The M/S Estonia Accident investigation - The biggest Fraud in Maritime History The impossible Sinking of the 'Estonia' Anders Björkman M.Sc., Naval Architect How or why did the 'Estonia' sink 1994? The fundamental deficiency of the Final report into the sinking of the 'Estonia' issued 1997 is that it does not explain how and why the ferry actually sank as a result of the published proximate cause of accident - defective locks securing the visor protecting the ramp of the forward opening in the superstructure. If you, like Heiwa Co, ask that simple question, the only reply you get is an insult; you are stupid, conspirative, unreasonable. The Commission censored the fact that the ferry floated on its undamaged watertight hull according to the principle of buoyancy of Archimedes developed circa 252 BC and that sinking could only have started, when (or if) thehull started to fill up with water. The Commission never explained how the undamaged hull - 14 watertight compartments - were filled with water so that the ferry could sink. The now infamous Final report does not mention or investigate watertight integrity, watertight doors, bilge pumps and bilge alarms in the hull preventing sinking. The Commission instead alleges (invents) that  the hull was undamaged all the times (all watertight doors were closed and the hull was intact and, indirectly the Commission confirmed, that the Principles of Archimedes applied at all times), and that there was increasing amounts of water inside the undamaged superstructure due to pitching below water of the open , forward ramp/bow door in the superstructure on the watertight car deck on top of the hull > 2,15 meters abovethe waterline producing a heeling moment, which in turn caused the ship with the undamaged hull (floating according to good Greek principles) to list ... but not trim.You would expect that the free water on the deck would trim the vessel! If the vessel trimmed on the bow, the water would simply flow out, when the ship stopped! If the vessel trimmed on the stern , the water would collect at the aft end and the opening forward would be high above the water and no more water could flow in. Thus the Commission invented that the 'Estonia' never trimmed due to water on the car deck, and that later there was water in the deck house on top of the superstructure, when the hull was still intact without any water in it (and thus still floating according to Archimedes - but not trimming!), and concluded, without giving any explanation why Archimedes suddenly was wrong, that sinking of the whole ship was then inevitable.Why and how 14 watertight compartments of the undamaged hull - totally 18 000 cubic meters volume - on which the 'Estonia' initially floated with displacement about 12 000 tons and with 6 000 cubic meter of reserve buoyancy and closed watertight doors was waterfilled is never explained. One major reason to have the investigation re-opened is actually to clarify this very serious deficiency - how can a heeling moment produced by water inside a superstructure cause an intact ship hull to sink? Naval architects everywhere are invited to answer the riddle. The members of the  Royal Institution of Naval Architects and students of marine accidents have been invited 2002) to explain why the 'Estonia' sank in the official sequence of events of the Commission/Final report as quoted below. Nobody at the RINA has replied (2004).
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(a) the superstructure,
(b) the deck house ... and
(c) the hull of the 'Estonia'.
This
There are at least 33 'events' according to the Commission/Final report preceeding the sinking (none of them proven!) - events 1-18 are about the list occasioned by alleged very large, increasing amounts of water inside the superstructure on the watertight car deck producing a big heeling moment (the trimming moment is conveniently forgotten) of the intact hull.
Then there are events 19-33 about the flooding of the deck house on top of the superstructure and 8-18 meters above the waterline. There the Commission states - event 30 - that due to flooding of the deck house (sic) - 8-18 meters above the waterline - the watertight compartments of the hull below waterline started to flood from above!? Mr Sjöling was appointed to explain this surprising effect - the watertight compartments of the hull started to flood from above. How?
No scientific explanation had been given for eight years why water in the open deck house of the 'Estonia' flooded the hull compartments below the superstructure. It is evidently not possible to explain at all! Event 34 - that the ship inevitably sank - is therefore not explained. Please dear reader, remember, every event must also have a proven cause to produce an effect. In spite of the fact that Mr Sjöling should explain the water filling based on the official sequence of events including flooding from above, Sjöling invents new defects - ventilation ducts in the side - and new phenomena - the vessel floats on the deck house, which is only flooded when one or two doors or a few windows break open - preventing capsize for 35 minutes!
