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Sunday, June 24, 2012

Report - Congo - 1993 to 2003

Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003
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Foreword .
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
INTRODUCTION 
SECTION I. Inventory of the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the DRC between March 1993 and June 2003  
CHAPTER I. March 1993 – June 1996: Failure of the democratisation process and regional crisis 
A. Shaba (Katanga) 
B. North Kivu 
C. Kinshasa
D. Rest of the country
    1. Bas-Zaire (Bas-Congo) 
    2. Orientale Province 
    3. Maniema
    4. Kasai Occidental 
CHAPTER II. July 1996 – July 1998: First Congo War and AFDL Regime 
A. Attacks against Tutsi and Banyamulenge civilians 
    1. South Kivu 
    2. Kinshasa .
    3. Orientale Province 
B. Attacks against Hutu refugees
    The Flight of Refugees (1996-1997)
    1. South Kivu .
    2. North Kivu 
        Attacks against refugees in camps on the Goma to Rutshuru road
        Attacks against refugees in the Mugunga and Lac Vert camps
       Attacks against refugees fleeing across the Masisi and Walikale territories
        Masisi territory
    3. Maniema 
    4. Orientale Province 
            Attacks against refugees along the Lubutu-Kisangani road
           Executions and forced disappearances of refugees in and around the town of Kisangani
            Attacks against refugees along the Ubundu to Kisangani railway line
            Attacks against refugees along the Kisangani–Opala road
    5. Équateur 
C. Attacks against other civilian populations 
    1. North Kivu 
    2. South Kivu 
    3. Orientale Province 
    4. Maniema 
    5. Katanga 
    6. Équateur 
    7. Kasai Occidental
    8. Bandundu
    9. Kinshasa
    10. Bas-Congo
CHAPTER III. August 1998–January 2001: The Second War 
A. Attacks directed at Tutsi civilians .
    1. Kinshasa
    2. North Kivu 
    3. Katanga
    4. Orientale Province 
    5. Kasai Occidental 
    6. Maniema 
    7. Kasai oriental
B. Attacks on other civilian populations 
1. Bas-Congo
2. Kinshasa 
3. North Kivu 
4. South Kivu 
5. Maniema .
6. Orientale Province 
7. Ituri 
8. Kasai Occidental 
9. Katanga 
10. Équateur 
CHAPTER IV. January 2001–June 2003: Towards Transition 
A. Orientale Province 
B. Ituri 
C. Katanga
D. North Kivu 
1. Town of Goma, Masisi, Rutshuru, Walikale and Nyiragongo regions (Petit-Nord) 
2. Beni and Lubero regions (Grand-Nord)
E. South Kivu 
F. Maniema .
G. Rest of the country
1. Kinshasa 
2. Bas-Congo
3. Kasai Occidental
4. Kasai Oriental
CHAPTER V. Legal classification of acts of violence 
A. War crimes 
1. Prohibited acts
2. Protected persons .
3. Armed conflict ..
4. Nexus ..
5. Issues around the classification of armed conflicts in the DRC 
    1993-1996: Regional crisis
    Persecution of the Kasaians in Shaba (Katanga)
B. Crimes against humanity.
C. Crime of genocide ..
1. Listed acts ..
2. Directed against a national, ethnic, racial or religious group 
3. With the specific intention to destroy the protected group, as such, either in whole or in part ..
4. Crime of genocide..
D. Serious human rights violations 
SECTION II. Inventory of specific acts of violence committed during the conflicts in the DRC .
CHAPTER I. Acts of violence committed against women and sexual violence 
A. Legal framework applicable to acts of sexual violence .......
1. Domestic law .......
2. International Law .............
B. March 1993 - September 1996: Failure of the democratisation process and regional crisis .
C. September 1996 - July 1998: first war and the AFDL/APR regime 
D. August 1998 - January 2001: Second war 
1. Government-controlled zone ..........
2. Rebel-controlled zone .........
E. January 2001-June 2003: Towards the transition ................
3. Government-controlled zone ............
4. Rebel-controlled zone ..........
F. Multiple aspects of sexual violence ....
1. Sexual violence as an instrument of terror .......
2. Sexual slavery ....
3. Sexual violence committed on the basis of ethnicity....
4. Sexual violence committed in the name of ritual practices .
Conclusion ..
CHAPTER II. Acts of violence committed against children .
A. Impact of armed conflict on children .......
1. Children victims of widespread attacks on the civilian population ...............
2. Children victims of ethnic violence .....
3. Sexual violence committed against children .....
4. Infant mortality ..
5. Anti-personnel mines .....
B. Specific case of children associated with armed groups and forces (CAAFAG)
1. Legal framework ..
2. Recruitment and use of children from 1993 to 2003 ...................
3. Acts of violence committed against CAAFAG ...
4. Crimes committed by CAAFAG and youth justice ..
5. Demobilisation and reintegration .
Conclusion .


CHAPTER III. Acts of violence linked to natural resource exploitation .
A. Violations of human rights and international humanitarian law linked to the struggle for control of natural resources ...............
1. North Kivu, South Kivu and Maniema Provinces .
2. Orientale Province .
3. Katanga .
B. Human rights violations related to natural resource exploitation 
C. Natural resource exploitation as a factor in the prolongation of the conflict .
1. Financing the conflict through natural resource exploitation ..
2. Contributions of State-owned companies to Kabila’s war effort 
3. Paying back the war debt ..
4. Illegal or unfavourable contracts ..
5. Links with the arms trade ..
Conclusion 
SECTION III. Assessment of the justice system in the DRC
CHAPTER I. Legal framework applicable to crimes under international law committed in the DRC 
A. The DRC’s binding international obligations .
1. Obligations under international human rights law .
2. Obligations under international humanitarian law 
3. Rules and obligations arising from the Peace Agreements .
B. Applicable substantive law: crimes under international law in Congolese law 
1. Recognition of the main human rights in Congolese
constitutional law .
2. War crimes ...
3. Crimes against humanity....
4. Crime of genocide ...
5. Other serious human rights abuses .
C. Procedural law and basic procedural safeguards ...
1. Jurisdiction of the military courts and tribunals
2. Basic procedural safeguards 382 833-840
Conclusion 
CHAPTER II. Judicial practice in the DRC relating to serious violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law 
A. Pre-transition period
B. Post-transition period 
1. Équateur Province .
2. Katanga Province ..
3. Maniema Province .
4. Orientale Province ..
5. North Kivu and South Kivu Provinces .
Conclusion .
CHAPTER III. Evaluation of the capability of the Congolese justice system to provide justice for crimes under international law committed between March 1993 And June 2003 .
A. Lack of capability and resources in the Congolese justice system .
1. Insufficient budget .
2. Lack of personnel
3. Lack of technical and material support
4. Lack of transportation 
5. Lack of training, professional development and specialisation among judges 
6. Weakness and deterioration in other components of the justice system 
B. Lack of independence of the judicial system .
C. Military courts have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes under international law
Conclusion .
SECTION IV. Transitional justice options for the DRC
CHAPTER I. Definition of transitional justice


CHAPTER II. Transitional Justice
A. Challenges facing transitional justice 
1. Number and types of crimes committed and the number of perpetrators and victims 
2. Characteristics of the conflict 
3. Context 
B. Implications for transitional justice in the DRC 
CHAPTER III. Judicial Mechanisms .
A. Prosecution of perpetrators of serious violations against human rights and international humanitarian law and transitional justice .
B. Obligation to prosecute the perpetrators of crimes under international law committed in the DRC between 1993 and 2003
C. Challenges posed by prosecuting crimes under international law committed in the DRC between 1993 and 2003 
D. Role of the International Criminal Court.
E. Role of third-party States: extraterritorial and universal jurisdiction 
F. International Court .
G. Hybrid court ....
1. Tribunal independent from the Congolese judicial system 
2. Special mixed chambers within the judicial system .
Conclusion .
CHAPTER IV. Searching for the truth 
A. Brief assessment of the TRC during the transition .
B. Creation of a new TRC 
CHAPTER V. Reparations 
A. Types of reparations 
B. Right to reparation in the context of the DRC
1. Responsibility for reparation
2. Existing reparation methods 
3. National reparation programme 
Conclusion
CHAPTER VI. Reforms 
A. Reform of the judicial system 
B. Vetting of security services 
Conclusion 
Pages
ANNEX I
List of key acronyms used 
ANNEX II
List of documents on the Democratic Republic of the Congo consulted by the Mapping Team
ANNEX III
Maps of the province
--------------------------------


Foreword
This report is the sum of the work of a team of men and women, from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) and beyond, who have spared no effort in providing the
Congolese people and their leaders with a basic tool to help them build a better future
where impunity has no place. The result of many interviews, meetings and exchanges
with several hundred Congolese men and women, the report endeavours to reflect and
substantiate their aspirations. However, no report could adequately describe the horrors
experienced by civilian populations in Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. Every individual has at least one story to tell of suffering and loss. In some
cases, victims have turned perpetrators, and perpetrators have in turn been victims of
serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in a cycle of
violence that continues to this day. This report does not seek to lecture the men and
women who hold the country’s future in their hands. It is intended to be inclusive and
representative in its description of the acts of violence that have affected the entire
Congolese population directly and indirectly. Its aim is not to attribute individual
responsibility or blame one group rather than another, and nothing has been concealed,
leaving to the victims and witnesses the sometimes brutal description of the tragedies
they will never forget. It is meant as a first step towards a sometimes painful but very
necessary application of the truth. Admittedly, the implicit assumption of such a plan is
that the authorities and the Congolese people themselves will take over.
This report also takes an objective look at justice in the DRC, inspired by the remarks
and observations of many of the system’s actors, who are also its victims. It offers a
number of options and avenues that should inspire Congolese society in the difficult task
of reforming the justice system, which is threatened on all sides. It calls for the unfailing
commitment of the authorities to restore justice as one of the fundamental pillars of
Congolese democracy. Lastly, it looks to the future by formulating a series of options
that could be used by Congolese society to come to terms with its past, fight impunity
and handle the present situation without the risk of such atrocities happening again.
Congolese men and women crave truth and justice. They have gone without both for too
long. It is up to the DRC and its people to take the initiative to develop and implement
their strategy for transitional justice. They can, however, count on the support of the
international community in this respect. The Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) will remain by the side of the DRC and its
people in this important journey towards truly sustainable peace.
Navanethem Pillay
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Background and mandate
1. The discovery by the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (MONUC) in late 2005 of three mass graves in North Kivu was a painful
reminder that past gross human rights violations committed in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC) had remained largely uninvestigated and that those responsible had
not been held accountable. Following a number of consultations within the UN system,
an initial idea to “reactivate” the Secretary-General’s 1997–1998 investigative Team1 was
abandoned in favour of a plan with a broader mandate. Consultations between the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), MONUC, the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Department of Political Affairs (DPA),
the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) and the Office of the Secretary-General’s Special
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide led to an agreement aimed at providing the
Congolese authorities with tools needed to break the cycle of impunity. It was
recommended that a mapping exercise of the most serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the DRC2 between
March 1993 and June 20033 be conducted and, on the basis of the findings of the
exercise, that an assessment be carried out of the existing capacities of the Congolese
national justice system to address these violations and a series of options formulated for
appropriate transitional justice mechanisms that would assist in combating the prevailing
impunity in the DRC.
2. In his report of 13 June 2006 to the Security Council on the situation in the DRC,
the Secretary-General indicated his intention to “dispatch a human rights team to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo to conduct a mapping of the serious violations
committed between 1993 and 2003”.4 This intention was reaffirmed in the two following
reports of the Secretary-General of 21 September 2006 and 20 March 2007.5 On 8 May
2007, the Secretary-General approved the Terms of Reference (ToR) of the Mapping
Exercise, delineating the following three objectives:
_______________
Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team on serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law in the DRC (S/1998/581)
.
2 As the DRC was formerly known as “Zaire”, this name may appear in this report for the period ending
May 1997.
3 March 1993 was chosen as a kick-off date for the mapping exercise because of the Ntoto market massacre
in North Kivu, which triggered wider ethnic conflict in the province. June 2003 corresponds to the
establishment of a transitional government of “national unity”, made up of President Joseph Kabila and
four vice-presidents representing the various political persuasions, following the inter-Congolese talks at
Sun City (South Africa) between the government, rebel groups, civil society and the different political
parties.
4 Twenty-first report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2006/390), para. 54.
5 Twenty-second and twenty-third reports of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2006/759 and
S/2007/156 and Corr.1).

· Conduct a mapping exercise of the most serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the DRC
between March 1993 and June 2003.
· Assess the existing capacities within the national justice system to deal
appropriately with such human rights violations that may be uncovered.
· Formulate a series of options aimed at assisting the Government of the DRC in
identifying appropriate transitional justice mechanisms to deal with the legacy of
these violations, in terms of truth, justice, reparation and reform, taking into
account ongoing efforts by the DRC authorities, as well as the support of the
international community.6
3. The Mapping Exercise was presented to President Joseph Kabila during the visit
of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to the DRC in May 2007, and was well
received. In its Resolution 1794 (2007) of December 2007, the UN Security Council
requested the full support of the Congolese authorities for the OHCHR-initiated Mapping
Exercise. On 30 June 2008, a letter was sent by the High Commissioner to President
Kabila announcing the imminent arrival of the Mapping Team. The Mapping Exercise
began officially on 17 July 2008 with the arrival of the Chief of the Mapping Team in
Kinshasa. Around twenty human rights officers were deployed across the DRC between
October 2008 and May 2009 to gather documents and information from witnesses to
meet the three objectives defined in the ToR. The Congolese Government has expressed
its support for the Mapping Exercise on a number of occasions, notably in the statement
delivered by the Minister for Human Rights at the Special session of the Human Rights
Council on the human rights situation in the East of the DRC in November 2008 and in
various meetings between the Chief of the Mapping Exercise and the Justice and Human
Rights Ministers.
Mapping Exercise
4. “Mapping” is a generic expression implying no predefined methodology or
format.7 A mapping exercise itself should be concerned not only with the violations
themselves but also with the context(s) in which they were committed, either in a given
region or across an entire country, as is the case here. Such an exercise requires various
activities to be carried out, including the collection, analysis and assessment of
information contained in multiple reports and documents from different sources,
meetings and witness interviews, as well as consultation with field experts and
consultants. However, a mapping exercise is not an end in itself. It remains a preliminary
_______________
6 Article 1, ToR.
7 As a point of interest, the French translations of “mapping” – cartographie, inventaire or état des lieux
(inventory) – fail to reflect accurately the scope of the mapping exercise's mandate, and it was decided by
the team to retain the generic English term to designate this exercise in French.

exercise leading to the formulation of transitional justice mechanisms, whether they be
judicial or not. It represents a fundamental step in enabling the identification of
challenges, the assessment of needs and better targeting of interventions.
5. The ToR for this Mapping Exercise required the Team8 to “start and complete this
exercise as soon as possible […] to assist the new government with the tools to manage
post-conflict processes”.9 The six-month deployment period set by the Secretary-General
for the Mapping Team, with the mandate of compiling an inventory of the most serious
violations committed over a ten-year timeframe within the territory of the DRC, provided
a methodology of sorts for the mapping exercise. This stage was not concerned with
pursuing in-depth investigations or gathering evidence of sufficient admissibility to stand
in court, but rather with “providing the basis for the formulation of initial hypotheses of
investigation by giving a sense of the scale of violations, detecting patterns and
identifying potential leads or sources of evidence”.10 Consequently, with regard to human
rights and international humanitarian law violations, the Mapping Exercise provides a
description of the violation(s) and their location in time and space, the nature of the
violation(s), the victims and their approximate number and the – often armed – group(s)
to which the perpetrators belong(ed). This exercise was carried out “chronologically and
province by province”.11
6. Given the scale of the violations committed in the ten years of conflict in the
DRC, it was necessary to select from the most serious of these crimes. A gravity
threshold12 with a set of criteria enabling the Team to identify incidents of sufficient
severity to be included in the final report was used for incident selection. These criteria
fell into four categories: 1) nature of the crimes and violations revealed by the incident, 2)
scale (number) of crimes and violations revealed by the incident, and number of victims,
3) how the crimes and violations were committed and 4) impact of crimes and violations
on communities, regions or the course of events.
7. Since the primary objective of the Mapping Exercise was to “gather basic
information on incidents uncovered”, the level of evidence required was naturally lesser
than would be expected in a case brought before a criminal court. It was not a question,
therefore, of being satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that a violation was committed,
but rather having reasonable suspicion that the incident did occur. Reasonable suspicion
_______________
8 “Team” is used to designate the body of human rights specialists who led the Mapping Exercise
investigations across the DRC. These specialists may also be designated “Mapping Exercise Teams” or
“Mapping Teams”.
9 Article 2.3, ToR.
10 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Rule-of-Law tools for
post-conflict states: Prosecution initiatives, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2008, p.6.
11 Article 4.2, ToR: “It should be carried out province by province, and in chronological order of events. It
should gather basic information and not replace in-depth investigations into the incidents uncovered.”
12 The gravity threshold was developed by the International Criminal Court to identify “the most serious
crimes for investigation”. See, for example, Article 17(d)(1): Issues of admissibility under the Rome Statute

is defined as follows: “a reliable body of material consistent with other verified
circumstances tending to show that an incident or event did happen”.13 Assessing the
reliability of the information obtained was a two-stage process involving evaluation of
the reliability and credibility of the source,14 and then the validity and truth of the
information itself.15
8. Unlike some commissions of inquiry with a specific mandate to identify the
perpetrators of violations and make them accountable for their actions, the objective of
the Mapping Exercise was not to establish or to try to establish individual criminal
responsibility of given actors, but rather to expose in a transparent way the seriousness of
the violations committed, with the aim of encouraging an approach aimed at breaking the
cycle of impunity and contributing to this. This decision is further explained by the fact
that, in light of the methodology adopted and the level of evidence used in this Exercise,
it would have been unwise – unjust, even – to seek to ascribe personal criminal
responsibility to any given individual, as this should remain dependent first and foremost
on legal proceedings pursued on the basis of an appropriate level of evidence. The report
does, however, identify the armed group(s) to which the alleged perpetrator(s)
belong(ed), since it was essential to identify the groups involved in order to qualify the
crimes legally. Consequently, information on the identity of the alleged perpetrators of
some of the crimes listed does not appear in this report but is held in the confidential
project database submitted to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.16 However,
the identities of perpetrators under warrant of arrest and those already sentenced for
crimes listed in the report have been disclosed. It should also be noted that where political
officials have assumed public positions encouraging or provoking the violations listed,
their names have been cited in the sections relating to the political context.
9. Conducting a mapping exercise of the most serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law committed in the DRC during the period under
examination presented a number of challenges. In spite of the scale of extreme violence
that characterises the violations in some of the country’s regions, it was also necessary to
take into consideration less serious violations in seemingly less affected regions in order
to provide an overview of the entire country. With this in mind, the gravity threshold was
adapted for each region. Confirming violations that occurred over ten years previously
was sometimes difficult due to the displacement of witnesses and victims and the passing
_______________
13 Another formulation would be “reliable and consistent indications tending to show that the incident did
happen”.
14 Reliability of the source was determined using several factors, including the nature, objectivity and
professional standing of the source providing the information, the methodology used and the quality of
prior information obtained from that source.
15 The validity and authenticity of the information were evaluated through comparison with other data on
the same incidents to ensure cohesion with other verified elements and circumstances.
16 Article 4.3, ToR: “Sensitive information gathered during the mapping exercise should be stored and
utilised according to the strictest standards of confidentiality. The team should develop a database for the
purposes of the mapping exercise, access to which should be determined by the High Commissioner for
Human Rights.”

of time. In some cases, violations that initially appeared to be isolated crimes turned out
to be an integral part of waves of violence occurring in a given geographical location or
within a given timeframe. There is no denying that vis-à-vis the frightening number of
violations committed between 1993 and 2003, the sheer size of the country and
difficulties accessing a number of sites, the Mapping Exercise remains necessarily
incomplete and can in no case reconstruct the complexity of each situation or obtain
justice for the victims. We state this with utmost regret.
10. The Mapping Exercise report contains descriptions of over 600 violent incidents
occurring within the territory of the DRC between March 1993 and June 2003. Each of
these incidents demonstrates gross violations of human rights and/or international
humanitarian law. Each of the incidents listed is backed by at least two independent
sources identified in the report. As serious as they may be, uncorroborated incidents
backed by a single source are not included in this report. Over 1,500 documents relating
to human rights violations committed during this period were gathered and analysed with
a view to establishing an initial chronology by region of the main violent incidents
reported. Only incidents meeting the gravity threshold developed in our methodology
were considered. The in-field Mapping Teams then met with over 1,280 witnesses to
confirm or invalidate the violations listed in the chronology. During these interviews,
information was also collected on previously undocumented crimes.
Implementation of the Mapping Exercise
11. Throughout the implementation of the Mapping Exercise, contacts were
established with Congolese non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in order to obtain
information, documents and reports on serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law that occurred in the DRC during the period covered by the
ToR. To this end, meetings were held with over 200 NGO representatives to present the
Mapping Exercise and request their collaboration. Thanks to this collaboration, the
Mapping Team had access to critical information, witnesses and reports pertaining to the
violations committed between 1993 and 2003. Without the courageous and outstanding
work of the Congolese NGOs during these ten years, documenting the many violations
committed would have been incredibly difficult.
12. Meetings were also held with the Congolese authorities, in particular with the
civilian and military judicial authorities across the country, government representatives,
in particular the Ministers for Justice and Human Rights, and the government agencies
responsible for judicial system reform.
13. Consultations were also held with the main partners of the Mapping Exercise
[MONUC, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)], diplomatic missions as
well as actors involved in human rights and the fight against impunity in the DRC
(notably UN organisations, international NGOs, religious groups and trade unions) to
explain the exercise and seek their collaboration. The project was warmly received by all
and the collaboration fruitful.
14. The Mapping Exercise was rolled out in three successive phases:
· Phase one began with the arrival of the Chief of the Mapping Team in July 2008,
and was dedicated to the recruitment of teams and to the collection, analysis and
use of documents, both confidential and in the public domain, from existing
information sources on the violations committed during the period under
examination. Over 1,500 documents on this subject, some of them confidential,
were obtained from many sources, including the United Nations, the Congolese
Government, Congolese human rights organisations, major international human
rights organisations, the national and international media and various NGOs
(notably unions, religious groups, aid agencies and victims’ associations). In
addition, different national and international experts were consulted in order to
open up new avenues of research, corroborate some of the information obtained
and streamline the overall analysis of the situation.
· Phase two began on 17 October 2008 with the deployment of the field Teams to
carry out the mandate in all provinces of the DRC from five field offices,17
including all investigations, consultations and analyses necessary both to prepare
the inventory of the most serious violations and also to assess the existing
capacities of the Congolese judicial system to deal with this and formulate options
for transitional justice mechanisms that could contribute to the fight against
impunity. During this phase previously obtained information was verified in order
to corroborate or invalidate that information with the aid of independent sources,
while also obtaining new information on previously undocumented violations.
· Phase three began with the closure of the field offices on 15 May 2009 and was
aimed at compiling all the information gathered and drafting the final report.
During this period, regional consultations regarding transitional justice were held
with civil society representatives in Bunia, Bukavu, Goma and Kinshasa. The
final report was submitted to OHCHR on 15 June 2009 for review, comments and
finalisation.
I. Inventory of the most serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law committed on the territory of the DRC between March 1993
and June 2003
15. The period covered by this report is probably one of the most tragic chapters in
the recent history of the DRC. Indeed, this decade was marked by a string of major
political crises, wars and multiple ethnic and regional conflicts that brought about the
_______________
17 The five field offices were at Bukavu (South Kivu), Goma (North Kivu), Kisangani (Orientale), Kalemie
(Katanga) and Kinshasa. The Kisangani team moved to Bunia to cover the Ituri region. The Kalemie-based
team covered the provinces of Maniema, Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental. The Kinshasa-based team
covered the provinces of Kinshasa, Bas-Congo, Bandundu and Équateur.

deaths of thousands, if not millions, of people. Very few Congolese and foreign civilians
living on the territory of the DRC managed to escape the violence, and were victims of
murder, mutilation, rape, forced displacement, pillage, destruction of property or
economic and social rights violations. Aside from its historical contribution to
documenting these serious violations and fact-finding during this period, the ultimate
purpose of this inventory is to provide the Congolese authorities with the elements they
need to help them decide on the best approach to adopt to achieve justice for the many
victims and fight widespread impunity for these crimes.
16. The Mapping Exercise report is presented chronologically, reflecting four key
periods in the recent history of the DRC, each preceded by an introduction explaining the
political and historical background in which the violations were committed. Each period
is organised by provinces and sometimes subdivided into groups of victims and presents
a description of the violations committed, the groups involved and the approximate
number of victims.
A. March 1993–June 1996: Failure of the democratisation processes and regional
crisis
17. The first period covers violations committed in the final years of the regime of
President Mobutu and is marked by the failure of the democratisation process and the
devastating consequences of the Rwandan genocide on the declining Zairian state, in
particular in the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu. During this period, 40
incidents were listed. The most serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law were concentrated for the most part in Katanga, North Kivu and in the
city-province of Kinshasa.
B. July 1996–July 1998: First Congo War and the Alliance des forces
démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-Zaire (AFDL) regime
18. The second period concerns violations committed during the First Congo War and
the first year of the regime established by President Laurent-Désiré Kabila. With 238
listed incidents, this period has the greatest number of incidents in the whole of the
decade under examination. The information available today confirms the significant role
of other countries in the First Congo War and their direct implication in the war, which
led to the overthrow of the Mobutu regime.18 At the start of the period, serious violations
were committed against Tutsi and Banyamulenge civilians,19 principally in South Kivu.
This period was then characterised by the relentless pursuit and mass killing (104
reported incidents) of Hutu refugees, members of the former Armed Forces of Rwanda
(later “ex-FAR”) and militias implicated in the genocide of 1994 (Interahamwe) by the
Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL). A
proportion of the AFDL’s troops, arms and logistics were supplied by the Armée
patriotique rwandaise (APR), the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) and by the
Forces armées burundaises (FAB) throughout the Congolese territory. Hutu refugees,
often rounded up and used by the ex-FAR/Interahamwe as human shields during their
flight, began a long trek across the country from east to west towards Angola, the Central
African Republic or the Republic of the Congo. This period was also marked by serious
attacks on other civilian populations in all provinces without exception, in particular by
the Forces armées zaïroises (FAZ) retreating towards Kinshasa, the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe driven back by the AFDL/APR and the Mayi-Mayi.20
C. August 1998–January 2000: Second Congo War
19. The third period concerns the inventory of violations committed between the start
of the Second Congo War in August 1998, and the death of President Kabila. This period
includes 200 incidents and is characterised by the intervention on the territory of the DRC
of the government armed forces of several countries, fighting alongside the Forces
armées congolaises (FAC) (Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia) or against them, and also
the involvement of multiple militia groups and the creation of a coalition under the
_______________
18 In an interview with Washington Post on 9 July 1997, Rwandan president Paul Kagame (then Defence
Minister) recognised that Rwandan troops had played a key role in the ADFL campaign. According to
President Kagame, the campaign strategy comprised three elements: a destroy the refugee camps, b destroy
ex-FAR and Interahamwe structures based in and around the camps and c overthrow the Mobutu regime.
Rwanda had planned the rebellion and had participated in it by supplying arms, munitions and training
facilities for Congolese rebel forces. According to Kagame, operations – in particular key operations – were
directed by Rwandan mid-level commanders. “Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo”, Washington Post, 9 July
1997. See also the interview with General James Kabarebe, the Rwandan chief military strategist of the
ADFL, in the Observatoire de l’Afrique Centrale: “Kigali, Rwanda. Plus jamais le Congo”, Vol. 6, No. 10,
3–9 March 2003. See also the televised interviews with the Ugandan and Rwandan presidents and General
James Kabarebe explaining in detail their respective roles in the First Congo War, in “L’Afrique en
morceaux”, a documentary by Jihan El Tahri, Peter Chappell and Herve Chabalier, 100 minutes, produced
by Canal Horizon, 2000.
19 The term “Banyamulenge” came into popular use in the late 1960s to distinguish ethnic Tutsis
historically based in South Kivu, the Banyamulenge, from those arriving from the 1960s onwards as
refugees or economic migrants. Banyamulenge means “people of Malenge” and takes its name from a city
in the Uvira territory with a very large Tutsi population. Over time, however, the use of the term
Banyamulenge has become increasingly more generalised and has been used to designate all Zairian,
Congolese and occasionally Rwandan Tutsis.
20 In the DRC, the term Mayi-Mayi is used to designate groups of armed combatants resorting to specific
magic rituals such as water ablutions (“Mayi” in Swahili) and carrying amulets prepared by witchdoctors,
believed to make them invulnerable and protect them from ill fate. Present mainly in South Kivu and North
Kivu, but also in other provinces, the various Mayi-Mayi groups included armed forces led by warlords,
traditional tribal elders, village heads and local political leaders. The Mayi-Mayi lacked cohesion and the
different groups allied themselves with various government groups and armed forces at different times.

