TERRITORY AND POLITICS IN ISRAEL/PALESTINE
Oren Yiftachel
Department of Geography, Ben Gurion University, Beer Sheva, Israel, 84105
Fax: 972-8-278991; Email: yiftach@mail.bgu.ac.il
In February 1998, President of the Israeli High Court, Aharon Barak, issued a statement explaining the temporary deferral of proceedings on an appeal known as the 'Katzir case'. The appeal was lodged in 1995 by an Arab citizen against his rejection from leasing state land in the Israeli village of Katzir, on grounds of not being a Jew. Judge Barak, publicly known as a champion of human rights, urged the sides to find a personal housing solution for the appellant, and noted that deliberating on this case has been among the most strenuous in his legal career.
The fact that in Israel's 50th year, the state's highest legal authority still finds it difficult to protect a basic civil right such as equal access to state land, provides a telling starting point for reflecting over the evolution of the country's political geography. On the basis of such reflection I will argue later that the Israeli polity cannot be classified as a democracy, but is rather as a "settling ethnocracy''.
Judaising the Homeland
Following independence, Israel entered a radical stage of territorial restructuring. Some policies and initiatives were an extension of earlier Jewish approaches, but the tactics, strategies and ethnocentric cultural construction of the pre-1948 Jewish Yeshuv were significantly intensified. This was enabled with the aid of the newly acquired state apparatus, armed forces, and the international legitimacy attached to national sovereignty.
The territorial restructuring of the land has centered around an all-encompassing and expansionist Judaisation (de-Arabisation) program adopted by the nascent Israeli state, following the 1947-49 flight and expulsion of close to 800,000 Palestinians. This created big 'gaps' in the geography of the land, which the authorities were quick to fill with Jewish settlements inhabited by migrants and refugees who entered the country on-mass during the late 1940s and early 1950s.
The Judaisation program was premised on a hegemonic myth cultivated since the rise of Zionism, namely that "the land' (Haaretz) belongs to the Jewish people, and only to the Jewish people. An exclusive form of territorial ethnonationalism developed, in order to quickly 'indigenise' immigrant Jews, and to conceal, trivialise or marginalise the existence of a Palestinian people on the land prior to the arrival of Zionist Jews.
The 'frontier' became a central icon, and its settlement was considered one of the highest achievements of any Zionist. The frontier kibbutzim (collective rural villages) provided a role model, and the reviving Hebrew language was filled with positive images such as aliya lakaraka (literally 'ascent to the land', i.e.. settlement), ge'ulat karka ('land redemption'), hityashvut, hitnahalut (positive biblical terms for Jewish settlement), kibbush hashmama ('conquest of the desert'), and hagshama (literally 'fulfilment' but denoting the settling of the frontier). The glorification of the frontier thus assisted in the construction of both national-Jewish identity, and in the capturing of physical space on which this identity can be territorially constructed.
A popular youth-movement song, frequently sang in schools and public gatherings and known to nearly every Jew in Israel during its formative years, illustrates the powerful construction of these icons and myths. This song was far from exceptional among dozens of other similar songs and cultural expressions in attempting to anchor Jewish-Zionist identity in the land, and create an unbreakable bond between people and country, blood and soil:
(By: A. Levinson; Translation: Oren Yiftachel)
We shall build our country, our homeland
Because it is ours, ours, this land
We shall build our country, our homeland
It is the command of our blood, the command of generations
We shall build our country despite our destroyers
We shall build our country with the power of our will
The end to malignant slavery
The fire of Freedom is burning
The glorious shine of hope
Will stir our blood
Thirsty for freedom, for independence
We shall march bravely towards the liberation of our people
Such sentiments were translated into a pervasive program of Jewish-Zionist territorial socialisation, expressed in school curriculum, literature, political speeches, popular music, and other spheres of public discourse. Settlement thus continued to be a cornerstone of Zionist nation-building, even after the establishment of a sovereign Jewish state.
To be sure, the 'return' of Jews to their ancestors mythical land, and the perception of this land as a safe haven after generations of Jewish persecutions had a powerful liberating meaning. Yet the 'darker sides' of this project were nearly totally absent from the construction of an unproblematic 'return' of Jews to their biblical promised land. Very few dissenting voices were heard against these 'Judaising' discourse, policies or practices. If such dissent did emerge, the national-Jewish elites found effective ways to marginalise, co-opt or gag most challengers.