Some basic information that Mr Sjöling ignores in his study:
the 'Estonia' floats on the watertight hull, which is subdivided into 14 watertight compartments by watertight, transverse bulkheads fitted with (too many) watertight doors. The hull, 7.56 meters deep, is shown in green in the figure right where the double bottom of the hull is shown blue. The main engine room compartment in the hull is purple. The top of the hull is the watertight car deck no. 2, which is >2,15 meters above the waterline,
More basic information to consider:
The alleged 'sinking' of the 'Estonia is only described by the Commission in two pages (pp 175) in chapter 13.2.6 and in a couple of pages (pp 181) in chapter 13.6 of the 228 pages Final report, FR. It is only a long description of events about the list (no mention about trim) and a long description of further events of the flooding of the deck house 8-18 meters above waterline but very little about the sinking (why the hull compartments were flooded). There is in fact no evidence for any alleged event - the whole sequence of events is made up from bits and pieces of real or fabricated happenings onboard and false (or incorrect) stability calculations. It means that an alleged event cannot be supported by a valid stability or floatability calculation. Every event is just an invention of the Commission. Thus it is very difficult for Mr. Sjöling to explain the water filling of the hull and the sinking.
The movements (speed, course, position, angle of heel, etc) of the 'Estonia' during the 33 events leading up to the sinking at 0152 hrs are plotted in figure 13.2 of the Final report. It can easily be proven that this plot is
The Final report gives some key times 01.14, 01.24, 01.27, 01.33, 01.42 and 01.52 hrs with certain amounts of water in the superstructure and the deck house and the associated angle of list as per below table. The expert of the Commission, Dr. Michael Huss, FRINA, who made the original plot, had previously suggested other - much smaller - amounts/angles of list in a report to the Commission, which were later modified in the Final report.
Huss only calculated the water inflow into the superstructure and the resulting list until capsize (at 01.42 hrs). Trim was not considered. Huss knew that the ship would capsize but cannot admit it. His calculations therefore stop, when 2 000 tons have entered the superstructure. Huss has falsified the inflow rates to delay the capsize. Huss cannot explain how the hull would fill with water. Dr Huss assisted the Commission to falsify the accident investigation.
The Commission arbitrarily then suggested that the water inflow (tons/min) into the superstructure was about six to seventeen times larger than suggested by dr Huss. Huss did not protest! The Commission did not provide any stability calculations except
a"During the port turn water continued to enter the car deck and the list increased to 20-30 degrees where the vessel for some minutes stabilised as the water inflow decreased". (Chapter 13.2.6 of (5)) - Event 14 below
Time
(h. m. s.)
/in the Deck House as per Huss (tons)
/in the Deck House as per the Final report (tons)
b"By about 0120 hrs all four main engines had stopped ... The main generators stopped about five minutes later.
After the main engines stopped, the 'Estonia' drifted with a list of about 40 degrees and the starboard side towards the waves". (Chapter 13.2.6 of (5)) - Event 15 below
c"... and the vessel started to sink. At a list of about 80 degrees the bridge was partly flooded. This happened shortly after 0130 hrs as indicated by the clock in the chartroom ... The emergency generator stopped at the same time ..." (Chapter 13.2.6 of (5)) - Events 18 and 31 below.
There is no doubt that the Commission manipulated (added to) Huss figures. Thus all alleged events of the Commission are not based on any correct stability calculations - just on arbitrary angles of heel and amounts of water inside the ship. It is a scandal that Mr Sjöling does not discover this. Evidently you must check the validity of the input data. Has Mr Sjöling not heard the expression 'Rubbish in - rubbish out'?
The 33 events or statements of the Commission below left are verbally from the Final report with right some comments and references to the book
No.
Event as per the Commission - 13.2.6 in FR - Development of the list ... of the vessel Comments 1.
"On deck 1 the first passengers left their cabins already when they began hearing metallic blows from the bow area. A few have reported seeing small amounts of water in corridors on deck 1 and feeling that the vessel already at this stage had a slight list". There is no evidence that the metallic blows allegedly heard by some passengers on deck 1 originated from the bow area - 2.
"While the ramp was partly open inside the visor, water entered the car deck along the sides of the ramp, as observed first by the third engineer at 0110-0115 hrs on the TV monitor showing the forward part of the car deck". This event is strange - the ramp could not have been partly open inside the visor, as the ramp was pulled fully open when the visor fell off and 'water entering the superstructure' at the leaking ramp is alleged to have occurred two minutes after the sudden list according to the systems engineer (Sillaste) - 3.