banner of a new political and military movement, the Rassemblement congolais pour la
démocratie (RCD), which would later split on several occasions. During this period the
DRC was racked by numerous armed conflicts: “Some […] international, others internal
and […] national conflicts that became internationalised. Participants in these conflicts
include at least eight national armies and 21 irregular armed groups”.21 In spite of the
signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement on 10 July 200922 by all the parties,23 which
called for the respect of international humanitarian law by all parties and the definitive
withdrawal of all foreign forces from the national territory of the DRC, the fighting
continued, as did the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law by all parties to the conflict. On 16 June 2000, the UN Security Council, in its
Resolution 1304 (2000), called for all parties to cease hostilities and demanded that
Rwanda and Uganda withdraw from the territory of the DRC, having been in violation of
its sovereignty. It was not until the signing of two new agreements with Rwanda (Pretoria
Agreement) and Uganda (Luanda Agreement) in 2002, that these foreign forces began to
withdraw from the country.24
20. This period was marked by attacks on civilians with Tutsi morphology, in
particular in Kinshasa, Katanga, Orientale Province, East and Kasai Occidental, Maniema
and North Kivu. Within the context of the war and the conflicts across the whole of the
territory, civilian populations were broadly speaking the victims of serious violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law by all parties in the conflicts and
throughout the territory, but especially in North Kivu and South Kivu, Orientale Province
(in particular in Ituri), Katanga, Équateur and also Bas-Congo.
D. January 2001–June 2003: Towards transition
21. Lastly, the final period lists 139 incidents describing the violations committed in
spite of the gradual establishment of a ceasefire along the front line and the speeding up
of peace negotiations in preparation for the start of the transition period on 30 June 2003.
During this period, fighting that had shaken the province of Ituri, in particular the ethnic
conflicts between the Lendu and the Hema, reached an unprecedented peak. The period
was marked by clashes between the Forces armées congolaises (FAC) and the Mayi-Mayi
forces in Katanga province. As in previous periods, the main victims of the parties
involved in the conflict were civilian populations throughout the territory, particularly in
Orientale Province, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema and Kasai Oriental provinces.
_______________
21 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DRC (A/55/403), para. 15.
22 S/1999/815, Annex.
23 The following were party to the Agreement: Angola, Namibia, Uganda, Rwanda, the DRC and
Zimbabwe. The Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RDC) and the Mouvement de libération du
Congo (MLC) rebel groups signed at a later date.
24 Pretoria Agreement of 31 July 2002 between the DRC and Rwanda, Article 8, para. 3 (S/2002/914,
Annex); Luanda Agreement of 6 September 2002 between the DRC and Uganda, Art

E. Legal classification of acts of violence committed in the DRC between March
1993 and June 2003
22. It must be stated that the vast majority of the 617 most serious incidents
described in this report point to the commission of multiple violations of human rights
but above all of international humanitarian law. It did not appear either appropriate or
essential to classify in law each of the hundreds of violent incidents listed. It was
therefore decided instead to identify the legal framework applicable to the main waves of
violence and to draw conclusions on the general legal classification of the incidents or
groups of incidents reported.
War crimes
23. This term is generally used to refer to any serious breaches of international
humanitarian law committed against civilians or enemy combatants during an
international or domestic armed conflict, for which the perpetrators may be held
criminally liable on an individual basis. Such crimes are derived primarily from the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols I and II of 1977,
and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. Their most recent codification can be
found in article 8 of the Rome Statute25 of the International Criminal Court (ICC) of
1998.
24. The vast majority of incidents listed in this report point to the commission of
prohibited acts such as murder, willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body
or health, rape, intentional attacks on the civilian population, and unlawful and arbitrary
pillage and destruction of civilian goods, which are sometimes essential to the survival of
the civilian population. The vast majority of these acts were committed against protected
persons, as defined in the Geneva Conventions, primarily people who did not take part in
the hostilities, particularly civilian populations and those put out of combat. This applies
in particular to people living in refugee camps, who constitute a civilian population that is
not participating in the hostilities, in spite of the presence of military personnel among
them in some cases. Finally, there is no doubt that the violent incidents listed in this
report almost all fall within the scope of armed conflict, whether international in nature or
not. The duration and intensity of the violent incidents described, and the level of
organisation of the groups involved, make it possible to state, with few exceptions, that
this was a domestic conflict and not simply domestic disturbances or tensions or criminal
acts. In conclusion, the vast majority of violent incidents listed in this report are the result
of armed conflict and point to the commission of war crimes as serious breaches of
international humanitarian law.
_______________
25 Official documents of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June-17 July 1998, vol. I: Final documents (United Nations
publication, sales number: F.02.I.5), sect. A.

Crimes against humanity
25. The definition of this term was codified in paragraph 1 of article 7 of the Rome
Statute of the ICC. When acts such as murder, extermination, rape, persecution and all
other inhumane acts of a similar character wilfully causing great suffering, or serious
injury to body or to mental or physical health are committed “as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack”,
they constitute crimes against humanity.
26. This report shows that the vast majority of incidents listed fall within the scope of
widespread or systematic attacks, depicting multiple acts of large-scale violence, carried
out in an organised fashion and resulting in numerous victims. Most of these attacks were
directed against non-combatant civilian populations consisting primarily of women and
children. As a consequence, the vast majority of acts of violence perpetrated during these
years, which formed part of various waves of reprisals and campaigns of persecution and
pursuit of refugees, were in general terms all transposed into a series of widespread and
systematic attacks against civilian populations and could therefore be classified as crimes
against humanity by a competent court.
Crime of genocide
27. Since it was initially formulated in 1948, in article 2 of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the definition of the crime has
remained substantially the same. It can be found in article 6 of the Rome Statute, which
defines the crime of genocide as “any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such”. The
definition is followed by a series of acts representing serious violations of the right to life
and the physical or mental integrity of the members of the group. The Convention also
provides that not only the acts themselves are punishable, but also conspiracy to commit
genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, the attempt to commit
genocide and complicity in genocide.26 It is the specific intention to destroy an identified
group either in whole or in part that distinguishes the crime of genocide from a crime
against humanity.
28. The question of whether the numerous serious acts of violence committed against
the Hutus (refugees and others) constitute crimes of genocide has attracted a significant
degree of comment and to date remains unresolved. In practice, this question can only be
decided by a court decision on the basis of evidence beyond all reasonable doubt. Two
separate reports by the United Nations, in 1997 and 1998, examined whether or not
crimes of genocide had been committed against Hutu and other refugees in Zaire,
subsequently the DRC. In both cases, the reports concluded that there were elements that
might indicate that genocide had been committed but, in light of the shortage of
_______________
26 Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, art. 3.
information, the investigative Teams were not in a position to answer the question and
requested that a more detailed investigation be carried out.27 The Mapping Exercise also
addressed this question in accordance with its ToR and drew the following conclusions.
29. At the time of the incidents covered by this report, the Hutu population in Zaire,
including refugees from Rwanda, constituted an ethnic group as defined in the
aforementioned Convention. Several of the incidents listed appear to confirm that
multiple attacks targeted members of the Hutu ethnic group as such, and not only the
criminals responsible for the genocide committed in 1994 against the Tutsis in Rwanda
and that no effort had been made by the AFDL/APR to distinguish between Hutu
members of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and Hutu civilians, whether or not they were
refugees.
30. The intention to destroy a group in part is sufficient to constitute a crime of genocide
and the international courts have confirmed that the destruction of a group can be limited
to a particular geographical area.28 It is therefore possible to assert that, even if only a
part of the Hutu population in Zaire was targeted and destroyed, it could nonetheless
constitute a crime of genocide if this was the intention of the perpetrators. Several
incidents listed in this report point to circumstances and facts from which a court could
infer the intention to destroy the Hutu ethnic group in the DRC in part, if these were
established beyond all reasonable doubt.29
31. The scale of the crimes and the large number of victims, probably several tens of
thousands, all nationalities combined, are illustrated by the numerous incidents listed in
the report (104 in all). The extensive use of edged weapons (primarily hammers) and the
systematic massacres of survivors after the camps had been taken show that the numerous
deaths cannot be attributed to the hazards of war or seen as equating to collateral
damage.30 The majority of the victims were children, women, elderly people and the sick,
_______________
27 See the Report from the joint mission tasked with investigating allegations of massacre and other
violations of human rights in eastern Zaire (currently the DRC) from September 1996 (A/51/942), par. 80,
and the Report of the Investigative Team of the Secretary General on serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law in the DRC (S/1998/581), par. 4.
28 Brdjanin, ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia), Trial chamber, 1 September
2004, par. 703, Krstić, ICTY, Trial chamber, 2 August 2001, par. 590 and Krstić, Appeal chamber, 19 April
2004), par. 13; Jelisić, ICTY, Trial chamber, 14 December 1999, par. 8, which accepts that a geographical
area can be limited “to a region or municipality”.
29 Among the factors, facts and circumstances used by the international courts to infer or deduce a
genocidal intention are: the general context, the perpetration of other reprehensible acts systematically
directed against the same group, the scale and number of atrocities committed, the fact of targeting certain
victims systematically because of their membership of a particular group, the fact that the victims were
massacred without regard to their age or gender, the consistent and methodological nature of the
commission of acts, the existence of a genocidal plan or policy and the recurrence of destructive and
discriminatory acts.
30 See, for example, the cases of Lubarika and Muturule (20 October 1996), Kashusha (2 November 1996),
Shanje (21 November 1996), the massive massacre on the Ulindi Bridge (5 February 1997), Osso
(November 1996), Biriko (December 1996 – there were no armed elements at this location at the time of
the attack).

who were often undernourished and posed no threat to the attacking forces.31 Numerous
serious attacks on the physical or mental integrity of members of the group were also
committed, with a very high number of Hutus shot, raped, burnt or beaten. The
systematic, methodological and premeditated nature of the attacks listed against the
Hutus is also marked: these attacks took place in each location where refugees had been
screened by the AFDL/APR over a vast area of the country.32 The pursuit lasted for
months, and on occasion, the humanitarian assistance intended for them was deliberately
blocked, particularly in the Orientale province, thus depriving them of resources essential
to their survival.33 Thus the systematic and widespread attacks described in this report
reveal a number of damning elements that, if proven before a competent court, could be
classified as crimes of genocide.
32. It should be noted, however, that certain elements could cause a court to hesitate
to decide on the existence of a genocidal plan, such as the fact that as of 15 November
1996, several tens of thousands of Rwandan Hutu refugees, many of whom had survived
previous attacks, were repatriated to Rwanda with the help of the AFDL/APR authorities
and that hundreds of thousands of Rwandan Hutu refugees were able to return to Rwanda
with the consent of the Rwandan authorities. Whilst in general the killings did not spare
women and children, it should be noted that in some places, particularly at the beginning
of the first war in 1996, Hutu women and children were in fact separated from the men,
and only the men were subsequently killed.34
33. Nonetheless, neither the fact of only targeting men in the massacres,35 nor the fact
of allowing part of the group to leave the country or even facilitating their movements for
various reasons are sufficient in themselves to entirely do away with the intention of
certain people to in part destroy an ethnic group as such and thus to commit a crime of
genocide. It will be for a competent court to make a decision on the issue.
_______________
31 This emerges particularly in the crimes committed in the province of North Kivu in Kibumba (October
1996), Mugunga and Osso (November 1996), Hombo and Biriko (December 1996), Kashusha and Shanje
(November 1996), in the province of South Kivu, in the province of Maniema in Tingi-Tingi and Lubutu
(March 1997) and in the province of Équateur in Boende (April 1997).
32 Such cases were confirmed in the province of North Kivu in Musekera, Rutshuru and Kiringa (October
1996), Mugogo and Kabaraza (November 1996), Hombo, Katoyi, Kausa, Kifuruka, Kinigi, Musenge,
Mutiko and Nyakariba (December 1996) and Kibumba and Kabizo (April 1997), in Mushangwe (around
August 1997), in South Kivu in Rushima and Luberizi (October 1996), Bwegera and Chimanga (November
1996), Mpwe (February 1997) and on the Shabunda-Kigulube road (February-April 1997), in the province
of Orientale in Kisangani and Bengamisa (May and June 1997), in Maniema in Kalima (March 1997) and
in Équateur in Boende (April 1997).
33 The Investigative Team of the Secretary General concluded that the blockage of humanitarian assistance
was systematic in nature and constituted a crime against humanity: see the Report of the Investigative Team
of the Secretary General on serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the
DRC (S/1998/581), par. 95.
34 This was confirmed in Mugunga (November 1996), in the province of North Kivu, and Kisangani (March
1997), in the province of Orientale.
35 Krstić, decision, ICTY, Appeal chamber, no.. IT-98-33-A, 19 April 2004, par. 35, 37 and 38.

II. Inventory of specific acts of violence committed during the conflicts in the
DRC

34. Given that the methodology used for the first section of the report would not
enable full justice to be done to the numerous victims of specific acts of violence such as
sexual violence and violence against children, nor adequately reflect the scale of the
violence practised by all armed groups in the DRC, nor enable an analysis of the causes
of some of the conflicts, it was decided at the beginning of the Exercise to devote a part
of it to these subjects. This approach has helped to highlight the recurrent, widespread
and systematic nature of these types of violation and enabled a brief analysis to be
produced.
A. Inventory of acts of violence committed against women and sexual violence
35. This section highlights the fact that women and girls paid a particularly heavy
price during the decade 1993-2003, primarily as a result of their socio-economic and
cultural vulnerability, which fostered the forms of extreme violence to which they were
subjected. Violence in the DRC was, in fact, accompanied by the systematic use of rape
and sexual assault by all combatant forces. This report highlights the recurrent,
widespread and systematic nature of these phenomena and concludes that the majority of
the incidents of sexual violence examined constitute offences and crimes under domestic
law as well as under rules on human rights and international humanitarian law.
Furthermore, the Mapping Team was able to confirm massive incidents of sexual
violence that had only been documented to a limited extent or not documented at all,
particularly the rape of Hutu refugee women and children in 1996 and 1997.
36. This chapter emphasises the fact that the scale and gravity of sexual violence were
primarily the result of the victims’ lack of access to justice and the impunity that has
reigned in recent decades, which has made women even more vulnerable than they
already were. The phenomenon of sexual violence continues today as a result of this
near-total impunity, even in areas where the fighting has ended; it has increased in those
areas where fighting is still ongoing.
B. Inventory of acts of violence committed against children
37. This chapter shows that children did not escape the successive waves of violence
that swept over the DRC, quite to the contrary: they were often its first victims. In fact,
children are always affected when crimes under international law are committed against
civilians, partly because they are particularly fragile and partly because violence takes
away their first line of defence, namely their parents. Even when children are not direct
victims themselves, the fact of seeing their parents killed or raped, their property pillaged
and their homes set on fire leaves them deeply traumatised. Being displaced makes them
more vulnerable to malnutrition and diseases. Their young age makes them the target of
contemptible beliefs and superstitions, which claim, for example, that sexual
relationships with children can treat certain diseases or make rapists invincible. Lastly, war generally deprives them of their right to education and thus often compromises their long-term future.36
38. The decade 1993-2003 was also marked by the widespread use by all those
involved in the conflicts37 of children associated with armed groups and forces
(CAAFAG or “child soldiers”), making the DRC one of the countries in the world where
this phenomenon is most common. In the military camps, these children suffered
indescribable violence, including murder, rape, torture, and cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment, and were deprived of all their rights. The report highlights the fact that child
soldiers were sometimes also forced to commit very serious violations themselves but
that in terms of justice, it is essential first to pursue the political and military leaders
responsible for the crimes committed by the child soldiers placed under their command,
based on the principle of hierarchical superiority and the person with most responsibility,
as well as investigating to establish to what extent the children were forced to act or
influenced by their adult superiors.
39. The chapter concludes that the recruitment and use of child soldiers is ongoing
and cites as an example “Kimia II”, the joint military operation between the MONUC and
the Forces Armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) in South Kivu,
during which the use of child soldiers was heavily criticised,38 and emphasises the fact
that the FAC (now FARDC) have been cited since 2002 in every report of the Secretary
General on children and armed conflict for having recruited and used child soldiers.39
C. Inventory of acts of violence linked to the exploitation of natural resources
40. Finally, based on the view that it was not possible to draw up an inventory of the
most serious violations committed in the DRC between 1993 and 2003 without
examining, if only briefly, the role played by the exploitation of natural resources in the
commission of these crimes, chapter III shows that, in a significant number of events, the
_______________
36 According to the World Bank, in 2003 the DRC was one of the five countries in the world with the largest
number of children not in school. Figure cited in: Watch List, The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children in
the DRC, 2003. See also the Report of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 50th session, final
observations: DRC (CRC/C/COD/CO/2).
37 See in particular the Report of the Secretary General on children and armed conflict (A/58/546–
S/2003/1053 and Corr.1 and 2), which cites 12 parties to the conflict: the Forces armées congolaises (FAC),
the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie–Goma (RCD-G), the Mouvement national de libération
du Congo (MLC), the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie/Kisangani–Mouvement de libération
(RCD-K/ML), the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie–National (RCD-N), the Hema militia
[Union des patriotes congolais (UPC) and Parti pour l’unité et la sauvegarde du Congo (PUSIC)], the
Lendu/Ngiti militia [Front nationaliste and intégrationniste (FNI) and Forces de résistance patriotique en
Ituri (FPRI)], the Forces armées populaires congolaises (FAPC), the Mayi-Mayi, the Mudundu-40, the
Forces de Masunzu and the ex-Forces armées rwandaises and Interahamwe (ex-FAR /Interahamwe).
38 Internal report of the Human Rights division of MONUC, April 2009; Press statement by Mr Philip
Alston, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary executions, Mission in the DRC from 5
to 15 October 2009.
39 Report of the Secretary General on children and armed conflict (S/2002/1299, A/58/546-S/2003/1053
and Corr.1 and 2, A/59/695-S/2005/72, A/61/529-S/2006/826 and Corr.1, A/62/609-S/2007/757 and
A/63/785-S/2009/158 and Corr.1).

struggle between different armed groups for control of the DRC’s natural assets served as
a backdrop for numerous violations directed against civilian populations.
41. In this chapter, the link between the exploitation of natural resources and
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law has been analysed from
three different points of view: firstly, violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law committed by those involved in the conflict as part of the fight to gain
access to and control the richest areas; secondly, the violations committed by armed
groups during their long-term occupation of an economically rich area; and thirdly, the
huge profits generated from the exploitation of natural resources, which have driven and
helped fund the conflict and which are themselves a source and cause of the most serious
violations.
42. The report concludes that there is no doubt that the abundance of natural
resources in the DRC and the absence of regulation and responsibility in this sector has
created a particular dynamic that has clearly contributed directly to widespread violations
and to their perpetuation and that both domestic and foreign state-owned or private
companies bear some responsibility for these crimes having been committed.
III. Assessment of the resources available to the national justice system to deal
with the serious violations identified

43. One important aspect of the ToR for the Mapping Exercise was the assessment of
the resources available to the Congolese justice system to deal with the numerous crimes
committed, particularly during the decade 1993-2003, but also afterwards. This involved
analysing the extent to which the national justice system could deal adequately with the
serious crimes described in the inventory in order to begin to combat the problem of
impunity. To do this, an analysis was carried out of the domestic and international law
applicable in this area, as well as the courts with jurisdiction to prosecute and judge the
presumed perpetrators of the serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law committed in the DRC. A study of Congolese case law on crimes under
international law was also carried out to examine domestic judicial practice in relation to
war crimes and crimes against humanity. This study helped to gain a better understanding
of the legal, logistical, structural and political challenges and obstacles that characterise
criminal proceedings in relation to crimes under international law in the DRC.
44. Around 200 actors in the judicial system, academics and national experts in
criminal and international law were interviewed by the Mapping Team.40 Hundreds of
documents from different sources were obtained and analysed, in particular laws, judicial
decisions and various reports dealing with the justice system.
_______________
40 Primarily meetings with the civilian and military judicial authorities in various public prosecutor’s
offices, Government representatives and national bodies tasked with the reform of the judicial system.

45. The analysis of the legal framework applicable in the DRC to deal with the most
serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed between
March 1993 and June 2003 shows that there is a significant body of legal norms and
provisions both in international law and domestic law, which is sufficient to begin to
tackle impunity in respect of the crimes documented in this report. The DRC is bound by
the major conventions in respect of human rights and international humanitarian law and
has been party to the majority of them since well before the conflicts of the 1990s.41
Whilst the lack of jurisdiction of the civilian courts for crimes under international law
may be regrettable, it should be noted that the military courts are competent to judge
anyone responsible for crimes under international law committed within the DRC
between 1993 and 2003. Finally, the Constitution of February 2006 is highly eloquent in
respect of protecting human rights and fundamental judicial guarantees and the text
incorporates the main international standards in this area.
46. Whilst the legal framework may seem adequate, however, the study of Congolese
case law identified only around a dozen cases since 2003 where the Congolese courts had
dealt with incidents classified as war crimes or crimes against humanity. Furthermore,
only two of these cases concerned incidents covered by this report, namely the Ankoro
case,42 a judgment of 20 December 2004 on the incidents that took place in Katanga in
2002, and the Milobs case,43 a judgment of 19 February 2007 on the incidents that
occurred in Ituri in May 2003.
47. Whilst it is undeniable that some of those involved in the Congolese military
justice system, inspired by the DRC’s adherence to the Rome Statute of the ICC in 2002
and supported by the international community, rendered a small number of courageous
decisions in relation to crimes under international law,44 braving physical and
psychological obstacles as well as political pressure, all the cases studied nonetheless
_______________
41 With the exception of Additional Protocol II (1977) to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, ratified in 2002,
the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ratified
in 1996 (Resolution 39/46 of the General Assembly, appendix), and of course the Rome Statute of the ICC,
signed in 2000 and ratified in 2002.
42 In the Ankoro case, the investigations carried out by MONUC revealed that violent confrontations
between the FAC and the Mayi-Mayi, in November 2002, had caused the deaths of at least 70 people.
Thousands of homes were set on fire and destroyed, and hundreds of public and private buildings including
hospitals, schools and churches were pillaged. In December 2002, 28 FAC soldiers were arrested and
handed over to the military judicial authorities. Seven of them were charged with crimes against humanity.
The trial was delayed for many months to enable the creation of a commission of enquiry of officers able to
judge a lieutenant-colonel; in the end, the court acquitted six of the defendants and sentenced the seventh to
20 months’ imprisonment for murder. The Public Prosecutor’s Office, having been satisfied by the arrest,
did not lodge an appeal (RMP 004/03/MMV/NMB–RP 01/2003, RMP 0046/04/NMB–RP 02/2004).
43 In the Milobs case, in May 2003, members of the Front nationaliste et intégrationniste (FNI), a militia
that was running wild in Ituri, tortured and killed two soldiers on a peace monitoring mission for MONUC.
Seven members of the militia were charged with war crimes over three years after the incidents. On 19
February 2007, the court at the military garrison in Bunia sentenced six of the defendants to life
imprisonment for war crimes under the Congolese Military Penal Code and article 8 of the Rome Statute of
the ICC (RP 103/2006).
44 This applied in the Songo Mboyo (2006), Milobs (2007), Gety and Bavi (2007), Lifumba Waka (2008),
Gédéon Kyungu (2009) and Walikale (2009) cases.

illustrate the significant operational limitations of the military judges. Slapdash, dubious
investigations, poorly drafted or inadequately substantiated court documents, irrational
decisions, violations of due process and various examples of interference by the civilian
and military authorities in the judicial process are all examples of defects that have
characterised some of these decisions, particularly in the cases of Ankoro, Kahwa
Mandro, Kilwa and Katamisi.
48. The lack of political will to prosecute serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the DRC is also confirmed by the fact that the vast
majority of decisions handed down came about as the result of constant pressure from
MONUC and NGOs.
49. This lack of dynamism in the Congolese justice system in relation to war crimes
and crimes against humanity, particularly in respect of those primarily responsible for
them, has only encouraged the commission of new serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law, which continue to this day.
Inability of the Congolese justice system to deal adequately with crimes under
international law committed on its territory
50. The problem in the DRC is less a problem of inadequate provisions in the
criminal law than a failure to apply them. Although, as the Report on the current state of
the justice sector in the DRC confirms, the Congolese judicial system enjoys “a solid
legal tradition inherited from colonisation, as still evidenced by the quality of certain
senior judges”,45 it is universally accepted that the Congolese judicial system is in poor
health and even in a “deplorable state”.46 Having been significantly weakened under the
Mobutu regime, it suffered severely as a result of the various conflicts that ravaged the
DRC for over ten years.
51. The research and analyses carried out by the Mapping Team, and the working
sessions and consultation with key figures in the Congolese judicial system, both at an
institutional level and within civil society, confirmed that there are significant structural
and chronic shortcomings in all parts of the Congolese justice system. Even successful
criminal prosecutions are inadequate if the State does not take the necessary steps to
_______________
45 The mission tasked with analysing the judicial system was the result of an initiative of the European
Commission acting jointly with Belgium, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, MONUC, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). See Status report, Organisational audit of the Justice System in the
DRC, May 2004, p. 7.
46 See in particular the Report from the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers,
Leandro Despouy, addendum, Mission in the DRC, (A/HRC/8/4/Add.2) (hereinafter referred to as the
“Despouy report”).

ensure that prisoners do not escape.47 The fact that the military courts and tribunals have
exclusive jurisdiction over crimes under international law also poses a problem with
regard to the punishment of serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law.48 Their lack of capacity and lack of independence are illustrated by the
insignificant number of cases they have heard and the way in which they have dealt with
them.
52. The high level of involvement of foreign nationals in serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the DRC also causes a problem for the
Congolese courts. Although they have jurisdiction in respect of any person, whether or
not they are Congolese, they have few means of ensuring that suspects residing outside
the country appear in court. Cooperation on extradition from certain States remains
unlikely, given the few guarantees offered by the Congolese military courts in respect of
fair and equitable trials and respect for the fundamental rights of defendants, particularly
as the death penalty is still in effect in Congolese law.
53. To sum up, given the limited commitment of the Congolese authorities to
strengthening justice, the derisory resources allocated to the judicial system for tackling
impunity, the acceptance and tolerance of multiple incidents of interference by the
political and military authorities in court cases that confirm the system’s lack of
independence, the inadequacy of the military justice system, which has sole jurisdiction
for dealing with the numerous crimes under international law often committed by the
security forces, inadequate and inefficient judicial practice, non-compliance with
international principles in relation to minors and the inadequacy of the judicial system for
cases of rape, it must be concluded that the resources available to the Congolese justice
system to bring an end to impunity for crimes under international law are woefully
inadequate. Given the multitude of crimes under international law committed, however,
the operation and independence of the judicial system is all the more important in light of
the large number of senior figures in the armed groups that were parties the conflict, who
are involved in various violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.
_______________
47 ”The disastrous state of the prison system, perhaps the weakest link in the judicial chain, means that it is
easy for suspects and convicted prisoners to escape; this includes some very influential figures, who
“sometimes “escape” with the connivance of the authorities.” Combined report of seven thematic special
procedures on Technical Assistance to the Government of the DRC and urgent examination of the situation
in the east of the country (A/HRC/10/59), par. 63. According to figures from MONUC, during the second
half of 2006 only, at least 429 prisoners, including some who had been convicted for serious violations of
human rights, escaped from prisons throughout the DRC. See Despouy report (A/HRC/8/4/Add.2), par. 55.
48 Military justice should “be restricted solely to specifically military offences committed by military
personnel, to the exclusion of human rights violations, which shall come under the jurisdiction of the
ordinary domestic courts or, where appropriate, in the case of serious crimes under international law, of an
international or internationalised criminal court”. Commission on Human Rights
(E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1), Principle 29.

