examine it as it exists in wartime. The same structure is preserved in
peacetime, although a variety of decorative features, which completely distort
the true picture, are added as camouflage. Unfortunately, most researchers do
not attempt to distinguish the really important parts of the organisation from
those which are completely unnecessary and there purely for show.
We already know
that in wartime the Soviet Union and the countries which it dominates would be
ruled by the Defence Council, an organisation first known as the Workers' and
Peasants' Defence Council, next as the Labour and Defence Council and then as
the State Committee for Defence.
On this Council
are one representative each from the Party, the Army, and the KGB and two
others who preside over these organisations--the General Secretary and his
closest associate. Until his recent death the latter post was held by Mikhail
Suslov.
The Defence
Council possesses unrestricted powers. It functioned in wartime and has been
preserved in peacetime with the difference that, whereas during wartime it
worked openly and in full view, in peacetime it functions from behind the cover
offered by the President of the Soviet Union, the Supreme Soviet, elections,
deputies, public prosecutors and similar irrelevancies. Their only function is
to conceal what is going on behind the scenes.
Directly
subordinate to the Defence Council is the Headquarters (Stavka) of the Supreme
Commander, which is known in peacetime as the Chief Military Council. To it
belong the Supreme Commander and his closest deputies, together with certain
members of the Politburo. The Supreme Commander is appointed by the Defence
Council. He may be either the Minister of Defence, as was the case with Marshal
Timoshenko, or the General Secretary of the Party, as with Stalin, who also
headed both the Stavka and the civil administration. If the Minister of Defence
is not appointed Supreme Commander he becomes First Deputy to the latter. The
organisation working for the Stavka is the General Staff, which prepares proposals,
works out the details of the Supreme Commander's instructions and supervises
their execution.
2
In wartime, the
armed forces of the USSR and of the countries under its rule are directed by
the Stavka along two clearly differentiated lines of control: the operational
(fighting) and administrative (rear).
The
line of operational subordination:
Directly
subordinate to the Supreme Commander are five Commanders-in-Chief and eight
Commanders. The Commanders-in-Chief are responsible for:
The Western Strategic
Direction
The South-Western
Strategic Direction
The Far Eastern
Strategic Direction
The Strategic
Rocket Forces
The National Air
Defence Forces
The Commanders are
responsible for:
The Long-Range Air
Force
The Airborne
Forces
Military Transport
Aviation
The Northern Fleet
Individual
Front--Northern, Baltic, Trans-Caucasian and Turkestan.
The
Commander-in-Chief of the Western Strategic Direction has under his command
four Fronts, one Group of Tank Armies and the Baltic Fleet,
The
Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Strategic Direction also commands four
Fronts, one Group of Tank Armies and the Black Sea Fleet.
The
Commander-in-Chief of the Far Eastern Strategic Direction is responsible for
four Fronts and the Pacific Fleet.
The Fronts
subordinated to the Strategic Directions and individual Fronts, subordinated
directly to the Stavka, consist of All-Arms, Tank and Air Armies. The Armies
are made up of Divisions. East European Divisions are included in Armies, which
can be commanded only by Soviet generals. The commanders of East European
divisions are thus subordinated directly to Soviet command--to Army Commanders,
then to Fronts, Strategic Directions and ultimately to the Defence Council--in
other words to the Soviet Politburo. East European governments can therefore
exert absolutely no influence over the progress of military operations.
The
line of administrative subordination:
The First Deputy
of the Minister of Defence is subordinated to the Supreme Commander. At present
the post is held by Marshal S. L. Sokolov, under whom come four
Commanders-in-Chief (Air Forces, Land Forces, Naval Forces, Warsaw Treaty
Organisation) and sixteen Commanders of Military Districts.
The
Commanders-in-Chief are responsible for the establishment of reserves, for bringing
forces up to strength, re-equipment, supply of forces engaged in combat
operations, development of new military equipment, study of combat experience,
training of personnel, etc. The Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Treaty
Organisation has precisely these responsibilities but only on behalf of the
East European divisions operating as part of the United (i.e. Soviet) forces.
He has full control over all the East European Ministries of Defence. His task
is to ensure that these Ministries bring their divisions up to strength, and to
re-equip and supply them according to schedule. In wartime he has only a modest
role. It is now clear why the function of the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw
Treaty Organisation is seen in the USSR as being a purely honorific legacy from
the past, remote from real power.
Each of the
sixteen Commanders of Military Districts is a territorial functionary, a sort
of military governor. In questions concerning the stability of Soviet authority
in the territories entrusted to them, they are responsible directly to the
Politburo (Defence Council), while on subjects concerning the administration of
military industries, transport and mobilisation they are subordinated to the
First Deputy of the Minister of Defence, through him to the Stavka and
ultimately to the Defence Council.
Troops acting as
reserve forces, to be used to bring units up to strength, for re-equipment,
etc., may be stationed in the territories of Military Districts. These troops
are subordinate, not to operational commanders but to the Military District
Commanders, through them to the Commander-in-Chief, to the First Deputy and
then to the Stavka. For instance, during war, on the territory of the Urals
Military District there would be one Air Division (to replace losses), one Tank
Army (Stavka reserve), one Polish tank division (for re-equipment) and three
battalions of marine infantry (a new formation). These units will be
subordinate to the Commander of the Urals Military District and through him, as
regards the Air Division, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces, while
the Tank Army comes under the Commander-in-Chief of Land Forces, the Polish
division to the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the
battalions of marine infantry to the Commander-in-Chief of Naval Forces. Each
Commander-in-Chief has the right to give orders to the Commander of a Military
District, but only in matters concerning sub-units subordinate to him. Because
the complement of each Military District always consists mainly of sub-units of
the Land Forces some Western observers have the impression that Military
Districts are subordinated to the Commanders-in-Chief of Land Forces. But this
is not so. The Commander of a Military District has very wide powers, which are
not in any way subject to the control of the Commander-in-Chief of Land Forces.
As soon as the Stavka decides to transfer one or other sub-unit to an
operational army, the sub-unit ceases to be controlled by the line of
administrative subordination and comes under the instructions of the
operational commander.
3
In wartime the
system for controlling the Soviet Union, the countries which it has occupied
and the entire united armed forces is stripped of the whole of its unnecessary
decorative superstructure. The division between the operational and
administrative lines of subordination then becomes apparent.
In peacetime the
operational and administrative structures are blended with one another; this
produces a misleading appearance of complexity, duplication and muddle. Despite
this, the system which one can see clearly in wartime continues to function in
peacetime. One simply needs to look at it carefully, to distinguish one
structure from another and to ignore useless embellishments.
But is it possible
to spot the summit of the edifice in peacetime--the Defence Council and the
Stavka? This is quite simple. Each year on 7 November a military parade takes
place on Red Square in Moscow. The whole military and political leadership
gathers in the stands on top of Lenin's mausoleum. The position of each person
is clearly discernible. For such a position, for each place in the stands,
there is a constant, savage but silent struggle, like that which goes on in a
pack of wolves for a place closer to the leader, and then for the leader's
place itself. This jostling for position has already continued for many decades
and each place has cost too much blood for it to be surrendered without a
battle.
