From our regular contributor El Inglés comes the first in what will be an ongoing series of essays taking as their core subject matter a) the mechanics of the Islam-induced breakdown of law and order in European countries and b) the likely nature of the response.
On the Failure of Law Enforcement
by El Inglés
I will argue in this essay that there are a number of mechanisms and tendencies in place in European countries that make it difficult, if not impossible, for them to control or restrain the burgeoning criminality of their Muslim populations under extant political paradigms. Readers of certain of my other essays will be familiar with the type of argument I advance here, though I apply it in this essay to new subject matter.
It should be understood that this text is essentially a piece of analysis, an attempt to rigorously frame and discuss one large and important piece of the problem we face thanks to Islam. Though it does not attempt to formulate a response, it is written in the hope that those keen to defend their countries and peoples from the depredations of Muslim colonization will find it useful in clarifying their own thinking.
The Human Substrate Problem
First, it is necessary to discuss what I have chosen to call the Human Substrate Problem. Though this part of the analysis may seem slightly esoteric, I ask that readers bear with it, as its relevance will become clearer later on.
The Human Substrate Problem derives from the historically irrefutable observation that racially and/or culturally different groups in a given society tend to have very different statistical properties with respect to crime and other forms of deviance. Note that the causes of these differences are not of any particular importance here. I myself believe that both racial and cultural factors play important roles in creating these disparities, but for the purposes of this essay, it suffices to ignore the question of causality and focus on the mere existence of the differences and their persistence with respect to time.
Here, we will create a conceptual model simple enough to be easily grasped, but complex enough to capture some of the intricacies and seeming paradoxes of crime and criminality in our societies.
Imagine a society in which only two racially and culturally distinct groups exist: the Blues and the Greens, who exist in equal numbers. The Blues are relatively law-abiding and the Greens relatively criminal, a state of affairs that we describe by creating a composite index of criminality, C, for all individuals in our societies. This is plotted on the x-axis of a graph that has number of individuals, N, plotted on the y-axis, with the stipulation that C is normally distributed for both Blues and Greens, with the same standard deviation but with the Green mean being higher than the Blue mean. Individuals are not necessarily fixed in place within these distributions. Law-abiding folk can drift toward crime, and those with criminal backgrounds can, in principle, go straight. However, this Brownian motion of individuals around the distribution does not alter its statistical properties; it is merely a reshuffling of components within a persisting whole. This state of affairs is represented in Figure 1.
Now we must imagine an addition being made to our graph: an incarceration point. The incarceration point, as its name suggests, marks that degree of criminality which will result in the incarceration of the criminal in question, which is to say that everyone to the right of the line is incarcerated. This oversimplification (some criminals will escape detection, and criminals newly released from prison will be at large even if they are, strictly speaking, to the right of the incarceration point) could be overcome by refining the model further, but we need not concern ourselves with that at the moment. Figure 2 shows the Blues and the Greens as they appear on the graph, the incarceration point, and the incarcerated and non-incarcerated fractions of the Blue and Green populations. It is clear that a greater fraction of the Greens than of the Blues is incarcerated at any given point in time; this is precisely what we would expect on the basis of their higher criminality. But this simple model implies certain other things too.
Focus for a moment on those fractions of the Blue and Green populations not in prison, i.e. those to the left of the line. We can see that the non-incarcerated fraction of the Greens is relatively close to the incarceration line, which means that the mean C-value of the non-incarcerated Greens is higher than that of their Blue equivalents. Given that crime is committed by the non-incarcerated, we must expect the crime rates of the Greens, therefore, to be higher than those of the Blues. This is an important point: even if the law is applied to both the Blues and the Greens in a completely evenhanded manner (represented by their incarceration points being in the same place), the Greens will be both disproportionality incarcerated and disproportionality criminal. In other words, under the same legal system, there is no way to equalize their crime rates.
Our model captures and explains one of the puzzling phenomena that confront those who think about crime: that disproportionally incarcerated groups are, without major exception as far as I am aware, also still disproportionately criminal despite the larger fraction of their most criminal members already locked away. However, there is something else that it sheds light on as well. Let us imagine that, for whatever reason or reasons, the government of our hypothetical country chooses to apply the law somewhat less assiduously to the Greens. We represent this in our model by making a distinction between Blue and Green incarceration points, with the Green incarceration point being to the right of the Blue incarceration point. For the time being, we will ignore the obvious objection that shifting the incarceration point for the Greens alters their behavioural profiles and increases their criminality, C, (which it surely would) and stipulate that their C curve stays the same, as shown in Figure 3 below. What happens now?
The fraction of the Greens incarcerated is still larger than the fraction of the Blues incarcerated, and the Green crime rates will now be higher than that of the Blues by an even greater margin. Bearing in mind that we have, in a manner of speaking, simply let some number of otherwise criminal Greens out of prison and back onto the streets, this rise in Green crime rates as a whole is hardly surprising. However, the significance of this lies in the fact that we now have a way of explaining how the Greens can possess the following, seemingly contradictory characteristics: a) being more criminal than other groups in a society (as measured by the mean C-value of the non-incarcerated), b) being incarcerated in greater numbers than others in a society (as indicated by the fraction of them to the right of their incarceration point), and c) being treated more leniently by the long arm of the law (as made clear by their higher incarceration point).
Treated with kid gloves, filling up the prisons, and causing chaos on the streets; such are the characteristics of our as yet entirely hypothetical population of Greens. If the law is applied to them without fear or favour, they impose a disproportionate burden on the law enforcement apparatus and criminal justice system whilst also inflicting disproportionate damage directly through their criminal behaviour. If the law loosens its grip upon them, the burden on the prisons is eased, but the burden placed on the common man through their disregard for law and order soars. Such is the nature of the problem, which is why I call it the Human Substrate problem; it is the underlying behavioural and attitudinal characteristics of the population that cause difficulties. In response, the state seems to have little option but to trade the two evils of greater incarceration and greater crime off against each other by shifting the incarceration point up and down.
Our Predicament and its ‘Solution’
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It will hopefully not be lost on readers that the rudimentary model of crime and criminality developed above on the basis of the Human Substrate Problem model is not so unrelated to reality as it may have seemed at the outset. Indeed, it is the reality of crime in heterogeneous societies. In this essay, I propose to apply it to an analysis of Muslims and natives in European countries, and the gist of the analysis that is to follow can probably already be guessed at. To be completely explicit, it is that the Muslim populations of European countries are akin to the Greens in the model outlined above, and that the native populations are akin to the Blues, with the single caveat that the sizes of these two populations are not in fact equal, a stipulation made earlier to avoid unnecessary complications in presenting the model.
Our problem then, consists of large Muslim populations of whom the following can be said: a) their criminality profiles lie so far to the right of those of their host societies that they must be some combination of substantially over-incarcerated and substantially over-criminal, irrespective of where their incarceration point lies, and b) it so happens that weak and confused governments have allowed the Muslim incarceration points to edge up, sometimes significantly, in relation to the baseline incarceration points, which is to say that they have chosen greater Muslim crime and less Muslim incarceration than would otherwise be the case. We now have a fairly rigorous statement of the problem. How do we solve it?