IV. Formulation of options in the field of transitional justice mechanisms that
could help to combat impunity in the DRC.

54. The transitional justice mandate with which the Mapping Team has been
entrusted consists of providing various options in order to help the Government of the
DRC to deal with the many serious human rights and international humanitarian law
violations committed on its territory, with a view to achieving "truth, justice, reparation
and reform".49 This mandate also echoes the demands that Congolese society has made of
its leaders, initially at the Inter-Congolese Dialogue which resulted in the global and
inclusive Agreement concerning transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo in Sun
City (South Africa) in 200250 and, subsequently, at the Conference on Peace, Security
and Development which was held in January 2008 in North Kivu and South Kivu. This
mandate has also received firm support from the Security Council, which has asked
MONUC "to help [the Government] to create and apply a transitional justice strategy".51
55. In order to carry out this mission, the Mapping Team has examined recent
experience in DRC in terms of transitional justice and has identified existing issues in this
area, particularly in the light of the conclusions of the evaluation of the judicial system
that are presented in this report. The experience of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) that operated in the DRC during the transition, and current reforms of
the justice and security sectors have also been reviewed. In addition, there were
consultations with Congolese experts, particularly judicial authorities and representatives
from the Ministries of Justice and Human Rights, international experts in this field, local
and international human rights and criminal law specialists and victims' associations. As
there was a convincing need for national approval of transitional justice measures if these
were to be effective, several round-table meetings were also organised, in order to gather
views and opinions from civil society on this subject.52
56. The options for transitional justice that are put forward in this report broadly take
into account the diverse points of view expressed by the Congolese and international
stakeholders who were consulted, and these options are also informed by other studies of
victim expectations in terms of transitional justice and data from grassroots work,
reported by members of the Team. Finally, these transitional justice options are part of
current efforts to reform the judicial system, to reform Congolese law and to create new
institutions that would promote greater respect in the DRC for its international
obligations concerning justice and the fight against impunity.
_______________
49 Article 1.3 of the ToR.
50 Available at the following address:
http://home.hccnet.nl/docu.congo/Frans/OudSysteem/accordglobal.html  [in French]
51 Mandate repeated by the Security Council in several of its resolutions, in particular Resolution 1794
(2000) dated 21 December, para. 16, and Resolution 1856 (2008) dated 22 December 2008, para. 4.
52 Round-table meetings concerning the combat against impunity and transitional justice were organised by
the Mapping Exercise in Bunia, Goma, Bukavu and Kinshasa in May 2009.

57. Because of the many challenges that arise when seeking justice for the crimes
committed in the DRC, it is crucial that a holistic policy of transitional justice be adopted,
which will depend on the creation of diverse and complementary mechanisms, both
judicial and non-judicial. The process requires a strategy based on a global view of
known violations, the timescales involved and the main categories into which the victims
fall. With this in mind, this report may help to form the basis of a process of reflection for
civil society and the Congolese Government as well as their international partners. This
strategy must involve complementarity between various mechanisms, whether these are
already available or to be created, each of which would have a particular role to play in
seeking truth, justice, reparation and rehabilitation of victims, in reform of judicial and
security institutions (including methods for vetting security forces and the army) and in
reconciliation, or even reconstruction of the historical truth. These mechanisms
complement each other and are not exclusive. Most of the many countries that have
looked to a past marked by dictatorship, armed conflict and large-scale serious crime
have used several types of transitional justice measures, implemented simultaneously or
gradually in order to restore rights and dignity to victims, to ensure that human rights
violations are not repeated, to consolidate democracy and sustainable peace and to lay the
foundations for national reconciliation.
Judicial mechanisms:
58. The DRC cannot escape its obligations under international law, namely to pursue
crimes under international law committed on its territory, any more than it can remain
unaware of the many Congolese victims who are demanding justice for the harm they
have suffered. The decision as to which judicial mechanism would be most appropriate
for dealing with these crimes is the exclusive responsibility of the Congolese
Government, and this decision must take into account the demands of Congolese civil
society. In order to achieve this, a consultation process must be put in place by the
Government, with the support of the international community, and this process must be
as broad as possible.
59. The violations that meet the criteria for crimes under international law were
committed on a huge scale over more than ten years of conflict and by various Congolese
and foreign armed groups. These violations were so numerous that no judicial system
functioning at the peak of its abilities can deal with so many cases. There were tens of
thousands of serious crimes and perpetrators, and hundreds of thousands of victims. In
such cases, it is important to establish priorities when embarking on criminal
prosecutions, and to concentrate efforts on "those who bear the greatest responsibility".
However, prosecution of "those who bear the greatest responsibility" requires an
independent justice system which is capable of resisting political and other types of
intervention, which is definitely not the case for the current Congolese judicial system,
the independence of which remains seriously compromised and poorly treated.
60. The generalised and systematic nature of the crimes that have been committed
poses a challenge in itself. Such crimes require complex investigations, and these cannot
be carried out without significant material and human resources. In some cases, specific expertise may be essential, in enquiry staff and prosecutors. However, the lack of
resources available to Congolese jurisdictions means that they are not capable of carrying
out their mandate as it pertains to crimes under international law. Reinforcement and
restoration of the internal judicial system is also of primary importance.
61. In response to these observations, the report concludes that a mixed judicial
mechanism53 - made up of national and international personnel - would be the most
appropriate way to provide justice for the victims of serious violations. Whether national
or international, the exact form and function of such a jurisdiction should be decided
upon in detail jointly by stakeholders involved, particularly concerning their participation
in the process, in order to provide credibility and legitimacy for the adopted mechanism.
In addition, before international resources and stakeholders are deployed, a rigorous
planning process is required, as well a precise assessment of the available material and
human resources within the national judicial system.
62. When implementing such a system it is essential that some important principles
be adhered to so that the mechanism can be effective and so that any lack of capacity,
independence and credibility can be compensated for, in particular:
- Significant financial involvement and clear government commitment;
- Guarantees of independence and impartiality. The best way of achieving these
objectives is to entrust international stakeholders (judges, magistrates, prosecutors
and those in charge of the investigation) with key roles in the various components
of the mechanism;
- Paying special attention, particularly in terms of procedure, to specific types of
violence, notably sexual violence against women and children.
63. Such a mechanism must also:54
- apply international criminal law as it relates to crimes under international law,
including the responsibility of superiors for acts committed by their subordinates;
- ensure that any amnesty granted for crimes under international law does not apply
in the context of this mechanism; ensure that military courts do not have
jurisdiction over this matter;
_______________
53 There are several forms of mixed judicial mechanisms: a court that is independent of the national
judicial system or special mixed chambers within the national judicial system.
54 Some of these criteria were established by the Secretary General in his report on the re-establishment of
the rule of law and administration of justice during the transition period in societies that are in conflict or
that are emerging from a period of conflict. See S/2004/616, chapter XIX, Sect. A., para. 64, conclusions
and recommendations.

- have competence over all persons who have committed these crimes, whether
nationals or foreigners, civilians or military personnel, and who at the time the
crimes were committed were aged 18 or over;
- ensure that all judicial guarantees providing for a fair and equitable process are
respected, particularly the fundamental rights of the accused;
- plan for a mechanism to provide legal assistance to the accused and to victims;
- plan for protection measures for witnesses and, if required, legal personnel who
risk being threatened or intimidated;
- not plan to use the death penalty, in compliance with international principles;
- ensure the co-operation of third-party States, the United Nations and NGOs that
would be capable of supporting the activities involved in this mechanism,
particularly with the provision of defence.
64. A mixed court in itself will not solve the problem of the participation of foreign
armed groups in the waves of violence across the country. There is no doubt that in many
of the recorded incidents, armed forces and groups from countries other than the DRC
were involved. However, it is impossible to establish the extent to which foreign
commanders, controllers and those who gave orders are responsible, without the
assistance of the authorities in the relevant countries. In this respect, since 2001 the
Security Council has been reminding States in the region that were involved in armed
conflict of their obligations under international law "and to bring to justice those
responsible, and [...] ensure accountability for violations of international humanitarian
law".55 The alleged perpetrators can thus be prosecuted by third-party States for crimes
committed in the DRC, whether in the same region or not, on the basis of universal
jurisdiction. This facility has been used previously, though not often enough.56 Such
possibilities should be encouraged.
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC):
65. The extent and the systematic and generalised nature of the crimes committed
against vulnerable people, women, children and defenceless refugees requires an
investigation into the reasons behind this cycle of violence, and into the existence of a
deliberate policy of attacking certain categories of persons for ethnic, political or
_______________
55 See, for example, resolution 1291 (2000) dated 24 February 2000, para. 15.
56 In three cases, third-party States have exercised universal jurisdiction over crimes under international
law committed in DRC between 1993 and 2003. See: Arrest warrant under international law, issued by
examining magistrate Vandermeersch (Belgium) against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, dated 11 April
2000; Judgement of Rotterdam District Court (Netherlands), 07 April 2004 against Colonel Sébastien
Nzapali, and Spanish arrest warrants against 40 officers in the Rwandan army, “Juzgado Nacional de
Instruccion n. 4, Audiencia Nacional, Madrid”, 06 February 2008.

nationality reasons. The systematic use of sexual violence, which continues today, must
be given special attention. Economic factors, connected to occupation of land and illegal
exploitation of natural resources among other issues, must also be considered. Such
questions will not be answered satisfactorily by a single court, which would primarily
seek to assess the individual responsibility of perpetrators without attempting to
understand the conflict as a whole, how it came into being and the deep-seated
underlying reasons. A judicial mechanism, in and of itself, can only look in a limited and
fragmentary way at such violence, and can only deal with a limited number of cases,
without taking into account the needs of the majority of victims or their urgent need for
the truth.
66. Despite the fact that victims were very disappointed with the failure of the DRC’s
first TRC, there is still a very strong desire for a new commission and for the truth. In his
closing speech at the Goma Conference in February 2008, President Kabila positively
welcomed the demand for the creation of a new TRC.57
67. To this end, and to avoid the errors made in the past, a serious and wide-ranging
consultation process must be started, in a non-politicised atmosphere, so that the work of
the TRC will be based on a credible foundation and mandate that will be needed if it is to
establish the truth, propose reparation measures and institutional reforms. With this in
view, it is important that efforts be made to help victims to organise themselves so that
they can be better prepared to contribute to the consultation process and the creation of a
truth-seeking mechanism.
68. Although there is no ready-made model or template for a truth-seeking
mechanism, it is possible, in the light of the experience of the first TRC in DRC and in
the Congolese context, to propose some basic principles which should enable some of the
identified issues to be overcome:
- Need for broad consultation: This was absent from the first TRC and from the
new plan lodged with Parliament; a consultative process involving victims and
representatives from civil society appears to be indispensable if the basic
parameters of a future mechanism are to be identified, and if the population are
then to understand how this mechanism works and recognise that it is credible and
legitimate;
- A realistic and precise mandate: Given the numerous conflicts that have
plagued DRC, the mandate should be limited to the periods in history that have
produced the most serious violations of human rights and of international
humanitarian law. Particular attention should be paid to certain groups that have
been particularly badly affected by violence in the DRC, particularly women,
_______________
57 Speech by President Kabila closing the peace, security and development conference in North Kivu and
South Kivu, Goma, 22 February 2008, p. 5.

children and some ethnic minorities and communities of particular ethnicities,
political views or nationalities;
- Determination of mandate: The variety of different mandates with which the
first TRC in DRC was entrusted contributed to its failure. A TRC cannot act as a
substitute for a mediation facility or a reparation mechanism58, although it can, of
course, provide useful recommendations in these areas;
Membership of the TRC: The process for selecting members of any new truthseeking
mechanism in the DRC, and the process whereby it can be ensured that
these members are credible, independent and competent, will to a large extent
determine the legitimacy of such a mechanism, the support it receives and,
ultimately, whether it succeeds or fails.59 The possibility of appointing
international members to the commission should also be explored, given the
mistrust that persists in the DRC (among the civilian population and of various
parties towards the authorities);
- Powers of the Commission: It is of primary importance that the mechanism that
is created can have the power (for example) to cross-examine witnesses, to make
them appear before the Commission, to protect them and guarantee that their
testimony cannot be used against them in judicial proceedings, to obtain the full
co-operation of the authorities. Prerogatives allowing amnesties to be granted to
penitent perpetrators must be compatible with principles of international law in
this area, and must not be applicable in cases of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, genocide and other serious human rights violations.
- Content of final report: A truth-seeking mechanism must be able at least to
make recommendations concerning measures for reparation and compensation for
victims, institutional reform, particularly in the legal system and security forces,
so that such violations may be avoided in future and, if necessary, it must be able
to recommend sanctions.
69. The success of any new truth-seeking mechanism remains highly dependent on a
strong commitment from the Government to confront the past and on a conviction that
establishing the truth is essential if there is to be a peaceful transition to a country in
which the rule of law is respected. Any efforts by civil society and the international
community will be useless without such a commitment from the Government.
_______________
58 ”...truth commissions are not well placed to implement an extensive reparations programme
themselves”, Truth commissions, OHCHR, p. 35.
59 ”To be successful, they must enjoy meaningful independence and have credible commissioner selection
criteria and processes.” See the Report on the re-establishment of rule of law and transitional justice in
conflict and post-conflict societies (S/2004/616), para. 51.

Reparation
70. Many international treaties contain references to the rights of victims of serious
human rights violations to compensation.60 This is linked to the right to remedy that
provides all victims with the right to an easily accessible process for obtaining reparation,
via criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary routes. Hundreds of thousands of
victims have suffered psychological and physical damage as a result of the terrible
violence they experienced. They have the right to reparations. The right to reparation
must account for all injury suffered by the victim and this can take several possible
forms: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees that violence
will not be repeated, via adoption of appropriate measures.
71. A comprehensive and creative approach to the issue of reparation is clearly
required. Even if it seems as though collective reparation is easier to implement,
individual reparation must nevertheless be considered in some cases, particularly those in
which the consequences of the violations continue to have a major impact on the lives of
victims.
72. The Congolese Government must be the first to contribute to a reparations
programme. This contribution must be proportional to the State's budgetary capacity, but
a suitable investment will demonstrate that the State recognises this legal and moral
obligation, will provide a clear political signal of its willingness to help victims, and will
stimulate contributions from other international partners in the programme. Third-party
countries that have international responsibility for serious violations of human rights and
of international humanitarian law also have the obligation to pay reparations to the State
on whose territory these acts were committed and harm suffered, as in the case of
Uganda.61 This obligation, which arises from customary international law, exists
independently of any judgement from the International Court of Justice (ICJ). This
obligation must be respected. Any sum of money seized from perpetrators of crimes
under international law committed in the DRC, whatever their nationality and regardless
of which judicial authority seized the money, can also be directed towards such
reparation mechanisms. It may even be possible to consider prosecution of some private
or nationalised companies, within or outside the country, which illegally bought natural
resources from the DRC, with a view to obtaining compensation that would be
channelled into the reparation mechanism.
73. The most important issue to resolve when creating any reparation mechanism is
that of how to determine who should receive help from such a programme. Several
criteria can be used to delimit the scope of a programme and to help those who have
_______________
60 See the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (article 8), the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (article 2.3), the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial
Discrimination (article 6), the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (article 14), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (article 39) as well as the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (articles 19 and 68).
61 International Court of Justice, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), 19
December 2005, para. 259 – 260.

suffered most and who have the greatest need of assistance, without trivialising the
suffering of other victims. The seriousness of the violation, its consequences for the
physical or mental health of the victims, stigmas attached, any repetition of violations
over time, and the current socio-economic situation of victims are all valid criteria.
74. As an exclusively judicial approach that is required to establish the extent to
which perpetrators are responsible will never give full satisfaction to victims, and given
the limitations of the judicial system in the face of the number of crimes committed and
the number of victims, alternatives to the judicial route must be explored, such as the
Victims' Fund run by the ICC, which is active in the DRC and which has developed new
ways to approach reparation.
75. The report concludes that a national agency, a reparation commission or
compensation fund, which would have as its exclusive task the creation and
implementation of a programme of compensation for the victims of conflict in the DRC,
would be the most appropriate mechanism with which to address the issue of reparations.
This body must have sufficient independence and prerogatives in order to define and
identify the categories of victims who have claims to various types of reparation to be
granted individually and collectively. It should establish relatively simple procedures that
are free to access and appropriate to victims, in order to facilitate access and provide
effective solutions, which is often lacking in purely judicial settings.
Reforms
76. One of the purposes of the transitional justice policy is to establish guarantees that
serious human rights and international law violations that were committed in the past will
not be repeated. If this aim is to be achieved, it is often of primary importance to reform
institutions that have committed such violations and that have failed to perform their
institutional role. Such reforms are clearly highly relevant in the DRC, and this report has
exposed several instances in which the Zaire (later Congolese) security forces were
directly or indirectly responsible for serious violations of international human rights law
and international humanitarian law that were committed between 1993 and 2003 and
which still persist in the DRC. Although all transitional justice mechanisms are
important, it should nonetheless be emphasised that institutional reform is without doubt
the step that will have the greatest long-term impact in achieving peace and stability in
the country and which will offer citizens the best protection against repeat violations.
77. The most crucial and urgent of the reforms that aim to prevent repetition of these
crimes are those that concern improvements to the judicial system, adoption of a law to
implement the Rome Statute and the vetting of the security services. Several reforms of
the judicial system are underway and deserve support. These aim to support
improvements in the capabilities of the judicial system, particularly by reforming
criminal legislation, deployment of legal administration throughout the whole country
and the retraining of judges and judicial staff
78. As part of efforts to curb and prevent crimes under international law, the DRC has
undertaken, by ratifying the Rome Statute, to prosecute the perpetrators of crimes listed
in the Statute and to provide for all forms of co-operation with the Court in its national
legislation. This bill, which complies in every way with the DRC's international
obligations, is of paramount importance and Parliament must pass it without further
delay.
Vetting
79. The process of reforming the security forces, particularly the police and the army,
was begun at the start of the transition period, along with the reform of the justice sector.
However, it is to be regretted that transitional justice was not taken into account during
this process. A significant transitional justice mechanism in the field of institutional
reform relates to the vetting procedure that aims to ensure that "government workers who
are personally responsible for flagrant human rights violations, particularly personnel in
the army, the security services, the police, the intelligence services and the judicial
system, must be prevented from working in government institutions".62 Vetting is
particularly important and relevant in the DRC, as many people who were responsible for
serious human rights violations were employed as government workers after the peace
agreements were reached. The presence of such people within institutions, and
particularly within the army, means that they can block or hold back any transitional
justice initiative, or threaten or simply discourage potential witnesses and victims. In
view of this, a vetting process is not just essential in itself, but would seem to be a
prerequisite for any other credible transitional justice initiative.
80. The Security Council considers that such a measure is necessary in order to break
the cycle of impunity that has always surrounded the DRC security forces, and that a true
reform of the security sector will only achieve sustainable results if vetting is used.63
International Criminal Court
81. Although the ICC is not a transitional justice mechanism in itself, its contribution
to criminal justice in the DRC remains very important. For the time being it is the only
judicial mechanism that has the capacity, the integrity and the independence required to
prosecute those who bear the greatest responsibility for the crimes under international law
committed on DRC territory. Three ICC cases concerning the situation in Ituri have been
opened by the Prosecutor.64 By doing this, the ICC has played and continues to play a
_______________
62 See Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity
(E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1), principle 36.
63 See Resolution 1794 (2007) dated 21 December 2007, para. 15; contents repeated in subsequent
resolutions that extended MONUC's mandate.
64 Case The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06); Case The Prosecutor v. Germain
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07); Case The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda (ICC-
01/04-02/06)

very important role in combating impunity in the DRC, and is likely to encourage the
work of Congolese courts and tribunals and other mechanisms to be set up in future. The
Court has also inspired some actors in the Congolese judicial system, who have looked
into the provisions of the ICC Rome Statute for material to supplement and clarify
Congolese law in this area, as explained in section III of the report.
82. However, the numerous expectations raised by the ICC have led to
disappointment among the Congolese people and international actors with an interest in
victims' rights, particularly because of the slow pace of proceedings and the limited scope
of the charges that were brought, which failed to provide justice for hundreds or even
thousands of victims and which did not reflect the true scale of the criminal activities of
the accused, as has been shown in numerous inquiries.65
83. Given the lack of progress in the fight against impunity in the DRC, it would
seem to be of primary importance that the ICC maintain and indeed increase its
commitment. The ICC must address in particular the most serious crimes, which could be
difficult to prosecute in the DRC because of their complexity, for example networks that
fund and arm the groups involved in these crimes. People involved in these activities
benefit from political, military and economic support and are sometimes outside the DRC
and hence beyond the reach of national justice. It would therefore appear important that
the ICC's Prosecutor pay particular attention to these cases, if they are not to evade
justice.
84. Conversely, the fact that the ICC has no jurisdiction over the many crimes
committed before July 2002, and the fact that it is not able to deal with a large number of
cases, limits its direct role in the fight against impunity and confirms the importance and
need to create new mechanisms which would enable prosecution of the main perpetrators
of the most serious crimes that are covered in this report.
Conclusion
85. Drawing up an inventory of the most serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law that were committed on DRC territory between March
1993 and June 2003, the report concludes that the vast majority of the 617 listed incidents
constitute crimes under international law. These were war crimes committed during
armed conflict, either internal or international, or crimes against humanity committed in
the context of a generalised or systematic attack against a civilian population, or in many
cases both. The issue of whether the many serious acts of violence committed against
Hutus in 1996 and 1997 constitute crimes of genocide has also been addressed, and the
_______________
65 See “FIDH and its Congolese member organisations disappointed by the limited scope of the
International Criminal Court’s investigations”, (under “Fourth ICC Arrest Warrant in DRC Situation”),
available at www.fidh.org .

report emphasises that there are elements that could indicate that genocide has been
committed, but that the question can only be addressed by a competent court that would
rule on individual cases.
86. In terms of justice, the response of the Congolese authorities in the face of the
overwhelming number of serious crimes committed within the territory of the DRC has
been negligible or even non-existent. The lack of political will on the part of the
Congolese authorities to prosecute those who are responsible for serious violations of
human rights and of international humanitarian law committed in the DRC has only
encouraged further serious violations, which continue to this day. The report notes that,
because of the many issues that arise when seeking justice for the crimes committed in
the DRC, it is crucial that a holistic policy of transitional justice be implemented, which
will depend on the creation of diverse and complementary mechanisms, both judicial and
non-judicial. While the report is careful not to give any recommendations or directives in
the strict sense of the word, it does, however, examine the advantages and drawbacks of
various transitional justice options in terms of truth, justice, reparation for and
rehabilitation of victims, and reform of judicial and security institutions (including
vetting measures), in the current Congolese context. These options, which must be
examined by the Government of the DRC and civil society, include: a) the creation of a
mixed jurisdiction; b) creation of a new Truth and Reconciliation Commission; c)
reparation programmes; and d) reforms of both the legal sector and the security forces. In
order to ensure that the Congolese people are intimately involved in assessing needs,
establishing priorities and finding solutions – in short, to ensure that they adopt these new
mechanisms and understand their function and scope – it is essential that the authorities
carry out national consultations on transitional justice beforehand to assure the credibility
and legitimacy of any approaches carried out in this domain.
INTRODUCTION
87. The discovery by the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in late 2005 of three mass graves in North Kivu was a
painful reminder that past gross human rights violations committed in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) had remained largely uninvestigated and that those
responsible had not been held accountable. Following a number of consultations within
the UN system, an initial idea to “reactivate” the Secretary-General’s 1997–1998
investigative Team was abandoned in favour of a plan with a broader mandate aimed at
providing the Congolese authorities with the tools needed to break the cycle of impunity.
Consultations between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), MONUC,
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Department of
Political Affairs (DPA), the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) and the Office of the
Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide led to an agreement
recommending the conduct of a mapping exercise covering the period March 1993 to
June 2003. The agreed purpose was to gather, analyse and publish prima facie evidence
of human rights and international humanitarian law violations and, on the basis of the
findings of the exercise, to carry out an assessment of the existing capacities within the
national justice system in the DRC to address such violations as might be uncovered. It
was agreed that the initiative should also result in the formulation of options on
appropriate transitional justice mechanisms to adequately address the legacy of these
violations. Lastly, it was decided that MONUC’s human rights mandate, approved by the
Security Council in 2003 (Resolution 1493 (2003)),66 would provide the basis for the
proposed “Mapping Exercise”.
88. The so-called Mapping Exercise was aimed at providing a key advocacy tool visà-
vis the Government and Parliament, as well as the international community regarding
the establishment of appropriate transitional justice mechanisms and to encourage
concerted efforts to combat impunity in the DRC. In his report of 13 June 2006 to the
Security Council on the situation in the DRC, the Secretary-General indicated his
intention to “dispatch a human rights team to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to
conduct a mapping of the serious violations committed between 1993 and 2003”.67 This
intention was reaffirmed in the two following reports of the Secretary-General of
_______________
66 In paragraph 11 of Resolution 1493 (2003), the Security Council “encourages the Secretary-General,
through his Special Representative, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to
coordinate their efforts in particular to assist the transitional authorities of the DRC in order to put an end to
impunity”. In paragraph 5, subparagraph g of Resolution 1565 (2004), the Security Council “decides that
MONUC will also have the mandate, in support of the Government of National Unity and Transition: (…)
to assist in the promotion and protection of human rights, with particular attention to women, children and
vulnerable persons, investigate human rights violations to put an end to impunity, and continue to cooperate
with efforts to ensure that those responsible for serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law are brought to justice, while working closely with the relevant agencies of the United
Nations.”
67 Twenty-first report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2006/390), paragraph 54.