As is to be
expected, the General Secretary and the Minister of Defence stand shoulder to
shoulder in the centre of the tribune. To the left of the General Secretary are
the members of the Politburo, to the right of the Minister of Defence are the
Marshals. The stands on the mausoleum are the only place where the members of
the political and military leadership parade, each in the position where he
belongs. This is the only place where each individual shows his retinue, his
rivals and his enemies, the whole country and the whole world how close he is
to the centre of power. You can be sure that if the head of the KGB could take
his place by the side of the General Secretary he would do so immediately, but
this place is always occupied by a more influential individual--the Chief
Ideologist. You can be certain that if the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw
Treaty Organisation could move closer to the centre he would immediately do so,
but the place he is after is already occupied by the almighty Chief of the
General Staff.
On the day after
the parade you can buy a copy of Pravda for three kopeks and on the
front page, immediately beneath the masthead, you can see a photograph of the
entire political and military leadership.
Take a red pencil
and mark the General Secretary and the four other members of the Politburo
standing closest to him. These are the members of the Defence Council. They run
the country. It is to them that hundreds of millions are enslaved, from Havana
to Ulan Bator. It is they who will control the fate of the hundreds of millions
in their power when the time comes to `liberate' new peoples and new countries.
Now, mark the
General Secretary, the member of the Politburo closest to him and the five
Marshals nearest to him. This is the Stavka.
High Commands in
the Strategic Directions
A platoon
commander has three or four, sometimes five, sections under his command. It is
pointless to give him more than this. He would be quite unable to exercise
effective control over so large a platoon. If you have another, sixth, section
it would be better to form two platoons of three sections each.
A company
commander has three, four, or sometimes five platoons under his command. There
is no point in giving him more--he just could not control them.
This system, under
which each successive commander controls between three and five detachments, is
used universally and at all levels. A Front Commander, for instance, directs
three or four and sometimes five Armies. And it is at just this level that the
system breaks down. The Soviet Army has sixteen Military Districts and four
Army Groups. In the event of all-out war each District and each Army Group is
able to form one Front from its own resources. How, though, can the Stavka
control twenty Fronts simultaneously? Would it not be simpler to interpose a
new intermediate link in the chain of command, which would control the
operations of three or four and sometimes five Fronts? In this way the Stavka
could be in immediate control not of twenty Fronts but of between three and
five of the new intermediate units. Such an innovation would complete the whole
balanced system of control, in a logical fashion.
In fact,
intermediate control links between the Stavka and the Fronts do exist, but they
are given no publicity. They are designated as High Commands in the Strategic
Directions. The first mention of these command links occurred in the Soviet
military press in 1929. They were set up two years later, but their existence
was kept secret and was not referred to officially. Immediately after the
outbreak of the Second World War they were officially brought into existence.
During the first
two weeks of the war, official announcements were made about the formation of
North-Western, Western and South-Western Strategic Directions. Each Direction
consisted of between three and five Fronts. At the head of each Direction was a
Commander-in-Chief, who was subordinated to the Stavka.
Just how important
each of these High Commands were can be judged by looking at the composition of
the Western Strategic Direction. The Commander-in-Chief was Marshal of the
Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko, who held the post of Minister of Defence at the
outbreak of war. The Political Commissar was Politburo member N. A. Bulganin,
one of those closest to Stalin, who later became a Marshal of the Soviet Union
and President of the Council of Ministers. The Chief of Staff was Marshal B. M.
Shaposhnikov, the pre-war Chief of the General Staff. The other Strategic
Directions also had command personnel of approximately the same calibre--all
the posts were occupied by Marshals or members of the Politburo.
In 1942 a further
High Command, the North Caucasus Strategic Direction, was established,
incorporating two Fronts and the Black Sea Fleet. Its Commander-in-Chief was
Marshal S. M. Budenniy.
However it was
subsequently decided that no further steps in this direction should be taken
for the time being. The High Commands of the Strategic Directions were
abolished and the Stavka took over direct control of the Fronts, which totalled
fifteen. However the idea of an intermediate link was not abandoned. Frequently
throughout the war representatives of the Stavka, usually Marshals Zhukov or
Vasilyevskiy, were detached to work with those who were preparing large-scale
operations and coordinating the work of several Fronts. Among the most
brilliant of many examples of such coordinated efforts are the battles for
Stalingrad and Kursk and the advance into Byelorussia. What amounted to a
temporary grouping of Fronts, under a single command, was set up for each of
these operations. A system of this sort provided greater flexibility and
justified itself completely in conditions in which operations were being
carried out against a single opponent. As soon as the decision had been taken
to go to war with Japan, in 1945, the Far Eastern Strategic Direction was set
up, consisting of three Fronts, one Fleet and the armed forces of Mongolia. The
Commander-in-Chief of the Direction was Marshal A. M. Vasilyevskiy.
It is interesting
to note that the very existence of a Far Eastern Strategic Direction with its
own High Command was kept secret. As camouflage, Marshal Vasilyevskiy's
headquarters were referred to as `Colonel-General Vasilyev's Group'. Many
officers, including some generals, among them all the division and corps
commanders, had no idea of Vasilyevskiy's function, supposing that all the Far
Eastern Fronts were directed from Moscow, by the Stavka. The fact that he had
acted as Commander-in-Chief was only revealed by Vasilyevskiy after the advance
into Manchuria at the end of the war.
The High Command
of the Far Eastern Strategic Direction was not abolished at the end of the war
and no official instructions for its disbandment were ever issued. All that
happened was that from 1953 onwards all official mention of it ceased. Does it
exist today? Do High Commands exist for other Strategic Directions or would
they be set up only in the event of war?
They exist--and
they are in operation. They are not mentioned officially, but no particular
efforts are made to conceal their existence. Let us identify them. This is
quite simple. In the Soviet Army there are sixteen Military Districts and four
Army Groups. The senior officer in each District and each Army Group has the
designation `Commander'. Only in one case, that of the Group of Soviet Forces
in Germany, is he given the title of `Commander-in-Chief'. In the event of war
most Districts would be made into Fronts. But Fronts, too, are headed only by
`Commanders'. The title `Commander-in-Chief' is considerably senior to
`Commander of a Front'. In a war the number of troops available would increase
many times over. Platoon commanders would take over companies, battalion
commanders would head regiments and regimental commanders would become
divisional commanders. In this situation every officer might receive a higher
rank; he would certainly retain the one he already holds. A general who in
peacetime commands enough troops to be entitled to the designation
`Commander-in-Chief' can hardly have his responsibilities reduced to those of a
Front Commander at a time when many more troops are being placed under his
command. If during peacetime the importance of his post is so great, how can it
diminish when war breaks out? Of course it cannot. And a general whose
peacetime title is `Commander-in-Chief of the GSFG' will retain this rank,
which is considerably higher than that of Front Commander.
There can be no
doubt that the organisation known as the `Headquarters of the GSFG' in
peacetime would become, not a Front Headquarters, but the Headquarters of the
Western Strategic Direction.
It is significant
that, already in peacetime, the Headquarters of the GSFG controls two Tank
Armies and one Shock Army (essentially another Tank Army). For each Front can
have only a single Tank Army and in many cases it does not have one at all. The
presence in GSFG of three Tank Armies indicates that it has been decided to
deploy at least three Fronts in the area covered by this Direction. Is this
sufficient? Yes, for in a war the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Strategic
Direction would have under his command not only all the Soviet troops in East
Germany but all those in Czechoslovakia and Poland, together with the entire
complement of the German, Czech and Polish armed forces, the Soviet Baltic
Fleet and the Byelorussian Military District. This will be discussed in greater
detail. For the present it is sufficient to note that the Group of Soviet
Forces in Germany is an organisation which is regarded by the Soviet leadership
as entirely different from any other Group of forces. No other force--in
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Cuba, Afghanistan or, earlier, Austria or
China--has ever been headed by a Commander-in-Chief. All these Groups were
headed by a Commander.