The hegemonic historical and political perception of the land as only Jewish created a national discourse dominated by an unproblematic historical linearity of 'forced exile' and subsequent 'return', nearly 2,000 years later. A parallel discourse developed in reaction to the Arab-Jewish conflict (and Arab rejectionism), elevating the exigencies of national security onto a level of unquestioned gospel. These discourses made most Jews 'blind' to a range of discriminatory policies imposed against the state's Palestinian citizens, including imposition of military rule, lack of economic or social development, political surveillance and under-representation, and -- most important for this essay -- large-scale confiscation of Palestinian land.
Judaisation, Settlement and Palestinian Land
With the establishment of the state, the Jewish settlement project swung into full gear, with a mission to de-Arabise the country, accompanied by a drive to control Palestinian-Arab land. Prior to 1948, only about 7-8 percent of the country was in Jewish hands, and about 10 percent was vested with the representative of the British Mandate. The Israeli state, however, quickly increased its land holdings, and it currently owns 92 percent of the state area (within the Green Line). The lion's share of this land transfer was based on expropriation of Palestinian refugee property, but even about two thirds of the land belonging to Palestinians who remained as Israeli citizens were expropriated. At present, Palestinian-Arabs, who constitute around 16 percent of Israel's population, own only around three percent of its land.
A central aspect of Jewish land transfer was its legal unidirectionality. Israel created an institutional and legal land regime, where confiscated land did not merely become state land, but (jointly) belonged to the entire Jewish people, and was prohibited from being sold. This ensured a unidirectional character of all land transfers: from Palestinians to the state, and never vice versa.
During the 1950s and 1960s, and following the transfer of land to the state, over 700 Jewish settlements were constructed in all parts of the country. This created the infrastructure for the housing of Jewish immigrants who continued to pour into the country. The Jewish Agency and Jewish National Fund -- two bodies representing world Jewry, were granted legal rights to settle and develop the land on behalf of the state and the 'Jewish People'.
The upshot was the penetration of Jews into most Palestinian areas, the encirclement of most Palestinian villages by exclusively Jewish settlements (where non-Jews are not permitted to purchase housing), and the virtual ghettoisation of the Palestinian minority. In the process, the Palestinian citizens of Israel did not only lose individual property, bwere also dispossessed of many collective territorial assets, since nearly all land transferred to the state was earmarked for Jewish use.
A particularly sophisticated system of exclusion was formulated in rural areas, where all Jewish settlements were allocated state land by a method known as a 'triple-sided contract'. Under this arrangement, land is held jointly by (a) the Jewish village as a collectivity, (b) the Israel Land Authority, and (c) the Jewish Agency. The land-holding powers of the Jewish agency and the Jewish National Fund create a situation in which Israel's Palestinian citizens are nearly totally prevented from purchasing, leasing or using land in around 80 percent of the country, being the total area controlled by Israeli rural Regional Council.
Settlement and Intra-Jewish Segregation
Beyond the obvious adverse consequences for the Palestinians, the Jewish settlement project also spawned regressive processes of segregation and stratification within Jewish society. In order to explain, let us outline in more detail the social and ethnic nature of the Israeli-Jewish settlement project which advanced in three main waves.
During the first wave, in the 1949-52 period, some 240 communal villages (kibbutzim and moshavim) were built, mainly along the Green Line. During the second wave, from the early 1950s to the mid-1960s, 27 'development towns' and a further 56 villages were built and populated mainly by North-African Mizrahi Jewish immigrants. During the same period large groups of Mizrahim were also housed in 'frontier' urban neighbourhoods, which were either previously Palestinian or adjacent to Palestinian areas. Given the low socioeconomic resources of most Mizrahim, their mainly Arab culture, and lack of ties to Israeli elites, the development towns and 'the neighborhoods' quickly became, and have remained to date, distinct concentrations of segregated, poor, and deprived Mizrahi populations.