21 September 2006 and 20 March 2007.68 On 8 May 2007, the Secretary-General
approved the Terms of Reference of the Mapping Exercise. The Mapping Exercise was
subsequently presented to the Congolese authorities, notably to President Joseph Kabila,
by whom it was well received, and to some of his cabinet ministers, by the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights during her visit to the DRC in May 2007. In Resolution
1794 (2007) of 21 December 2007, the Security Council requested the full support of the
Congolese authorities for the OHCHR-initiated Mapping Exercise. On 30 June 2008, a
letter was sent by the High Commissioner to President Kabila announcing the imminent
arrival of the Mapping Exercise Team. The Mapping Exercise began officially on 17
July 2008 with the arrival of the Chief of the Mapping Team in Kinshasa. Around twenty
human rights officers were deployed over the entire territory of the DRC between
October 2008 and May 2009 to gather documents and information from witnesses to
meet the three objectives defined in the Terms of Reference. The Congolese Government
has expressed its support for the Mapping Exercise on several occasions, notably in the
statement delivered by the Minister of Human Rights at the Special session of the Human
Rights Council on the human rights situation in the East of the DRC in November 2008
and in various meetings between the Chief of the Mapping Exercise, the Minister of
Justice and the Minister of Human Rights.
TERMS OF REFERENCE
89. On 8 May 2007, the Secretary-General approved the ToR of the Mapping
Exercise, delineating the following three objectives:
· Conduct a mapping exercise of the most serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the DRC
between March 1993 and June 2003.
· Assess the existing capacities within the national justice system to deal
appropriately with such human rights violations that may be uncovered.
· Formulate a series of options aimed at assisting the Government of the DRC in
identifying appropriate transitional justice mechanisms to deal with the legacy of
these violations, in terms of truth, justice, reparation and reform, taking into
account ongoing efforts by the DRC authorities, as well as the support of the
international community.69
90. It was decided that OHCHR would lead the Mapping Exercise and the project was
funded by the voluntary contributions of ten interested partners.70 The UNDP Country
Office in the DRC was responsible for the financial administration of the Mapping
Exercise and MONUC provided logistical support. The three parties signed an agreement
_______________
68 Twenty-second and twenty-third reports of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2006/759 and
S/2007/156 and Corr.1).
69 Article 1, ToR.
70 Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom,
Sweden, Switzerland and the MacArthur Foundation.

defining their respective rights and obligations.71 The continued and overwhelming
support of these three bodies for the Mapping Exercise should be mentioned at this
juncture.
91. In the words of the High Commissioner in office at the time, the Mapping
Exercise report was “expected to be the first and only comprehensive United Nations
report documenting major human rights violations committed within the territory of the
DRC between 1993 and 2003. In this regard, the report should be of fundamental
importance in the context of efforts devoted to protecting human rights and combating
impunity.” By contributing significantly to the documentation on the most serious
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed in the DRC
during this time of conflict,72 this report aims to assist the Congolese authorities and civil
society in defining and implementing a strategy that will enable the many victims to
obtain justice and thereby fight the widespread impunity. This should also enable the
mobilisation of other international resources to address the principal challenges faced by
the DRC with regard to justice and reconciliation.
92. The ToR required the Mapping Exercise Team73 to “start and complete this
exercise as soon as possible (…) to assist the new Government with the tools to manage
post-conflict processes”.74 It was expected to take at least two months for the Team to be
recruited, deployed and become fully operational, followed by an additional period of six
months to carry out the Mapping Exercise, extendable should the circumstances require
it. Although many considered the timeframe for the Mapping Exercise to be too short for
the scale of the task at hand, it was nonetheless necessary given the urgent need to bring
the operation – the launch of which had been reported on many occasions – to a speedy
conclusion so that the Congolese people could start benefiting from it right away. In the
end, the Mapping Exercise would last just over ten months in total, from the arrival of the
Chief of the Mapping Exercise in late July 2008 to the submission of the final report to
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in mid-June 2009.
_______________
71 Memorandum of understanding between UNDP, MONUC and OHCHR relating to the implementation of
the Mapping Exercise on serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed
in the DRC between 1993 and 2003, signed in December 2007.
72 As the DRC was formerly known as “Zaire”, this name will appear in this report for the period ending
May 1997.
73 “Team” is used to designate the body of human rights specialists who led the Mapping Exercise
investigations across the DRC. These specialists may also be designated “Mapping Exercise Teams” or
“Mapping Teams”.
74 Article 2.3, ToR.

METHODOLOGY
93. A “mapping exercise” is a generic expression implying no predefined
methodology or format.75 A mapping exercise itself should be concerned not only with
the violations themselves but also with the context(s) in which they were committed,
either in a given region or across an entire country, as is the case here. Such an exercise
may include various activities, such as the collection, analysis and assessment of
information, surveys and witness interviews, and consultation with field experts and
consultants, among others. This type of project is not an entirely new concept. It has
much in common with international commissions of inquiry, commissions of experts and
fact-finding commissions. It functions perfectly as a preliminary step prior to the
formulation of transitional justice mechanisms, whether they be judicial or not, to enable
the identification of challenges, the assessment of needs and better targeting of
interventions. It can also be found in international and hybrid jurisdictions, where it is
used to better define investigations and devise global completion strategies. Among the
recent examples of mapping exercises, some have been based solely on documents in the
public domain (Afghanistan) and others on interviews with thousands of witnesses
(Sierra Leone).
94. Mapping remains a preliminary exercise that does not seek to gather evidence of
sufficient admissibility to stand in court, but rather to “provide the basis for the
formulation of initial hypotheses of investigation by giving a sense of the scale of
violations, detecting patterns and identifying potential leads or sources of evidence”.76
With regard to human rights and international humanitarian law violations, the Mapping
Exercise should provide a description of the violation(s), their nature and location in time
and space, the victim(s) and their approximate number and the – often armed – group(s)
to which the perpetrators belong(ed), among others. As a result, the findings of such an
operation should be very useful for all transitional justice mechanisms, whether they be
judicial or not.
95. The six-month deployment timeframe set by the Secretary-General for the
Mapping Exercise, with the mandate of covering the most serious violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law committed across the whole territory of the
DRC over a ten-year period, provided a methodology of sorts. It was not a case of
pursuing in-depth investigations, but rather gathering basic information on the most
serious incidents, chronologically and province by province.77 The collection, analysis
and use of any existing information sources on the violations committed during the
_______________
75 As a point of interest, the French translations of “mapping” – cartographie, inventaire or état des lieux
(inventory) – fail to reflect accurately the potential scope of a mapping exercise, and it was decided by the
team to retain the generic English term to designate this exercise in French.
76 OHCHR, Rule-of-Law tools for post-conflict states: Prosecution initiatives, United Nations, New York
and Geneva, 2008, p.6.
77 Article 4.2, ToR: “It should be carried out province by province, and in chronological order of events. It
should gather basic information and not replace in-depth investigations into the incidents uncovered.”

period under examination was also established as a starting point for the Exercise, in
particular “the outcome of past United Nations missions to the country”.78 The
subsequent six-month deployment of five in-field mobile Teams would enable this
information to be verified and corroborated or invalidated with the aid of independent
sources, while also enabling the reporting of previously undocumented violations.
96. A document outlining the methodology to be followed by the Mapping Team was
drafted on the basis of United Nations-developed tools, in particular those of OHCHR.
These methodological tools covered the following areas in particular: a gravity threshold
for the selection of serious violations, standard of evidence required, identity of
perpetrators and groups, confidentiality, witness protection, witness interviewing
guidelines with a standardised fiche d’entretien, and physical evidence guidelines
(including mass graves), among others. It was important that the methodology adopted
for the Mapping Exercise catered for the requirements and constraints of the ToR, in
particular the necessity to cover the entire Congolese territory as well as the period from
1993 to 2003, to report only the “most serious” violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law and to ensure that the security of witnesses was not
compromised and that information was kept confidential.
Gravity threshold
97. The expression “serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law”, used by the Secretary-General to define the first objective of the Mapping Exercise,
is non-specific and open to interpretation. Generally speaking, it is intended to apply to
violations of the right to life and the right to physical integrity. It may also cover
violations of other fundamental human rights, in particular where such violations are
systematic and motivated by forms of discrimination forbidden under international law.
In international humanitarian law, violations are considered serious when they endanger
protected persons and property, or when they violate important values.
98. Given the scale of the violations committed in the ten years of conflict over a very
vast territory, it was necessary to select from the most serious crimes. Each recorded
incident demonstrates the commission of one or several serious violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law localised to a given date and location.
Occasionally, a wave of individual violations (e.g. arbitrary arrests and detentions,
summary executions, etc.) is considered as one incident.
99. To identify the most serious incidents (those describing the commission of the
most serious violations) a gravity threshold similar to that used in international criminal
law to identify the most serious situations and crimes for investigation and prosecution
was used.79 The gravity threshold provides a set of criteria enabling the identification of
_______________
78 Article 4.1, ToR.
79 The main organisations that were contacted were: Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International,
International Center for Transitional Justice, Global Rights, Global Witness, Open Society (Justice

incidents of sufficient gravity to be included in the final report. These criteria function as
a whole. No one criterion alone can be the decisive factor and all may be used to justify
the decision to class an incident as serious. The criteria used to select the incidents listed
in this report fall into four categories:
  • Nature of the crimes and violations revealed by the incident: Each recorded
    incident reveals the commission of one or more crimes under international law, be
    they war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide or other crimes constituting
    serious human rights violations. All of these crimes can be classified on the basis
    of the objective gravity threshold, where violations of the right to life are
    considered most serious (murder, massacre, summary execution, etc.), followed
    by violations of the right to physical and mental integrity (sexual violence, torture,
    mutilation, injury to body, etc.), the right to liberty and security of person
    (arbitrary arrest and detention, forced displacement, slavery, recruitment and use
    of child soldiers, etc.), the right to equality before the law and equal protection of
    the law without any discrimination (persecution) and, lastly, violations relating to
    the right to own property (destruction of civilian property, pillage, etc.).
  • Scale (number) of crimes and violations revealed by the incident: Each
    recorded incident reveals the commission of numerous crimes resulting in many
    victims. The number of crimes committed and the number of victims is taken into
    consideration when establishing the gravity of an incident.
  • How the crimes and violations were committed: Crimes and violations of a
    widespread and systematic nature, crimes targeting a specific group (vulnerable
    groups, ethnic groups, political groups, etc.), and indiscriminate/disproportionate
    attacks with many civilian victims are all elements that will contribute to raising
    the gravity level of an incident.
  • Impact of the crimes and violations committed: Aside from the number of
    victims of the crimes revealed, some incidents may have a devastating impact in
    the context, either by triggering conflict, threatening existing peace efforts, or
    preventing humanitarian relief efforts and the return of refugees or displaced
    persons, etc. The regional impact of an incident or its legacy for a specific
    community, and its particular significance for certain ethnic, political, religious or
    other groups may also contribute to raising its gravity level.
Standard of evidence
100. Since the primary objective of the Mapping Exercise is to “gather basic
information on incidents uncovered”, the level of evidence required is naturally lesser
_____Initiative), Right and Accountability in Development, International Crisis Group, The International
Federation for Human Rights, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Minority Rights Group
International, Droits et démocratie, Médecins sans frontières and the International Committee of the Red
Cross.

than would normally be expected in a case brought before a criminal court. It is not a
question, therefore, of being satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that a crime was
committed, but rather having reasonable suspicion that the incident did occur; a level of
evidence decidedly lower than that required to secure a criminal conviction. Reasonable
suspicion is defined as “a reliable body of material consistent with other verified
circumstances tending to show that an incident or event did happen”.80 In cases
where such reliable bodies of material were gathered by the Mapping Team, it was
decided that incidents would be described using the past tense, without the use of
hypothetical formulations.
---Assessing the reliability of information
101. Assessing the reliability of the information obtained was a two-stage process
involving evaluation of the reliability and credibility of the source, and then the
pertinence and truth of the information itself. This method is known as the admiralty
scale. Reliability of the source is determined using several factors, including the nature,
objectivity and professionalism of the organisation providing the information, the
methodology used and the quality of prior information obtained from the same source.
The validity and authenticity of the information is assessed by comparing it to other
available data relating to the same incidents to ensure that it tallies with already verified
elements and circumstances. In other words, the process involves corroborating the
originally obtained information by ensuring that the corroborating elements do in fact
come from a different source than the primary source that provided the information in the
first place. Such corroboration will generally be obtained from evidence gathered in the
Mapping Exercise, but may also come from other reports and documents. However,
different reports on the same incident and based on the same primary source would not
constitute corroboration by a separate source.
---Identification of individual and group perpetrators
102. Unlike some commissions of inquiry with a specific mandate to “identify the
perpetrators of violations and make them accountable for their actions”,81 the objective of
the Mapping Exercise is limited to compiling an inventory of the most serious violations
of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the
DRC between March 1993 and June 2003.82 The objective of the Mapping Exercise was
_______________
80 Another possible formulation would be “reliable and consistent indications tending to show that the
incident did happen”.
81 See Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary-General (S/2005/60);
see also Security Council Resolution 1564 (2004) of 18 September 2004.
82 The mandate of the Mapping Exercise is closer to that of the Commission of Experts reviewing the
prosecution of serious violations of human rights committed in Timor-Leste (then East Timor) in 1999
(S/2005/458), whose mandate was to “gather and compile systematically information on (…) violations of
human rights and acts which may constitute breaches of international humanitarian law committed in East
Timor (…) and to provide the Secretary-General with its conclusions with a view to enabling him to make
recommendations on future actions”; see Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1999/S-4/1.

therefore not to establish or to try to establish individual criminal responsibility of given
actors.
103. The only reference to this matter in the ToR for the Mapping Exercise can be
found in the Methodology section, in which it states that the Exercise “should gather
basic information (e.g. establishing the locations, timings and backgrounds of major
incidents, the approximate numbers of victims, the alleged perpetrators, etc.) and not
replace in-depth investigations into the incidents uncovered”. Although the primary
objective of the Mapping Exercise is not to identify the alleged perpetrators or people
who should be held accountable for their actions, it was nevertheless necessary to gather
basic information relating to the identity of alleged individual or group perpetrators.
Given the level of evidence used in this Exercise, however, it would be unwise – unjust,
even – to seek to ascribe criminal responsibility to certain individuals. Such a conclusion
should be dependent on legal proceedings pursued on the basis of an appropriate level of
evidence. However, it seems essential to identify the groups involved in order to classify
these serious violations of international humanitarian law. Finally, the identities of the
alleged perpetrators of some of the crimes listed will not appear in this report but are held
in the confidential project database submitted to the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, who will determine the conditions for its access.83 However, the
identities of perpetrators under warrant of arrest and those already sentenced for crimes
listed in the report have been disclosed. It should also be noted that where political
officials have assumed public positions encouraging or provoking the violations listed,
their names have been cited in the sections relating to the political context.
Other aspects accounted for in the methodology
104. Beyond the methodological tools presented above, certain constraints particular to
the Mapping Exercise, the prevailing situation in the DRC and the accessibility of certain
sites have been taken into consideration during investigations to verify previously
identified incidents. For example, the capacity of the Mapping Exercise to investigate
certain incidents has at times been limited due to difficulties accessing some remote
regions of the country, or due to security issues that prevent their access. The choice of
priority areas for investigation and the main incidents for verification was also influenced
by the short timeframe – six months – allocated to the implementation of the Mapping
Exercise itself. Investigations that would take too long to achieve the anticipated findings
that would feature in the final report were not included. To an even greater extent,
acknowledgement of the global mandate of the Mapping Exercise – to cover the whole of
the Congolese territory for the entire period
 from March 1993 to June 2003 so as to
present a detailed and well-balanced report of the many violations of human rights and
_______________
83 Article 4.3, ToR: “Sensitive information gathered during the Mapping Exercise should be stored and
utilised according to the strictest standards of confidentiality. The Team should develop a database for the
purposes of the Mapping Exercise, access to which should be determined by the High Commissioner for
Human Rights.”

international humanitarian law committed at that time – for the most part dictated the
choice of the main incidents reported.
105. In this report, each verified (corroborated) incident is reported in a separate
paragraph, indented and preceded by a bullet point. Each of these paragraphs includes a
brief description of the incident identifying the nature of the violations and crimes
committed, their location in time and space, a description of the individual or group
perpetrators involved and details of the victims and their approximate number. In the
reported incidents, figures relating to the number of victims have been provided as a
means of assessing the scale of violations and are in no way intended to be definitive. As
a general rule, the Mapping Exercise has used the lowest and most realistic assessment of
victim numbers indicated by the various sources and has sometimes resorted to estimates.
In light of its mandate, it was not the responsibility of the Mapping Exercise to ascertain
the total number of victims of violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law in the DRC during the period in question, given that precise victim counts are not
essential to determining the legal classification of violations. Each paragraph describing
an incident is followed by a footnote identifying the primary and secondary sources of the
information reported. Incidents not corroborated by a second independent source have not
been included in this report, even in cases where the information came from a reliable
source. Such incidents are, however, recorded in the database.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MAPPING EXERCISE
106. The Mapping Exercise was rolled out in three successive phases. Phase one,
known as the “Pre-Deployment Phase”, began with the arrival of the Chief of the
Mapping Exercise on 17 July 2008 and ended with the deployment of the in-field Teams
from 17 October 2008 onwards. Phase two covers the deployment of the Teams across
the country to cover all provinces of the DRC from five regional field offices. The
deployment phase lasted seven months and ended on 15 May 2009 with the closure of the
field offices. In the final, post-deployment phase, all the data were compiled and final
verifications made with a view to completing the draft of the final report, which was
submitted to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on 15 June 2009.
107. Phase one (17 July 2008 to 17 October 2008) was essentially aimed at ensuring
the successful start-up of the Mapping Exercise, obtaining logistical support and
developing the necessary methodological and legal tools for the Mapping Team to carry
out the mandate.
108. Meetings were also held with the main partners of the Mapping Exercise
(MONUC and UNDP), diplomatic missions as well as actors involved in human rights
and the fight against impunity in the DRC (UN organisations, international NGOs,
religious groups and trade unions, among others) to explain the Exercise and seek their
collaboration.
109. Phase two (17 October 2008 to 15 May 2009) was dedicated to carrying out the
mandate itself, including all analyses, investigations and consultations necessary both to
prepare the inventory of the most serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law and also to assess the existing capacities of the Congolese judicial
system to deal with this, including options relating to transitional justice mechanisms that
could contribute to the fight against impunity.
110. Phase three (15 May 2009 to 15 June 2009) saw the closing down of the Mapping
Exercise with the compilation of data, final updating of the database, the organisation,
digitisation and classification of all the archives and the drafting of the final version of
the report. Regional consultations regarding transitional justice were held in this last
phase in the form of round-table meetings with civil society representatives in Bunia,
Bukavu, Goma and Kinshasa.
ACTIVITIES OF THE MAPPING EXERCISE
---Official meetings
111. The Chief of the Mapping Exercise attended official meetings with nearly one
hundred actors, partners and individuals involved in matters of justice and the fight
against impunity in the DRC to explain the objectives of the Exercise and seek their
support. Among these, the following should be noted:
· DRC government authorities, i.e. the Minister of Justice (on two occasions) and
the Minister of Human Rights (also on two occasions). Both Ministers assured the
Chief of the Mapping Exercise of their collaboration and support for this exercise.
· Donors, who were met at the start, mid-point and end of the Exercise, and to
whom a progress report was submitted on each occasion. Meetings were held with
the following: the Ambassadors of Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands,
Sweden and the United Kingdom, and representatives of the Republic of Korea
and Switzerland.
· Representatives of United States, French and European Union diplomatic
missions.
· Heads of United Nations organisations: UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR,
UNFPA/UNIFEM.
· MONUC leaders: Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Alan Doss,
and his deputies, Ross Mountain and Leila Zerrougui; and representatives of the
various MONUC offices, including Human Rights, Child Protection, Rule of Law
and the Gender Office.
· Francis Deng, Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide; Walter Kälin,
Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally
displaced persons.
· Head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegation;
representatives in the DRC of OXFAM, Save the Children, Global Rights,
Médecins Sans Frontières (France and Belgium), International Center for
Transitional Justice (ICTJ), Avocats Sans Frontières (Belgium) and a
representative of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
· A number of local NGOs involved in human rights and justice in the DRC.
---Professional contacts
112. A number of contacts were established with Congolese non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) in order to obtain information, documents and reports on the
serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that occurred in the
DRC during the period covered by the ToR. To this end, meetings were held with over
two hundred NGO representatives during the course of the mandate, both to present the
Mapping Exercise and request their collaboration. Thanks to this collaboration, the
Mapping Team has had access to critical information, witnesses and reports relating to
the violations committed between 1993 and 2003. Without the courageous and
outstanding work of the Congolese NGOs during these ten years, documenting the many
violations in such a short period of time would have been incredibly difficult.
113. Contacts were also established with international organisations and NGOs to
obtain information, reports and documents relating to the Mapping Exercise mandate.84
Almost all responded positively to this request.85 Research and documentation
centres also contributed to the success of the Exercise by allowing Team members to
consult their archives and meet with researchers.86 Several DRC experts also visited the
Mapping Exercise on trips to Kinshasa to speak to the Team.87
---Collection and analysis of information
_______________
84 The main organisations contacted were the following: Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International,
International Center for Transitional Justice, Global Rights, Global Witness, Open Society (Justice
Initiative), Rights & Accountability in Development, International Crisis Group, International Federation
for Human Rights, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Minority Rights Group International, Rights
& Democracy, Médecins Sans Frontières and the International Committee of the Red Cross.
85 Two organisations, Rights & Democracy and Global Witness, were also important contributors and
prepared special reports on the issues of sexual violence and human rights violations relating to the illegal
exploitation of natural resources respectively.
86 Groupe Jérémie/RODHECIC (Kinshasa-based network of Christian organisations working to promote
human rights and education), Centre d’information et de solidarité avec l’Afrique (France), IPRA’s
(International Peace Research Association) Congo Peace Project, Centre for Peace Research and Strategic
Studies, Institute for International and European Policy, Faculty of Social Sciences, Catholic University of
Leuven (Belgium), Entraide Missionnaire (Canada) and the University of Pittsburgh (USA).
87 Suliman Baldo (ICTJ – International Center for Transitional Justice), Anneke Van Woudenberg (HRW –
Human Rights Watch), Filip Reintjens (University of Antwerp), Peter Rosenblum (Columbia Law School),
Jason Stearns (UN Group of Experts on the DRC) and Arthur Kepel (ICG – International Crisis Group).