The most obvious candidate for a solution to the problem would be the forcing of the Muslim incarceration point back down until it rejoins the baseline incarceration point. How could this be accomplished? To a greater or lesser extent, the police, court system and prison system would have to be expanded, with the ultimate target of all this expansion (i.e. the Muslim population) being obvious to all and sundry. Considerable financial and other costs would have to be incurred, and the state and society as a whole would have to implicitly revise their relationship with the Muslim population.
If the UK — to pick a country — were to take on this challenge and ensure that the Muslim incarceration point were identical to the baseline incarceration point (and this would be relatively feasible in the UK, whose Muslim population is not so chronically criminal as that of, say, France), we would have a situation in which the British people (i.e. the actual, historic, white British people) would have to bear two burdens: the excess crime committed by their Muslim populations, and the excess financial and organizational costs incurred through bringing to justice and incarcerating a disproportionate fraction of the Muslim population. Might this be an acceptable solution to a difficult situation? It would surely be at least as effective a response as those implemented by many other countries with troublesome and unruly minorities. It is, after all, how America has solved the disproportionate criminality of its black population.
But what sort of solution has that turned out to be? Once-great cities, from Detroit and St. Louis to Baltimore and Philadelphia, hollowed out, with crumbling inner cities populated by a degenerate, desperate black underclass, and surrounded by the suburbs into which whites and the black middle class have long since fled. Massive population decline in these same cities, with St. Louis losing over 50% of its population from its peak of several decades ago. Murder rates and robbery rates in the black population seven and eight times higher, respectively, than for whites. Blacks seven times more likely to be in prison than whites. If this is success, what would failure look like?
This essay is not about race. Nor is it about America. I am simply attempting here to convey the reality of a specific instance of the Human Substrate Problem. And the difficulties that America faces with its black population, are, arguably, dwarfed by the problems that certain European countries now face or soon could with regards to their Muslim populations. For we have no guarantee that our societies consist of only Blues and Greens. Perhaps they contain another group, the Oranges. What if the Oranges are to the Greens as the Greens are to the Blues? What if their criminality profile is as far to the right of the Greens as that of the Greens is to the right of the Blues, as shown in Figure 4? What then?
We have already noted that Greens are significantly overincarcerated and overcriminal relative to the Blues. Let us now assume that the Blue-Green disparities are bearable for the Blue-Green society as a whole, whatever exactly one understands by this term. The same cannot be true for the Oranges, whose incarceration and crime rates (as indicated, again by the mean C-value of the non-incarcerated) are so much higher than those of the Blues as to create a huge qualitative gap between the two, and a large gap between them and the Greens. The Oranges impose massive costs on the society as a whole, via both the huge financial costs required to restrain their criminality, and the massive costs, financial and human, of the crime they commit. In other words, even ensuring that the Orange incarceration point remains the baseline incarceration point cannot create a situation in which we could feel that we have solved the problem of Orange criminality. On the contrary, their criminality will plague our model society and its people, be they Blue or Green, (or, for that matter, Orange) and criminal justice will come to resemble a mechanism created solely for the purpose of keeping their savagery at bay.
What happens if the Orange incarceration point now starts to slide to the right as the state, for whatever reason, takes a step back from applying the law fully to the Oranges, as shown in Figure 5? As in the Blue-Green comparison, their incarceration rate will fall and their crime rate rise, yielding a situation in which they are still hugely overincarcerated but in which their crime rates soar to a point at which they represent a threat to the very nature and cohesion of the society they inhabit. Again, this is the stark reality of the Human Substrate Problem: a problematic human substrate presents no good options for dealing with it, only a trade-off between bad and worse.
As was suggested earlier, keeping Orange and Blue incarceration points the same would result in incarceration rates and crime rates being so much higher for Oranges that there would effectively be two societies in one country, with a single law enforcement apparatus struggling to deal with the very different problems they create. Bad though this would be, allowing the Muslim incarceration point to slide is a recipe for total collapse, and will result in an inexorable breakdown of law and order. Combined with growth in the Orange population as a fraction of the whole, it must and will destroy the society in question.
We need look no further than France to see this process in action. Insofar as I understand the situation there at all, it seems to me that this is an accurate description of the current situation, which is to say that the Blue French have a very large Orange Muslim population. Furthermore, Belgium, Sweden, Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands also seem to have rapidly growing Orange Muslim populations as well, though these populations are not yet so large as to create a situation as dire as that which obtains in France. For reasons that are not easy to understand, the UK seems to have a Green Muslim population rather than an Orange one, though I suspect, for reasons that I will not go into here, that it will become Orange over time.
The Likelihood of the Problem Being ‘Solved’
Having stated some fairly strong reservations as to whether the problem posed by Muslim criminality in Europe is soluble in any useful sense of the term, I would now like to make a key claim, to wit, that it is highly improbable that even the stop-gap solution, i.e. the reapplication of the baseline incarceration point to Muslims, will be implemented by mainstream politicians. I consider this to be true irrespective of whether the Muslim population of a given country is closer to Green than Orange or closer to Orange than Green, though the probability of such action is even less for the latter type of Muslim population.
There are many reasons why Muslim incarceration points will have an inexorable tendency to creep up and be extraordinarily resistant to being pushed down again. Discussing them all here would be excessive, so I will simply present a handful of the most important.
1) Prevalence of Narrative of Oppression
First and foremost, there still exist large constituencies in our political and media establishments who are deranged enough to believe that the criminality of Muslims derives from the racist oppression visited upon them by the white man. In the absence of such hideous white supremacism, the Arab population of Sweden would be no more criminal than the Swedes, the Turkish population of Germany would be no more criminal than the Germans, and the Somali population of the UK would be no more criminal than the British.
This bizarre delusion evokes a significant degree of sympathy for these downtrodden Third-World masses as they merrily inflict robbery, riots, rapes, assaults, and murder both on the people of their adopted countries and each other. Every day, fewer people believe that this behaviour derives from our actions, and more wake up to the obvious truth that it derives from who and what these people are. Nonetheless, substantial and influential constituencies in all European countries are still committed to the notion that freeing these people from the terrible oppression they face at our hands will be far more effective in reducing their sky-high crime rates than applying the law to them. As long as this remains the case, generating the political will required to reunite the Muslim and baseline incarceration points will be extremely difficult.
2) Dynamic of Escalation and Effects on Cost-Benefit Analysis of Police Action
This is emerging as a key factor in interactions between Muslims and the state in several countries, and warrants extended discussion. In fact, it warrants a degree of discussion so great that I have decided to postpone in-depth analysis for a future essay. Here, I will have to be brief, and explain the problem through reference to recent events in Brussels.
In preparation for Ramadan this year, that holy time when the behaviour of the believers best exemplifies the values of their psychotic creed, the police in Brussels were issued with instructions to avoid all unnecessary ‘provocations’ of Muslims in the Belgian capital. As far as the layman could discern, these provocations consisted of virtually all normal police work conducted in the presence of Muslims, and normal human activities such as eating and drinking. However, even these sterling efforts on the part of the ‘law enforcement’ apparatus of this disintegrating city proved insufficient. One particular Muslim youth, having got away with taunting and challenging the police for days, was finally arrested at his home one evening. A crowd of some twenty agitated believers gathered outside the entrance of said domicile as the arrest was taking place to explain to the police the error of their ways and prevent the great injustice inherent in the application of Belgian law to Muslims. Eventually, the police were forced to pepper spray their way through the slaves of Allah to take the youth to the local police station.