Let us list the
Generals and Marshals who have held the post of Commander-in-Chief of the
Soviet Group of Forces in Germany:
Marshal G. K.
Zhukov, the former Chief of the General Staff, who became First Deputy to the
Supreme Commander and subsequently Minister of Defence and a member of the
Politburo, the only man in history to have been awarded the title of Hero of
the Soviet Union four times.
Marshal V. D.
Sokolovskiy, former Chief of Staff of the Western Strategic Direction and later
Chief of the General Staff.
General of the
Army V. I. Chuykov, subsequently a Marshal and Commander-in-Chief of the Land
Forces.
Marshal A. A.
Grechko, later Minister of Defence and a member of the Politburo.
Marshal M. V.
Zakharov, later Chief of the General Staff.
Marshal P. K.
Koshevoy.
General of the
Army V. G. Kulikov, later a Marshal, Chief of the General Staff and then
Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.
Only one of this
galaxy rose no higher--Marshal Koshevoy, who became seriously ill. But to reach
the rank of Marshal is no mean achievement--and it was in Germany that he
received the rank of Marshal, at a time when other Groups of forces were
commanded only by Lieutenant-Generals and Colonel-Generals. Thus Koshevoy, too,
stands out from the crowd.
One rule applied
to all--anyone who held the post of Commander-in-Chief of the GSFG was either a
Marshal already, was promoted to this rank on appointment or was given it
shortly afterwards. Nothing of this sort has occurred with other Groups of
forces.
The GSFG is a kind
of springboard to the very highest military appointments. Commanders of other
groups have never achieved such high standing. Moreover even the
Commanders-in-Chief of the Land Forces, of the Air Forces, Fleet, Rocket Troops
or Air Defence have never had such glittering careers or such future prospects
as those who have been Commanders-in-Chief in Germany.
Surely this is
enough to indicate that in wartime something far more powerful will be set up
on the foundation represented by the GSFG than in the other, ordinary, Military
Districts and Groups of forces?
None of the other
Military Districts and Groups of forces have Commanders-in-Chief--only
Commanders. Does this mean that in peacetime there are no Strategic Directions?
Not at all. The Headquarters of the Western Strategic Direction (HQ, GSFG) is
hardly concealed at all while the existence of the other Strategic Directions
is only lightly camouflaged, as was `Colonel-General Vasilyev's Group'. But it
is easy to see through this camouflage.
It is sufficient
to analyse the careers of those commanding Military Districts. One can then see
that, for the overwhelming majority, command of a District represents the
highest peak they will reach. Those who advance further are rare. In some cases
what follows is honourable retirement to posts such as Director of one Military
Academy or another or an Inspector's post in the Ministry of Defence. Both
these types of appointment are seen as `elephants' graveyards'. They represent,
in fact, the end of any real power.
However one of the
sixteen Military Districts is a clear exception. None of its former Commanders
has ever left for an elephants' graveyard. On the contrary--the Kiev Military
District is a kind of doorway to power. Here are the careers of all those who
have commanded this District since the war:
Colonel-General A.
A. Grechko became Commander-in-Chief of GSFG and a Marshal, Commander-in-Chief
of Land Forces, Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, Minister
of Defence and a member of the Politburo.
General of the
Army V. I. Chuykov--C-in-C GSFG, Commander, Kiev Military District, Marshal,
C-in-C of Land Forces and Deputy Minister of Defence.
Colonel-General P.
K. Koshevoy--First Deputy to the C-in-C GSFG, Commander, Kiev Military District
and General of the Army, C-in-C GSFG, and Marshal.
General of the
Army I. I. Yakubovskiy--C-in-C GSFG, Commander, Kiev Military District, C-in-C
of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and Marshal.
Colonel-General V.
G. Kulikov--Commander Kiev Military District, C-in-C GSFG and General of the
Army, Chief of the General Staff, C-in-C of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and
Marshal.
Colonel-General G.
I. Salmanov--Commander Kiev Military District, Commander of the Trans-Baykal
Military District.
Surprisingly, as
we have been following the brilliant careers of the Commanders of the Kiev
Military District, we have come across some old friends, whom we met previously
as C-in-C GSFG. Strangely, there has been an interchange of Generals between
Wünsdorf and Kiev. Those who have gone to Kiev have later gone to GSFG. Those
who have reached GSFG without going to Kiev have done so later. However, a
Commander of the Kiev Military District does not see himself as junior to the
C-in-C GSFG. The journey from GSFG to Kiev is not demotion and for many it has
represented promotion. Chuykov, for instance, was C-in-C GSFG as a General and
was made a Marshal when he moved to Kiev.
But perhaps the
Kiev Military District is of greater numerical strength than the others? Not at
all--Byelorussia has more troops and the Far Eastern Military District has more
than both the Kievan and Byelorussian put together. In territory Kiev is one of
the smallest of the Districts. The Siberian District is sixty-seven times as
large and Moscow District is far more important. But the Commander of the
Moscow, Siberian, Far Eastern, Byelorussian and the other Military Districts
cannot even dream of the prospects which stretch before Commanders in Kiev. In
the last twenty years not one of the Commanders of Moscow District has become a
Marshal, while all but one of those from Kiev have done so, the exception being
the most recent who is still young and who will certainly soon be promoted.
Why is there such
a sharp contrast between the Kievan and the fifteen other Districts? Simply
because the organisation designated Headquarters Kiev Military District is in
fact the Headquarters of the South-Western Strategic Direction, which in the
event of war would take control not only of the troops already on its
territory, but of those in Sub-Carpathia, Hungary (both Soviet and Hungarian)
and also the entire armed forces of Romania and Bulgaria, with their fleets,
and, finally, the Black Sea Fleet.
While relations
with China were good there were only two High Commands of Strategic
Directions--the Western and the South-Western--but as soon as the relationship
deteriorated the Far Eastern Strategic Direction was reestablished. It
encompasses the Central Asian, Siberian, Trans-Baykal and Far Eastern Military
Districts, part of the Pacific Fleet and the Mongolian armed forces. In
peacetime the Headquarters of this Strategic Direction is merged with that of
the Trans-Baykal Military District and is located in Chita. Clearly this is a
most convenient location, occupying, as it does, a central position among the
Military Districts bordering on China and protected by the buffer state of
Mongolia.
Part Two
Types of Armed
Services
How the Red Army
is divided in relation to its targets
1
Over the
centuries, the armed forces of most countries have traditionally been divided
between land armies and fleets. In the twentieth century the third category of
air forces was added. Each of the armed services is divided into different arms
of service. Thousands of years ago, land forces were already divided into
infantry and cavalry. Much later, artillery detachments were added, these were
eventually joined by tank forces, and so the process continued.