114. The main activity of the Mapping Exercise consisted in collecting and analysing
as much information as possible on the serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law committed during the period covered by the ToR. The
Mapping Teams obtained over 1,500 documents. The documents come from many
sources, including the United Nations and its agencies, the Congolese government, major
international human rights organisations, Congolese human rights organisations, the
national and international media and various NGOs (unions, religious groups, aid
agencies, victims’ associations, etc.). Among the documents, over three hundred are
confidential, notably the archives of the Secretary-General’s 1998 investigative Team,
and some internal NGO reports. The Mapping Teams also consulted a large number of
articles in the national and international press, as well as monographs on topics related to
the mandate. Lastly, various sources, individuals and experts, national and international,
were also consulted in order to open up new avenues of research, corroborate some of the
information obtained and streamline the overall analysis of the situation.
115. Analysis of all these documents enabled the Team to establish a chronology by
region of the main incidents revealing serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law committed on the territory of the DRC between March
1993 and June 2003. The analysis resulted in the initial identification of over 660 major
incidents for verification. Only incidents meeting the gravity threshold developed in the
methodology were considered. Subsequently, investigative work in the different
provinces revealed the existence of new and unreported serious incidents which were
added to the original chronology as and when they were found, bringing the number of
major incidents in the database to 782 major incidents.
---In-field verification investigations
116. On the basis of the chronology, five in-field mobile Teams had the task of
verifying, confirming or invalidating information relating to the occurrence of key
incidents revealing the commission of serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law. Each Team comprised two international human rights
officers, supported by a Congolese human rights associate. The work of these Teams
consisted essentially of meeting with witnesses to confirm or invalidate the occurrence of
the most serious violations reported in the chronology. To this end, each reported incident
had to be confirmed by at least one independent source in addition to the primary source
in order to confirm its authenticity. Every incident investigated by the Teams was then
recorded in the Mapping Exercise database.
117. Over one thousand witnesses were interviewed by the Mapping Exercise Teams
about major incidents identified in the chronology. Of the 782 open incidents and cases
in the database
, the Teams were able to close 563 (71%) cases in the verification
process. Although some cases were invalidated, the majority of them were
confirmed
. It was not possible, however, to verify the 219 remaining cases (29%),
either through lack of time or being unable to access the regions in question or the
witnesses of incidents, or being unable to find an independent source to confirm the
information obtained from an initial source. Some cases include several incidents,
meaning, for example, that a large-scale attack could manifest itself in different types of
violations or target different groups. Consequently, in the report, confirmed cases
constitute 617 incidents.
118. All the relevant information relating to the 782 open incidents and cases can be
found in the Mapping Exercise database, which was submitted to the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva. The following entries can be found in the
database for each incident or case: the source(s) of the original information, fiche(s)
d’entretien with witnesses to the incident, the nature of the violations committed, a
description of the violations and their location in time and space, preliminary
classification of crimes revealed by the incident, the approximate number of victims, the
armed group(s) involved and the identities of some of the victims and the alleged
perpetrators.
---Investigation and analysis of specific acts of violence against women and children,
and acts of violence linked to the illegal exploitation of natural resources
119. Given that the methodology used for the first part of the report would not enable
full justice to be done to the numerous victims of specific acts of violence such as sexual
violence and violence against children, nor adequately reflect the scale of the violence
practised by all armed groups in the DRC, nor enable an analysis of the causes of some of
the conflicts, it was decided at the beginning of the Exercise to devote a part of it to these
subjects, based partly on the investigations of the Mapping Team but also to a large
extent on specific documents supporting these violations. Although these specific acts of
violence are mentioned in several incidents recorded in the first part of the report, this
more global approach enabled the Team to better illustrate in Part II the scale of the
phenomena of rape, recruitment of child soldiers and violations of human rights linked to
the illegal exploitation of natural resources. This has helped to highlight the recurrent,
widespread and systematic use of these specific violations by all parties in the various
conflicts and enabled a brief analysis to be produced.
---Assessment of the resources available to the national justice system to deal with the
serious violations identified
120. One important aspect of the ToR for the Mapping Exercise is the assessment of
the resources available to the Congolese justice system to deal with the numerous crimes
committed. A “Justice Team” was created within the Mapping Exercise to address these
matters. Around 200 actors in the judicial system as well as national experts in
domestic criminal law and international law were interviewed by the Justice Team in
Kinshasa and in the provinces, notably the civilian and military judicial authorities,
government representatives and the government agencies responsible for the reform of
the Congolese judicial system.
121. The Justice Team began by carrying out an analysis of the domestic and
international law applicable in this area, as well as the courts with jurisdiction
prosecute and judge the alleged perpetrators of the serious violations of human rights and
international law committed between March 1993 and June 2003. A study of Congolese
case law on crimes under international law was also carried out to illustrate domestic
judicial practice in this area. The Team then assessed the capacities of the national justice
system with regard to fighting impunity. The Team integrated the points of view and the
needs expressed by judicial system actors met in Kinshasa, Orientale Province, Ituri,
South Kivu and North Kivu, as well as in audit reports for the Congolese justice system
created by the Congolese authorities (Plan of Action for Justice Reform) and by
international agencies and some donors involved in the reform of the Congolese justice
system.
---Formulation of options in the field of transitional justice mechanisms that could help
to combat impunity in the DRC
122. To formulate options for transitional justice mechanisms that were compatible
with efforts already underway and with the international obligations of the DRC
concerning the fight against impunity, consultations were held in Goma, Bukavu and
Kinshasa with professors of criminal law, human rights NGOs, victims’ associations,
civil society experts working in the fight against impunity and representatives of bar
societies and judges’ associations. Regional consultations regarding various areas of
transitional justice were organised in the form of round-table meetings with civil society
representatives in Bunia, Bukavu, Goma and Kinshasa. In all, these round-table meetings
attracted more than one hundred representatives of victims’ associations and human
rights organisations involved in matters of justice and the fight against impunity.
123. In particular, the Team assessed the extent to which current reforms of the justice
system and the security sector address the imperative to prevent further violations of
human rights, combat impunity and meet the needs of the many victims in terms of truth
and reparation. Finally, the Team was in a position to formulate several transitional
justice options as part of the current efforts in the country to reform the judicial system,
to reform Congolese law and to create new institutions that would promote greater
respect in the DRC for its international obligations concerning justice and the fight
against impunity.
CONCLUSION
124. Drawing up an inventory of the most serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law that were committed on DRC territory between March
1993 and June 2003, the report concludes that the vast majority of the 617 listed incidents
constitute crimes under international law. These were war crimes committed during
armed conflict, either internal or international, or crimes against humanity committed in
the context of a generalised or systematic attack against a civilian population, or in many
cases both. The issue of whether the many serious acts of violence committed against
Hutus in 1996 and 1997 constitute crimes of genocide has also been addressed, and the
report emphasises that there are elements that could indicate that genocide has been
committed, but that the question can only be addressed by a competent court that would
rule on individual cases.
125. The lack of political will to prosecute those who are responsible for serious
violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law committed in the DRC
has only encouraged further serious violations, which continue to this day. The report
notes that, because of the many issues that arise when seeking justice for the crimes
committed in the DRC, it is crucial that a holistic policy of transitional justice be
implemented, which will depend on the creation of diverse and complementary
mechanisms, both judicial and non-judicial. The report does not give any
recommendations or directives in the strict sense of the word, but it does examine the
advantages and drawbacks of various transitional justice options in terms of truth, justice,
reparation for and rehabilitation of victims, reform of judicial and security institutions
(including vetting measures), and reconciliation, or indeed reconstruction of the historical
truth in the current Congolese context. These options, which must be examined by the
Government of the DRC and civil society, include: a) the creation of a mixed
jurisdiction; b) creation of a new Truth and Reconciliation Commission; c) reparation
programmes; and d) reforms of both the legal sector and the security forces. In order to
achieve this, the report recommends that national consultations be carried out in order to
provide credibility and legitimacy to the mechanism(s) to be adopted.
SECTION I. INVENTORY OF THE MOST SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW COMMITTED WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THE DRC
BETWEEN MARCH 1993 AND JUNE 2003

126. The period examined by this report is probably one of the most tragic chapters in
the recent history of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), if not the whole of
Africa. Indeed, the decade was marked by a string of major political crises, wars and
multiple ethnic and religious conflicts that brought about the deaths of hundreds of
thousands, if not millions, of people.88 Very few Congolese and foreign civilians living
on the territory of the DRC managed to escape the violence, and were victims of murder,
maiming, rape, forced displacement, pillage, destruction of property or economic and
social rights violations.
127. Compiling an inventory of the most serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law committed in the DRC during this period presents a
number of challenges. In spite of the scale and the extreme nature of the violence that
characterises the violations in some of the country’s provinces, it has been necessary to
take into consideration less serious violations as well as seemingly less affected regions.
Confirming violations that occurred over ten years ago can sometimes prove impossible
on account of the displacement of witnesses and victims. In some cases, violations appear
to be isolated crimes and it is difficult to account for them. They can only be integrated in
the waves of violence occurring in a given geographical location or within a given
timeframe. Vis-à-vis the frightening number of violations committed, the sheer size of the
country and difficulties accessing many sites, the Mapping Exercise is therefore
necessarily incomplete and cannot reconstruct the complexity of each situation or obtain
justice for all of the victims.
128. The inventory that follows, therefore, aims solely to present the most serious
violations committed during the period under examination. The inventory endeavours
nonetheless to cover the entire Congolese territory. It will be presented in chronological
order, in relation to four key successive periods in the recent history of Zaire/Congo. The
first period, from March 1993 to June 1996, describes violations committed in the final
years of the regime of President Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, marked by the failure of the
democratisation process and the devastating consequences of the Rwandan genocide, in
particular in the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu. The second period, from July
1996 to July 1998, covers violations committed during the First Congo War and the first
fourteen months of the regime established by President Laurent-Désiré Kabila. The third
period concerns the inventory of violations committed between the start of the Second
Congo War in August 1998 and the death of President Kabila in January 2001. Lastly, the
final period lists violations committed against a background of increasing observation of
the ceasefire along the front line and the speeding up of peace negotiations in preparation
for the start of the transition period on 30 June 2003.
_______________
88 The International Rescue Committee (IRC) conducted four mortality surveys in the DRC between 1998
and 2004. According to the IRC, from the start of the Second Congo War in August 1998 to the end of April
2004 around 3.8 million people were thought to have died as the direct or indirect victims of the War and
the armed conflict. It should be noted, however, that the methodology used by the IRC to determine the
number of indirect deaths is based on epidemiological studies and population growth estimates that have
been disputed. In light of its mandate, it was not the responsibility of the Mapping Exercise to ascertain the
total number of deaths attributable to the situation in the DRC during the period in question.

CHAPTER I. MARCH 1993 – JUNE 1996: FAILURE OF THE
DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS AND REGIONAL CRISIS

129. In the early 1990s, under pressure from the people and donors, President Mobutu
was compelled to re-establish a multiparty system and convene a national conference. As
the months went by, however, Mobutu managed to off-balance his opponents and remain
in power through the use of violence and corruption, and by using tribal and regional
antagonisms to his advantage. This strategy had particularly serious consequences for
Zaire, including the destruction of key infrastructures, economic meltdown, the forced
deportation of civilians in Katanga, ethnic violence in North Kivu and increased
tribalism. Violations of human rights also became commonplace across the entire
country.
130. In 1994, after months of institutional paralysis, supporters and opponents of
President Mobutu eventually came to an agreement on the appointment by consensus of a
prime minister and the establishment of a transition parliament. However, the agreement
did not succeed in solving the political crisis, curbing the criminalisation of security
forces or setting the country on the road towards elections. From July 1994 onwards, the
influx of 1.2 million Rwandan Hutu refugees following the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda
further destabilised the province of North Kivu and made the situation in South Kivu still
more delicate. Due to the presence among the refugees of members of the former Forces
armées rwandaises (later “ex-FAR”), as well as militias responsible for the genocide (the
Interahamwe), and given the alliance that had existed for some years between the former
Rwandan regime and President Mobutu, this humanitarian crisis quickly degenerated into
a diplomatic and security crisis between Zaire and the new Rwandan authorities.
131. Faced with the use by the ex-FAR and the Interahamwe of refugee camps as a
base from which to lead their incursions into Rwanda, in 1995 the new Rwandan
authorities opted for a military solution to the crisis. With the aid of Uganda and Tutsis
from North and South Kivu who had been denied Zairian citizenship by the transition
parliament at Kinshasa, they organised a rebellion to counter the ex-FAR and
Interahamwe and bring about a change of regime in Kinshasa.
132. During this period, the most serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law were concentrated for the most part in Katanga, North Kivu and in the
city-province of Kinshasa.
A. Shaba (Katanga)
133. For over a century, a sizeable community from the Kasai provinces had settled in
Katanga89 to construct the railway at the request of the Belgian colonial authorities and
_______________
89 The province of Katanga was called Shaba from 1971 to 1997.
50
work

work in the mines. With the exception of the secession period (1960-1963), the natives of
Katanga90 and the natives of the Kasai provinces91 had always lived in harmony. Under
the regime of President Mobutu, however, the Katangese felt politically marginalised and
criticised the Kasaians for taking up too many jobs and management positions, in
particular in the largest mining firm, Gécamines.92 After the political liberalisation of the
regime, most Kasaian and Katangese delegates to the National Sovereign Conference
(CNS) united under the opposition front known as the “Sacred Union” to overthrow
President Mobutu. In November 1991, however, President Mobutu managed to get
Katangese delegates from the Union of Federalists and Independent Republicans
(UFERI) to split with the Sacred Union’s main party, the Union for Democracy and
Social Progress (UDPS) led by Étienne Tshisekedi.
134. Following this change of alliance, the president of UFERI, Nguz Karl-i-Bond,
became Prime Minister; the party’s provincial president, Kyungu wa Kumwanza, was
appointed Governor of Shaba and relations between the Kasaians and the Katangese
began to seriously deteriorate. While in Kinshasa, Étienne Tshisekedi and Nguz Karl-i-
Bond were fighting for control of the CNS, in Shaba, Governor Kyungu wa Kumwanza
had begun to demonise UDPS and its supporters. As UDPS was very popular among the
Kasaians in Shaba and Étienne Tshisekedi himself hailed from Kasai Oriental, the
political conflict between UFERI and UDPS took on a tribal dimension. For months,
Kyungu wa Kumwanza accused the Kasaians of opposing Nguz Karl-i-Bond’s
Government so they could continue dominating the Katangese. Blaming them for the
majority of the province’s problems, he called on the Katangese to expel them. At his
instigation, many young Katangese enlisted in UFERI’s youth wing, JUFERI,93 where
they received paramilitary training inspired by Mayi-Mayi rites.94
135. The first attacks on Kasaian civilians by members of the JUFERI militia took
place in late 1991 and early 1992 in the towns of Luena, Bukama, Pweto, Kasenga,
Fungurume and Kapolowe. In the first half of 1992, Kyungu wa Kumwanza dismissed
many Kasaians from the courts, the education sector, hospitals, state-owned companies,
sports associations, state media and the administration. In several towns, Kasaian traders
could no longer access public markets and, in many areas, JUFERI prohibited them from
_______________
90 In the text that follows, the natives of Katanga are designated “Katangese”.
91 In the text that follows, the natives of the Kasai provinces are designated “Kasaians”.
92 La Générale des Carrières et des Mines (state-owned mining company).
93 JUFERI was run as a full-blown militia. It comprised several branches, including the Division spéciale
Pononai (DSPO), responsible for eliminating the movement’s enemies, the Division spéciale PUMINA,
responsible for attacks on the Kasaians (torture, beatings, torching homes, etc.) and the Ninja group, which
practised martial arts and was responsible for ensuring the protection of UFERI leaders.
94In the DRC, the term Mayi-Mayi is used to designate groups of armed combatants resorting to specific
magic rituals such as water ablutions (“Mayi” in Swahili) and carrying amulets prepared by witchdoctors,
believed to make them invulnerable and protect them from ill fate. Present mainly in South Kivu and North
Kivu, but also in other provinces, the various Mayi-Mayi groups included armed forces led by warlords,
traditional tribal elders, village heads and local political officers. The Mayi-Mayi lacked cohesion and the
different groups allied themselves with various government groups and armed forces at different times.

farming the land. After the election of Étienne Tshisekedi by the CNS to the post of
prime minister on 15 August 1992, the tension mounted. At Lubumbashi, JUFERI youths
looted Kasaian homes before being overpowered by the army, the FAZ (Forces armées
zaïroises), in bloody clashes. In the days that followed, Kyungu wa Kumwanza and Nguz
Karl-i-Bond accused the Kasaians of insulting the Katangese at gatherings held to
celebrate the election of the UDPS leader to the Premiership. Likening the Kasaians to
insects (“Bilulu” in Swahili), they called on the Katangese people to eliminate them.
136. Starting in August 1992, JUFERI members attacked Kasaians at Luena, Kamina,
Kolwezi, Sandoa and Likasi. From September to November 1992, JUFERI carried out a
campaign of persecution and forced displacement against the Kasaians in Likasi, in
collusion with the local and provincial authorities. The violence resulted in dozens of
civilian victims and saw hundreds of dwellings looted and many buildings destroyed,
including places of worship. In a few months, almost 60,000 civilians – almost half the
Kasaian population of Likasi – had taken refuge in the train station and in high schools
waiting for peace to be restored or for a train to take them away from the town. In the
same period, JUFERI carried out similar yet smaller-scale attacks on Kasaians living in
the mining town of Kipushi.
137. On 20 February 1993, at a meeting held in the Place de la Poste at Kolwezi,
Governor Kyungu wa Kumwanza urged the Katangese to drive the Kasaians out of
Gécamines and take over the management positions in the firm. Beginning on 20 March
1993, members of the JUFERI militia organised a campaign of persecution and forced
displacement against the Kasaians of Kolwezi, with the support of the gendarmerie and
in collaboration with the municipal and provincial authorities.
· Having forbidden Kasaian workers from entering Gécamines sites across the town
on 23 March, JUFERI units began by killing an unknown number of Kasaian
civilians in the outlying districts of Kolwezi, forcing Kasaians to gather in schools
and places of worship under the protection of the FAZ. In the Musonoie district,
three kilometres from Kolwezi in the direction of Kapata, members of the FAZ
from the 14th Brigade, Kamanyola Division, attacked JUFERI youths, who fled.
On 24 March, JUFERI received reinforcements from the surrounding villages and
imposed a curfew in several districts of the town.95
· On the morning of 25 March, JUFERI units armed mainly with machetes, knives
and fuel cans burst into the homes of Kasaians in different districts of the town of
Kolwezi and ordered them to leave immediately or they would be killed and their
houses torched. Over the course of that day, JUFERI went on a targeted killing
spree aimed at terrorising Kasaians and forcing them to leave Kolwezi. Over
50,000 Kasaian civilians fled into the town to take refuge at the train station, the
_______________
95 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009; Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental,
March–April 2009; La Voix du Centre des droits de l’homme et du droit humanitaire (CDH), No.1,
January–February–March 1994.

post office, the Hotel Impala, the high school and the convent schools of the
Notre-Dame de Lumière cathedral. In the days that followed, JUFERI killed an
unknown number of Kasaian civilians at identity checks carried out at roadblocks
erected in the town. At least two people were killed by JUFERI with spears or
arrows. There was also mention of Kasaian women killed near the Mutshinsenge
river.96
138. From April onwards, a certain degree of calm was restored. Tensions remained,
however, between the FAZ97 and the “Mobiles”98 on the one hand and JUFERI and the
gendarmerie on the other.99
  • On 2 May and 4 May, JUFERI units attacked the camp of Kasaian refoulés100 at
    the train station in Kolwezi, killing three civilians belonging to the Mobiles group.
    On 5 May, the Mobiles retaliated by killing a Katangese civilian who had
    wandered into the tunnel near the train station.101
139. In late June 1993, Governor Kyungu wa Kumwanza and the commander of the
military region, General Sumaili, pressured the refoulés to leave Kolwezi before 1 July.
  • On 30 June 1993, a high-ranking FAZ officer set fire to the shelters and tents of
    the Kasaian refoulés in the train station at Kolwezi. Unable to leave the site fast
    enough, at least one elderly person and an unknown number of disabled people
    were burned alive.102
140. The total number of victims of JUFERI’s campaign of persecution in Kolwezi is
hard to determine. According to statistics from the Comité des refoulés de Kolwezi,
between 24 March 1993 and 14 January 1994 direct clashes between JUFERI and the
Kasaians are thought to have resulted in 371 victims.
141. According to all the witness accounts gathered, most of the deaths resulting from
the campaign of persecution and forced displacement were not so much attributable to
_______________
96 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009, Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental,
March–April 2009; Association zaïroise pour la défense des droits de l’homme (AZADHO), Périodique
des droits de l’homme, No.5, May–June 1993; Human Rights Watch Africa, Zaire: inciting hatred, June
1993; La Voix du Centre des droits de l’homme et du droit humanitaire (CDH), No.1, January–February–
March 1994; Donatien Dibwe Dia Mwembu and Marcel Ngandu Mutombo, Vivre ensemble au Katanga,
L’Harmattan, 2005, pp. 378–379.
97 The Katanga-based FAZ included many citizens from other provinces in Zaire and were hostile to
JUFERI’s ideology.
98The “Mobiles” were self-defence groups responsible for protecting expelled Kasaians (French: refoulés).
99The gendarmerie was predominately Katangese and operated in collaboration with JUFERI.
100 The term refoulés, meaning “displaced people”, is used by Kasaians driven out of Shaba.
101 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009 and Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental,
March–April 2009.
102 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009 and Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental,
March–April 2009.

direct attacks by JUFERI as the inhumane living conditions imposed by the authorities.
According to the Comité des refoulés de Kolwezi, between 24 March 1993 and January
1994 a total of 1,540 Kasaian refoulés died through lack of food and medicines or from
diseases contracted in refoulement sites or on trains transporting them to the Kasai
provinces.
  • In the days that followed the attacks of 25 March 1993, dozens of refoulés in a
    state of shock died for want of humanitarian aid at their refuge sites. Witnesses
    gave figures ranging from 7 to 20 deaths each day. Many died as the result of a
    cholera epidemic. Thanks to aid provided by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF),
    the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Katangese friends,
    living conditions at refoulement sites improved gradually but infant mortality
    remained very high.103
142. Some refoulés managed to leave Kolwezi by road or on foot, but most, for fear of
coming up against JUFERI roadblocks, remained near the train station, waiting for a train
for the Kasai provinces. After several passenger trains were laid on by Gécamines and
religious sisters in April and May 1993, the refoulés had no option but to take goods
trains. In October 1993, many sick people and people unfit for travel were airlifted thanks
to planes chartered by the Salvatorian Fathers. By 14 January 1994, fewer than 5,000
Kasaians remained in Kolwezi.
  • During their interminable journey to Mwene Ditu, Mbuji-Mayi and Kananga, the
    refoulés travelled in freight cars, packed in groups of eighty. Several surviving
    witnesses have likened these trains to “coffins on rails”. Mortality, in particular
    child mortality, was especially high on these trains. According to the Kolwezi
    Comité des refoulés, 94 Kasaian civilians are thought to have died on the journey
    from accidents caused by poor transport conditions. Most of the deaths, however,
    are thought to have been attributable to overcrowding, stress caused by JUFERI
    train attacks, disease, lack of water and despair caused by persecutions and the
    loss of family members and friends. In spite of the presence of the FAZ, who
    escorted many of the convoys, JUFERI attacked the trains during their journey.
    As soon as they left Kolwezi, the attackers cut the air supply to the cars or threw
    petrol bombs on to the trains. At stations where trains were due to stop, in
    particular at Luena and Kamina, JUFERI members prevented refoulés from
    getting off to buy food, get treatment or bury those who had died on the journey.
    A large number of refoulés died during the journey and had to be hastily buried
    along the railway track. One survivor described it as “the world’s longest
    graveyard”. Upon their arrival in Mwene Ditu, Kananga and other towns and
    _______________
    103 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009; Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental,
    March–April 2009; AZADHO, Périodique des droits de l’homme, No.5, May–June 1993.
communities in the Kasai provinces, the refoulés received MSF aid and were
taken in charge by CARITAS and OXFAM UK.104
143. Ultimately, according to the statistics put forward by the Comité des refoulés de
Kolwezi, over 130,000 Kasaian civilians were expelled, including over 80,000 children.
The campaign of persecution and expulsion at Kolwezi is thought to have caused the
deaths of over 300 children. Those who remained were the target of various acts of
persecution and discrimination until at least 1995.
144. JUFERI’s persecution of civilians of Kasaian origin that began in September 1992
continued into 1993 and 1994 in Likasi.
  • At Likasi, between January and August 1993, JUFERI resumed its campaign of
    persecution to force Kasaians still working at Gécamines to leave the town for
    good. It is hard to determine the total number of deaths resulting from the attacks
    and diseases contracted at the refoulement sites.105
145. In 1993, the campaign of persecution carried out by JUFERI against Kasaian
civilians since September 1992 continued at Kipushi.
  • The anti-Kasaian movement began in Kipushi on 3 May 1993. On 25 June, 500
    members of JUFERI attacked Kasaian civilians working at Gécamines, preventing
    them from further access to facilities. The same movement was resumed with
    greater intensity in late September and led to the deaths of at least three civilians,
    injuring an unknown number of others and causing much material damage.106
146. Throughout 1993 and 1994, Governor Kyungu wa Kumwanza stepped up his
speeches against Kasaians living in Lubumbashi. In early 1994, he famously declared that
having cleaned out the “bedrooms” (Likasi and Kolwezi) he would now see to the “living
room”, by which he meant Lubumbashi, the capital of the province. The Kasaians of
Lubumbashi lived in terror for months, fearing the same fate as the refoulés of Likasi and
Kolwezi. Many were dismissed by major private enterprises and the various public
services simply for being Kasaian.
147. The total number of victims of the campaign of persecution executed by JUFERI
and Governor Kyungu wa Kumwanza, in collusion with President Mobutu, is hard to
determine. Interviews and documents consulted by the Mapping Team have not been able
to confirm the figure of 50,000 deaths put forward by a human rights NGO in 1994.
_______________
104 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009 and Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental,
March–April 2009.
105 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009 and Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental,
March–April 2009.
106 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kasai Oriental, April 2009.

There is no doubt, however, that several thousand Kasaian civilians lost their lives in the
course of these events.
148. According to data from the NGO Association des refoulés pour le développement
du Kasaï (ARKASAI), which worked alongside MSF Belgium and the European Union
on refoulé reception, over 780,000 Kasaians were expelled to Kasai Oriental between
November 1993 and November 1995. In the same period, around 450,000 Kasaians were
received in Kasai Occidental, according to statistics provided by a former OXFAM UK
officer. The remaining refoulés settled mainly in Kinshasa. The consequences of this
tragedy are still felt more than fifteen years after the events took place. Most of the
refoulés live in utter destitution, the Kasaians driven out of Gécamines have never
received outstanding pay checks or pensions, the refoulés have never received
compensation for their loss and no legal action has been brought against those
responsible for this persecution.
149. From the second half of 1994, the political situation in Kinshasa evolved in a way
that was not advantageous for UFERI. Following the institutional agreement forged
between the Political Forces of the Conclave and the Sacred Union, Étienne Tshisekedi
and Faustin Birindwa were removed from the Premiership and a member of the
presidential majority, Kengo wa Dondo, was appointed prime minister. Having no further
need for UFERI and Kyungu wa Kumwanza to weaken Étienne Tshisekedi, President
Mobutu gradually withdrew his support for them. Against a backdrop of rivalry for the
control of various types of illicit traffic (mainly cobalt and stolen vehicles) in the
province, the Zairian security services (the FAZ, the Civil Guard, SNIP)107 attacked
members of the JUFERI militia in several territories of the province. On 27 March 1995,
Governor Kyungu wa Kumwanza was arrested for separatist activities. As a reaction,
UFERI declared two days of ville morte on 30 and 31 March 1995. Kyungu wa
Kumwanza was discharged from the governorship on 20 April 1995.
  • On 31 March 1995, members of the Civil Guard opened fire on JUFERI units
    trying to impose respect of the ville morte days, killing two of them and injuring
    at least seven others. In the months that followed, the Civil Guard and the SNIP
    opened fire on and tortured tens of UFERI and JUFERI members at Lubumbashi,
    Likasi, Kolwezi, Kambove and Luena.108
_______________
107 National intelligence and protection service.
108 See La Voix du CDH, No.7, March–April 1995; AZADHO, Périodique des droits de l’homme, No.19,
Annual Report 1995, January 1996; Fédération des droits de l’homme, Rapport succinct au Rapporteur
spécial, 20 August 1995.

B. North Kivu
150. For decades, the increasing number and economic prosperity of the
Banyarwanda109 had been a source of tension with the other communities of North Kivu
(the Hunde, Nyanga, Tembo, Kumu and Nande).110 Present to a modest extent even
before the colonial partitioning of 1885, through successive waves of migration the
Banyarwanda had become a sizeable community in the province. Their dynamism and
the support of influential members in Kinshasa had enabled them to purchase a lot of land
and head of cattle and take control of several major trade networks. This growing hold on
the province was often hard for the other communities to come to terms with. They
accused the Banyarwanda in particular of stealing their land in collaboration with the
central government and violating the ancestral rights of their tribal chiefs. Their
discontent was fuelled by the fact that many Banyarwanda had not arrived in Zaire until
the early 1930s and were only granted Zairian citizenship by virtue of a law contested on
5 January 1972. Far from clarifying the situation, the repeal of this law by President
Mobutu in the early 1980s had created confusion among the people and reopened the
polemic. In fact, the Banyarwanda were allowed to keep their Zairian identity cards and
their title deeds. Nevertheless, the other communities saw them as refugees and
immigrants whose title deeds were worthless in comparison to the ancestral rights held by
“nationals”.
151. In 1989, the refusal of part of the population to allow the Banyarwanda to
participate in local elections had led to violent incidents and forced the Government to
postpone the elections in North Kivu. With the liberalisation of political activity in the
early 1990s, competition for power in the province had become more intense and the
“indigenous” communities111 had begun to contest the political and land rights of the
Banyarwanda more openly. Accusing the provincial authorities dominated by the Nande
and Hunde of trying to deny them their political rights, some members of the Hutu-
Banyarwanda farmers’ mutual association, the MAGRIVI,112 became more radical and
set up small armed groups. In May 1991, armed units of the Hutu Banyarwanda attacked
officers overseeing the population census in Masisi territory. At the National Sovereign
_______________
109 The term “Banyarwanda”, literally “people from Rwanda”, is used to designate both Hutu and Tutsi
populations originating from Rwanda and living in North Kivu. Some are the descendants of peoples of
Rwandan origin who settled on the Congolese territory before 1885 and whose Zairian nationality has
never been seriously contested. Most Banyarwanda, however, arrived in Congo/Zaire during the colonial
era or after the country’s independence.
111 In this report, the term “indigenous” refers to people with a particular attachment to the land they
traditionally occupy. The term “indigenous” as used in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No.169) of the International Labour
Organisation, or the report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on indigenous
peoples in Africa is broader as it aims to cover communities in a situation of extreme marginalisation and in
non-dominant positions in terms of politics and their economy, while still having a particular attachment to
the territories they traditionally occupy, representative institutions that are particular to them and a distinct
identity from the rest of the population.
112 Mutuelle des Agriculteurs de Virunga.