"The water noted by the first passengers fleeing from their cabins on deck 1 could (sic) at this stage have poured down to the accommodation on deck 1".
For this 'event' - water pouring down to deck 1 - to be possible water must thus have entered at the ramp, flooded the superstructure up above the sills of the starboard fire doors (25 cms high) in the centreline not causing any list (then the water would flow to the starboard side) and through the slots of the fire doors. Then into the stairwell on deck 2 - the fire doors are not lined up with the stairs - flooding the stairwell enclosure and then down into the hull via the nearest stairs. However - the stairwell doors on deck 1 are on the port side - there are no doors on the starboard side on deck 1 (the ship was listing to starboard), so the water should have flowed down to deck 0 - the bilges! So the water 'could' not have poured down from deck 2. It is more likely it came from below - deck 0! 4.
"Later, during the evacuation, several passengers observed on deck 2 that water entered the staircase through the slots around the fire doors to the car deck". Later the list had developed, so all alleged water in the superstructure should have been in one starboard corner on deck 2 far away from any fire doors. And apparently nobody observed water flowing down the stairs to deck 1 or 0. The 'event' is not proven. It is an invention by the Commission. 5.
"After the ramp had been forced open by the visor, waves may (sic) have caused the ramp to move between fully open (sic) and partly closed position but generally a significant opening was available for waves (sic) to enter the car deck as further described in 13.5 below".
(So we move to chapter 13.5)Waves 'may' not have caused the rampt to move at all. Note that the ramp (16 tons of steel) is alleged to have been moved between fully open, i.e. fully down, and partly closed position, i.e. up, by waves, while the ship was doing 14 knots with a pitching/relative motion amplitude forward of >5 meters. The weight of the ramp itself is not considered. Evidently a 16 tons ramp cannot flip up/down due to wave motion. You would expect the ramp to fall down on the fore peak deck below the waves and act as a plough pushing the water into the superstructure. Then the ramp would twist itself around the bow - . Event as per the Commission - 13.5 in FR - Failure sequence of ... ramp Evidently the ramp must be fully open in order for
2 000-4 000 tons of water to enter the superstructure.6.
"... probably (sic) in one single movement, the visor pulled the ramp forward so that its locking devices and hydraulic actuators failed. The ramp was then free to fall forward towards the uppermost cross-bar of the visor". There is no evidence for this 'probable' 'event'. The ramp locks and hooks are undamaged - 7.
"... Only during the final phase, when the ramp had been forced partly open, could water, collected in the visor, flow onto the car deck through the openings along the sides of the ramp".
(We continue in chapter 13.2.6)The time for this alleged 'event' is 0115 hrs, even if there is no evidence for it. This is all in chapter 13.5 about the ramp and waves (sic - event 5) starting to enter into the superstructure. According to event 3 water had already flowed down to deck 1 before this time. . Event as per the Commission - 13.2.6 in FR - Development of the list ... of the vessel (continued) The ramp is now fully open! No list has developed. 8.
"The large amounts of water flooding onto the car deck caused the vessel to heel over and after a few rolling movements (sic) a significant list developed to starboard".
This alleged 'event' is at 0115-0117 hrs.
The result is that all water collects in one starboard corner of the superstructure, the ship lists so that the water cannot flood any compartment of the hull -9.
"This happened within the first minutes after the visor had separated from the ship". There is no evidence that the visor separated from the ship. Evidently - water (e.g. 571 tons) in thesuperstructure causes the ferry to list (e.g. 15 degrees) and to trim (e.g. 0.5 meters and then the water flows out if the speed is zero). But you would expect that 180 tons would have been scooped up into the superstructure every six seconds or > 1 800 tons in one minute before the speed became zero causing immediate capsize, or that the first wave would have pushed down the bow under water forever. 10. "According to witnesses the ship steadied temporarily at a list angle of about 15 degrees". Actually witnesses stated that the ship first listed >30 degrees, maybe 50 degrees and then uprighted to 15 degrees list - 11.
"... At about the time when the list developed, the engines were throttled back close to idling speed and the vessel was turned into the wind as dealt with in section 13.3".