The third wave, during the last two decades, saw the establishment of over 150 small ex-urban developments known as 'community' or 'private' settlements (yeshuvim kehilatiyim). These are small suburban-like neighborhoods, located in the heart of areas on both sides of the Green Line (Figure 1). Their establishment was presented to the public as a renewed effort to 'Judaise' Israel's hostile frontiers, using the typical rhetoric of 'national security', 'Arab threat' to state lands, or the possible emergence of Arab secessionism. In the West Bank, an additional rationale Jewish settlement was the return to ancient Jewish biblical sites. But the people migrating into most of these high quality residential localities were mainly middle class Ashkenazi suburbanites. In recent years, urban Jewish settlement in the West Bank accompanied the on-going construction and expansion of small kehilatti settlements. These towns have increasingly accommodated religious-national and ultra-orthodox Jews.
Notably, the different waves of settlement were marked by social and institutional segregation sanctioned and augmented by state policies. A whole range of mechanisms was devised and implemented not only to maintain nearly impregnable patterns of segregation between Arabs and Jews, but also to erect fairly rigid lines of separation between various Jewish ethno-classes. Segregation mechanisms included the demarcation of local government and education district boundaries, the provision of separate and unequal government services (especially education and housing), the development of largely separate economies, the organisation of different types of localities in different state-wide 'settlement movements', and the uneven allocation of land on a sectoral basis.
As a result, 'layered' and differentiated Jewish spaces were created, with low levels of contact between the various ethno-classes. This has worked to reproduce inequalities and competing collective identities. Movement across boundaries has been restricted by allowing most new Jewish settlements (built on state land!) to 'screen' their residents, by applying tests of 'resident suitability'. This practice has predicably produced communities dominated by middle-class Ashkenazim. At least part of the ethno-class fragmentation and hostility currently evident in Israeli society can thus be traced to the settlement system and its institutionalised segregation.
Democracy or Ethnocracy?
As we have seen, the politico-geographic analysis of Jewish land and settlement policy highlights two crucial factors, often neglected in other interpretations of Israeli society: (a) Israel is a state and polity without clear boundaries; and (b) The country's organisation of social space is based on pervasive and uneven ethnic segregation. Let us elaborate on these assertions, which lead me to question the taken-for-granted notion that Israel is a democracy. Instead, I would argue that the polity is governed by a different regime type: an 'ethnocracy', which denotes a non-democratic rule for, and by, a dominant ethnic group.
Let us first look at the question of boundaries and borders. As shown above, the Jewish system of land ownership and development, as well as the geography of frontier settlement have undermined the state as a territorial-legal entity. Organisations based in the Jewish diaspora, such as the Jewish Agency and Jewish National Fund, possess statutory power within Israel to purchase and develop land, build new settlements and provide social services. These organisations operate on the basis of legal 'compacts' with the Israeli state which allow them to operate as 'pseudo-statutory' bodies, despite a declared mandate to operate only on behalf of Jews, and despite being unaccountable to the residents of the state in which they operate.
In addition, Jewish settlement in the occupied territories has ruptured the Green Line as a meaningful border. At the time of writing, some 340,000 Israeli Jews resided in the territories (including al-Quds, or East Jerusalem), and Israeli law has been unilaterally extended to each of these settlements. The Green Line has thus been transformed into a geographical mechanism of separating (citizen from non-citizen) Palestinians, but not Jews.
The combination of the two factors mean that 'Israel' as a definable democratic-political entity simply does not exist. The legal and political power of extra-territorial (Jewish) bodies and the rupturing of state borders empty the notion of 'Israel' from the broadly accepted meaning of a state as a territorial-legal institution. Hence, the unproblematic acceptance of 'Israel proper' in most social science writings (including some of my own previous work) and the public media has been based on a misnomer.
Israel has thus operated in recent decades as a polity without clear borders. Regardless of the historical reasons behind this reality, it simply does not comply with a basic requirement of democracy -- the existence of a 'demos'. The 'demos', as already defined in ancient Greece, denotes an inclusive body of citizens within a given territory. It is a competing organising principle to the 'ethnos', which denotes common origin. The term 'democracy' therefore means the rule of the 'demos', and modern application points to an overlap between permanent residency in the polity and equal political rights as a necessary democratic condition,. This actually means the institutionalisation of clear and permanent borders, without which the establishment of inclusive democratic institutions and civil society faces severe difficulties.