The believers not being the type to take such unconscionable police brutality lying down, a crowd of several dozen of them soon gathered outside the police station in question to contest the issue further, by hurling rocks and abuse at the unfortunate edifice and those within. The situation escalated to the point where the riot police were called in to quell the situation, which obliged them to engage in running battles with an estimated two hundred Muslim youth.
Now, I confess that I have no background in criminology, law enforcement, or anything else of even oblique relevance to these matters. But it is surely not beyond the bounds of possibility that the Brussels police, come Ramadan next year, might decide to further reduce the ‘provocations’ that they visit upon hapless Muslims even further. Is it really worth having a riot, their leaders will ask themselves, simply to apprehend one youth who will probably be out of prison the next day at the latest? In a nutshell, brute, tribal responses to law enforcement rewrite the cost-benefit analyses of law enforcement processes so completely that they can no longer be expected to function properly.
And indeed, they do not.
3) Magnitude of Extra Financial Commitments Required
The law enforcement apparatus of a developed country is an exceptionally large, complex and expensive entity. In the UK, the size of the prison population and the costs of maintaining that population are a perennial topic of discussion and debate, and sometimes a cause of agonized disagreement. Incarceration is a fantastically expensive way of keeping criminals out of commission, costing tens of thousands of pounds per prisoner per year in the UK. It is very hard to imagine any European government embarking on a plan to expand the criminal justice system and law enforcement apparatus at a time of such financial difficulties as we endure at present, when prison chiefs are actually being ordered to slash their budgets.
4) Electoral Disadvantage
Muslims now exist in sufficiently large numbers in European countries to exert significant influence over election results, particularly at the local and municipal levels. The scale of the problem and its consequences are well-attested to by the fact that Rotterdam now has a Muslim mayor who is also a Moroccan citizen. The socialist politicians who decided to re-engineer the demographics of their countries for political objectives I will not pretend to understand are unlikely to lose favour with their imported savages any more than they have to. Given that one of the reasons for their initial importation was to shift the electoral balance to favour the left, the probability of such action appears all the more remote.
5) Demographic Issues
Lurking behind this entire discussion is the demographic bogeyman, with, for example the growth rate of the Muslim population of the UK being ten times higher than that of the country as a whole. I hope I have managed to convince readers that forcing the Muslim incarceration point back down to the baseline incarceration point would already constitute a staggering challenge in many European countries. Now how much harder does it become as a given European Muslim population creeps up from 5% to 6% and from there to 7%? Every day that passes, the problem becomes more difficult to even start to grapple with, as the demographic problem compounds every other aspect of the problem.
Let us review our progress so far. The apparatus of state in all European countries afflicted with large Muslim populations is being confronted with a Human Substrate Problem already severe and growing worse by the day. The best that said apparatus can do, at least in the absence of a two-tier legal system, and short of reducing the number of Muslims in the country through deportation, is to ensure that the Muslim incarceration point remains the baseline incarceration point for the whole society. However, even this optimal response will inflict significant costs of various sorts on the native populations, costs which will tend towards the unsupportable as the Muslim population of any given country a) grows in size and b) tends from Green to Orange. Furthermore, this response is, politically speaking, exceptionally difficult to implement, a fact testified to by the sheer feebleness of the response to Muslim criminality throughout Europe (a phenomenon represented by the sliding Muslim incarceration point in our model). As such, it will not be implemented until we hit a discontinuity of the type I have written about in the past, and the cancer of Muslim crime will spill out over an ever-greater swathe of our urban areas for some time.
The beauty of making bold, concrete predictions is that their falsifiability provides feedback as to the strengths and weaknesses of the analytical model that they stem from. Though the task of determining how much crime actually takes place in a given society is plagued by any number of methodological difficulties, trends in crime rates (as opposed to absolute rates at any given time) are relatively easy to get a grip on. Incarceration rates, by their nature, can be known with great accuracy. Expenditures on the various parts of the law enforcement apparatus and criminal justice system can also be known. These sorts of information, taken together, will provide a relatively straightforward way of determining how accurate my analysis is. Those who consider it to be flawed should, over time, be able to demonstrate just how flawed it is.
Assuming that my rudimentary model is as sound as it needs to be to allow a reasonably rigorous discussion of the problem, what are the implications for those opposing the Islamization of their countries? Readers of my past articles, most obviously SGW and related tracts, will not be looking to me for much optimism, and I have do not have much to offer. Eventually a discontinuity of the type I have predicted in the past will completely change the prevailing political paradigms and allow European societies to take the gloves off with respect to Islam.
That said, I am not advocating apathy. This essay is not a message of despair; consider it, if you will, a call to arms instead. The nature and severity of the problems we face are now sufficiently clear for European patriots to start asking themselves what actions they and others like them will eventually be called upon to take when the failure of the state reaches a critical point, and what sort of battlefield they will be arrayed upon at that moment.
Hopefully these people will find that their preparations are at least somewhat aided by the analysis herein, which I hope to continue and expand upon in future essays.
On the Failure of Law Enforcement — Part 2
by El Inglés
In the first installment of this essay, I laid down a rudimentary conceptual framework for understanding the nature and scale of the law enforcement challenges posed to us by certain alien groups within European societies, be they ethnically defined, religiously defined, or both. The focus of the essay was, naturally, Muslims, though the analysis could be equally well applied to any group. Here I would like to expand on my initial analysis by explaining the problems posed by what I have termed the dynamic of escalation.
The Dynamic of Escalation
In the first installment of this essay, I outlined the most important reasons why Muslim incarceration points in European societies would have a tendency to drift up relative to the baseline incarceration point, and similarly prove extremely difficult to force back down again. They were as follows:
|1.||the prevalence of the narrative of oppression,|
|2.||the dynamic of escalation,|
|3.||the magnitude of the extra financial commitments required,|
|4.||electoral disadvantage, and|
Apart from the dynamic of escalation, these barriers to bringing the incarceration points back together are all things that can, in principle, be overcome and presumably will be in time. Public opinion across Europe is slowly but surely waking up to what Islam is. Anti-Islamic political parties are making gains every day. Prisons can be built if budgets are cut in other areas.
However, the dynamic of escalation (hereafter referred to as the DoE) is different in this regard. It is not something that can be gradually overcome by an ever-more robust attitude towards Islam, but only by concerted action of a certain type. To understand why this us so, we need to first consider exactly what the DoE is, how it operates, and what problems it will present those who attempt to out-escalate it. How does it come to be the case that even fairly small clusters of Muslims, disproportionately dysfunctional and impoverished as they are, can force onto the back foot the law enforcement apparatus of wealthy, technologically advanced European countries, effectively creating a two-tier legal system to the Muslims’ own advantage?