Today's Red Army
consists, unlike any other in the world, not of three, but of five different
Armed Services:
The Strategic
Rocket Forces
The Land Forces
The Air Defence
Forces
The Air Forces
The Navy
Each of these
Services, with the exception of the Strategic Rocket Forces, is made up of
different arms of service. In the Land Forces there are seven, in the Air
Defence Forces three, in the Air Forces three, and in the Navy six. The
Airborne Forces constitute a separate arm of service, which is not part of the
complement of any of the main Services.
In addition to
these Services and their constituent arms of service, there are supporting arms
of service--engineers, communications, chemical warfare and transport troops
and others--which form part of the different Services and their component arms.
In addition there are other services which support the operations of the whole
Red Army. There are fifteen or so of these but we will examine only the most
important: military intelligence and the disinformation service.
2
At the head of
each of the Armed Services is a Commander-in-Chief. The standing of these
Commanders-in-Chief varies. Three of them--those in command of the Land Forces,
the Air Force, and the Navy--are no more than administrative heads. They are
responsible for the improvement and development of their Services, and for
ensuring that these are up to strength and properly equipped. Two of the
others--the Commanders-in-Chief of the Rocket Forces and of the Air Defence
Forces--are responsible not only for administrative questions but also for the
operational control of their forces in action.
The discrepancy in
the positions of Commanders-in-Chief results from the fact that, in combat, the
Rocket Forces operate independently, without needing to work with any other
Service. In the same way, the Air Defence Forces operate in complete
independence. The Commanders-in-Chief of these two Services are subordinated
directly to the Supreme Commander and are fully responsible for their forces
both in peacetime and in war.
With the Land
Forces, Air Forces and Navy the situation is more complex. In their operations
they need to cooperate constantly and closely. If any of these three should
decide to take independent action, the results would be catastrophic. For this
reason the Commanders-in-Chief of these `traditional' Services are deliberately
denied the right to direct their own forces in war. Their task is to supervise
all aspects of the development and equipment of their Services.
Since the Land
Forces, Air Forces and Navy can only operate in close conjunction, combined
command structures have been devised to control them independently of their
Commanders-in-Chief. We have already encountered these combined
structures--they are the Fronts, which contain elements from both Land and Air
Armies, and the Strategic Directions which incorporate Fronts and Fleets.
The establishment
of these combined command structures and of systems of combat control, which
are not subordinated to individual Commanders-in-Chief, has made it possible to
solve most of the problems which result from the rivalry which has existed
between the Services for centuries.
Let us take the
case of a Soviet general who is slowly climbing the rungs of his professional
ladder. First he commands a motor-rifle division, then he becomes deputy to the
Commander of a Tank Army (it is normal practice to move officers from
motor-rifle forces to tank forces and vice versa) and next he becomes an Army Commander.
Until now he has always been a fierce champion of the interests of the Land
Forces, which he supports fervently. So far, though, his position has been too
lowly for his views to be heard by anyone outside the Land Forces. But now he
rises a little higher and becomes Commander of a Front. He now has both an
operational task, for the fulfilment of which his head is at stake, and the
forces with which to carry it out--three or four Land Armies and one Air Army.
The Commander-in-Chief of Land Forces supplies his Land Armies with all they
require, the Cbmmander-in-Chief of Air Forces does the same for his Air Army.
But it is the Front Commander who is responsible for deciding how to use these
forces in combat. In this situation every Front Commander forgets, as soon as
he takes over his high post, that he is an infantry or a tank general. He has
to carry out his operational task and for this all his Armies--Land and
Air--must be appropriately prepared and supplied. If the Air Army is worse
prepared and supplied than the All-Arms and Tank Armies, the Front Commander
will either immediately take steps himself to restore the balance or will call
on his superiors to do this. There are sixteen Front Commanders in all. All of
them are products of the Land Forces, for these provide the basic strength of
each Front, but they are in no way subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of
Land Forces in questions concerning the use of their resources. It is the Front
Commanders who have the task of directing their forces to victory. For this
reason, if the Land Forces were to be increased at the expense of the Air
Forces, all the Front Commanders would protest immediately and sharply, despite
their own upbringing in the Land Forces.
If our general
should climb still higher and become Commander-in-Chief of a Strategic
Direction, he will have a Fleet under his control, as well as four Fronts, each
of which contains a mixture of Land Forces and Air Forces.
In wartime he will
be responsible for combat operations covering huge areas and he is already
concerned, in peacetime, to ensure that all the forces under his command
develop proportionately and in balance with one another. In this way
yesterday's tank officer becomes an ardent champion of the development not only
of the Land Forces but of the Air Forces and the Navy.
3
The Armed Services
consist of arms of service. At the head of each arm of service is a Commander.
However in most cases the latter has purely administrative functions. For
instance, the Commander-in-Chief of Land Forces has as one of his subordinates
the Commander of Tank Forces. But tens of thousands of tanks are spread
throughout the world, from Cuba to Sakhalin. Every reconnaissance battalion has
a tank platoon, every motor-rifle regiment has a tank battalion, every
motor-rifle division has a tank regiment, every Army a tank division, every
Front a Tank Army, and each Strategic Direction has a Group of Tank Armies.
Naturally, decisions on the use of all these tanks in combat are taken by the
combat commanders as the situation develops. The Commander of Tank Forces is in
no position to play any part in the control of each tank unit, and any such
intervention would be a violation of the principle of sole responsibility for
the conduct and results of combat operations. For this reason, the Commander of
Tank Forces is strictly forbidden to intervene in combat planning and in
questions of the use of tanks in combat. His responsibilities cover the
development of new types of tank and their testing, the supervision of the
quality of production of tank factories, ensuring that all tank detachments are
supplied with the necessary spare parts and the training of specialists in the
Tank Force Academies, in the five Tank High Schools and in training divisions.
He is also responsible for the technical condition of tanks in all the armed
forces and acts as the inspector of all tank personnel.
The Commander of
the Rocket Forces and Artillery of the Land Forces, the Commander of the Air
Defence of Land Forces, the Commander of Fleet Aviation and Commanders of other
arms of service have similar administrative roles.
However there are
exceptions to this rule. It is possible that some arms of service may be
totally (or almost totally) deployed in a single direction. The Commanders of these
arms of service have both administrative and combat roles. These arms of
service include the Air Forces' Long-Range (strategic missile-carrying)
Aviation and Military Transport Aviation and the Airborne Forces. In wartime,
and on questions concerning the use of their forces, the Commanders of these
arms of service are subordinated directly to the Stavka.
The Strategic
Rocket Forces
1
The Strategic
Rocket Forces (SRF) are the newest and the smallest of the five Armed Services
which make up the Soviet Army. They are also the most important component of
that Army.
The SRF was
established as an independent Service in December 1959. At its head is a
Commander-in-Chief with the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union. Under his
command are three Rocket Armies, three independent Rocket Corps, ten to twelve
Rocket divisions, three sizeable rocket ranges and a large number of scientific
research and teaching establishments. The total strength of the SRF is about
half a million.
The SRF is both an
operational and an administrative organisation. In peacetime its
Commander-in-Chief is responsible to the Minister of Defence on all
administrative questions and to the Politburo on all aspects of the operational
use of rockets. In wartime the SRF would be controlled by the Defence Council,
through the Supreme Commander. A final decision on the mass use of strategic
rockets would be made by the Defence Council--i.e. the Politburo.