As we have seen, Israel's political structure and settlement activity have ruled out the relevance of such boundaries. The significance of this observation becomes clear when we examine Israel's 1996 elections: counting only the results within the Green Line, Shimon Peres would have beaten Benjamin Netanyahu by a margin of six percent! The involvement of the settlers in Israeli politics is of course far deeper than simply electoral. They are represented by 18 Knesset members (out of 120), four government ministers, and hold a host of key positions in politics, armed forces academia. In addition, around 60 percent of the West Bank area is now held by Israeli Jews as private, state or military land.
But despite this clear reality, the dominant view regarding the democratic nature of Israel continue to rule supreme, augmented by the durable operation of many important democratic features (as distinct from structures), especially competitive politics and free media. The Israeli democratic image has also been promoted by the academia, media, political rhetoric and congratulating self-appraisals. It has had an enormously positive impact on the state's international status, enabling Israel to maintain a regime which structurally discriminates against non-Jews, but avoids the kind of international pressures and costs suffered by structurally discriminatory regimes such as Turkey, Serbia or Slovakia.
But careful analysis of the Israeli polity shows that 'ethnos' and not 'demos' is the organising political principle. Israel should therefore be characterised as an 'ethnocracy'. I have defined ethnocracy as a regime type with several key characteristics:
(a) Despite several democratic features, ethnicity (and not territorial citizenship) is the main logic behind resource allocation;
(b) State borders and political boundaries are fuzzy: there is no identifiable 'demos' , mainly due to the role of ethnic diasporas inside the polity and the inferior position of ethnic minorities.
(c) A dominant 'charter' ethnic group appropriates the state apparatus and determines most public policies.
A Settling Ethnocracy
As we have seen, ethnic settlement has been a major (indeed constitutive) feature of the Israeli ethnocracy, which should thus be labelled a settling ethnocracy. But the fusion of ethnocentric principles and the dynamics of settlement created uneven and stratified patterns of intra-Jewish social and ethnic fragmentation.
Here we can note that a fundamental rationale of the Jewish ethnocracy -- the spatial exclusion of Palestinian-Arabs -- has been diffused into Jewish society, and legitimised patterns of intra-Jewish ethnicisation. The most notable has been the segregation and tension between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim, as already noted. The political, legal and cultural tools of ethnic segregation which were at the basis of the Zionist project were also used to segregate Jewish elites from Jewish 'minorities'.
To be sure, these mechanisms were used differently, and more subtely towards other Jews, but the persisting gap between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim cannot be understood without accounting for the political geography of intra-Jewish relations. In the main, Mizrahim were spatially marginalised by the Israeli settlement project, whether in the isolated periphery or in poor and stigmatised neighborhoods of Israel's main cities. This has limited their potential economic, social and cultural mobilisation.
The same ethnic segregationist logic was also used to legitimise the creation of segregated neighborhoods and localities for Haredi (Ultra-Orthodox) and Orthodox Jews, recent Russian immigrants and Palestinian-Arabs. In other words, the uneven segregationist logic of the ethnocratic regime has been infused into spatial and cultural practices, which have worked to 'ethnicise' Israeli society. Not all ethnic separation is negative, and (voluntary) separation between groups can at times function to reduce ethnic conflict, as is often the case with the Haredim. But in a society which has declared the 'ingathering and integration of the exiles' (mizug galuyot) a major national goal, levels of segregation and stratification between Jewish ethno-classes have remained remarkably high.
This process, however, is not unidimensional, and must be weighed against counter-trends, such as the growing levels of equality of legal and social rights, cultural pluralism, a more inclusive media, higher levels of tolerance towards 'others', and genuine political openings for non mainstream ideological and life-style communities. Yet, the ethnicisation trend has been powerful, as illustrated by the growing tendency of political entrepreneurs to exploit 'ethnic capital' and draw on ethno-class-religious affiliations as a source of political support. In the 1996 elections such sectoral parties increased their power by 40 percent, and for the first time in Israel's history overshadowed the largest two parties, Labor and Likud, which have traditionally been the most ethnically heterogenous.
The Price
From the above it is clear that the Zionist settlement project has caused a tremendous redistribution of resources. Palestinian-Arabs of course paid the highest price, witnessing their private and collective assets and powers seized, fragmented and eroded. However, as we have seen, several Jewish sectors have suffered too, most notably the north-African Mizrahim who were settled in frontier towns, villages and neighborhoods, and who were largely segregated from the mainstream of Israeli-Ashkenazi society.