If, in the small English village that I live in, I throw a rock at a police car as it passes by, the officers inside will get out, arrest me and charge me with the appropriate crime. If, however, on trying to arrest me the two police officers are attacked by five friends of mine who think the police are acting unfairly and who do not intend to let them carry out their duties, they will be forced to call for backup. How many officers will be dispatched? Let us say that another six are sent in two cars, in response to which some thirty other neighbourhood youths come to my aid by congregating in the area and flinging rocks and various choice epithets at the police.
What happens now? Do the police send out another sixteen officers in two vans? And if they do, what if my friends and I notify, via text and mobile phone call, other friends in the area, who notify others in turn, so that before too very long we have a hundred or so youths swarming around the area hurling debris at the police? In a situation such as this, it is clearly not going to be the priority of the police to effect my arrest, but instead to prevent a riot or contain it if it has already commenced. This is not an unworthy goal in its own right, but it does mean:
|a)||that I have attacked the police with impunity unless they are prepared to come back for me another day and risk the same thing, and|
|b)||that a hundred youths have rioted with almost complete impunity, as only a small fraction of rioters at most riots are ever charged with any crime.|
Next time I or someone else in my street throws a rock at the police, how will they respond? Are they going to try and arrest me? They might, but the harsh reality of the situation is that, if a violent, tribal reaction on the part of the people of my neighbourhood is guaranteed, they may well think better of it. Do the police really want to have to dispatch large numbers of officers to control riots that they themselves have, in a certain sense, helped whip up, all because someone threw a rock at them and missed?
This is not a theoretical concern. The first time the DoE impressed itself upon me was when I read a translation of an article from the German magazine Die Welt on the evolution of no-go zones in Essen, Germany. I urge readers who have not read the article (entitled In Enemy Territory) to do so to understand the sheer scale and severity of the problems that hostile, unassimilable foreigners are creating there. Here I will quote it at length, as it makes the point far more eloquently than I could (all emphasis added by me):
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Every other week some dozen policemen in olive-green coveralls enter the area in company with employees from the city’s civil services. The exact number is secret, “so that the foe can’t adjust“, say the police.
The “danger zone” encompasses three dozen streets. The civil servants enter gloomy tea-houses and oriental cafés, normally disguised as “cultural societies”, kiosks, telephone shops, internet cafés. It is a twilight infrastructure of the Lebanese “community”, holding around 5,000 persons in Essen. The civil service demands lists of employees and licenses. They are met with little courtesy and sour expressions as if they were entering alien territory. The city of Essen tries to counter a phenomenon well known to other German cities. Policemen talk of “parallel worlds” and “rooms of fear”. When confronted with such terms, the immigration-politicians cringe. But the experienced civil servants can’t come up with better terms. They don’t dare to enter such areas without protection, otherwise they risk riots and physical assault.
This is an unusual strategy in Germany, but no longer a breach of taboo, due to the resistance the almost 270,000 civil servants from state and local police have to confront on a daily basis in many regions. “The problem with violence against the police has escalated in recent years. The police have to concentrate increasingly on self-protection” says national chief of police Konrad Freiberg to Die Welt. “When a fellow policeman goes on duty, he never knows what might happen to him“.
Kircher says that unauthorized persons interfere when papers are checked or arrest are made, and oppose the police. For some time now, the police have been trained how to behave in crowds of people. When a patrol enters a bar in order to arrest a criminal, another patrol of equal strength is needed to control the crowd.
Chief Inspector Andreas de Fries is all too familiar with the hunch that makes the little hairs on his neck start to rise when in the middle of the night he wants to see the papers of a suspect and suddenly, as from nowhere, he is surrounded by two dozen people who push and yell. “The voices come from all over, and suddenly you feel a stab in the back. So fast you can’t even see it,” says de Fries.
“With the Turks and the Albanians the parents are helpful,” says Schwerdtfeger; usually, if a youngster makes trouble, a talk with the parent can solve the problem. But the youngsters who call themselves “Arabs” don’t acknowledge any borders or respect. There may be some hundreds in Marxloh and their behavior tends to engender a disgust for all foreigners. Eight-year-old boys kick old ladies, sexually harass women, throw water balloons at business windows, ignore traffic lights, and create havoc at road intersections. “They constantly provoke incidents, even in proximity to patrol cars,” says de Fries. As soon as you try to calm down the younger ones, the older, aggressive brothers show up. “This is our street,” they yell. Then it becomes dangerous. The Police President of Duisburg, Rolf Cebin, calls the problem by its name: “The gathering of various communities when the police show up is an increasing problem. One can’t avoid a sense of hostility towards the police.”
If this seems quite similar to the hypothetical scenario I laid out above, that is because it was the basis for it. What exactly has happened to the Muslim incarceration point in this part of Essen I cannot say, but it would be very hard to believe that it has not edged substantially upwards as a consequence of the DoE as it operates there. Of course there are other reasons that the Muslim incarceration point will creep up in such contexts, the most obvious being the unwillingness of victims and witnesses to cooperate with the police that is generally observed in situations of this sort. But this does not affect the key point here: that the DoE is active and that it is hard to see how the German authorities, having let it develop in the first place, will be able to overcome it by operating within their current paradigms. I will elaborate on this last claim in the next section.
Why the Dynamic of Escalation is Special
I suspect that many readers will intuitively agree with the claim that the DoE is unlike other mechanisms forcing apart Muslim and baseline incarceration points in that it cannot be dealt with in a gradual, organic fashion. In the interests of completeness, however, I would like to make the reasoning underlying this conclusion completely clear here. If the law enforcement apparatus of a given country wishes to crack down on gun crime, or drug crime, or any other type of crime, it is, on the whole, free to do so by intensifying extant operations. Why is this not the case vis-à-vis the DoE in general?
The key to understanding this point lies in the name of the problem — the dynamic of escalation. Let me try to express this in terms of the model I presented in the first installment of this essay. What happens if the attempts of law enforcement to enforce the law vis-à-vis Muslims results in the criminality profile of Muslims shifting to the right in some fashion for the duration of the attempt, as the brute tribal response of Muslims runs its course? This will result in substantially more crime, the precise opposite of the original intent of the police.
What this means is that Muslims are re-writing the short-term cost-benefit analysis of police action against their criminal actions. In any short-term cost benefit analysis, it is a simple matter for a community of Arabs dominating a German neighbourhood to render the costs of trying to apprehend an Arab thug throwing a rock at a police car greater than the benefits of doing so. When this comes to be the case, an irresistible pressure will be brought to bear on the police in these areas, either at a personal psychological level, or at an institutional chain-of-command level, or both. That the former pressure exists is fairly clear from the article quoted above, and that the latter exists is made fairly obvious by the Belgian example I referred to in the first installment of this essay.
Even without these concrete examples, though, we would be able to deduce with a high degree of confidence that these pressures existed. How could they not?