(So we move to chapter 13.3)There is no evidence for these two alleged separate 'events'. Elsewhere in the Final report it is suggested that the engines were running for another five minutes. Nobody has observed a 180° turn -
. Event as per the Commission -13.3 in FR - Action on the bridge 12.
"... It is evident (sic) to the Commission that, because of the list and the sound from the (the visor's) collision (with the bulbous bow) the officers on the bridge initiated a reduction of speed and a turn to port".
(We continue in chapter 13.2.6)It is not evident that (a) there were any officers on the bridge and (b) that they took the two alleged actions. This is all in chapter 13.3 about the engines were throttled back, etc., and the vessel turned into the wind. Nobody survived from the bridge. Nobody has observed any 180° turn. . Event as per the Commission - 13.2.6 in FR - Development of the list ... of the vessel (continued) . 13.
"... It is the opinion (sic) of the Commission that full service speed setting was maintained right up to the time when the list developed".
As the visor is alleged to have fallen off at 0115 hrs and the first list developed until 0117 hrs, the speed 14/15 knots was maintained for two minutes. Actually full service speed was >19 knots. 14.
"During the port turn water continued to enter the car deck (i.e. into the superstructure) and the list increased to 20-30 degrees where the vessel for some minutes (sic) stabilised as the water inflow decreased (sic)". These events are at about 0116-0120 hrs. Nobody has observed the 180° turn.
The second period of stabilisation 'for some minutes' is not mentioned anywhere else in the Final report. Compare15.
"By about 0120 hrs (sic) all four main engines had stopped ... The main generators stopped about five minutes later.
After the main engines stopped, the 'Estonia' drifted with a list of about 40 degrees and the starboard side towards the waves".This event is at about 0120-0125 hrs.
The condition - 'event' - with 40 degrees list was unstable -
'... the 'Estonia' with 40 degrees list ...
16. "Water continued to enter the car deck (i.e. the superstructure) through the bow but at a significantly lower rate(sic)". We are again told that the inflow into the superstructure decreased, but it is not possible, because the list increased rapidly indicating a bigger heeling moment of water in the superstructure (a bigger inflow 666 t/min). At this time the bow was allegedly turned away from the waves so the water should have flown out (when the vessel floated on the deck house). Actually the ferry should have been floating upside down at this time - capsize!
Note that there is no mention about the vessel trimming due to the inflow water!
17. "Waves were pounding against the windows on deck 4. Window panels and aft doors broke, allowing flooding of the accommodation to start". It is correct that the deck house (deck 4) came under water at this angle of list (40 degrees). The deck houseis neither water- nor weather tight. 18. "As the flooding progressed, the list and the trim by the stern increased and
the vessel started to sink". Trim by the stern? How was that possible? The water was only extra cargo loaded on the car deck in thesuperstructure - but why would the ship with an undamaged hull start to sink ... and trim! ... due to that? Why hadn't she trimmed from the start? Was the ship overloaded? Yes, of course, with > 2 000 tons water inside the superstructure - and she should have capsized - not sunk due to it!
So now will we will finally know how and why the ship sank, i.e. how the buoyancy in the hull was lost ... or?
. Event as per the Commission - 13.2.6 in FR - ... sinking of the vessel (continued) Comments 19.
At a list of about 80 degrees the bridge (sic) was partly flooded. This happened shortly after 0130 hrs as indicated by the clock in the chartroom ... The emergency generator stopped at the same time ..."
"... the vessel started to sink. So the vessel started to sink after 0130 hrs - what it was doing prior to events 18 - 19 was only listing - and floating ... but not trimming. Suddenly the list was 80 degrees - a completely unstable condition/'event' - how was it reached shortly after 0130 hrs we do not know. At 0124 hrs the list was only 40 degrees (event 15) without trim. Note that the bridge (deck 9) was alleged to be flooded - but then the trim must have been on the bow. But in event 31 below decks 7 and 8 of the deck house (sic) were not flooded - they were a'stability reserve' - see event 22. And if the ship was trimming on the stern the bridge would have been above water. How could the clock on the bridge stop at 0135 hrs, unless the ship had already sunk then?
' ... the 'Estonia' with 80 degrees list at 0130 hrs ...'
20.
"... The sinking continued, stern first and the vessel disappeared from the surface of the sea at about 0150 hrs". So the sinking 'event' took place for 20 minutes between 0130 and 0150 hrs? But how did it take place? How was the buoyancy in the hull lost? How could water fill the hull? What happened to the testimonies from the 'Mariella' that the ship disappeared already 0136 hrs? 21.