A Rocket Army
consists of ten divisions. A division is made up of ten regiments and a technical
base. A rocket regiment may have from one to ten launchers, depending on the
type of rocket with which it is equipped. A strategic rocket regiment is the
smallest in size of any in the Soviet Army. Its fighting strength is between
250 and 400 men, depending on the type of rocket with which it is equipped. Its
basic tasks are to maintain the rockets, to safeguard and defend them and to
launch them. Organisationally, a rocket regiment consists of the commander, his
staff, five duty launch teams, an emergency repair battery and a guard company.
This sub-unit is dignified with the title of regiment solely because of the
very great responsibility which its officers bear.
Each regiment has
an underground command post in which there is always a duty team of officers
with direct communication links with the divisional commander, the Army
commander, the commander-in-chief of the SRF and the Central command post. If
this underground post goes out of action, the commander of the regiment
immediately deploys a mobile control point working from motor vehicles. In a
threatening situation two teams are on duty simultaneously--one in the
underground command post and the other at a mobile one--so that either could
take over the firing of all the regiment's rockets.
According to the
situation, the duty teams at command posts are changed either every week or
every month.
If a launcher is
damaged, it is dismantled by the regiment's emergency repair battery. The guard
company is responsible for the protection of the command posts and of the
launchers. A large proportion of the regiment's personnel are involved in guard
duties. Not one of them will have seen a rocket or know anything about one.
Their job is to guard snow-covered clearings in pine forests, clearings which
are surrounded by dozens of rows of barbed wire and defended by minefields. The
guard company of a rocket regiment has fifty or so guard dogs.
The principal task
of a rocket division is the technical supply of its regiments. For this, a
divisional commander has under him a sub-unit known as a technical base, which
has a complement of 3,000-4,000 and is commanded by a colonel. The technical
base carries out the transport, maintenance, replacement, repair and servicing
of the regiment's rockets.
The strength of a
rocket division is 7,000-8,000.
The headquarters
of each Rocket Army is responsible for coordination of the operations of its
divisions, which will be deployed throughout a very large area. In a critical
situation, the headquarters of a Rocket Army may make use of flying command
posts to direct the firing of the rockets of regiments and divisions whose
command posts have been put out of action. The independent Rocket Corps are
organised by the Rocket Armies, except that they have three or four rather than
ten divisions. They are also armed with comparatively short-range rockets
(3,000-6,000 kilometres), some of which are fired from mobile rather than from
fixed underground launchers.
The existence of
the rocket corps is due to the fact that while the three Rocket Armies come
under the exclusive control of the Supreme Commander, they are needed to
support the forces of the three main Strategic Directions and are at the
disposal of the Commanders-in-Chief of these Directions. A whole Corps, or some
of its divisions, can be used in support of advancing forces in any of the
Directions.
Separate rocket
divisions, subordinated directly to the Commander-in-Chief of the SRF, form his
operational reserve. Some of these divisions are equipped with particularly
powerful rockets. The rest have standard rockets and can be moved to any part
of the Soviet Union, in order to reduce their vulnerability.
2
The Strategic
Rocket Forces have a much revered father figure. If he did not exist neither
would the SRF. His name is Fidel Castro: you may smile, but the SRF does not.
The story behind
this is as follows. In 1959 Castro and his comrades seized power in Cuba. No
one in Washington was alarmed by this and no reaction came from Moscow; it was
seen as a routine Latin American coup-d'état. However it was not long before
Washington became uneasy and Moscow began to show interest. The Kremlin saw an
unexpected chance to loosen the hold of its hated enemy, capitalism, on the
Western hemisphere. This was obviously an excellent opportunity but one which
it seemed impossible to exploit because of lack of strength on the spot.
Hitherto, the Soviet Union had been able to support allies of this sort with
tanks. But how could it help Fidel Castro at the other side of an ocean? At
that time the Soviet Fleet could not dream of trying to take on the US Navy,
particularly on the latter's own doorstep. Strategic aircraft existed but only
for parades and demonstrations of strength. How could the United States be
dissuaded from stepping in?
There was a simple,
brilliant solution--bluff.
It was decided to
make use of a weapon which had not yet come into service--what Goebbels would
have called a `miracle weapon'. For a miracle weapon was what the Politburo
employed. Throughout 1959 there were top-priority firings of Soviet rockets and
persistent rumours of extraordinary successes. In December rumours began to
circulate about new, top-secret forces which were all-powerful, highly
accurate, invulnerable, indestructible and so forth. These rumours were supported
by the appointment of Marshal of Artillery M. I. Nedelin to a highly important
position of some sort, with promotion to Chief Marshal of Artillery. In January
1960 Khrushchev announced the formation of the Strategic Rocket Forces, with
Nedelin at their head. He followed this with claims that nothing would be able
to withstand these forces, that they could reach any point on the globe, etc.
Talking to journalists, Khrushchev revealed `in confidence' that he had been to
a factory where he had seen rockets `tumbling off the conveyor belts, just like
sausages'. (Incidentally, then, as now, the supply of sausages was presenting
the USSR with acute problems.) The West, unaccustomed to dealing with so
high-level a charlatan, was duly impressed and consequently there was no
invasion of Cuba. During the drama which took place, Khrushchev took to making
fierce threats about `pressing the button'.
At the moment when
the establishment of the SRF was announced, a Force equal in standing to the
Land Forces and said to far exceed the latter in striking power, at the moment
when Marshal Nedelin's headquarters was established, with great show, the
Soviet rocket forces consisted of four regiments armed with 8-Zh-38 rockets
(copies of the German V.2) and one range, on which experiments with new Soviet
rockets were being carried out. The figures for rocket production were
negligible. All the rockets that were made were immediately used for
demonstrations in space while the newly-formed divisions received nothing but
replicas, which were shown off at parades and in films. Empty dummies,
resembling rockets, were splendidly designated `dimensional substitutes'.
Meanwhile, a hectic race was in progress to produce real, operational rockets.
Accidents occurred, one after another. On 24 October, 1960, when an
experimental 8-K-63 rocket blew up, the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic
Rocket Forces, Chief Marshal Nedelin, and his entire staff were burned alive
...
However, the SRF
had won its first battle, the battle for Cuba.
3
As time passed,
the SRF became able to stand on its own feet. But the bluff continues. The
American armed forces refer modestly to fifty intercontinental ballistic
missiles as a Squadron. The Soviet Army builds at least five Regiments around
this number of missiles. Alternately if the rockets are obsolescent they may
form a Rocket Division or even a Rocket Corps. The Americans do not classify a
thousand rockets as a separate Service, or even as an individual arm of
service. They are just part of the US Air Force's Strategic Air Command. In the
USSR fifteen hundred rockets make up a complete Service, commanded by a Marshal
of the Soviet Union. At present, the Americans are armed, essentially, with a
single type of intercontinental rocket, the `Minuteman'. In the Soviet Union
there are more than ten different types, amounting to approximately the same
total as the Americans possess. Why this lack of coordination? Because not one
of them is of really good quality. Some lack accuracy, and have too low a
payload, and too short a range, but they are kept in service because they are
more reliable than other types. Others are retained because their accuracy is
more or less acceptable. Others are neither accurate nor reliable but have a
good range. But there is one other reason for this untidy situation, for this
multiplicity of types. The fact is that the rocket forces have been developed
piecemeal, like a patchwork quilt. Soviet industry is unable to turn out long
production runs of rockets quickly. For this reason, while the factories are
familiarising themselves with the manufacture of one type and beginning slowly
to produce it, another type is being brought just as slowly into service.