If the police respond to such a situation by further increasing the degree of law enforcement attention, only to be out-escalated again in the same fashion, then what are they supposed to do? Re-escalate? There are limits to how far this can be taken by law enforcement actors concerned with the short term and unaware of the long-term implications of their actions, as we saw in the hypothetical example above. All re-escalations against concentrations of tribal actors who hate the police and their host societies have the potential to turn into exercises in riot control, in which the original law enforcement objectives are forgotten, rendered impossible, or both, and at great expense, too. It is therefore entirely rational for the authorities to give in to the DoE if their time horizons are short. And they clearly have a tendency to be very short indeed, in Germany and elsewhere.
That said, ignoring Muslim crime on these grounds is a recipe for societal suicide in the long term. Are actors concerned about the long term therefore obliged to devise a way of out-escalating their opponents? The answer to this question must be ‘yes’ for those who believe that waiting for ‘moderation’ and ‘integration’ is not a realistic option. But the solution will be exceptionally difficult to implement, both politically and operationally. If it were not, the DoE would already have been defeated across Europe and I would not have felt compelled to write this essay.
Defeating the DoE
The DoE, by its nature, involves bringing the hostility and violence of more and more Muslims to bear on the police as they try to do their job, with the intention of rendering that job impossible. This means that whenever the DoE is operative, the police will be on the verge of facing a riot of some size, big or small. Our objective then, is to move from riot control to riot punishment. This cannot be stressed too strongly: the DoE is, at its heart, nothing more than an escalation of conflict by Muslims, at the point of contact between Muslims and law enforcement, with said conflict eventually turning into a riot. To break this dynamic by hurting (figuratively or literally) the rioters until they decide that rioting is not in their interests is, by definition, to have defeated the DoE.
Accordingly, all factors involved specifically in defeating the DoE rather than ‘just’ applying the law pertain to riot punishment, which I define as a set of responses to riots, big or small, that result in their costs significantly outweighing their benefits for their participants. It is therefore quite different to riot control, which — concerned with reducing the short-term human and economic costs of the rioting in question — has no such objective.
Let us consider, then, what defeating the DoE might look like, and then what it certainly will not look like, by examining certain recent events in Europe.
The Bradford Riots of 2001
In Bradford, England in July 2001, an estimated one thousand South Asian Muslims rioted for successive nights after a period of gradually increasing racial tension boiled over. Clashes and street violence between whites and Asians (as they tend to be called in Britain) had escalated to the point where substantial numbers of police were called in, whereupon the conflict turned into a battle largely between them and the Asians.
The build-up to the riots is complex and need not concern us here, where we are interested only in the operational characteristics of the law enforcement response. To give an account spliced together from different sources, 297 people were arrested, and 200 jail sentences for a total of 604 years were handed out, for riot and related offences. Over a year later, on September 5, 2002, David Blunkett, then Home Secretary, was quoted in The Independent as having said ‘The police have done a really good job in following this through and at last the courts are handing out sentences that are a genuine reprisal but also a message to the community.’ The time scale of the investigation gives, I feel, some indication of how assiduously the British police pursued the rioters, especially given the fact that the last conviction was gained six and a half years after the riots.
It is clear from all accounts of the riots and their aftermath that those convicted of riot and related offences were overwhelmingly Asian. Indeed, so many Asians were convicted and for such long sentences relative to the crimes they had committed, that the Bradford Fair Justice Campaign was founded to seek redress (unsuccessfully, it seems). CCTV footage was used extensively to identify rioters, which presumably accounts in part for the large numbers who came forward of their own account and surrendered themselves to the police. However, sentence reductions for this cooperation were apparently much less than is normal in the UK, which turned into another source of bitterness on the part of the Asian community.
It is worth pointing out that, according to Wikipedia, the greatest number of convictions ever handed out subsequent to any other riot in our history was only five. Five against two hundred! This makes it absolutely clear that despite my repeated and, I still feel, legitimate criticisms of the police in the UK, they and the Crown Prosecution Service at least had the sense to ‘go for’ the Bradford rioters fairly ruthlessly. Pursuing rioters for years if necessary; draconian sentencing; incarcerating a completely unprecedented fraction of them: this is what I mean by punishing riots rather than just controlling them. An intriguing question is whether or not this response has been at least partly responsible for the odd lack of endemic rioting and violent disorder from the Muslim population of the UK relative to its coreligionists in other European countries.
Either way, the British response to Bradford is the type of response that will be required to deal with the DoE, though it would need to be enhanced in certain regards to be all it could be even in the UK. But we must bear in mind that, as I pointed out above, the UK does not have the chronic problems with large-scale Muslim violence that other countries in Europe do, and provides only relatively poor and scattered examples of the DoE in action in the first place. This being the case, let us take some of the responses we saw implemented after the Bradford riots and ask ourselves how others might build on them in countries with more serious problems in this regard.
The French Riots of 2005
There are several countries in Europe in which extreme polarization between at least some Muslim groups and the state, accompanied by endemic anti-police violence and rioting, is already visible. France is the most obvious example. Though I cannot pretend to be any sort of expert on affairs in France, and find it frustratingly difficult to get satisfactory information on matters of interest there, I would like to concentrate a bit of educated guesswork on the country, for the following reasons:
|a)||its Muslim population is by the largest as a fraction of population of any country in the West;|
|b)||relations between Muslims and natives are as polarized and bitter as anywhere else, as far as an outsider can discern; and|
|c)||large-scale rioting and violence appear to be endemic and conducted largely with impunity.|
Let us consider the French riots of late 2005 in a slightly freewheeling and speculative fashion. Given that these disturbances continued for over three weeks, it is hard to know how many rioters there were in total. However, it would be instructive to try and compare these riots to those in Bradford in 2001, so let us try and determine how many rioters there were per night, on average. There is no figure for this anywhere that I can determine, so let us note that, approximately halfway through the riots, 18,000 police were deployed, with a reserve of 1,500 men. It seems to me that the ratios of police to rioters that seem to be deployed in response to riots in European countries is somewhere between 1 to 2 and 1 to 1. If we take the full figure of 19,500 to represent the number of police deployed to contain the riots specifically, then the number of rioters on any given night during the height of the riots was between 19,500 and 39,000. I will take 30,000 as a compromise figure for the purposes of the discussion, though I reiterate that I have no way of knowing how accurate this figure is. Note that the scale of the riots was approximately 30 times greater than that of the Bradford riots, in a country with a population size (though it should be pointed out that other areas in the northwest of England also had riots at about the same time).
If we take the maximum number of rioters per night, 30,000, divide it by 2 to get a figure for average rioters per night of 15,000 for the entire period, and multiply by the 23 nights that Wikipedia says the riots lasted for, then we obtain a figure of 345,000 man-nights of rioting. There is no way of knowing how much churn there was amongst rioters, how many of them rioted consistently, and how many rioted less frequently. However, it is inconceivable that only 30,000 rioted in total if that was the maximum number of rioters on any night, as it would imply that everyone who rioted at all rioted on that night. It is also inconceivable that no one rioted more than once, which, if it were true, would mean that we had 345,000 different rioters who rioted once and only once each. The total number of rioters would therefore seem to lie somewhere between 30,000 and 345,000. Making the not entirely unreasonable estimate that the rioting would have been concentrated amongst a hard-core of rioters and that the lower end of the estimate is therefore more likely to contain the true number of rioters, I will take a figure of 60,000 as the total number of rioters, i.e. the number who rioted at least once. This is twice the maximum number who rioted on any given night, indicating a significant degree of churn while still being compatible with the claim that there was a substantial hard core of regular rioters.