Conference (CNS), Nande and Hunde delegates pressed for the Banyarwanda not to be
allowed to take part in future elections. At provincial level, Governor Jean-Pierre
Kalumbo (of Nande origin) and his party the DCF/Nyamwisi encouraged young
indigenous people to enlist in tribal self-defence militias (the Ngilima for the Nande and
the Mayi-Mayi for the Hunde and Nyanga) to counterbalance the militiamen from the
MAGRIVI. From 1992 onwards, conflicts relating to land ownership and ethno-political
murders became more common and every community started to live in fear of attacks by
other communities.
152. In 1993, Hunde and Nyanga groups in the Walikale territory believed that an
attack by the Hutu Banyarwanda was imminent. In March 1993, Governor Jean-Pierre
Kalumbo (of Nande origin) called on the FAZ to help the Ngilima and the Nyanga and
Hunde militias to “exterminate the Banyarwanda”. On 18 March, Vice-Governor
Bamwisho, from the Walikale territory, delivered an inflammatory speech against the
Banyarwanda in the village of Ntoto.
  • On 20 March 1993, armed units from the Hunde and Nyanga Mayi-Mayi killed
    dozens of Hutu-Banyarwanda peasants at the market in Ntoto, a village located at
    the border between the Walikale and Masisi territories. The Mayi-Mayi attacked
    the Hutus with rifles, knives, arrows and spears. On 21 March 1993, the same
    Mayi-Mayi group killed dozens of Banyarwanda at Buoye, a neighbouring village
    of Ntoto. The attack took place as the victims were leaving the village’s Catholic
    and Protestant churches. In their attempt to escape their attackers, many Hutu
    Banyarwanda drowned in the Lowa River.113
153. Starting in the Walikale territory, the violence spread quickly to the Masisi and
then to the Rutshuru territories.
  • In March and April 1993, armed units from the Hunde Mayi-Mayi killed an
    unknown number of Hutu civilians in the Kambule district of Katoyi village in the
    Masisi territory. Before leaving Kambule, the Mayi-Mayi set fire to Hutu
    dwellings.114
_______________
113 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, April 2009; Report of the Secretary-General’s
Investigative Team charged with investigating serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law in the DRC (S/1998/581); Mémorandum des communautés hutu et tutsi du Nord-Kivu à
la Commission d’enquête sur les massacres de Walikale, Masisi et Bwito en mars et avril 1993, 25 April
1993; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire des crimes impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.34;
Human Rights Watch (HRW), Zaire: Forced to flee: Violence against the Tutsis in Zaire, 1996.
114 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008/March 2009.

In April 1993, Hutu armed units killed at least twelve Hunde civilians, including
children, in Mulinde village in the Masisi territory. The victims were killed with
blows of machetes, hoes and axes.115
  • In April 1993, armed Hutu units killed around fifty people, mostly Hunde, in the
    village of Ngingwe in the Bashali chiefdom, in the north-east of the Masisi
    territory.116
  • In April 1993, armed Hutu units set fire to the primary school and the health care
    centre in the village of Kiusha in the Bashali chiefdom, in the Masisi territory. In
    the village of Muhongozi, they set fire to the church of the 8th CEPZA
    (Pentecostal church group, now CEPAC) and killed an unknown number of
    civilians.117
  • On 22 July 1993, armed Hutu units supported by the FAZ killed at least 48
    people, most of them Hunde but also three Hutus, in the village of Binza and the
    surrounding area, in the north of the Masisi territory. The victims were shot or
    killed by blows from machetes or spears. According to one eyewitness, some of
    the victims were maimed and a pregnant woman was disembowelled. Several
    other villages in the vicinity of Binza were attacked during this period, including
    Kalembe on 25 July 1993.118
  • On 7 September 1993, Hutu militiamen killed at least 38 displaced Hunde,
    including women and children, in the village of Kibachiro on the Karobe hill. The
    victims had fled their village and had regrouped at Kibachiro because of the
    prevailing insecurity in the territory. 119
154. It is very hard to determine how many people died in the first few months of the
conflict. Every community has its own version of the facts and its own estimate of the
number of victims. Furthermore, killing sprees often occurred at very heavily dispersed
sites that are hard to access even now. Where it is possible to visit these sites, it is rare to
find first hand witnesses to the events, because the successive wars that ravaged the
province often entailed the displacement of the people in the villages that came under
attack. With respect to the Ntoto massacre, the figure most often put forward is 500
_______________
115 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008; Léon Batundi Ndasimwa,
“Recensement des victimes hunde des massacres et affrontements interethniques de 1993 à nos jours”,
undated.
116 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008.
117 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008, March and April 2009.
118 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008 and April 2009.
119 Léon Batundi Ndasimwa, “Recensement des victimes hunde des massacres et affrontements
interethniques de 1993 à nos jours”, undated; Groupe d’étude et d’action pour le développement (GEAD),
Mahano No.24, October-November-December 1993.

deaths.120 At the provincial level, MSF estimated in 1995 that between 6,000 and 15,000
people had died between March and May 1993, and that the violence had caused the
displacement of 250,000 people.121
155. In July 1993, President Mobutu travelled to Goma and deployed soldiers from the
Special Presidential Division (DSP) to restore order. Thanks to changes in the leadership
of the province, in the sense of a more balanced representation of the various
communities, and dialogue between the various civil society associations (from
November 1993 to February 1994), calm was gradually restored in North Kivu. However,
the deep-rooted issues behind the conflict were not settled and the situation remained
very delicate when over 700,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees, some ex-FAR staff and a large
number of Interahamwe militiamen responsible for the Tutsi genocide arrived in the
province of North Kivu between 14 July and 17 July 1994.
156. Their long-term settlement added to the insecurity. Above all, it rekindled the fear
of Rwandan domination in the region in communities in conflict with the Banyarwanda.
Hutu armed units from MAGRIVI were very quick to join forces with the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe and strengthened their position towards the Hunde and Nyanga Mayi-
Mayi and the Nande Ngilima. From late 1994, the ethnic war resumed, with a higher
degree of violence than in 1993.
157. During this period, the solidarity between Hutu Banyarwanda and Tutsi
Banyarwanda was shattered. For a number of years, this solidarity had already been
tested, as many Tutsi Banyarwanda had left to fight in the Front patriotique rwandais
(FPR), while many Hutu Banyarwanda were working alongside the security forces of
Rwandan president Juvénal Habyarimana to stop the FPR from recruiting soldiers in
Zaire. After the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda and after the FPR took control in Kigali, the
split was confirmed between the two ethnic groups. Between July 1994 and March 1995,
over 200,000 Tutsis left the province of North Kivu and returned to Rwanda. Some left of
their own volition to benefit from the employment opportunities offered in the army and
administration of the new Rwandan regime. Others fled the growing hostility of the Hutu
Banyarwanda and ex-FAR/Interahamwe attacks, as well as the resumption of the ethnic
war between the Hutu Banyarwanda and the Hunde and Nyanga Mayi-Mayi.
158. For the Tutsis of Goma, the situation became increasingly difficult in the second
half of 1994. Tutsis living in North Kivu were the victims of harassment by other groups
and, in some cases, by the authorities. They often lost their jobs and became the target of
threats, acts of intimidation and extortion, rape and pillage. An unknown number of
Tutsis were abused and killed, or died in this period.
_______________
120 Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team (S/1998/581); Mémorandum des communautés
hutu et tutsi du Nord-Kivu à la Commission d’enquête sur les massacres de Walikale, Masisi et Bwito en
mars et avril 1993, 25 April 1993; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire des crimes impunis, la tragédie du
Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.34.
121 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Populations in danger 1995, 1995.

159. In August 1995, in the hope of regaining control over the situation at grassroots
level, and probably also satisfying the demands of the Rwandan authorities to a certain
extent, the Zairian Government made the decision to expel the Hutu refugees.
  • From 19 August to 23 August 1995, FAZ soldiers forcibly repatriated several
    thousand Rwandan refugees from the Mugunga camp, several kilometres from the
    town of Goma. The refugees were taken to the border in trucks and handed over
    to the Rwandan authorities. Zairian troops took advantage of the situation and
    looted from refugees and set fire to huts and shops in the camp.122
160. Criticised by the entire international community, the operation was a disaster.
Indeed, many refugees, convinced that they would be killed on their return to Rwanda,
chose to flee the camps and join the Hutu-Banyarwanda people living in the surrounding
countryside. Their arrival in these regions went hand in hand with fresh waves of
pillaging and caused the inter-community conflict in the Masisi and Rutshuru territories
to intensify.
  • On 17 November 1995, Hutu armed units killed around forty Hunde in an attack
    on the village of Mutobo in the Masisi territory. The tribal chief Bandu Wabo was
    among the victims.123
  • On 9 December 1995, Hunde armed units killed between 26 and 30 Hutus and
    four FAZ soldiers in Bikenge village in the Masisi territory. In doing so, these
    Mayi-Mayi intended to avenge the death of their tribal chief Bandu Wabo.124
161. These attacks brought about massacres and the large-scale displacement of
civilian populations, leading to the creation of a number of ethnically homogeneous
enclaves in the Masisi and Rutshuru territories. In this climate of increasing lawlessness,
the few thousand Tutsis still living in North Kivu became an easy target for the various
armed groups. While some Hunde Mayi-Mayi groups formed alliances with them, others
attacked them in the same way as the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and the Hutu armed units
from the MAGRIVI. Over the course of 1995, the standpoint of the Zairian security
forces became more and more ambiguous. While in some cases they protected the Tutsis
_______________
122 Confidential document submitted to the Secretary-General’s 1997/1998 Investigative Team; “Zaire
Expels 3,500 Refugees From Rwanda Border Camp” and “Zaire Troops Step Up Expulsion of Rwanda
Refugees”, New York Times, 22 and 23 August 1995.
123 AZADHO (Association zaïroise de défense des droits de l’homme), “État d’urgence”, April 1996; Léon
Batundi Ndasimwa, “Recensement des victimes hunde des massacres et affrontements interethniques de
1993 à nos jours”, undated.
124 AZADHO, “État d’urgence”, April 1996, p.6; Lutheran Church, Rapport d’enquête sur les violations des
droits de l’homme à l’est du Congo, May 1997; HRW, “Zaire: Forced to flee: Violence against the Tutsis in
Zaire”, 1996, p.12; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire des crimes impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu,
2006, pp.61–62.

from attacks by armed groups and the civilian population, in other cases they targeted
them directly.
  • In the first half of 1996, members of the Zairian security forces forcibly expelled
    to Rwanda an unknown number of Tutsis living in the town of Goma and in the
    territories of Rutshuru, Masisi and Lubero. Before their expulsion, members of
    the security forces and the population often subjected their victims to inhumane
    and degrading treatments. In the same period, the Zairian security forces pillaged
    many Tutsi homes and requisitioned their property.125
  • Around 3 February 1996, armed Hunde Mayi-Mayi elements killed at least 18
    Tutsi civilians at Osso farm, around forty kilometres north-west of Goma in the
    Masisi territory. The Mayi-Mayi also pillaged the cattle and property they found
    there. The victims were part of a group of several hundred internally displaced
    Tutsis who had settled on the site in late 1995.126
  • On 4 March 1996, armed Hutu and ex-FAR/Interahamwe units killed a dozen
    Tutsi Banyarwanda in the village of Bukombo in the territory of Rutshuru. Some
    of the victims were burned alive when their houses were set on fire. Others were
    killed by machete blows. Before they left, the assailants looted and torched
    several dwellings. Survivors fled to the Birambizu parish, where they were again
    attacked in the weeks that followed.127
  • On 12 May 1996, Hutu armed units killed several dozen displaced Hunde and
    Tutsis in the Mokoto monastery in the north-east of the Masisi territory. In early
    January 1996, several hundred displaced Hunde and Tutsis fleeing attacks by
    armed Hutu-Banyarwanda and ex-FAR/Interahamwe units had found refuge in
    the monastery. In the days that followed, a few hundred survivors left Mokoto to
    seek refuge in Kitchanga.128
  • Between 8 June and 11 June 1996, armed Hutu and ex-FAR/Interahamwe
    elements from the Katale and Mugunga camps killed dozens of Tutsi civilians
    near Bunagana and Jomba, including the Chef du poste d'encadrement
    administratif at Chengerero, a village 10 kilometres from Bunagana. The
_______________
125 HRW, “Zaire: Forced to flee: Violence against the Tutsis in Zaire”, 1996, pp.14–17.
126 Louis Mugawe Ruganzu, “La tension persiste en zone de Masisi”, in Dialogue No.192 August–
September 1996, p.73; Sheldon Yett, “Down the Road from Goma: Ethnic Cleansing and Displacement in
Eastern Zaire”, US Committee for Refugees Issue Brief, June 1996, p.6.
127 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2);
HRW, “Zaire: Forced to flee: Violence against the Tutsis in Zaire”, 1996, p.15.
128 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008, January and March 2009; Report of
the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2); “La guerre de
Masisi”, in Dialogue No.192 August–September 1996; HRW, “Zaire: Forced to flee: Violence against the
Tutsis in Zaire”, 1996, p.13; Associated Press (AP), “Refugees Continue to Flee Zaire”, 21 May 1996;
Voice of America (VOA), “Ethnic Violence in Zaire”, 16 May 1996.

massacre is thought to have been carried out in retaliation for the attack by
Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers at Bunagana several days earlier, leading to the
deaths of at least twenty Hutu-Banyarwanda civilians.129
162. In late 1995, faced with the growing insecurity in the territories of Masisi and
Rutshuru, the FAZ carried out a number of operations against the various armed groups
and militias operating in the province of North Kivu. During these campaigns, the FAZ
committed multiple acts of violence against civilian populations.
  • On 17 December 1995, FAZ soldiers and Hutu militiamen killed dozens of
    civilians, most of them Hunde, in Masisi village and the surrounding villages. The
    soldiers also looted and torched part of Masisi, destroying many public buildings,
    including a school. These attacks are thought to have been carried out in
    retaliation for the deaths of four FAZ members in Bikenge village on 9 December
    1995 (see Bikenge incident in paragraph 35).130
163. In March 1996, the Zairian Government sent 800 troops from the Special
Presidential Division (DSP), members of the Military Action and Intelligence Service
(SARM) and Paracommando units from the 312th battalion into the Masisi territory. The
operation, code-named “Kimia” (“peace” in Lingala) enabled a somewhat precarious
calm to be restored in the territory for several weeks. For want of troops and adequate
logistical and financial support, however, the operation did not succeed in disarming a
sufficient number of militiamen. Furthermore, rather than fight the armed groups, some
units in operation Kimia turned to pillaging livestock and gave money to the Tutsis in
exchange for their protection, hoping to be escorted to Goma or Rwanda.131
164. In May 1996, the Zairian Government launched Operation “Mbata” (“slap” in
Lingala) to disarm the Hunde and Nyanga Mayi-Mayi and the Nande Ngilima militia.
However, the operation again failed due to a lack of motivation on the part of the units
involved, the hostility of the local people and the resistance of the targeted armed groups.
  • On 10 May 1996, Nande armed units killed at least four Hutu Banyarwanda in the
    village of Vitshumbi in the territory of Rutshuru. According to some sources,
    local people called on members of the Ngilima to drive out the FAZ who were
_______________
129 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2);
Amnesty International (AI), “Lawlessness and Insecurity in North and South-Kivu”, November 1996, p.10.
130 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November–December 2008 and January 2009;
AZADHO, Nord-Kivu: État d’urgence, April 1996, p.6; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire des crimes
impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.62; AI, “Zaire – Lawlessness and insecurity in North and
South-Kivu”, 1996, p.8.
131 HRW, Zaire: Forced to flee: Violence against the Tutsis in Zaire, 1996, p.26.

committing acts of violence in the village. The Hutu Banyarwanda are thought to
have been targeted due to their alleged collaboration with the FAZ.132
  • On 19 May 1996, as part of Operation Mbata, FAZ soldiers killed an unknown
    number of civilians accused of supporting armed units from the Ngilima,
    including a Pentecostal pastor, in an attack against the village of Vitshumbi. After
    the recapture of Vitshumbi, soldiers kept the civilian population locked in village
    churches for two days. They also looted the village.133
  • On 29 May 1996, FAZ troops massacred over 120 civilians in the village of
    Kibirizi in the Bwito chiefdom, in the territory of Rutshuru. The FAZ fired at the
    village using heavy weapons and set fire to several houses.134
  • In June 1996, FAZ troops massacred over one hundred people in the village of
    Kanyabayonga in the Lubero territory. Most of the victims were killed when the
    village was shelled using heavy weapons and hundreds of homes were torched.
    Kanyabayonga was considered a Ngilima stronghold and most of the victims were
    Nande armed units or civilians suspected of supporting the group.135
165. For reasons mentioned above, the total number of victims of the massacres that
occurred in North Kivu between July 1994 and June 1996 is impossible to determine.
According to some estimates, the inter-ethnic conflict is thought to have caused close to
one thousand deaths in 1995 and led to the displacement of 100,000 people. In June 1996,
there were between 100,000 and 250,000 displaced persons in the province. At that time
it was estimated that since 1993, between 70,000 and 100,000 people had died as a result
of the ethnic war in the province. These figures are impossible to verify in the absence of
reliable statistics, but also in the absence of the large number of people who were the
subject of forced “disappearances” that occurred at this time in the province. One case
illustrating the very common practice of forced disappearance was confirmed by the
Mapping Team and is presented below by way of example.
_______________
132 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, April 2009; Action paysanne pour la reconstruction et le
développement communautaire intégral (APREDECI), Mission d’enquête sur la situation des droits de
l’homme dans la province du Nord-Kivu, 1997, pp.7–8.
133 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1995/67 and Corr.1),
para. 59; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire des crimes impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.66;
APREDECI, “Mission d’enquête sur la situation des droits de l’homme dans la province du Nord-Kivu”,
1997, pp.7–8.
134 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008; IRIN (Integrated Regional Information
Networks), Masisi Report, 23 August 1996; APREDECI, “Mission d’enquête sur la situation des droits de
l’homme dans la province du Nord-Kivu”, 1997, pp.8–9.
135 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008 and February 2009; Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add. 1), para. 59; IRIN,
Masisi Report, 23 August 1996; APREDECI, “Mission d’enquête sur la situation des droits de l’homme
dans la province du Nord-Kivu”, 1997, pp.9–10.

  • On 16 August 1995, two Hunde civilians disappeared going into the fields near
    Kitchanga at the crossroads between the Masisi, Walikale and Lubero territories.
    Their bodies were never found. The people have always suspected Hutu
    militiamen in the surrounding area to be responsible for their disappearance.136
166. During this period, the violence in North Kivu also led to widespread looting.
Buildings designated for education, hospitals and dispensaries were frequently targeted,
in particular in the Masisi territory. The war did not spare livestock, one of the province’s
key resources. Over three years, 80 percent of the livestock was pillaged, mainly by the
ex-FAR/Interahamwe and Hutu armed units from the MAGRIVI, in collaboration with
some FAZ units.137
C. Kinshasa
167. From March 1993 to June 1996, the crackdown on the political opponents of
President Mobutu’s regime was especially violent, particularly in Kinshasa. Under the
direct control of President Mobutu, the security forces carried out many summary and
extrajudicial executions as well as forced disappearances, tortured and raped a great
number of civilians.138 They also committed many acts of pillage. The widespread
impunity they enjoyed leads to the supposition that the highest powers of government
were providing cover for their actions – even encouraging them – in order to destabilise
their opponents.
168. The security force agencies most involved in violations of the right to life were
the Special Presidential Division (DSP), the Civil Guard, the FAS (Forces d’action
spéciale), the FIS (Forces d’intervention spéciale) and the National Intelligence and
Protection Service (SNIP). The BSRS (Special Research and Surveillance Brigade) and
the SARM (Military Action and Intelligence Service) were also heavily involved in
serious violations of the right to life. A special unit formed within the DSP, known as
Hibou (“the owls”), was specifically responsible for spreading fear among the people by
carrying out summary executions and kidnapping not only political opponents but
soldiers and ordinary citizens too.
169. Opponents were typically detained at the Civil Guard headquarters on the Avenue
Victoire in the Kasa-Vubu commune, the Civil Guard/IBTP prison, the 11th military
garrison (CIRCO), various SNIP detention centres dotted across the capital, and cells at
the Lufungula, Kokolo and Tshatshi military camps. Some were imprisoned at secret
detention sites. In the majority of cases, those arrested were tortured. Flogging, electric
shock, suspension by the feet, whipping and sexual abuse were the most frequently used
_______________
136 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008.
137 IRIN, Masisi Report, 23 August 1996.
138 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6); AZADHO,
Périodique des droits de l’homme, May–June 1993; AZADHO, Périodique des droits de l’homme, July–
August 1993; AZADHO, “L’armée tue”, 1994.

methods of torture. The detention conditions themselves amounted to cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment, and led to a large number of deaths. A great many victims were
packed into tiny cells, without ventilation or sanitary facilities, where they received
neither food nor medical treatment.
170. Between March 1993 and June 1996, over thirty communications regarding cases
in Kinshasa were sent to the Government via mechanisms provided for by the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights, including the Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment and the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.139
171. The serious violations of human rights are too numerous to be listed here in their
entirety, and therefore only a few illustrative cases of summary executions and torture are
reported below.
  • In April 1993, in Kinshasa, elements of the security forces arbitrarily arrested and
    tortured over 20 civilians, including political opponents, trade unionists and
    journalists.140
  • On 4 May 1994, elements of the security forces executed 15 people at the
    Tshatshi camp. The victims had been kidnapped by the security forces (notably
    the BSRS) two days previously at a protest march staged by the opposition. A
    further five individuals who had been kidnapped and transferred to the CIRCO
    military garrison were released after protests from human rights organisations.141
  • On 27 May 1994, Civil Guard elements executed six UDPS activists in the
    Maluku district in Nsele commune. Their bodies were loaded on to a boat and
    dumped in the middle of the river. The activists had been kidnapped that day by
    the BSRS and taken to the Civil Guard training centre at Mangengenge. On 27
    May, the opposition had called a day of ville morte in Kinshasa to demand the
    return of Étienne Tshisekedi to the Premiership. Between 1993 and 1994, the
    security forces killed a number of UDPS activists, including minors, during their
    crackdown on the movement.142
    _______________
    139 Most of these communications, which concerned hundreds of individuals, were made jointly with the
    Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire: E/CN.4/1994/7 and Corr. 1 and 2,
    E/CN.4/1994/31, E/CN.4/1995/31, E/CN.4/1995/61, E/CN.4/1996/4, E/CN.4/1996/35, E/CN.4/1997/7,
    E/CN.4/1997/7/Add.1, E/CN.4/1997/34, E/CN.4/1998/38, E/CN.4/1998/68/Add.1 http://daccessods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=E/CN.4/1995/31&Lang=E  and
    http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/70ef163b25b2333fc1256991004de370/00c4a2ec43a11d4f80
    25671d00371db0?OpenDocument   (E/CN.4/1999/63)   . 
    140 AI, “Violence Against Democracy”, September 1993; AZADHO, Périodique des droits de l’homme,
    No.4, March–April 1993; AZADHO, Périodique des droits de l’homme, No.6, July–August 1993.
    141 Interview with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, April 2009; AZADHO, Périodique des droits de l’homme,
    May–June 1994.
    142 Interview with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, April 2009; AZADHO, Périodique des droits de l’homme,
    March–April 1994; AI, “Violence Against Democracy”, September 1993

  • On 29 July 1995, units of the Civil Guard and the Gendarmerie killed at least
    seven PALU (Parti lumumbiste unifié – Unified Lumumbist Party) activists at a
    demonstration against the extension of the transition period. Around twenty
    people were injured in the operation, some seriously. An unknown number of
    demonstrators were arrested and transferred to Civil Guard and CIRCO detention
    sites, and cells at the Kokolo military camp. On the same day, some time around
    4am, members of the Civil Guard and the Gendarmerie raped women and beat
    PALU demonstrators at the residence of the party’s leader, Antoine Gizenga, in
    the Limete commune. On this occasion, the security forces looted and ransacked
    the residence, which was also PALU’s headquarters.143
172. In some densely-populated areas, like Kimbanseke, the people reacted to the
violence meted out by the security forces by creating self-defence groups. These groups,
in turn, committed summary executions and theft. Although the Mapping Team was
unable to confirm these figures, it is estimated that over one thousand people in total were
killed in Kinshasa by uniformed and plain-clothes members of the Zairian security forces
during this period.144
D. Rest of country
173. During this period, some provinces underwent a chaotic democratisation process
accompanied by mounting xenophobia, ending in the persecution of non-originaires, or
outsiders. The constant political arm-wrestling between President Mobutu and Étienne
Tshisekedi of the UDPS and the manipulation of regionalist and tribalist sentiment by
local political actors gave rise to many instances of abuse and acts of violence against
opponents and non-originaires in the different provinces.
Bas-Zaire (Bas-Congo)
174. In 1994, the Governor of Bas-Zaire province, Bieya Mbaki, staged a number of
public meetings, mainly in September, in which he encouraged the indigenous people of
the province to drive out all non-originaires holding positions of authority in the region.
Using xenophobic slogans that inflamed ethnic hatred, the Governor and the local
authorities expelled several natives of the Kasai provinces and issued an ultimatum to the
non-originaires to leave the province before 24 November 1994, the anniversary of
Mobutu’s 1965 coup. The following two incidents are cited as examples of this campaign
of persecution.
_______________
143 Interview with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, April 2009; AI, “Zaire: Nine demonstrators killed”, 1995;
HRW, “Uncertain Course: Transition and Human Rights Violations in the Congo”, 1997.
144 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1994/49); AZADHO,
Périodique des droits de l’homme, December 1993; AZADHO, Périodique des droits de l’homme, July–
August 1994; AZADHO, Périodique des droits de l’homme, January 1995; HRW, Annual Report, 1994.