Familiarisation with this new type starts, in a dilatory way, and a small
production run begins, with equal lack of haste, and thus, year by year, the
Rocket Forces expand, gradually and in leisurely fashion. Often a really good
rocket can only be produced in small numbers because the United States will
only sell a small quantity of the parts needed for it. For example, if the
Americans only sell seventy-nine precision fuel filters, the Soviets will be
unable to produce more than this number of rockets. Some of these will be
allocated for experimental use and the number available for operational
deployment therefore becomes smaller still. It is then necessary to design a
new rocket without high-precision filters but with electronic equipment to
control the ignition process. But then, perhaps, it is only possible to
purchase two hundred sets of this electronic equipment from the US. A
first-class rocket, but no more than two hundred can be produced...
4
The SRF faces
another, even more critical problem--its hunger for uranium. The shortage of
uranium and plutonium has led the Soviet Union to produce extremely
high-powered thermonuclear warheads with a TNT equivalent of scores of
megatons. One of the reasons for this was the poor accuracy of the rockets; in
order to offset this it became necessary to increase drastically the yield of
the warheads. But this was not the most important consideration. The
fundamental reason was that a thermonuclear charge, whatever its yield, needs
only one nuclear detonator. The shortage of uranium and plutonium made it
necessary to produce a comparatively small quantity of thermonuclear warheads
and to compensate for this by increasing their yield.
The Soviet Union
has put a lot of work into the problem of producing a thermonuclear warhead in
which reaction is brought about not by a nuclear detonator but by some other
means--for instance, by the simultaneous explosion of a large number of hollow
charges. This is very difficult to achieve, for if just one charge functions a
thousandth of a second early, it will scatter all the others. American
electronic equipment is needed to solve the problem high precision timers,
which will deliver impulses to all the charges simultaneously. There are some
grounds for believing that timers of this sort may be sold to the Soviet Union
and, if this happens, the SRF will acquire titanic strength. Meanwhile, not all
Soviet rockets have warheads. There are not enough for every rocket, so that,
at present, use is being made of radioactive material which is, quite simply,
waste produced by nuclear power stations--radioactive dust. Rather than launch
a rocket without a warhead, the wretched thing might as well be used to scatter
dust in the enemy's eyes... Naturally, scattering small quantities of dust over
wide areas of enemy territory, even if it is highly radioactive, will not do
much damage and it will certainly not decide the outcome of a war. But what can
one do if one has nothing better?
However,
naturally, the SRF must not be underestimated. Rapid technical progress is
being made and Soviet engineers are skilfully steering a course between the
technological icebergs which confront them, sometimes achieving astounding
successes, brilliant in their simplicity.
The technical
balance could change very quickly, if the West does not press forward with the
development of its own equipment as quickly and as decisively as the Soviet
Union is doing.
The National Air
Defence Forces
1
The National Air
Defence Forces (ADF) are the third most important of the five Services which
make up the Soviet Armed Forces, after the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Land
Forces. However, we will examine them at this point, directly after the SRF,
since like the latter they represent not simply an administrative structure but
a unified, controlled combat organisation, subordinated directly to the Supreme
Commander. Because they form a unified combat organisation, the ADF are always
commanded by a Marshal of the Soviet Union. The Land Forces, which are five
times the size of the ADF, and which represent the striking force of the Soviet
Union in Europe, are headed only by a General of the Army.
2
In the armed
forces of any other country, responsibility for air defence is laid upon its
air forces. In the Soviet Union, the air defence system was so highly developed
that it would be quite impossible to confine it within the organisational
structure of the Air Forces. Moreover, the ADF are the third most important
Service while the Air Forces occupy fourth place.
The independence
of the ADF from the Air Forces is due not only to their size and to their
technical development, but also to the overall Soviet philosophy concerning the
allocation of wartime roles. In any country in which Soviet specialists are
given the task of setting up or restructuring the armed forces, they establish
several parallel systems of air defence. One is a static system, designed to
defend the territory of the country and the most important administrative,
political, economic and transport installations which it contains. This is a
copy of the ADF. In addition, separate systems for self-defence and protection
against air attack are set up in the land forces, the navy and the air force.
While the national
defence system is static, those of the different armed services are mobile,
designed to move alongside the forces which they exist to protect. If several
systems find themselves operating in the same area, they work with one another
and in such a case their collaboration is always organised by the national
system.
3
The division of
the ADF into a national system and another system for the protection of the
armed services, took place long before the Second World War. All anti-aircraft
artillery and all searchlight and sound-ranging units were divided between
those under the command of army and naval commanders and those covering the
most important civil installations, which are not subordinated to army
commanders but had their own control apparatus. The fighter aircraft available
were divided in the same way. In 1939, for instance, forty air regiments (1,640
combat aircraft) were transferred from the strength of the Air Forces to that
of the ADF, for both administrative and combat purposes. Mixed ADF units were
formed from the anti-aircraft artillery, searchlight and air sub-units, which
succeeded in cooperating very closely with one another.
During the war the
ADF completed their development into a separate, independent constituent of the
Armed Forces, on an equal footing with the Land Forces, the Air Forces and the
Navy. During the war, too, the development of fighter aircraft designed
specifically for either the Air Forces or the ADF was begun. Flying training
schools were set up to train ADF pilots, using different teaching programmes
from those of the Air Forces. Subsequently, anti-aircraft gunnery schools were
established, some of which trained officers for anti-aircraft units of the Land
Forces and Navy while others prepared officers for the anti-aircraft units of
the ADF. After the war, the teams designing anti-aircraft guns for the Armed
Forces were directed to develop especially powerful anti-aircraft guns for the
ADF.
At the end of the
war the total strength of the ADF was more than one million, divided into four
ADF fronts (each with two or three armies) and three independent ADF Armies.
After the war the
ADF was given official status as an independent Armed Service.
4
Today the ADF has
more than 600,000 men. For administrative purposes they are divided into three
arms of service:
ADF Fighter
Aviation
ADF Surface-to-air
Missile Forces
ADF Radar Forces
For greater
efficiency and closer cooperation, the sub-units of these three arms of service
are brought together to form mixed units--ADF Divisions, Corps, Armies and
Fronts (in peacetime Fronts are known as ADF Districts).
The fact that
3,000 combat aircraft, among them some of the most advanced, have no
operational, financial, administrative or any other connection with the Air
Forces, has not been grasped by ordinary individuals in the West, nor even by
Western military specialists. It is therefore necessary to repeat, that the ADF
rate as a separate and independent Armed Service, with 3,000 supersonic
interceptor aircraft, 12,000 anti-aircraft missile launchers and 6,000 radar
installations.
It is because the
ADF are responsible both for the protection of Soviet territory and of the most
important installations in the USSR that they function independently. Since
they are concerned mainly with the defence of stationary targets, the fighter
aircraft developed for them differ from those with which the Air Forces are
equipped. The ADF are also equipped with surface-to-air missiles and radar
installations which differ from those used by the Land Forces and by the Navy.
The Air Forces
have their own fighter aircraft, totalling several thousand. The Land Forces
have thousands of their own anti-aircraft missile launchers, anti-aircraft guns
and radar installations. The Navy, too, has its own fighters, anti-aircraft
missiles and guns and radar, and all of these belong to the individual Armed
Service rather than to the ADF, and are used to meet the requirements of the
operational commanders of the Land Forces, Air Forces and Navy. We will discuss
these independent air defence systems later; for the moment we will confine
ourselves to the national defence system.