This is 60 times the number of people who rioted in Bradford. If the 1-in-5 conviction rate of Bradford had been obtained in France, this would have added, mainly over the couple of years subsequent to the riots, some 12,000 people to the French prison population if other factors were held the same. The French prison system currently holds about 64,000 people, which would mean a nearly 20% rise in that population to accommodate these people and a similar expansion in the size of the French prison system. In the UK, it costs about £30,000 per year to incarcerate someone (estimates differ), and the average sentence after the Bradford riots was apparently 3 years. Adding in the costs of arrest, investigation and trial, and assuming a mean sentence of three years for the French rioters (without early release), we can expect marginal costs in excess of £100,000 per rioter, i.e. in excess of £1.2 billion, even before the costs of building several large new prisons have been taken into account. Of course, the political capital that would have to be expended to implement such a response and the further poisoning of relations between France and its cultural enrichers are virtually impossible to imagine, as are the operational challenges that would be faced by a police force required to arrest thousands of rioters after the rioting had ceased, without re-inflaming it.
Now, the riots were indeed an escalation, starting as they did with the deaths of two immigrant youths who, fleeing the police (which is to say, law enforcement doing its job) for reasons that are still not clear, managed to electrocute themselves in the process. This, not the relatively minor example of the Bradford Riots I gave above, is the type of thing that the French need to be prepared to deal with if they are to defeat the DoE. But how could they ‘deal’ with it? The bloodless and number-heavy analysis of the previous paragraph notwithstanding, it is hard to see that the French state could possibly have punished the rioters without using the army and killing some substantial number of people.
Of course, we cannot say with any confidence what would have happened if such action had been taken. Would it have subdued rioters across the country (defeating the DoE), or inflamed them (simply creating counter-escalation)? Evidently, the French government was not keen to find out. A Bradford-style crackdown writ large probably has the potential to break France, by which I mean it could result in a degree and type of violence that would shatter forever the illusion that the disparate peoples of that nation could ever peacefully alongside each other. And where would the country go from there?
I cannot find a figure for exactly how many convictions were handed out subsequent to the riots. Figures for the number of arrests seem to vary between 3,000 and 5,000. If we suppose that the higher estimate was correct and that all 5,000 were incarcerated, that would correspond to a rise in the French prison population of about 8% in a single year or so. This is almost certainly not physically possible, let alone politically or financially possible. It therefore seems probable that most of these people were given a slap on the wrist at most, after having been detained long enough to prevent them returning to the riots. This is not riot punishment, and barely even riot control. Rather, it is the flailing of an apparatus of state that is rapidly losing the ability to even pretend that it knows what it is doing.
Needless to say, the desired approach to the DoE looks a lot more like the British response than the French one. This is not patriotic boasting; on the contrary, I was amazed to discover that a Labour government had acted in such a draconian fashion with respect to the criminality of cultural enrichers, out-escalating the rioters quite effectively.
That said, note the analytical difficulties involved when trying to judge the performance of opposing sides in real riots rather than moving lines around on graphs. How much did the state out-escalate the rioters by? Were the respective escalations simultaneous, or was the crucial escalation by the British government the long, gradual, punishment of an unprecedented fraction of rioters? Did this move discourage future riots, or are other factors responsible for the relative lack of such violence in the UK?
In the French case, who ‘won’ the riots? Who gave whom the biggest black eye? Am I correct in feeling that the French state will be far more concerned about future riots than the rioters themselves will be? Is defeating the DoE a meaningful option now for the French? How has the weakness they seem to have displayed affected the likelihood and nature of future riots? Will they meet future riots in a more or less draconian fashion? Do the Muslim immigrants smell blood in the water? Or is the state getting ready to deal with what will eventually turn into insurrection?
None of these questions is easy to answer. But one thing is clear. Concerted action, with the political class, the police, the state prosecution apparatus and public opinion all in accord with one another, will be required if the DoE is to be defeated. Think again of the sheer magnitude of the task the French would have faced in applying a Bradford-style response to their 2005 riots. A society not unified in the face of what it considers to be an existential threat will never muster the will to implement such a set of policies.
This brings us back to the earlier claim that the DoE is especially resistant to piecemeal, seat-of-the-pants type solutions. Muslims can escalate and are escalating their response to police action in a highly effective fashion based on:
|a)||a tribal identity at odds with the host society,|
|b)||a desensitization to violence, and|
|c)||local numerical superiority.|
All three factors are simply features of these communities, and require no thought, advance planning, or financial expenditure to obtain or maintain. In contrast, the state must train, pay, equip, organize, and command the personnel to implement a specially-formulated response backed up by a massive and massively expensive infrastructure to even hope to contain this escalation, with no guarantee of success. To acknowledge this asymmetry is bitter indeed. But this is the nature of the situation, and this observation reinforces the impossibility of dealing with it in an impromptu fashion.
There is probably little to be gained by this layman trying to lay down what he considers to be the ideal approach to riot punishment, and, through it, the defeat of the DoE. The options available to those who would oppose rioters on their streets, in whatever fashion, and for whatever purpose, are easily discovered by anyone with an Internet connection and a little bit of spare time.
To adopt some poker terminology for a moment, the crucial issue is whether or not the political will can be generated to raise and re-raise rioters until they fold. To the extent that it cannot, then the DoE cannot be defeated, which means that the Muslim incarceration point cannot be forced back to the baseline. This in turn will condemn Western countries to the horrors of rapidly growing Orange Muslim populations operating under a two-tier legal law enforcement system that greatly favours them, in effect if not in intent.
On the other hand, if the DoE can be defeated, this will play a huge part in allowing a state to reunite the Muslim incarceration point with the baseline incarceration point, which is all the law enforcement apparatus of a country can really hope to do with respect to the problematic human substrate that Muslims are.
Of course, this leaves unresolved the core dilemma, to wit, that a criminal human substrate will have to be some combination of over-incarcerated and over-criminal for reasons already explained. Can this problem be solved, or have we condemned ourselves to suffer the disproportionate criminality and economic costs of our recklessly imported third-world populations in perpetuity?
The answer to this most important question will have to wait for the third and final installment of this essay.
This is the third and final installment of El Inglés’ three-part essay “On the Failure of Law Enforcement”.
On the Failure of Law Enforcement — Part 3
by El Inglés
Sealing the Victory — Grappling with the Human Substrate Problem
In part two of this essay, we considered how we might overcome the Dynamic of Escalation. Now we must consider where we would stand if we were to succeed in doing so. After all, as I discussed in detail in the first installment of this essay, in solving the Dynamic of Escalation we will only have exchanged one problem for another, somewhat lesser one. We will now have a massively over-incarcerated and substantially disproportionately criminal Muslim population, which exists in an extremely polarized and tribally antagonistic relationship with its host society whilst inflicting huge costs of various sorts upon it. Moreover, this population will continue to grow as a fraction of the whole, even if only by virtue of higher fertility.