  • In July 1994, the state-owned maritime transport authority Régie des Voies
    Maritimes laid off a number of non-originaire employees. In the months that
    followed, the people drove out two non-originaire magistrates, including the
    President of the Tribunal de Paix in Luozi.145
  • On 15 October 1994, units of the Zairian security forces expelled 14 nonoriginaire
    families from Bas-Zaire province, including the Baluba (from the
    Kasai provinces) and the Bangala (from Équateur).146
Orientale Province
  • In 1995, the Governor and local authorities of Orientale province arbitrarily
    suspended several magistrates and expelled a local UDPS leader from the
    province. The victims were all natives of the Kasai provinces, known for their
    involvement with the political opposition and in civil society.147
  • Between 1995 and 1996, on several occasions and on the orders of the Governor,
    units of the security services cordoned off the homes of certain intellectuals and
    members of the clergy accused of being opposition supporters.148
Maniema
175. In this period, changes in the political situation underway in Kinshasa had only a
delayed and limited effect on Maniema province. The province remained under the
control of Governor Omari Léa Sisi and President Mobutu’s party, the MPR (Mouvement
pour la révolution). In 1994, in response to opposition attempts to organise themselves in
the field, the Governor demanded the deployment of a Civil Guard contingent to
reinforce the Gendarmerie Nationale garrison. Over the course of 1995, the Gendarmerie
and the Civil Guard committed dozens of rapes, inflicted torture and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment on many civilians and looted many properties. Public reports have
mentioned the existence of dozens of serious cases. Two such cases were confirmed by
the Mapping Team and are reported below by way of example.
_______________
145 AZADHO, Annual Report 1994, January 1995.
146 Toges Noires, “Kongolisation des cadres ou épuration ethnique au Bas-Zaïre?”, December 1994.
147 Interview with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, March 2009; “Victimes de xénophobie, les
Kasaiens souhaitent quitter le Haut-Zaïre”, La Référence Plus, 7 September 1995; Annual report of
AZADHO, 1996; document submitted to the Mapping Team, February 2009.
148 Interview with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, March 2009; “Victimes de xénophobie, les
Kasaiens souhaitent quitter le Haut-Zaïre”, La Référence Plus, 7 September 1995; AZADHO Annual
Report, 1996; document submitted to the Mapping Team, February 2009

  • On 6 February 1995 at Kampene in the Pangi territory, units of the Civil Guard
    raped an unknown number of women and looted all the stores in the market. The
    Civil Guard had been deployed in Kampene to investigate the destruction of the
    CELPA (Pentecostal Church in Africa) church by members of the Rega
    community.149
  • On 7 February 1995, Civil Guard units raped an unknown number of women and
    pillaged the village of Tchoko in the Kailo territory, near Kindu. The incident
    occurred after residents beat a member of the Civil Guard who had clashed with a
    village farmer.150
Kasaï occidental
176. In October 1993, as Zaire sank deeper and deeper into economic crisis, Faustin
Birindwa’s Government launched a programme of monetary reform and introduced a
new currency, the “New Zaire”. However, the use of the currency was swiftly opposed by
Étienne Tshisekedi and the Catholic Church. In opposition strongholds, such as the two
Kasai provinces, the people rallied to reject the monetary reform. In response, President
Mobutu sent military reinforcements into the province of Kasai Occidental.
  • In the month that followed 29 November 1993, soldiers from the Special
    Presidential Division (DSP) killed six civilians in Kananga, including a Catholic
    priest, and looted a number of Catholic establishments, among them the Procure
    Saint-Clément, as well as a number of department stores, including Africa Luxe,
    Ruff Congo and Simis. This deliberate attack, targeted predominately at the
    Catholic clergy and its property, was committed at a time when President Mobutu
    was criticising Catholic leaders for campaigning against the use of the “New
    Zaire”.151
    _______________
    149 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009; Haki Za Binadamu, “Monitoring: cas types
    des violations des droits de l’homme au Maniema”, Annual Report 1995; Politique Africaine, No.84, “Le
    Maniema, de la guerre de l’AFDL à la guerre du RCD”, December 2001, pp.64–65.
    150 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009; Haki Za Binadamu, “Monitoring: cas types
    des violations des droits de l’homme au Maniema”, Annual Report 1995; Politique Africaine, No.84, “Le
    Maniema, de la guerre de l’AFDL à la guerre du RCD”, December 2001, pp.64–65.
    151 Interview with the Mapping Team, Kasai Occidental and Kasai Oriental, April 2009; AI, “Zaire,
    Collapsing under Crisis”, 1994, pp.5–6.
----------------------------------------------------------------


CHAPTER II. JULY 1996 – JULY 1998: FIRST CONGO WAR AND AFDL
REGIME

177. From July 1996, Tutsi/Banyamulenge152 armed units who had left Zaire to pursue
military training in Rwandan army, the APR (Armée patriotique rwandaise), in Rwanda,
along with APR soldiers, began their operations to infiltrate the province of South Kivu
via Burundi and destabilise North Kivu via Uganda. The first serious clashes between the
FAZ and the infiltrés took place on 31 August 1996 near Uvira in the province of South
Kivu. On 18 October, the conflict took a new turn when an armed movement, the AFDL
(Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo), was officially formed
in Kigali, asserting its intention to topple President Mobutu.153 Under the cover of the
AFDL, whose own troops, weapons and logistics were supplied by Rwanda, soldiers
from the APR, the UPDF (Uganda People’s Defence Force) and the FAB (Forces armées
burundaises) entered Zaire en masse and set about capturing the provinces of North and
South Kivu and the Ituri district.154
178. During this lightning offensive, units of the AFDL, APR and FAB attacked and
destroyed all the Rwandan and Burundian Hutu refugee camps set up around the towns of
Uvira, Bukavu and Goma. Several hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees returned
to Rwanda, but hundreds of thousands of others, like the ex-FAR/Interahamwe, fled
towards the territories of Walikale (North Kivu) and Shabunda (South Kivu). For several
months, they were pursued by AFDL/APR soldiers, who went about systematically
destroying the makeshift refugee camps and persecuting anyone who came to their aid.
_______________
152The term “Banyamulenge” came into popular use in the late 1960s to distinguish ethnic Tutsis
historically based in South Kivu, the Banyamulenge, from those arriving from the 1960s onwards as
refugees or economic migrants. Banyamulenge means “people of Mulenge” and takes its name from a city
in the Uvira territory with a very large Tutsi population. Over time, however, the use of the term
Banyamulenge has become increasingly more generalised and has been used to designate all
Zairian/Congolese and occasionally Rwandan Tutsis.
153 From the second half of 1995, the Rwandan authorities, in cooperation with those in Kampala, began
their preparations to facilitate a mass military intervention of the Zairian territory by the APR and UPDF,
under the guise of a domestic rebellion. To enable the rebellion to surface, Rwandan and Ugandan leaders
requested the help of Tutsis in Zaire who had served in the FRP and APR for several years to mass recruit
in North Kivu and South Kivu to start a Banyamulenge rebellion. They also made contact with the leaders
of small Zairian rebel groups that had been foes of President Mobutu for decades (André Kisase Ngandu’s
CNRD (Conseil national de résistance pour la démocratie) and Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s PRP (Parti de la
Révolution Populaire)) to give the rebellion a national dimension. In addition to the CNRD led by André
Kisase Ngandu, AFDL President until his assassination in January 1997, and the PRP led by Laurent-Désiré
Kabila, the AFDL also included the ADP (Alliance démocratique des peuples), led by Déogratias Bugera,
and the MRLZ (Mouvement révolutionnaire pour la libération du Zaïre), led by Anselme Masasu Nindaga.
154 Given the high numbers of APR soldiers among AFDL troops and at AFDL headquarters – a fact later
acknowledged by the Rwandan authorities (see footnote on page 1014) – and the great difficulty
experienced by witnesses questioned by the Mapping Team distinguishing between AFDL and APR
members in the field, this report will refer to AFDL armed units and APR soldiers engaged in operations in
Zaire between October 1996 and June 1997 under the acronym AFDL/APR. In cases where, in certain
regions, several sources have confirmed high numbers of Ugandan soldiers (in some districts of Orientale
Province, for example) or the Forces armées burundaises (as in some territories in South Kivu) under the
cover of the AFDL, the acronyms AFDL/APR/UPDF and AFDL/APR/FAB or AFDL/UPDF and
AFDL/FAB may also be used.
70
179.

179. From December 1996, the Kinshasa Government attempted to launch a counteroffensive
from Kisangani and Kindu with the aid of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe. However,
it proved impossible to reorganise the ailing Zairian army in such a short space of time.
The AFDL/APR/UPDF troops, who were reinforced from February 1997 by anti-Mobutu
Katangese soldiers who had served in the Angolan Government army (the ex-Tigers)
since the 1970s, and by children involved with armed forces and armed groups
(CAAFAG),155 commonly known as the Kadogo (“small ones” in Swahili) and recruited
during the conquests, took control of Kisangani on 15 March 1997 and Mbuji Mayi and
Lubumbashi in early April. After the fall of Kenge in Bandundu province, the
AFDL/APR troops and their allies reached the gates of the capital and President Mobutu
had to resign himself to stepping down. On 17 May 1997, AFDL/APR troops entered
Kinshasa, and on 25 May, the AFDL president, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, declared himself
President of the Republic and renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC). Within a few months, however, President Kabila’s authoritarian measures,
his reneging on contracts signed with a number of foreign companies and his refusal to
cooperate with the special Team sent by the UN Secretary-General to investigate the
massacre of refugees in the East of the DRC lost the new regime its main international
allies.
A. Attacks against Tutsi and Banyamulenge civilians
South Kivu
180. Since the 1980s, the issue of the nationality of Tutsis living in South Kivu, like
that of the Banyarwanda in North Kivu, had been a matter of controversy. Most Tutsis in
South Kivu declared themselves to be Zairian Banyamulenge,156 the descendants of
Tutsis from Rwanda and Burundi who had settled on the Hauts Plateaux in the Uvira and
Fizi territories before the colonial partitioning of 1885. The other communities, on the
other hand, were of the opinion that most Tutsis living in South Kivu were political
refugees and, as economic migrants who had arrived in the country in the twentieth
century, they could not, therefore, claim Zairian nationality. The decision taken in 1981
by President Mobutu to repeal the law of 1972, by which Zairian nationality had been
granted collectively to peoples of Rwandan and Burundian origin present in the Zairian
territory before 1 January 1950, strengthened the position of the so-called “indigenous”
communities. Since then, there had been widespread suspicion over the true nationality of
_______________
155 Children associated with armed groups and armed forces (CAAFAG) designates children who were
enlisted in regular or irregular armed forces or armed groups either of their own free will or by force,
regardless of their role.
156 Gisaro Muhoza, of Tutsi origin, a deputy for the Congolese parliament in the territory of Uvira,
popularised this term in the late 1960s to distinguish ethnic Tutsis historically based in South Kivu, the
Banyamulenge, from those arriving from the 1960s onwards as refugees or economic migrants.
Banyamulenge means “people of Mulenge”, and takes its name from a city in the Uvira territory with a
very large Tutsi population. It should be noted, however, that most of Mulenge’s inhabitants are not Tutsis
but Vira. Over time, the term Banyamulenge has become increasingly used to designate all
Zairian/Congolese Tutsis.

the Tutsis in South Kivu and no Tutsi members of parliament had been elected in the
province. Moreover, as in North Kivu in 1989, controversy over the uncertain nationality
of the Tutsis in the province had led to the postponement of elections. Despite all that, in
the absence of major conflict over land, and in view of the relatively small size of the
Banyamulenge and Tutsi community in the province, in South Kivu the political
liberalisation of the regime after 1990 did not result in the same degree of violence and
tribalist manipulation of the political debate that was rife in North Kivu.
181. From 1993, however, the arrival in the province of Burundian157 and Rwandan158
Hutu refugees and armed groups, and the integration after July 1994 of many
Banyamulenge and Tutsis from South Kivu in the army and the administration of the new
Rwandan regime,159 stirred the anti-Banyamulenge and anti-Tutsi sentiment in many
South Kivuans. Accused of being agents of the Rwandan and Burundian Governments,
many Tutsis, and also some Banyamulenge, lost their jobs and were subject to threats and
discrimination. On 28 April 1995, the transition parliament (HCR-PT) in Kinshasa
officially rejected all claims of the Banyamulenge to Zairian citizenship and
recommended to the Government that they be repatriated to Rwanda or Burundi, on the
same basis as the Hutu refugees and Tutsi immigrants. In the months that followed, the
provincial administration seized many Banyamulenge properties.
182. In a memorandum released on 19 October 1995, the authorities of the Uvira
territory stated that the Banyamulenge ethnic group was unrecognised in Zaire and that,
with the exception of a dozen families, all Tutsis living in South Kivu were “foreigners”.
On 25 November, in Uvira, the signatories of a petition denouncing the persecution of the
Banyamulenge by the Zairian authorities were arrested by the security forces. In the
Hauts Plateaux and Moyens Plateaux in the Uvira, Fizi and Mwenga territories, the
Bembe, long-time foes of the Banyamulenge,160 took advantage of the situation to set up
armed groups and step up their cattle raiding activities and acts of intimidation against the
Banyamulenge. In response to this situation, an increasing number of young Tutsis and
Banyamulenge left for Rwanda to pursue military training in the APR. Some returned
_______________
157 After the assassination of Hutu president Melchior Ndadaye on 21 October 1993 at Bujumbura, interethnic
violence broke out in Burundi between the Hutus and the Tutsis. In response to the crackdown
organised by the Tutsi-dominated FAB (Forces armées burundaises), several tens of thousands of Hutus
took refuge in South Kivu between 1993 and 1995. In their wake, in 1994, the Burundian Hutu movement
CNDD (Centre national pour la défense de la démocratie), led by Léonard Nyangoma, and its armed wing
FDD (Forces pour la défense de la démocratie) set up in the territories of Uvira and Fizi. From their bases
in South Kivu, they launched a number of attacks against the FAB (Forces armées burundaises). The armed
wing of the Burundian Hutu movement PALIPEHUTU (Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu – Party for
the Liberation of the Hutu People), the FNL (Forces nationales de libération – National Forces of
Liberation), also used South Kivu as a base in its fight against the Burundian army.
158 The ex-FAR/Interahamwe.
159 From 1990, many Banyamulenge youths uncertain of their future in Zaire and many young Tutsis
wanting to return to Rwanda enlisted in the FPR (Front patriotique rwandais – Rwandese Patriotic Front) to
fight the FAR (Forces armées rwandaises – Rwandan Armed Forces).
160 Between 1963 and 1965, huge numbers of Bembe fought in the ranks of the Mulelist rebellion (the
“Simba”) against the state army. The Banyamulenge, on the other hand, had sided with the Kinshasa
government and then participated in the organised crackdown on the Bembe after the defeat of the Simba.

quickly to Zaire and created a self-defence militia in the Hauts Plateaux and the Moyens
Plateaux of the Mitumba mountains. Others remained in Rwanda, where they helped
form a Banyamulenge rebellion that would allow the APR to neutralise the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe and enable the Tutsis of South Kivu and North Kivu to obtain full and
official recognition of their Zairian citizenship by a new regime in Kinshasa.
183. From July 1996 onwards, as Banyamulenge/Tutsi armed units began operations to
infiltrate South Kivu, the situation for Banyamulenge and Tutsi civilians in general
became extremely precarious. On 31 August 1996, when members of the FAZ
intercepted Rwandan soldiers at Kiringye, sixty kilometres north of Uvira, the zone
commissioner Shweka Mutabazi called on local youths to enlist in fighting militias and
ordered FAZ soldiers to arrest all Banyamulenge and Tutsis161 living in the Uvira
territory.
  • On 9 September, while the people of Uvira mounted a demonstration calling on
    the Tutsis to leave Zaire, FAZ members arrested an unknown number of
    Tutsi/Banyamulenge and looted several buildings, including religious institutions
    and the offices of local Banyamulenge-led NGOs.162
  • On 17 September 1996, with the aid of FAZ soldiers, Bembe armed units killed
    an unknown number of Banyamulenge civilians in the village of Kabela in the
    Fizi territory. Only the men were killed. Although they were spared, most of the
    women were raped.163
  • Some time around 21 September 1996, FAZ soldiers killed at least two
    Banyamulenge civilians, including the president of Uvira’s Banyamulenge
    community, at the Kamanyola border post, ninety kilometres north of Uvira in the
    Walungu territory. The victims were part of a group of Banyamulenge awaiting
    deportation to Rwanda. At the border post, while the group was waiting for papers
    for its departure into Rwanda, FAZ soldiers killed a minor who had asked them
    for water. The FAZ then looted their goods. When APR units arrived at the Ruzizi
    River border crossing, however, the FAZ soldiers fled. The President of the
_______________
161 It is not for the Mapping Team to pass comment on the ever-controversial matter of the nationality of
Tutsis in South Kivu, or the respective sizes of the Banyamulenge and Tutsi communities living in the
province at the time. In some cases, the Mapping Team was able to confirm that victims were members of
Tutsi communities settled in the Moyens Plateaux and Hauts Plateaux and has chosen to designate them by
“Banyamulenge”. In other cases, the Mapping Team was able to establish that the victims were
Zairian/Congolese, Rwandan or Burundian Tutsis, and “Tutsi” is used to describe them in the text that
follows. In the majority of cases, however, it was not possible to establish the precise origin of Tutsi
victims, and therefore they are referred to in this text as Banyamulenge/Tutsi.
162 Interview with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February 2009; confidential documents submitted to the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; IRIN, “Weekly Roundup of Main Events in the
Great Lakes region”, 2–8 September 1996; AI, “Lawlessness and Insecurity in North and South-Kivu”,
1996.
163 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, June 2009.

Banyamulenge community was executed soon after at Kamanyola by FAZ
soldiers.164
  • Around 23 September, FAZ soldiers killed at least fifteen Banyamulenge/Tutsis at
    the Kamanyola border post. The victims were accused of being part of an armed
    Banyamulenge/Tutsi group infiltrating the Zairian territory.165
  • Between 22 and 24 September 1996, FAZ units publicly executed two
    Banyamulenge civilians at the village of Nyamugali, forty-seven kilometres north
    of Uvira, in the Ruzizi Plain. The victims were accused of being in contact with
    Banyamulenge/Tutsi infiltrated armed units. The executions took place shortly
    after a FAZ soldier was killed at the Rwanda border.166
  • In September 1996, Bembe armed units killed an unknown number of
    Banyamulenge at Lubonja village in the Nganja sector of the Fizi territory. The
    victims were mostly women who had left Nganja for Minembwe. Two pastors
    were also killed in the same village in similar circumstances.167
184. In Fizi territory, faced with the risk of clashes between the FAZ and
Banyamulenge/Tutsi armed units in the Moyens Plateaux and Hauts Plateaux of the
Mitumba mountains, several hundred Banyamulenge civilians left the village of
Bibokoboko and the surrounding area to seek refuge in Baraka and Lueba. By putting
themselves under the protection of the FAZ in this way, these civilians hoped not to be
confused with the infiltrated groups. In spite of this, the following incidents were
reported.
  • On 26 September 1996, with the aid of FAZ soldiers, Bembe armed units killed
    nearly 300 Banyamulenge civilians in the town of Baraka in the Fizi territory. The
    victims, including women and children, were mostly stabbed to death. Many
    women, including minors, were gang-raped before they were killed. The killings
    were carried out in front of the local population, who did not react. The victims
    came from villages around Bibokoboko in the Hauts Plateaux and Moyens
    Plateaux. Their bodies were buried in a mass grave at Baraka. In 2005, a highranking
    government official requested that the Mayi-Mayi groups operating in
    Baraka unearth the victims’ remains and dump them in Lake Tanganyika to erase
    all trace of the massacres.168
_______________
164 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, November 2008, February/April 2009; Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6), para. 180, Lutheran Church,
Rapport d’enquête sur les violations des droits de l’homme à l’est du Congo, May 1997, p.8.
165 Interview with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February and April 2009; Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6), para. 180.
166 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009.
167 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009.
168 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, November 2008 and February 2009.

  • On 29 September 1996, with the aid of FAZ soldiers, Bembe armed units killed
    152 Banyamulenge civilians, including many women and children, in the village
    of Lueba, seventy-eight kilometres south of Uvira, in the Fizi territory. Some of
    the victims were killed by machete blows. Others were burned alive in a house
    that was set on fire with a grenade. Many women, including minors, were gangraped.169
  • In the night of 29 to 30 September 1996, Bembe armed units killed nearly one
    hundred Banyamulenge civilians opposite the village of Mboko. The victims were
    mostly survivors of the Lueba masasacre who had been led away by the
    militiamen to be deported to Rwanda. The women and children of the group
    reached Rwanda but the men were bound and dumped in Lake Tanganyika. For a
    short time, the militiamen spared fifteen men, who were detained in a camp at
    Mboko. However, the militiamen claimed in front of witnesses that the fifteen
    men would be burned at a later date. The fifteen men have been reported missing
    ever since.170
  • Some time around 2 October 1996, local youths and FAZ units killed fifteen
    Banyamulenge in the village of Sange in the Uvira territory. Most of the victims
    were living in the Kinanira and Kajembo districts and had found temporary refuge
    at the home of the chef de cité. The youths and the militiamen came for them at
    the house of the chef de cité under the pretext of escorting them to Rwanda, but
    killed them en route.171
185. On 6 October 1996, Banyamulenge/Tutsi armed units killed over thirty people at
Lemera in the Uvira territory, including civilians and soldiers who were being treated at
the local hospital.172 In response to the outpouring of emotion that followed this
massacre, on 8 October the Vice-Governor of South Kivu, Lwabanji Lwasi, gave the
Tutsi/Banyamulenge one week to leave the province for good, or they would be
considered and treated as infiltrated armed units. On 10 October, Rwanda encouraged all
Banyamulenge men to remain in Zaire and fight for their rights. Meanwhile, the
Governor of South Kivu, Pasteur Kyembwa Walumona, called on all the young people of
the province to enlist in militias to support the FAZ.
_______________
169 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, November 2008 and February 2009, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6), para. 191; AI, “Loin des
regards de la communauté internationale: violations des droits de l’homme dans l’est du Zaïre”, 1996, p.3.
170 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009; AI, “Loin des regards de la communauté
internationale: violations des droits de l’homme dans l’est du Zaïre”, 1996, p.3.
171 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009; Lutheran Church, Rapport d’enquête sur
les violations des droits de l’homme à l’est du Congo, May 1997, p.8.
172 See page 119, note 366.

  • On 10 October 1996, members of the FAZ killed several hundred Banyamulenge,
    including women and children, in the town of Bukavu. Most of the killings took
    place in the Panzi district and at the Zairian railway company (SNCZ) site,
    currently operating as a port zone. On this occasion, a number of family members
    of Tutsi soldiers serving in the FAZ and accused of betrayal were executed. The
    victims were shot or killed with machete blows.173
186. On 11 October 1996, the FAZ Chief of Staff, General Eluki Monga Aundu,
officially accused the Banyamulenge of attacking the country with the help of Rwanda,
Uganda and Burundi. On 18 October, Banyamulenge/Tutsi armed units launched an
attack on Kiliba, for which the AFDL (Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la
libération du Congo) immediately claimed responsibility.
  • On 21 October 1996, local people killed a Banyamulenge/Tutsi civilian near the
    Kabindula district in the town of Uvira. The victim was decapitated and his head
    paraded on a stick around the town. The perpetrators then hung the victim’s
    testicles on a necklace.174
  • In October or November 1996, Burundian Hutu armed units from the FDD
    (Forces de défense de la démocratie) publicly executed between 12 and 20
    Banyamulenge/Tutsis in the village of Kamituga in the Mwenga territory. Most of
    the victims were from the villages of Lugushwa (Shabunda territory), Kitamba,
    Mero and Luliba (villages around Kamituga in the Mwenga territory), where they
    worked for the mining firms Société minière et industrielle du Kivu (SOMINKI)
    and Compagnie minière des Grands Lacs (MGL). They had recently left their
    villages to find refuge in Kamituga. The FDD accused them of collaborating with
    AFDL/APR soldiers who were advancing towards the village. The local people
    and the Red Cross buried the victims’ bodies in a mass grave located behind the
    parish.175
  • Over the course of November 1996, FDD and FAZ units killed around fifty Tutsi
    civilians by the Zalya River, a few kilometres from Kamituga-Centre, in the
    Mwenga territory. The killings most often took place at night. The bodies of the
    victims were then dumped in the Zalya River.176
187. During this period, mention was made of a number of massacres of
Banyamulenge in Minembwe, in the Hauts Plateaux of the Fizi territory. The Mapping
Team was not, however, able to confirm these cases. The members of the Banyamulenge
community who were consulted claimed not to have accurate information on these
events.
_______________
173 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009.
174 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February 2009.
175 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009.
176 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009.

2. Kinshasa
188. After war broke out in North and South Kivu, the people of Kinshasa became
increasingly hostile towards Rwandans and peoples of Rwandan origin, in particular the
Tutsis, whom they systematically accused of being in collusion with the AFDL/APR.
  • In late October 1996, during public demonstrations staged by students in protest
    of the presence of “Rwandans” in Kinshasa, men, women and children of
    Rwandan nationality or origin, particularly those of Tutsi derivation, were
    publicly humiliated and beaten. Instead of protecting these people, the security
    forces arbitrarily arrested a number of Rwandans, most of them Tutsis. With the
    cooperation of the people, they also looted and seized many of their homes. The
    victims were arrested and detained at various detention sites, including the Service
    d’action et de renseignements militaires (SARM) building in the Ngaliema
    commune, the Service national d’intelligence et de protection (SNIP) building
    opposite the Primature in the Gombe commune and the Tshatshi camp. The
    detention conditions themselves led to large numbers of deaths, as detainees
    received no food or medical care. Many victims were tortured and subjected to
    cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. An unknown number of people were
    executed by the security forces, particularly in the Tshatshi camp. Still more were
    deported to Rwanda and Burundi by the Zairian authorities. Others were forced to
    flee quickly into other countries.177
3. Orientale Province
189. After the start of the First Congo War, and as the AFDL/APR troops advanced
across Orientale Province, the Zairian security services and the people of Kisangani
adopted an increasingly hostile attitude towards the Rwandans and peoples of Rwandan
origin, especially Tutsis, who they systematically accused of being in collusion with
AFDL/APR.
  • From October 1996, the Zairian security services and civilians arbitrarily arrested
    several dozen civilians of Rwandan nationality or origin, as well as people
    resembling them, in the town of Kisangani and the surrounding area. They killed
    an unknown number of these people; at least one person was killed in public.
    Most of the victims were detained until the capture of Kisangani town by
    AFDL/APR troops, and several of them were tortured.178
_______________
177 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, April and May 2009; Report of the Special Rapporteur on
the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6); AI, “Zaire/Rwanda: Disappearances/Fear for
Safety”, 1996; AI, “Zaïre-Violentes persécutions perpétrées par l’État et les groupes armés”, 1996.
178 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, February to April 2009, North Kivu, March
2009.