"This phase of the accident (i.e. the sinking) is covered further in 13.6".
(So we move to chapter 13.6)Aha - we have to look into yet another chapter in the Final report for this 'event' - sinking - the hull being filled with water - to be clarified! The end of the accident is still not reached. . Event as per the Commission - 13.6 in FR - Flooding of the accommodation ... But first a description how the deck house was filled with water. 22.
"... Because of the list, waves reached up to the accommodation decks (i.e. decks 4-8), breaking doors and windows.The interior started to flood and the stability reserve (sic) disappeared".
Here is a strange statement - the stability reserve disappeared - in the deck house? What 'event' was that? There is no stability reserve in a deck house, which is not weathertight.
The stability of the ship is only provided by the hull (and by the intact superstructure, if it is tight. But in this case the superstructure was open to the sea and full of water and did not contribute to any stability - it was full of water listing the ship).
Strangely (sic) enough there are no correct stability calculations in the Final report (or in Mr Sjöling's study). On the other hand there are numerous false stability calculations in the Final report by Finnish and Swedish professors and 'experts', which Mr Sjöling expands on. Mr Sjöling proves here that he is 100% incompetent - he cannot understand that the stability calculations of the Commission are false.23.
"The first potential openings (sic) to be submerged were the aft windows on deck 4. In calm water (sic) this would happen when about 2 000 tons of water ... had entered the car deck (sic - the superstructure) and caused a heel angle of about 40 degrees". This is a repetition of event 15 at 0124 hrs. But one statement is correct - 2 000 tons of water loaded as extra cargo in the superstructure would have caused a list of 40 degrees - in calm water (assuming no trim). What was the righting lever GZ at this angle of heel? Answer is 0. What happens when GZ = 0? The ship capsizes! What is the trimming moment of 2 000 tons? Answer it is exactly equivalent to the maximum righting moment of the intact hull. Thus the remaining righting moment is zero = capsize.
In what direction trimmed the ship due to 2 000 tons - bow or stern?
Actually the first 'opening' to be submerged was either the bow opening in the superstructure itself , or, if the ship trimmed on the stern, the aft ventilators to the superstructure, with the bow several meters above water (and away from the waves).24.
"... The first windows broke probably a little after the main engines had stopped and when the vessel was drifting with her starboard side to the waves". This is a repetition of event 15. Is this relevant? Does a ship float on windows on deck 4? Why doesn't the ship capsize? Mr Sjöling has no idea! He thinks the vessel floats on the deckhouse. 25.
"Quickly submerged were also the aft windows on deck 5. This happened at a list of about 50 degrees ..." Or this? Windows on deck 5. Does the ship float on those? Why doesn't she capsize? The time is 0127 hrs. 26.
"... When some of the large windows on decks 4 and 5 broke, these decks became subject to progressive floodingand no buoyancy (sic) or stability (sic) contribution (sic) was available from this part of the superstructure (sic)".
This is very strange - the deck house (decks 4 and 5) is regarded as a superstructure. The real superstructurewas of course decks 2 and 3 (the car decks), which were already flooded. But it is of course correct that large (or small) windows (sic) of the deck house does not contribute to buoyancy or stability - this is basic naval architecture. The ship does not float on the deck house windows! Windows are evidently not permitted in a superstructure. 27.
"... As soon as the accommodation spaces (sic - the deck house decks 4 and 5) started flooding, the flooding could not stop before the vessel sank ... This is a 100% incorrect statement. The 'accommodation spaces' are the deck house, but it is not the flooding of a deck house that sinks a ship - it is the flooding of watertight compartments of the hull! Flooding of a deck house leads to capsize! 28. ... or the condition could no longer remain stable ...
Interesting statement - 'or the condition could no longer remain stable'! Exactly - this is it - the 'Estonia' should have capsized and floated upside down on the undamaged hull, when the deck house came under water at 0125 hrs - actually, when the righting arm GZ was 0 at 40 degrees list! But in event 31 below the ship is stable! And she is stable and floating for another 30 minutes. 29.