There exists a clear nexus connecting the de-Arabisation of the country with the marginalisation of the Mizrahim, who have been positioned -- culturally and geographically -- between Arab and Jew, between Israel and its hostile neighbors, between a 'backwardly' eastern past and a 'progressive' western future. But the depth and extent of discrimination against Palestinians and Mizrahim has been quite different, with the latter included in the Zionist project, and being themselves active participants in the oppression of the former.
In yet a broader sense, the entire Israeli society has suffered from the preservation of a settling ethnocracy. The high level of intra-Jewish segregation (partially created through the Judaising settlement process) and the ethno-class stratification of Israeli society cannot but harm social integration and breed conflict and political instability, as Israel enters its sixth decade. The failure of Israel to develop meaningful inclusive state citizenship and identity, and its continuing reliance on exclusionary ethnic categories are not only moral flaws, but a prescription for continuing waves of social and ethnic tension.
Israel is yet to fully realise the costs involved in consistent and persistent breaches of democratic principles. While the internal costs of an ethnocratic regime have began to surface (in the form of the Palestinian Intifada, the growing militancy and hostility among Palestinian citizens, and the tense ethnicisation of the Jewish public), the external costs are still far from the mind of most Israelis. But if international reaction to the ethnocentric policies of countries such as Serbia and Turkey is any indication, such costs must be regarded as a possibility.
Finally, some reservations are in order, and especially the recognistion that the picture briefly depicted above is neither totally one-sided, nor static. The strategy of Judaisation and population dispersal did encounter Palestinian-Arab resistance and Mizrahi grievances, which in turn reshaped some of the strategies, mechanisms and manifestations of Israeli territorial and development policies. As a result of persisting struggles by the peripheries, policies of control over the Arabs have eased in some areas, and the Mizrahim have been making some progress towards integration into the Israeli middle classes and cultural mainstream. Likewise, Palestinian resistance in the occupied territories, culminating in the Intifada, has stopped Jewish expansion in several regions, and have brought about the Oslo agreement, with a measure of limited Palestinian self-rule. These changes, important as they are, have still occurred within the firm boundaries of the dominant Zionist discourse, where Jewish settlement in the 'frontier' and the containment of Arab territoriality are still undisputed Jewish national goals both within the Green Line, and in large parts of the occupied territories.
Epilogue: Jewish Land, Negev and the Ethnocracy
To conclude, let to return once again to the 'coal face' of land control issues in Israel. Since September 1997, the Israeli government has announced on several occasions the introduction onew strategies to block 'Arab invasion' into state lands within the Green Line, and to curtail Bedouin 'illegal' dwelling construction and grazing. In most cases, 'illegal dwellings' and 'Arab invasion' are code terms for Bedouin residence on traditional tribal land and resistance to involuntary migration to a small number of towns designated by the state in the Negev and Galilee. The recently announced strategy would combine the development of small Jewish settlements (mainly in the Negev's north-eastern hills), the establishment of single-family Jewish farms, the sale of Negev land to the Jewish Agency and diaspora Jews, and the application of greater pressure on Bedouins to migrate to the state-planned towns. The initiator of the policy was the (then) director of the Prime Minister office -- Mr. Avigdor Liberman, an immigrant from the former Soviet Union, and a resident of a West Bank Jewish settlement.
A closer look at the latest land control strategy raises several hard questions: if the Bedouin-Arabs are Israeli citizens, as they are, why would their use of state land be considered an 'invasion'? How do other sectors of Israeli society, such as moshavim and kibbutzim, which regularly build without planning permission escape treatment as 'invaders'? Given that the initiator of the policy is a West Bank settler (illegal according to international law), who is actually 'the invader' here? How can a recent immigrant to the country campaign to evacuate residents who had been on the land for several generations, and well before the state was established? How can the state lease large tracts of land to non-citizen (Jewish) organisations and continue to block its own (Arab) citizens from using it for residential purposes?
At the end of its first Jubilee, then, Israel's ethnocratic features keep surfacing: the on-going Judaisation project, the stratification of ethnic rights, the fuzziness of geographical and political boundaries, and the legal and material involvement of extra-territorial Jewish organisations. Against this reality, scholars, students and activists are called upon to destabilise the hegemonic Jewish discourse of a 'Jewish and democratic state', and participate in the task of transforming Israel from ethnocracy to democracy.
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