5
The fighter
aircraft of the ADF are organised as regiments. In all, the ADF has more than
seventy regiments, each with forty aircraft.
The ADF cannot, of
course, use fighter aircraft built for the Air Forces, any more than the latter
can use aircraft built to the designs of the ADF. The Air Forces and the ADF
operate under entirely different conditions and have different operational
tasks and each Service therefore has its particular requirements from its own
aircraft.
The ADF operates
from permanent airfields and can therefore use heavy fighter aircraft. The
fighter aircraft of the Air Forces are constantly on the move behind the Land
Forces and must therefore operate from very poor airfields, sometimes with
grass runways or even from sections of road. They are therefore much lighter
than the aircraft used by the ADF.
ADF fighters are
assisted in their operations by extremely powerful radar and guidance systems,
which direct the aircraft to their targets from the ground. These aircraft do
not therefore need to be highly manoeuvrable but every effort is made to
increase their speed, their operational ceiling and range. The Air Forces
require different qualities from their fighter aircraft, which are lighter,
since they have to operate in constantly changing situations, and from their
pilots, who have to work unassisted, locating and attacking their targets for
themselves. The Air Force fighters therefore need to be both light and highly
manoeuvrable but they are considerably inferior to those of the ADF in speed,
range, payload and ceiling.
Let us look at an
example of these two different approaches to the design of fighter aircraft.
The MIG-23 is extremely light and manoeuvrable and is able to operate from any
airfield, including those with grass runways. Clearly, it is an aircraft for
the Air Forces. By contrast, the MIG-25, although designed by the same group,
at the same time, is extremely heavy and unmanoeuvrable and can operate only
from long and very stable concrete runways, but it has gained twelve world
records for range, speed, rate of climb and altitude reached. For two decades
this was the fastest operational aircraft in the world. It is easy to see that
this is an ADF fighter.
Besides the
MIG-25, which is a high-altitude interceptor, the ADF have a low-level
interceptor, the SU 15, and a long-range interceptor, the TU 128, which is
designed to attack enemy aircraft attempting to penetrate Soviet air space
across the endless wastes of the Arctic or the deserts of Central Asia.
The Surface-to-air
Missile (SAM) Forces of the ADF consist, organisationally, of rocket
brigades (each with 10 to 12 launch battalions), regiments (3 to 5 launch
battalions) and independent launch battalions. Each battalion has 6 to 8
launchers, according to the type of rocket with which it is equipped. Each
battalion has between 80 and 120 men. First, all battalions were equipped with
S 75 rockets. Then, to replace these, two rockets, the S 125 (low-altitude and
short-range) and the S 200 (high-altitude and long-range), were developed. The
S 200 can be fitted with a nuclear warhead to destroy enemy rockets or
aircraft. Also introduced, to destroy the enemy's inter-continental ballistic
missiles, was the UR 100, which has a particularly powerful warhead, but the
deployment of this type has been limited by the US-Soviet ABM Treaty.
Each SAM battalion
is equipped with several anti-aircraft guns of small (23mm) and large (57mm)
calibre. These are used to repel either low-flying enemy aircraft or attacks by
enemy land forces. In peacetime, these anti-aircraft guns are not classified as
a separate arm of service of the ADF. However, in wartime, when the strength of
the ADF would be increased three or four times, they would form an arm of
service, deployed as anti-aircraft artillery regiments and divisions, equipped
with 23, 57, 85, 100 and 130mm guns, which are mothballed in peacetime.
The
Radar Forces of the ADF consist of brigades and regiments, together with a
number of independent battalions and companies. They are equipped with several
thousand radar installations, for the detection of enemy aircraft and space
weapons and for the guidance towards these targets of ADF robot and interceptor
aircraft.
In addition to
these three main arms of service, the complement of the ADF includes many
supporting sub-units (providing transport, communications, guard duties and
administration), two military academies and eleven higher officers' schools,
together with a considerable number of test-ranges, institutes for scientific
research and training centres.
6
Operationally the
ADF consists of a Central Command Post, two ADF Districts, which would become
ADF Fronts in wartime, eight independent ADF Armies and several independent ADF
Corps.
Up to regimental
and brigade level ADF formations are drawn from a single arm of service--for
example from SAM brigades, fighter regiments, independent radar battalions,
etc. From division level upwards, each arm of service is represented in each
formation and these are therefore called ADF Divisions, Corps, etc.
The organisation
of each division, corps or other higher formation is decided in accordance with
the importance of the installation which it is protecting. However, there is
one guiding principle: each commander is responsible for the defence of one key
point only. This principle is uniformly applied at all levels.
The commander of
an ADF division is responsible for the protection of a single, highly important
installation, for instance, of a large power-supply centre. He is also required
to prevent incursions by enemy aircraft over his sector. The division therefore
deploys one SAM brigade to cover the main installation, and moves two or three
SAM regiments into the-areas most likely to be threatened, ahead of the
brigades, and a number of independent SAM battalions into areas which are in
less danger. In addition, the divisional commander has one air regiment which
may be used to make contact with the enemy at a considerable distance, for
operations at boundaries or junctions not covered by SAM fire, or in the area
in which the enemy delivers his main thrust. The operations of the SAM
sub-units and of the interceptor aircraft are supported by radar battalions and
companies which are subordinated both to the divisional commander himself and
to the commanding officers of the division's SAM units.
An ADF corps
commander organises coverage of the target he is protecting in precisely the
same way. To protect the main installation itself he has one ADF division. Both
he and his divisional commander are involved in the defence of the same
installation. Two or three SAM brigades are moved forward to cover the sectors
which are under greatest threat, while SAM regiments are deployed in less
endangered areas. One air regiment is under the direct command of the corps
commander, for long-range use or for operations in the area in which the enemy
delivers his main attack. If the SAM sub-units are put out of action, the corps
commander can at any time make use of his fighter regiment to cover an area in
which a breakthrough is threatened. Thus there are two air regiments with each
ADF Corps, one at the disposal of the ADF divisional commander, the other for
use by the corps commander. A corps contains three or four SAM brigades, one
with the ADF division, the others at the disposal of the corps commander,
covering the approaches to the divisional position. In a corps there are five
or six SAM regiments, two or three of which are used in the division's main
sector, the remainder in the secondary sectors of the corps area. Lastly, the
corps commander himself has a radar regiment, in addition to the radar forces
of his subordinates.
An ADF Army
commander, too, is responsible for the protection of a single key objective and
has an ADF corps to cover it. In addition, an Army has two or three independent
ADF divisions, each of which provides cover for its own key installation and
also defends the main approaches to the key objective guarded by the Army.
Independent SAM brigades are deployed in the secondary sectors of the Army's
area. An Army commander also has two air regiments (one with aircraft for
high-altitude operations, the other with long-range interceptors) and his own
radar installations (including over-the-horizon radars).
An ADF District is
similar in structure. The key objective is covered by an Army. Two or three
independent ADF corps are deployed in the sectors under greatest threat while
the less endangered areas are covered by ADF divisions, each of which, of
course, has a key objective of its own. The District Commander also has two
interceptor air regiments under his command and radar detection facilities,
including very large aircraft equipped with powerful radars.