... as there were connections between different decks via staircases and other openings. Totally unclear and another 100% incorrect statement.! Did the ship sink or did the condition become unstable as there were staircases and other openings connecting decks in the deck house? But the deck house was flooded because the windows were broken. No mention of any ventilation ducts in the side to cause flooding of the hull. They are invented later - by Sjöling 2003. The text left was written 1997. 30.
"The watertight compartments below the car deck were thus flooded from above".
? Completely unclear and impossible - thus another 100% false statement! If the 14 watertight compartments on decks 0-1 below the car deck - the hull - were not flooded, when the superstructure decks 2-3 was flooded, it will not take place at any later stage, when the angle of heel is greater and when decks 4 and 5 are flooded. Water in the deck house decks 4-9 should evidently first flow down into the superstructuredecks 2-3! This event is complete nonsense. It is nonsense because the Commission censors the simple fact that capsize takes place much earlier. 31.
"... 18 000 tons of water onboard, distributed between the car deck and decks 4 and 5 (sic) would have given a heel angle of about 75 degrees ..."
?? Another 100% false statement based on available falsified stability calculations! With 18 000 tons of water onboard the vessel would have sunk like a stone - there were only 6 000 m3 of reserve buoyancy in the hull. But you only needed 2 000 tons loaded on the car deck in the superstructure to make her capsize and float upside down on the hull long before this event 31. And why were water not distributed in the deck house decks 6, 7, 8 and 9? The bridge - deck 9 - was flooded already shortly after 0130 hrs, when the clock stopped - event 19!
The statement ('event 31') is complete nonsense.
Actually the 'stability experts' of the Commission - see below - apparently assumed that there were 4 000 tons of water in the 'superstructure', 14 000 tons of water in the 'deck house' (decks 4 and 5) and that decks 6, 7 and 8 were completely watertight providing at least 18 000 tons of extra buoyancy that evidently does not exist! 32.
"It can be concluded (sic) that, although the vessel fulfilled the SOLAS damage (sic) stability requirements ..., she had no possibilities to withstand progressive flooding through the superstructure (sic, i.e. deck house) openings once the heel angle approached 40 degrees."
This is nonsense - progressive flooding through the superstructure at heel angle 40 degrees ??? Strange conclusion - who has ever heard of progressive flooding of a 7,6 meters deep hull through the deck house openings (sic) situated >6-10 meters above the hull - via a floodedsuperstructure? Water could never flow down into the hull of the 'Estonia from above!
SOLAS damage requirements are only about side collision damage (structure ripped apart) to the hullstarting at the keel upwards without limit, where the hull is flooded from outside/below waterline first - one or two compartments. The hull shall then still float with the superstructure above water. The deck house is evidently not considered at all!
Why not simply say that the vessel would have capsized and floated upside down, when the heel angle approached 40 degrees due to water collected inside the superstructure above waterline? The righting arm GZ was then zero! See events 23 and 28 above. No flooding of the hull will or can ever take place. The conclusion in event 32 is nonsense.
In addition it is not proven that the vessel fulfilled the SOLAS damage stability requirements. The hull had 22 watertight doors, which was against the SOLAS requirements -33.
"When windows on the accommodation decks (i.e. in the deck house decks 4 - 9) were broken by wave forces, subsequent
.... sinking was inevitable". ???? Strange statement ('event') - ships do not sink because windows in the deck house are broken! Ships do not float on windows. It is not inevitable that ship sinks when a window is broken. The only purpose of the windows were to protect the passengers from wind, rain, cold and weather and to provide light and a view of the sea. This is one of the most stupid statements in the whole Final report - sinking is inevitable when windows in the non-watertight deck house were broken! But it is part of the official sequence of events. . Event as per the Commission - 13.6 in FR - ... and the sinking of the vessel. So now we will be told how the vessel inevitably sank. 34.
" ... sinking was inevitable". Why was it inevitable? There is no explanation in the Final report why and how the ship sank! Except that the windows in the deck house were broken. Had the windows not broken, then the vessel would have floated according to the Commission and its stability experts. You wonder what monkeys have concluded events 1-34 left above? It is not a serious accident investigation!
The above 33 'events' are the alleged 'scientific' explanations by the Commission after 38 months of secret deliberations, why the 'Estonia' sank in 37 or 20 minutes, i.e. how 14 watertight compartments in the hull were flooded and 12 000 m3 of buoyancy and 6.000 m3 of reserve buoyancy in the hull were lost. But the latter - event 34, the inevitable sinking - is never explained.