It is essential to understand here that, unless we rid ourselves of some fundamental taboos, this outcome, exceptionally difficult to arrive at and deeply unsatisfactory in every way, is still the best that can be hoped for, in perpetuity. A question needs to be put here: are the peoples of Western countries prepared to accept that their countries will be forever blighted by the criminality, dysfunctionality, and ideological hostility of Muslim populations imported into those countries against the will of the host population? If the answer to this question is no, then we need to ask what the non-acceptance of this state of affairs implies.
Here we must revisit the Human Substrate Problem. I claimed that the Human Substrate Problem leaves us with no good options for dealing with a problematic human substrate, only bad and worse. However, this is only true under prevailing political paradigms, which prohibit the large-scale deportation and/or internment of the worst elements of problematic populations. Given that there are few restraints on what human beings will feel entitled to do to protect themselves when faced with existential threats, we need not concern ourselves with these paradigms here. Instead, we will assume that they have been discarded when we seek to implement solutions to the Human Substrate Problem.
So, we consider these matters from the perspective of peoples who are faced with crime of a type and magnitude that fundamentally threatens their societies and ways of life. After stating this up front, what follows? In essence, the only way of overcoming the Human Substrate Problem is to physically exclude the worst elements of a problematic substrate so that their unpleasantness cannot spill over onto unfortunate members of the host society.
There are two ways of doing this: internal exclusion and external exclusion, more conveniently referred to as internment and deportation. They need not be implemented independently of each other, but any solution to the Human Substrate Problem will consist of a combination of them. I have discussed internment, deportation and related topics at length in other essays (most obviously Surrender, Genocide, or What and follow-ups) with a different emphasis, and do not propose to revisit these discussions in any detail here. Instead, I will concentrate on the use of internment and deportation in attempts to grapple with the Human Substrate Problem and its implications for crime. The significance of these measures for the de-Islamization of European countries is something that I will then touch on briefly at the end, to explain why they may well be of greater utility in this regard than I have suggested in the past.
The key distinction to be made between internment and deportation is that the former can be carried out without the consent or cooperation of external parties, whereas the latter can not. Deportation requires the immigration authorities of the destination country to accept the deportee, and this restriction on how widely it can be applied is likely to be an important factor in developments in European countries vis-à-vis the most criminal parts of their foreign populations. For this reason, we will discuss it first, and then move onto internment, about which there is more to say.
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Deportation is the most effective and final way of dealing with the Human Substrate Problem. A system could quite easily be devised under which Muslims (by which I mean people of Muslim background, irrespective of how devoutly they practice their religion) acquired some number of points each time they were convicted of a crime, with the accumulation of some number of points being considered grounds for deportation. Needless to say, any country attempting to implement such a program would have to have complete control over its own borders and extremely strict border checks. Biometric identity checks and pre-flight screening would have to suffice to make sure that people were never allowed back in once deported. This would all be simple enough. However, there are two absolute barriers to this process and one conceptual difficulty of note.
The first of the two barriers is citizenship. If a given criminal of foreign origin has dual citizenship, say between the UK and Pakistan, then it would be a simple matter to revoke his British citizenship. However, if he had only British citizenship, then it is difficult to see how he could be deported back to his ancestral country. Some countries, such as, I believe, Morocco, do not allow their citizens to renounce their citizenship, and will continue to treat such people and their children as full citizens irrespective of any other considerations. This has the potential to be a great boon for a country such as the Netherlands, badly afflicted as it is by a shockingly criminal and parasitic Moroccan population.
Here, however, we run into the second barrier. As I have discussed in previous essays, it is entirely possible that certain Muslim countries could refuse entry to flights attempting to deport people in this manner, or refuse to allow them to enter the country in some other fashion (severing diplomatic relations and all transport links, for example). I do not wish to revisit this in detail here. Suffice it to say that it is a potentially serious problem that may, in some cases, make large-scale deportations virtually impossible.
The conceptual difficulty referred to above is as follows. If we decided that we wanted to exclude blacks in the UK once they had acquired the requisite number of points, we would be faced with the difficulty of deciding who exactly was black. This would be a difficult task now that a significant degree of interbreeding with other populations has taken place, and one that would involve a great deal of unpleasantness and arbitrariness. Would the same be true if we targeted Muslims instead of blacks?
It seems to me that the very strong tendency of all Muslim groups to marry and have children within their own communities would make the determination of foreign origin relatively straightforward for the Muslim population, by which I mean that the extremely fuzzy boundary between those of foreign and native origin when we look at blacks and whites is replaced by a relatively clear boundary when we concern ourselves with Muslim and non-Muslim. Furthermore, a history of Islamic religious observance could be taken as proof of ‘Muslimness’ and grounds for exclusion even if a given criminal was only partially of foreign origin. On these grounds, I conclude that this problem is surmountable, though the problems it throws up would have to be considered very carefully.
Under a system of internment, the points system for determining who was to be excluded would be identical to that for deportation, as the problem and the end goal would be the same in both cases. Once exclusion had been decided upon, the criminal would be interned until it was determined whether or not he could be deported. If deportation proved not to be an option, internment would then become permanent until the criminal left the country in whatever fashion.
Internment has great disadvantages relative to deportation. It creates the constant possibility of riots, breakouts, hunger strikes, and the like. Moreover, it would result in constant political opposition from Muslim fellow-travellers and ‘human rights’ activists at home and abroad, which is to say that these people would try to reverse it. Lastly, it would be extremely expensive and require the construction of some number of large internment facilities somewhere off in the countryside of the country in question, and undoubtedly the stationing of army units nearby to quell possible disturbances.
These caveats notwithstanding, internment may well become necessary, so it needs to be discussed. Let me state up front that I take it as given that the ultimate objective of internment would be to convince the interned to leave the country, relinquishing, in the case of the UK, their British citizenship and handing over their British passports. To this end, it would have to be impressed upon them that they had absolutely no future in the UK and no prospect of returning to British society under any circumstances whatsoever.
One can think of this as an internal exile that we would be trying to convert into an external exile. Needless to say, it would make most sense for the interned to leave for their country of ancestral origin, Pakistanis to Pakistan, Somalis to Somalia, and so on. From the perspective of European peoples, however, the crucial thing is that they leave the UK after biometric data had been taken to facilitate their future identification and continued exclusion.
The camps themselves would have to be sufficient to hold, in total, at least several thousand people at any given time. I predict a fairly rapid throughput once it can properly be impressed upon inhabitants that their exclusion from British society is indeed permanent. They should be as unlike prisons as possible to impress upon all concerned that they are not prisons, and that their inhabitants have passed beyond the criminal justice system as it is conventionally understood. Within and without the camps, it will need to be understood that the camps are settlements for Muslims who have made it clear that they cannot be allowed to be a part of British society. They will have prison cells to be temporarily inhabited by those who break their rules, but the underlying notion is that inmates should have as much freedom of motion and action as is possible within the camps, as would be the case in any other settlement.
That said, segregation of men and women into separate camps would be absolutely essential. Exclusion must be a reproductive dead end unless and until the excluded leave for their countries of origin. There is no particular reason to allow rough equivalents of the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and other countries to spring up on European soil. Note that this is no different to the reproductive dead end that is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Since the vast majority of the excluded would be male, this sexual segregation would not be too much of an issue anyway.