The nerve
centre--Moscow--is, of course, covered by an ADF District; the main approaches
to this District by ADF Armies and the secondary sectors by ADF corps. Each
District and Army has, of course, the task of covering a key installation of
its own.
The ADF contains
two ADF Districts. Something must be said about the reasons for the existence
of the second of these--the Baku District. Unlike the Moscow District, the Baku
ADF District does not have a key target to protect. The fact that Baku produces
oil is irrelevant: twenty-four times as much oil is produced in the Tatarstan
area as in Baku. The Baku ADF District looks southwards, covering a huge area
along the frontiers, which is unlikely to be attacked. Several of the armies of
the ADF (the 9th, for instance), have considerably greater combat resources
than the whole Baku District. It is, however, because of the need to watch such
a huge area, a task for which an ADF Army has insufficient capacity, that a
District was established there.
All in all, the
ADF is the most powerful system of its sort in the world. It has at its
disposal not only the largest quantity of equipment but in some respects the
best equipment in the world. At the beginning of the 1980s the MIG-25
interceptor was the fastest in the world and the S-200 had the largest yield
and the greatest range of any surface-to-air missile. In the period since the
war the Soviet Air Defence Forces have shown their strength on many occasions.
They did this most strikingly on 1 May, 1960, by shooting down an American U-2
reconnaissance aircraft, a type regarded until then as invulnerable, because of
the incredible height at which it could operate. There is no doubt that the
Soviet Air Defence Forces are the most experienced in the world. What other
system can boast of having spent as many years fighting the most modern air
force in the world as the Soviet ADF system in Vietnam?
In the mid-1970s
some doubt arose as to its reliability when a South Korean aircraft lost its
way and flew over Soviet Arctic territory for some considerable time before
being forced down by a Soviet SU-15 interceptor. However, the reasons for this
delay can be fully explained; we have noted that interceptor aircraft do not
represent the main strength of the ADF, which lies in its surface-to-air
missiles. The territory across which the lost aircraft flew was quite unusually
well-equipped with SAMs, but there is simply no reason to use them against a
civil aircraft. At the same time, because of the deep snow which lay in the
area, hardly any interceptors were stationed there. Their absence was
compensated for by an abnormally large number of SAMs, ready to shoot down any
military aircraft. In this unusual situation, once the invader had been found
to be a civil aircraft, it became necessary to use an interceptor brought from
a great distance. This aircraft took off from Lodeynoye Polye and flew more
than 1,000 kilometres, in darkness, to meet the intruder. In an operational
situation it would not have been necessary to do this. It would be simpler to
use a rocket.
Nevertheless,
despite everything, the ADF has its Achilles heel. The fastest aircraft are
flown by men who detest socialism with all their hearts. The pilot Byelenko is
by no means unique in the ADF.
The Land Forces
1
The Land Forces
are the oldest, the largest and the most diversified of the Services making up
the Armed Forces of the Red Army. In peacetime their strength totals
approximately 2 million, but mobilisation would bring them up to between 21 and
23 million within ten days.
They contain seven
arms of service:
Motor-rifle Troops
Tank Troops
Artillery and
Rocket Troops of the Land Forces
Air Defence Troops
of the Land Forces
Airborne Assault
Troops
Diversionary
Troops (Spetsnaz)
Fortified Area
Troops
The existence of
the last three is kept secret.
In their
organisation and operational strength, the Land Forces can be seen as a
scaled-down model of the entire Soviet Armed Forces. Just take a look at their
structure: the Strategic Rocket Forces are subordinated to the Stavka; the Land
Forces have their own rocket troops; the Air Defence Forces are subordinated to
the Stavka; the Land Forces have their own air defence troops. They also have
their own aircraft, which are independent of the Air Forces. The Air Defence
Forces, in their numbers and equipment the strongest in the world, are
subordinated to the Stavka; the Land Forces also have their own airborne troops
which, using the same yardstick, are the second strongest in the world.
The
Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces has no more than an administrative
function. His headquarters contains neither an Operational nor an Intelligence
Directorate. All operational planning is carried out by the mixed commands of
the Fronts, Strategic Directions or General Staff. The Commander-in-Chief's
responsibilities are limited to the equipment, provisioning and training of his
forces. However, despite the fact that he has no responsibility for the
direction of operations the C-in-C Land Forces is still a highly influential
administrator. Clearly, anyone who is responsible for the development and
supply of forty-one Armies, including eight Tank Armies deserves respect.
The Commanders of
the various arms of service of the Land Forces, too, have purely administrative
functions. The direction of operations, as we already know, is the function of
mixed all-arms commands, which are not subordinated for this function to either
the C-in-C or the Commanders of individual arms of service.
2
The Motor-Rifle
Troops
Each motor-rifle
section has a strength of eleven. One man acts as assistant to the rocket
launcher and is jokingly referred to as the missile transporter. He does indeed
carry three rockets, in a satchel. Each of these has a warhead capable of
penetrating the armour of any modern tank, booster and sustainer engines, a
spin stabiliser, a turbine, a fin assembly and a tracer compound.
His are not the
only rockets in the section. It is also equipped with anti-aircraft rockets
with seeker heads, which enable them to distinguish hostile aircraft from
friendly ones and to destroy them. In addition, the section has four 9-M-14
`Malyutka' rockets which have an automatic guidance system. All this in one
infantry section.
The section's
BMP-1 combat vehicle has an automatic 73mm gun and three machine guns and has
sufficient fire-power, manoeuvrability and protection to take on any modern
light tank. The section also has three radio sets, sensors for the detection of
radioactivity and gas and other complex devices in addition to its ordinary
infantry equipment.
At this, the
lowest, level, we find not a true infantry formation but a hybrid of tank,
anti-tank, SAM, chemical, sapper and other sub-units.
The infantry is
the oldest of the arms of service. All the remainder originated later and were
developed as additions or reinforcements to the infantry. From our examination
of the infantry section we see that the modern infantry is an arm of service
which, even at its lowest level, has absorbed elements of many others.
The concept of the
infantry, not as cannon fodder, but as the framework of the entire Armed
Forces, the skeleton on which the whole of the remainder develops, has been
held for a long time by Soviet generals. After the last war, all Soviet
infantry officer training schools were renamed Officer Cadet Academies, and
began to turn out, not run-of-the-mill platoon commanders, but commanders with
a wide range of knowledge, able to organise cooperation between all arms of
service in the battlefield, in order to ensure joint success.
It is for this
reason that today's officers are not called either infantry or motor-rifle
commanders, but all-arms commanders.
The organisation
of a normal Soviet regiment which, by tradition, is still called a motor-rifle
regiment, is as follows:
Command
headquarters
Reconnaissance
company
Signals company
Tank battalion
(three companies)
Three motor-rifle
battalions (each of three companies and one automatic mortar battery)
A battalion of
self-propelled howitzers (three fire batteries and one control battery)
A battery of
Grad-P multiple rocket launchers
A SAM battery
An engineer
company
A chemical defence
company
A maintenance
company
A motor transport
company
In all, the
regiment has 27 companies, only 9 of which are motor-rifle companies. It is
significant that, in a so-called `motor-rifle' regiment, there are 10 artillery
battery commanders--that is to say, one more than the number of motor-rifle
company commanders.