The conclusion that a ship sinks due to windows breaking in a deck house 8-12 meters above waterline is of course ridiculous - but it is the official explanation for the biggest maritime accident in the Baltic since 1945. You wonder what clown wrote this? And why not one Estonian, Finnish or Swedish expert has queried it! Except the undersigned (who is based in Egypt and France). Anyway, Mr. Staffan Sjöling of the Swedish Defence Board of Equipment accepted in September 2002 to explain in 60 hours how to describe the sinking. And Mr Sjöling accepted all above 33 events as truth! Mr Sjöling has then proven himself incompetent.
We are in fact not very interested in the various 'events' when the ship was still floating, we are only interested why the 'Estonia' sank according to the principle of Archimedes.
More basic information:
Events 19-33 are about water in the deckhouse causing a ship to sink. Everybody (including Mr Sjöling) should know that a ship does not float on a deckhouse or its windows (it is always high up in the air) but the Commission made up 15 events to explain that water in a deckhouse with broken windows causes sinking of the hull. It is to say the least unsatisfactory. An even more obvious and serious question was never replied to in the Final report - why didn't the 'Estonia' capsize and float upside down when the superstructure was flooded? Doesn't the principle of Archimedes apply at every alleged 'event'?
It is sad to conclude that all 33 'events' above are false - the listing (events 1 - 18) cannot have been caused by water in the superstructure and the flooding of the deck house (event 19 - 33) with broken windows is irrelevant and cannot have caused the sinking - the flooding of the watertight hull below the superstructure and associated loss of buoyancy.
It is even sadder to note that Mr Sjöling in 2002-2003 expands on the broken windows deckhouse doors theory - he assumes that the deckhouse is watertight and allows small amounts of water to enter the deck house through selected windows and doors, while at the same time the ship floats on the deck house. This is not incompetence - it is unscientific and in the circumstances ... criminal. Sjöling assists to clean up after the cover up.
If the ramp had been fully open when the ship was making 14/15 knots and pitching up/down five meters every six seconds, as alleged by the Commission, the ship should simply have capsized in the first minute - each wave entering the superstructure (every six second) would have added 180 tons of water into the superstructure. Any other story with an open ramp, speed forward and big pitching is a fairy tale. Mr Sjöling does not agree ... he believes the vessel floats on unbroken windows.
Who wrote the fairy tale in the Final report? It seems to have been written by persons with some knowledge of ship and stability and it should be clear that these persons are fully aware that they are making it up? Evidently the story does not tally fully with the official plot of the accident. Why did the Commission publish a
The stability experts were, i.a. dr. Michael Huss, FRINA, professor Olle Rutgersson, FRINA and member of RINA Safety Committee, captains Hans Rosengren, Olle Noord and Sten Anderson, Sweden, mr Tuomi Karppinen (head of Finnish Bord of Accident Investigations since 2002), Anti Rantanen and Veli-Matti Junnila and professor Jerzy Matusiak, Finland and professor Heino Levald of Estonia, none of whom have questioned the info on this page - they all refuse to answer.
The writer has in fact met dr Michael Huss (August 1997) and asked him to explain the stability during the sinking. Dr Huss refused but was kind enough to accuse the writer of being conspiratorial before he (Huss) left the room in anger. Dr Huss is today the head of the ship department of the Swedish Maritime Administration in charge of stability, etc. It seems that dr Huss is looking for new staff to help him falsifying more stability calculations - the NMA is looking for new staff - call in Sweden (+46) Mikael Huss 011-19 18 12, Göran Liljeström 011-19 13 29, Tina Hjort 011-19 14 46 for more info.
And how comes that no serious naval architects except Heiwa Co have questioned the fairy tales of the Commission for seven years? (Or ten years - this article is up-dated in 2004) A new investigation should give the answer. All new facts are, as stated above, to be collected and analysed by the
Heiwa Co suggests since 1994 that the 'Estonia' sank due
Heiwa Co suggests since 2002 that the Swedish government ordered the removal of the visor under water after the accident to assist the Commission to produce a false investigation report. Explosives were used and
Heiwa Co encourages 2004 the Estonian people to demand a completely new investigation into the sinking of the 'Estonia' 1994.
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