Given that the camps would aim to allow inhabitants as normal a life as possible under the circumstances, there would be opportunities for inhabitants to engage in productive labour, and enjoy the fruits of that labour. However, these would not extend to visits from anyone outside the camps. Exclusion means exclusion. Of course, considering the character of the people going into these camps, there would undoubtedly be a certain amount of unpleasantness directed from inmate to inmate, and from inmate to guard. Such behaviour would not be tolerated and would result in punishment up to and including indefinite periods of solitary confinement. It would also be advisable to have separate areas for those of different racial, religious, and/or national backgrounds to minimize tensions within the camps.
I touched earlier on the subject of how large the camps would have to be, and what the expected rate of throughput might be, i.e. the rate at which the interned left Britain for good. Examining this issue in any detail would require legal and other expertise that I do not possess, so I will restrict myself here to a brief observation concerning the rate of flow of the interned out of the country. If the decision had been made to intern, in the UK, a given Pakistani pending deportation, it is of no interest to the British people where that person ends up. If it can somehow be arranged for him to get transit to a third country (Turkey, say), then he can be provided with whatever travel documents are necessary to allow him to get that far, where he would no longer be our problem. This could allow the partial circumvention of restrictions imposed on the deportation of, say, Pakistanis by the Pakistani government. Turning back flights from the UK for political reasons would be one thing, but attempting to turn back a Turkish airline carrying an excluded Pakistani would simply bring the Pakistani government into conflict with the Turkish government, the Pakistani in question, and his friends, family and supporters in Pakistan. Either way, it has nothing to do with us once the person in question has left. Why the Turkish government should allow transit through their country in this matter is a difficult question to which I have no answer. Indirect deportation may well prove to be an important part of the exclusion process nonetheless.
The Left of the Incarceration Point
We have now laid down the bare bones of a solution to the Human Substrate Problem posed to us by criminal, hostile, and parasitic Muslim populations. It should be clear to readers that the overlap between this problem and the basic problem of Islamization is very significant, as is the overlap in the solutions. I have tried to keep this overlap in the background throughout the three parts of this essay for the sake of conceptual clarity. Here, however, I would like to step outside this constraint and highlight, in closing, how the exclusion system outlined above could be used not only with the objective of crime reduction, but with the specific intent of de-Islamizing our countries. It should go without saying that the following discussion assumes that Muslim immigration has already been permanently halted.
An application of the exclusion system to fight crime can be considered a reactive application, whereas the avid de-Islamizer would be looking to adopt what we might call a proactive application instead. This consists of doing everything we have already discussed, but also using the exclusion system to hack away at the Muslim population on the left-hand side of the incarceration point. This hacking will not be arbitrary; rather, it will consist of putting into the exclusion system a portion of the problematic substrate to the left of the incarceration point, who we might consider to be those who have come into contact with the law enough to impress their criminal nature upon us, but have not yet been convicted of anything.
Muslim men who abuse their wives and children, Muslims who intimidate Europeans in public, Muslims who justify Muslim terrorism, Muslims who advocate the adoption of sharia law in European countries: it is not difficult to think of people who would fit the bill. Such people could go straight into the exclusion system without ever being exposed to the criminal justice system. Given that the people in question would not have been convicted of criminal offences, there would have to be a separate process for deciding who was to be excluded, but it should not be particularly difficult to devise one. Peremptory hearings, with magistrates pronouncing their verdicts whilst applying hammers to gavels, sounds about right to the current author. Others will have their own thoughts.
We would then have an exclusion system which is heartily funnelling the most seditious, criminal, and dangerous Muslims out of British society, whether to internment camps or beyond. As impressive an achievement as this would be, one is forced to return to the looming difficulty, to wit, that many countries will not cooperate with the deportation of large numbers of their nationals from European countries. In my essay To Push or to Squeeze, I presented an extremely pessimistic analysis which suggested that, rather than the push of deportation, the squeeze of a gradually tightening brutality and oppression of Muslims within European countries would be likely to be relied upon, sooner or later, to de-Islamize European countries. I still consider this analysis to be largely correct, but certain aspects of it can be reconsidered in light of the exclusion system we have now devised.
If European countries were to play host to the type of genocidal tribal violence I have predicted in other essays, it seems probable that internal pressure on Muslim governments around the world would force them to readmit their nationals overseas even if they were not particularly keen to do so. However, it seems that a better solution for all concerned would be for these same Muslim governments to make the same decision without such a descent into savagery in Europe. The beauty of the exclusion system presented above is that it could, in principle, do much to facilitate this.
Imagine a Lebanese-origin youth recently convicted of rape in Germany, for which he has been sentenced to five years in prison and subsequent exclusion. Five years pass, at the end of which he is cast into the exclusion system, which is to say he is interned pending deportation. Though he himself is prepared to be sent back to Lebanon, the Lebanese government refuses to allow his repatriation. He is not a citizen of their country; he is a convicted criminal; his treatment is a breach of his human rights: it is not difficult to imagine the reasons the German government would be presented with.
However, after another year passes, it starts to dawn on the German-resident family of this unhappy rapist that the German government is serious. The fruit of their loins is never getting back into German society. Furthermore, they are never going to see him again and he is never going to have any semblance of a real life unless he can get out of the internment camp and back to Lebanon. How could we then expect them to act?
If the only barrier to his deportation and, therefore, to his eventual reunion with his family and return to a real life, is the uncooperative attitude of the Lebanese government, it is surely to be expected that his family will exert pressure on that government to allow him into Lebanon. It is also at least reasonably likely that they will decide to live in Lebanon themselves, both to better exert that pressure and to be together as a family once it has paid dividends. Even if the young criminal is not himself a Lebanese citizen, his parents almost certainly will be, and their demands, in-country, for their son to be able to join them will not be easily ignored, even by a relatively despotic and callous government.
In this manner does the exclusion system allow the greatest single potential barrier to a relatively non-violent de-Islamization of Europe to be undermined. A situation will be created in which Muslim parents living in European countries will be:
|a)||willing to have their children deported,|
|b)||keen to apply pressure to their home governments to allow that deportation, and|
|c)||likely to go home themselves, for reasons already explained.|
To say that this makes the exclusion system a useful tool for de-Islamizers would be something of an understatement. Indeed, it is probably the single best option for any government wishing to de-Islamize its country in the least bloody and unpleasant manner for all concerned.
In essence, the exclusion system can be considered an extremely fiendish squeeze of the Muslim population of any given European country, in the sense that I used the term in To Push or to Squeeze. It has the potential to overcome all sorts of opposition to the deportation of problematic Muslims that only raw brutality would otherwise be able to deal with.
Contrary to certain charges levelled at me in the past, I am not keen to see my country and its neighbours descend into widespread tribal violence. It is for this reason that I am so delighted with the broader potential of the exclusion system, which, I reiterate, holds out the possibility of being a tool of great utility in the hands of those who are keen to ensure that the worst elements of the Muslim populations of their countries go back where they come from.