B. Attacks against Hutu refugees
190. After moving into North and South Kivu in July 1994, the ex-FAR/Interahamwe
used the refugee camps along the Rwanda and Burundi borders as bases and training
camps. Using the decades-old strategic alliance with President Mobutu and the
widespread corruption within the FAZ to their advantage, the ex-FAR bought back or
recovered the military equipment confiscated on their arrival in Zaire and resumed war
against the army of the Front patriotique rwandais, which was now the national army of
Rwanda, the Armée patriotique rwandaise (APR).
191. In response to the mounting tension between Zaire and Rwanda, several countries
suggested moving the refugee camps away from the border. Some also recommended that
an international peacekeeping force be deployed and that negotiations be opened in the
region. However, due to a lack of adequate funding, political willpower and a suitable
strategy for separating combatants from refugees, the camps were not moved and the ex-
FAR and Interahamwe units continued to rearm themselves with a view to recapturing
Kigali by force. On account of the presence of many génocidaires among the ex-FAR,
the growing diplomatic isolation of President Mobutu and the refusal of the new
Rwandan authorities to open negotiations, no political settlement was reached and ex-
FAR/Interahamwe attacks in Rwanda became more common, as did the incursions of the
APR into the Zairian territory. From August 1996, Banyamulenge/Tutsi armed units and
soldiers from the APR and the FAB infiltrated South Kivu. They attacked the FAZ and
the ex-FAR/Interahamwe but also, and above all, the refugee camps, some of which
served as bases for the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and for Burundian Hutu armed groups
(CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL).
192. The entire period was characterised by the relentless pursuit of Hutu refugees and
the ex-FAR/Interahamwe by the AFDL/APR forces across the entire Congolese territory.
The refugees, who were sometimes rounded up and used by the ex-FAR/Interahamwe as
human shields during their flight, then began a long trek across the country from east to
west towards Angola, the Central African Republic or the Republic of the Congo. During
this journey, acts of violence against Zairian civilian populations were common among
refugees and the ex-FAR/Interahamwe, and there were many instances of looting.
The Flight of Refugees (1996-1997)

1. South Kivu
193. After the massacres that occurred in Burundi in late 1993179 and after the FPR
took power in Rwanda in 1994, several hundred thousand Burundian and Rwandan Hutu
refugees, as well as ex-FAR/Interahamwe units and Burundian CNDD-FDD rebels, had
found refuge in the province of South Kivu. In late 1994, ex-FAR/Interahamwe units
stepped up their (sometimes deadly) incursions into Rwanda to take back the power by
force. From 1995 onwards, the Armée patriotique rwandaise (APR) carried out at least
two raids in Zaire to neutralise them.
  • On 11 April 1995, around fifty APR soldiers attacked Birava camp in the Kabare
    territory with heavy weapons, killing around thirty people and seriously injuring
    an unknown number of others. During the attack, the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and
    the refugees did not retaliate. After this incident, the camp’s refugees were
    transferred to the Chimanga and Kashusha camps.180
194. Another incident took place in April 1996 at the Burundian and Rwandan refugee
camp at Runingu in the Uvira territory.
  • In April 1996, Banyamulenge/Tutsi armed units from Burundi killed between
    eight and ten refugees in the Runingu camp in the Uvira territory. The assailants
    then continued their journey towards the Hauts Plateaux and the Moyens
    Plateaux.181
Uvira territory
195. In 1996, UNHCR estimated the number of refugees in the territory of Uvira at
219,466; two thirds of them were of Burundian nationality.182 These refugees were spread
_______________
179 As previously indicated, after the assassination on 21 October 1993 at Bujumbura of the Hutu president
Melchior Ndadaye, inter-ethnic violence broke out in Burundi between the Hutus and the Tutsis. Faced
with the crackdown organised by the Tutsi-dominated Forces armées burundaises (FAB), several tens of
thousands of Hutus took refuge in South Kivu between 1993 and 1995. In their wake, during 1994, the
Burundian Hutu movement Centre national pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD), led by Léonard
Nyangoma, and its armed wing, the Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (FDD), moved into the
territories of Uvira and Fizi.
180 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and South Kivu, January 2009; Report
of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team (S/1998/581), p.57; Witness accounts gathered by the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; Groupe Jérémie, press release “Massacres à Birava”,
13 April 1995.
181 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, October 2008 and April 2009; Report on the situation
of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6), para. 198; Witness statement gathered by the Secretary-
General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; Voice of America, “Rwanda Denies Attack in Zaire”, 14
October 1997; IRIN, “Weekly Roundup of Main Events in the Great Lakes region”, 14–21 October 1996;
CNN, “Zaire Refugee Camps Site of New Ethnic Killing”, 14 October 1997; New York Times, “Refugees
Flee Camp In Zaire After Killings”, 14 October 1997; The Independent, “Hutus flee gun raiders”,
14 October 1997.
182 Office of the Regional Special Envoy of UNHCR, Kigali, Rwanda, Zaire: UNHCR population statistics
as of 26 September 1996.

over the eleven camps located along the Ruzizi River: Runingu, Rwenena, Lubarika,
Kanganiro, Luvungi, Luberizi (between Mutarule and Luberizi), Biriba, Kibogoye,
Kajembo, Kagunga and Kahanda. Although in some camps civilian refugees lived
alongside ex-FAR/Interahamwe units (in Kanganiro camp, for example) or members of
CNDD-FDD (Kibogoye camp), the vast majority of refugees were unarmed civilians.
  • In the night of 13 to 14 October 1996, Banyamulenge/Tutsi armed units attacked
    the Runingu camp with heavy weapons, killing four refugees and injuring seven
    others.183
196. After the AFDL was officially formed on 18 October 1996, Alliance troops,
supported by soldiers from the APR and FAB (Forces armées burundaises) attacked the
village of Bwegera. On 20 October, having taken control of the village, the soldiers were
divided into two columns, the first leaving northwards towards Luvungi and the second
southwards towards Luberizi. As they advanced, AFDL/APR/FAB soldiers carried out
widespread and systematic attacks on the eleven Rwandan and Burundian refugee camps
set up in the territory. Many witnesses have confirmed that these attacks took place
within a few days of the majority of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and CNDD-FDD units
leaving the area.
  • On 20 October 1996, AFDL/APR/FAB units attacked the Itara I and II refugee
    camps near Luvungi village, killing at least 100 Burundian and Rwandan
    refugees. In the neighbouring village of Katala, they captured and killed refugees
    at point-blank range who were trying to flee. The soldiers then forced local people
    to bury the bodies in mass graves.184
  • On 20 October 1996, AFDL/APR/FAB units attacked the Kanganiro camp at
    Luvungi with heavy weapons, killing an unknown number of refugees, including
    around twenty in the camp’s hospital. On the same day, they also killed an
    unknown number of refugees who had been hiding in the homes of Zairian
    civilians at Luvingi. The solders then forced local people to bury the bodies in
    mass graves.185
    _______________
    183 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, October 2008 and April 2009; Report on the situation
    of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6), para. 198; Confidential document submitted in 1997/1998 to the
    Secretary-General’s Investigative Team; Voice of America, “Rwanda Denies Attack in Zaire”, 14 October
    1997; IRIN, “Weekly Roundup of Main Events in the Great Lakes region”, 14–21 October 1996; CNN,
    “Zaire Refugee Camps Site of New Ethnic Killing”, 14 October 1997; New York Times, “Refugees Flee
    Camp In Zaire After Killings”, 14 October 1997; The Independent, “Hutus flee gun raiders”, 14 October
    1997.
    184 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February and April/May 2009; CARITAS, “Tableau
    synoptique relevant les cas des massacres et tueries commis par l’AFDL à l’endroit des réfugiés et
    populations civiles autochtones dans les zones d’Uvira et Fizi du 18 octobre 1996 au 10 avril 1997”;
    Lutheran Church, Rapport d’enquête sur les violations des droits de l’homme à l’est du Congo, May 1997,
    p.9.
    185 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February and April/May 2009; witness accounts
    gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998.

  • On 20 October 1996, when they entered the village of Rubenga, units of the
    AFDL/APR/FAB killed an unknown number of refugees and Zairian civilians
    who were fleeing in the direction of Burundi. The victims’ bodies were then
    dumped in the Ruzizi River.186
  • On 21 October 1996, units of the AFDL/APR/FAB attacked Lubarika camp and
    village, killing an unknown number of Rwandan and Burundian refugees, as well
    as Zairian civilians who were trying to flee the village after the departure of the
    FAZ. The soldiers forced local people to bury the bodies in four large mass
    graves. On the same day, soldiers also burned thirty refugees alive in a house in
    the village of Kakumbukumbu, five kilometres from Lubarika camp.187
  • On 21 October 1996, AFDL/APR/FAB units attacked the Luberizi refugee camp
    between Luberizi and Mutarule with heavy weapons, killing around 370 refugees.
    The soldiers threw the bodies of the victims into the latrines. They also killed
    several dozen people (refugees and Zairians) at the villages of Luberizi and
    Mutarule. After the killings, the bodies of over 60 victims were found in houses in
    the two villages.188
  • On 24 October 1996, AFDL/APR/FAB troops attacked the Kagunga camp, where
    they killed an unknown number of refugees. One direct witness to the attack
    confirmed having seen eight bodies. Soldiers also killed an unknown number of
    refugees trying to escape in the company of Zairians at the village of Hongero,
    one kilometre from Kagunga.189
197. After the capture of the town of Uvira in the night of 24 and 25 October 1996 and
the routing of the FAZ over practically all of Uvira territory, the Burundian and Rwandan
refugees fled in several directions. Some left for the territory of Fizi, then travelled on to
North Katanga, Tanzania or Zambia. Others tried to escape towards the north, passing
through the territories of Kabare and Walungu. Many Burundian refugees fled in the
direction of Burundi. Unable to cross the Ruzizi River, they were often apprehended at
the Kiliba sugar mill and the villages of Ndunda, Ngendo and Mwaba.
_______________
186 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March–April 2009.
187 Interview with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February 2009; witness accounts gathered by the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; CARITAS, “Tableau synoptique relevant les cas des
massacres et tueries commis par l’AFDL à l’endroit des réfugiés et populations civiles autochtones dans les
zones d’Uvira et Fizi du 18 octobre 1996 au 10 avril 1997”, p.2.
188 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009; Report on the situation of human rights in
Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6), para. 198; Confidential documents submitted to the Secretary-General’s
Investigative Team in 1997/1998; CADDHOM (Collectif d’actions pour le développement des droits de
l’homme), “Enquête sur les massacres des réfugiés 1998”, p.3.
189 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009; Report of the Secretary-General’s
Investigative Team (S/1998/581); AI, “Loin des regards de la communauté internationale: violations des
droits de l’homme dans l’est du Zaïre”, 1996, pp.4–5; Peacelink, “Les violations des droits de l’homme par
l’AFDL”, p.3.

  • On 25 October 1996, AFDL/APR/FAB units killed an unknown number of
    refugees who were hiding in disused dwellings in sectors 3 and 4 of the Kiliba
    sugar mill.190
  • Between 1 and 2 November 1996, AFDL/APR/FAB units carried out the
    indiscriminate killing of around 250 civilians, including over 200 refugees and
    around thirty Zairians, in the village of Ndunda, near the Burundian border. The
    refugees were hiding in the village of Ndunda in the hope of securing the
    protection of CNDD-FDD militiamen, who had a base nearby. During the attack,
    a number of refugees drowned in the Ruzizi River as they tried to escape. The
    soldiers also killed Zairians from the village, accusing them of backing the
    CNDD-FDD.191
  • On 24 November 1996, in the village of Mwaba, units of the AFDL/APR/FAB
    burned 24 Burundian Hutu refugees from the Biriba camp alive. On their arrival
    in Mwaba, the soldiers arrested those present in the village. After questioning
    them, they freed the Zairian civilians and imprisoned the Burundian refugees in a
    house which they then set on fire.192
198. AFDL/APR/FAB soldiers set up a number of checkpoints on the Ruzizi Plain
around the villages of Bwegera, Sange, Luberizi and Kiliba, at the entrance to Uvira town
(Kalundu Port), at Makobola II (Fizi territory) and at the Rushima ravine (Uvira
territory). At these checkpoints, soldiers sorted the people they intercepted according to
their nationality, under the pretext of preparing for their return to their country of origin.
Individuals identified as Rwandan or Burundian Hutus on the basis of their accent, their
morphology or their dress were systematically separated from the other intercepted
people and killed in the surrounding area.
  • On 22 October 1996, in the Rushima ravine between Bwegera and Luberizi, units
    of the AFDL/APR/FAB killed a group of nearly 550 Rwandan Hutu refugees who
    had escaped the Luberizi and Rwenena camps a few days before. Soldiers
    intercepted the victims at the checkpoints set up in the surrounding area. Between
    27 October and 1 November 1996, under the pretext of repatriating them to
_______________
190 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, May 2009.
191 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April/May 2009; Report of the Secretary-General’s
Investigative Team (S/1998/581); CARITAS, “Tableau synoptique relevant les cas des massacres et tueries
commis par l’AFDL à l’endroit des réfugiés et populations civiles autochtones dans les zones d’Uvira et
Fizi du 18 octobre 1996 au 10 avril 1997”, p.2.
192 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, October 2008 and April 2009. CARITAS, “Tableau
synoptique relevant les cas des massacres et tueries commis par l’AFDL à l’endroit des réfugiés et
populations civiles autochtones dans les zones d’Uvira et Fizi du 18 octobre 1996 au 10 avril 1997”, p.

Rwanda, units of the AFDL/APR/FAB led an unknown number of additional
refugees into the Rushima ravine and executed them.193
  • In the days and weeks that followed 25 October 1996, units of the
    AFDL/APR/FAB killed an unknown number of refugees at a place called
    Kahororo, in sector 7 of the Kiliba sugar mill. The victims had been apprehended
    in the surrounding villages.194
  • On 29 October 1996, units of the AFDL/APR/FAB killed around 220 male
    refugees near the church of the 8th CEPZA (Pentecostal Community of Zaire),
    now CEPAC (Community of Pentecostal Churches in Central Africa), in the
    village of Luberizi. The victims were part of a group of refugees who were told by
    soldiers that they had to be rounded up for their repatriation to Rwanda. The
    soldiers separated the men from the rest of the group and shot them or killed them
    with bayonets. The bodies of the victims were buried in mass graves near the
    church.195
  • On 3 November 1996, units of the AFDL/APR/FAB burned 72 Rwandan refugees
    alive at the COTONCO headquarters, one kilometre from the village of Bwegera.
    The victims had been captured in neighbouring villages. The AFDL/APR/FAB
    units had gathered the victims in the COTONCO house under the pretext that they
    would then be repatriated to Rwanda.196
  • On 13 November 1996, AFDL/APR/FAB units killed around 100 Burundian
    refugees in the village of Ngendo, seven kilometres from Sange in the Uvira
    territory.197
  • On 8 December 1996, AFDL/APR/FAB soldiers killed 13 male refugees in the
    village of Rukogero, nine kilometres from Sange in the Uvira territory. The
    victims belonged to a group of between 200 and 300 refugees that had fled the
    Kibogoye camp. After their arrest, the refugees were imprisoned in the church of
    the 8th CEPZA. The soldiers allowed the women and girls to leave but killed the
_______________
193 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009; Report of the Secretary-General’s
Investigative Team (S/1998/581); Lutheran Church, Rapport d'enquête sur les violations des droits de
l’homme à l’est du Congo, May 1997, p.8.
194 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April/May 2009.
195 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April/May 2009; witness account gathered by the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998.
196 Interview with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March-April 2009; CARITAS, “Tableau synoptique
relevant les cas des massacres et tueries commis par l’AFDL à l’endroit des réfugiés et populations civiles
autochtones dans les zones d’Uvira et Fizi du 18 octobre 1996 au 10 avril 1997”, p.2; Association contre la
malnutrition et pour l’encadrement de la jeunesse (ACMEJ), Report 2009, p.5.
197 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998.

men and boys. The bodies of the victims were thrown in the latrines beside the
church.198
  • On 12 December 1996, AFDL/APR/FAB units killed fifteen civilians in the
    village of Ruzia, including refugees who had fled the Luberizi/Mutarule camp and
    Zairian civilians. The victims were captured during a military combing exercise to
    flush out refugees hiding among the Zairian population. Some of the victims were
    burned alive in a house; others were shot. The victims’ bodies were then buried in
    three mass graves.199
  • On 22 December 1996 at Ruzia, on the banks of the Ruzizi River,
    AFDL/APR/FAB soldiers killed at least 150 people, most of them refugees who
    had survived the attack on the Runingu camp. The victims were hiding in the
    forest when they were spotted by the soldiers. Their bodies were burned by the
    soldiers two days after the incident. Another source suggested a figure of 600
    victims.200
Walungu and Kabare territories
199. In 1996, UNHCR estimated that there were 307,499 refugees spread over the 26
camps in the territories of Walungu, Kabare and Kalehe, commonly known as the
“Bukavu camps”: Kamanyola, Izirangabo, Karabangira, Nyangezi (Mulwa), Nyantende,
Muku and Mushweshwe to the south of Bukavu, Bideka, Chimanga (Burhale), Bulonge
(non-UNHCR-recognised), Nyamirangwe and Chabarhabe to the west of the town, Panzi,
Nyakavogo, Mudaka/Murhala, INERA (Congolese Institute for Agronomic Studies and
Research), ADI-Kivu (Action for Integrated Development in Kivu), Kashusha, Katana,
Kalehe and Kabira north of Bukavu and Chondo, Chayo, Bugarula, Maugwere and
Karama on Idjwi Island.201
200. As they advanced towards Bukavu, the AFDL/APR troops destroyed the
makeshift camps created by refugee survivors of the massacres committed in the Ruzizi
Plain (in the Uvira territory) and to the west of Bukavu city. When they left Nyantende
village, the AFDL/APR troops split into two groups. The first group continued in the
direction of Bukavu, passing through Buhanga, Mushweshwe, Comuhini, Chabarhabe,
_______________
198 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009; CARITAS, “Tableau synoptique relevant
les cas des massacres et tueries commis par l’AFDL à l’endroit des réfugiés et populations civiles
autochtones dans les zones d’Uvira et Fizi du 18 octobre 1996 au 10 avril 1997”, p.3.
199 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, October 2008 and April 2009; CARITAS, “Tableau
synoptique relevant les cas des massacres et tueries commis par l’AFDL à l’endroit des réfugiés et
populations civiles autochtones dans les zones d’Uvira et Fizi du 18 octobre 1996 au 10 avril 1997”, p.3.
200 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, October 2008 and April 2009; CARITAS, “Tableau
synoptique relevant les cas des massacres et tueries commis par l’AFDL à l’endroit des réfugiés et
populations civiles autochtones dans les zones d’Uvira et Fizi du 18 octobre 1996 au 10 avril 1997”, p.2.
201 Office of the Regional Special Envoy of UNHCR, Kigali, Rwanda, Zaire: “UNHCR population statistics
as of 26 September 1996

Ciriri and Lwakabirhi. The second group headed towards Walungu-Centre via Muku,
Cidaho and Cidodobo.
  • On 20 October 1996, units of the AFDL/APR from Bwegera and the Rwandan
    town of Bugarama attacked the Kamanyola refugee camp in the Walungu
    territory, killing an unknown number of refugees and Zairian civilians. The
    soldiers then dumped the bodies of the victims in the camp’s latrines.202
  • On 21 October 1996, AFDL/APR units killed an unknown number of refugees at
    Nyarubale in the Kalunga hills, two kilometres from Kamanyola. Having escaped
    the attack on their camp at Kamanyola, the refugees were trying to reach Bukavu.
    Some were the victims of surprise attacks while they were resting and others were
    intercepted by soldiers at checkpoints set up along the roads. Those answering the
    soldiers’ Swahili greetings with a Rwandan or Burundian accent were
    systematically executed. The victims’ bodies were later buried by the local
    people.203
201. From 22 October 1996, in the face of the advancing AFDL/APR troops, refugees
from the Nyangezi and Nyantende camps began to flee towards Bukavu. From 26
October 1996 onwards, the soldiers launched attacks on the camps to the south and west
of Bukavu city. In most cases, the refugees had already left the camps before the soldiers
arrived, fleeing towards the Kashusha, INERA and ADI-Kivu camps (north of Bukavu)
and the Chimanga camp (west of Bukavu in the direction of Shabunda). On 26 October,
AFDL/APR soldiers set fire to the already abandoned camp of Muku, ten kilometres from
Bukavu in the Walungu territory.
  • On 26 October 1996, units of the AFDL/APR killed several hundred refugees
    who were fleeing along the routes between Nyantende and Walungu-Centre and
    Nyantende and Bukavu. Most of the victims came from the Uvira territory and the
    Ruzizi Plain. They were shot, killed by blows from bayonets or hit by shrapnel.
    The soldiers set fire to most of the sites where refugees were located. Most of the
    victims were women, children and the elderly. According to the witness
    statements gathered, the soldiers killed between 200 and 600 people. The bodies
    of the victims were buried at the scene by the local people.204
_______________
202 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009; confidential documents submitted to the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; Lutheran Church, “Rapport d’enquête sur les
violations des droits de l’homme à l’est du Congo”, May 1997, p.8.
203 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February 2009 and April 2009; Report of the Secretary-
General’s Investigative Team (S/1998/581).
204 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, December 2008 and March 2009; witness accounts
gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; CADDHOM, “Les atrocités
commises en province du Kivu 1996-1998”, p.5; Palermo-Bukavu Solidarity Committee, “Les morts de la
libération”, June 1997, pp.5–6.

  • On 28 October 1996, units of the AFDL/APR from Nyangezi killed five refugees
    in the village of Lwakabiri, thirty kilometres west of Bukavu.205
202. After the capture of Bukavu on 29 October 1996, AFDL/APR troops continued
their operations against the camps located north of the city.
  • On 2 November 1996, AFDL/APR units attacked the Kashusha/INERA camp in
    the Kabare territory with heavy weapons, killing hundreds of refugees.
    Outflanked, FAZ troops from the camp security contingent CZSC (Contingent
    zaïrois pour la sécurité des camps)206 fled, followed by some of the refugees.
    During the attack, AFDL/APR soldiers fired indiscriminately at the FAZ, the ex-
    FAR/Interahamwe and the refugees.207
  • Around 22 November 1996, units of the AFDL/APR killed several hundred
    refugees in the Chimanga camp, seventy-one kilometres west of Bukavu. When
    they arrived at the camp, the soldiers asked the refugees to assemble for a
    meeting. The soldiers then promised them that they would slaughter a cow and
    give them meat so they could build their strength with a view to returning to
    better conditions in Rwanda. They then began to register the refugees, grouping
    them according to their prefecture of origin. At a given moment, however, a
    whistle sounded and the soldiers positioned all around the camp opened fire on
    the refugees. According to the different sources, between 500 and 800 refugees
    were killed in this way.208
  • In January 1997, AFDL/APR units killed at least thirty Rwandan and Burundian
    refugees, mostly with knives, on the Bukavu to Walungu road, around sixteen
    kilometres from the city of Bukavu. The victims had been arrested as part of a
    combing operation. Before killing the victims, the soldiers often tortured and
    maimed them.209
_______________
205 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, May 2009; list of those killed in the parish of Ciriri
from 1996 to 2008 by different armed groups, submitted to the Mapping Team in 2009.
206 Since 1995, this unit had been financed by UNHCR to guarantee the protection of its facilities.
207 Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team (S/1998/581); confidential documents submitted to
the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; HRW (HRW), “Zaire: Attacked by All Sides.
Civilians and the War in Eastern Zaire”, 1997, p.13; CADDHOM, “Les atrocités commises en province du
Kivu 1996-1998”, p.5; ICHRDD & ASADHO (International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic
Development & Association africaine de défense des droits de l’homme), International Non-Governmental
Commission of Inquiry into the Massive Violations of Human Rights Committed in the DRC - Former Zaïre
- 1996-1997, 1998, p.14.
208 Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team (S/1998/581); Witness accounts gathered by the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; Ospiti/Peacelink, “Les violations des droits de
l’homme dans le territoire contrôlé par l’AFDL”, undated, p.3.
209 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009; The Guardian, “Truth buried in Congo’s
killing fields”, 19 July 1997, p.2.

Kalehe territory
 

203. After the capture of Bukavu by the AFDL/APR troops and the destruction of the
refugee camps north of the town, the survivors fled in the direction of North Kivu. They
either passed through Kahuzi-Biega National Park (towards Bunyakiri/Hombo) or
Nyabibwe, on the Goma road. However, the refugees who travelled via Nyabibwe were
caught between AFDL/APR troops arriving from Goma and Bukavu, and did not reach
North Kivu.
  • Towards mid-November 1996, ex-FAR/Interahamwe units killed an unknown
    number of refugees in Nyabibwe village. Most of the victims were sick, elderly or
    physically disabled people who no longer had the strength to escape. The ex-
    FAR/Interahamwe killed them by firing rockets at the house and the containers in
    which some of them were shut away. Others were burned alive when the vehicles
    they were in were set on fire. Some of these victims are alleged to have asked to
    be killed for fear of falling into the hands of the AFDL/APR. However, the
    Mapping Team was not able to confirm this claim.210
204. Most of the refugees who were trapped at Nyabibwe tried to reach Bunyakiri and
Hombo via the Hauts Plateaux of Kalehe. One group moved into the makeshift camps at
Shanje and Numbi. Pursued by the AFDL/APR soldiers, many refugees were killed in
these makeshift camps and at Chebumba and Lumbishi in the Kalehe territory.
  • On 21 November 1996, units of the AFDL/APR killed several hundred refugees
    and injured hundreds more in their makeshift camp at Shanje and in and around
    the Rukiga bamboo forest in the Kalehe territory. Some of the victims were shot,
    or killed by shrapnel or rockets. Others, including many elderly people, the sick
    and children, were killed along the roadside. This second group of victims were
    the survivors of the attack on the camp. The soldiers, who had asked them to
    assemble and march as a column towards Rwanda, opened fire on them along the
    way.211
  • On 22 November 1996, AFDL/APR units killed an unknown number of refugee
    survivors from the Shanje camp at Lumbishi.212
_______________
210 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March–April 2009; The Guardian, “Truth buried in
Congo’s killing fields”, 19 July 1997, p.2.
211 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998;
Ospiti/Peacelink, “Les violations des droits de l’homme dans le territoire contrôlé par l’AFDL”, undated,
p.4; New York Times, “Refugees Tell of Youths Killed on March Back to Rwanda”, 30 November 1996;
Benoit Rugumaho, L’hécatombe des réfugiés rwandais dans l’ex-Zaïre, témoignage d’un survivant,
L’Harmattan, 2004, p.7.
212 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; ICHRDD &
ASADHO, International Non-Governmental Commission of Inquiry into the Massive Violations of Human
Rights Committed in the DRC - Former Zaïre - 1996-1997, 1998, pp.14–15, 27, 51.

205. Most of the Shanje survivors fled via the Rukiga bamboo forest. At the village of
Hombo, they joined the survivors of the Kashusha/INERA camp, who were trying to
reach North Kivu by travelling through the Kahuzi-Biega National Park.
  • Around 2 November and 4 November 1996, in the Kahuzi-Biega National Park,
    AFDL/APR units killed an unknown number of refugees.
Shabunda territory
206. Many refugee survivors of the Uvira and Bukavu camps tried to escape via the
Shabunda territory. These refugees took the old Bukavu to Kindu road, passing through
the villages of Chimanga, Kingulube, Katshungu and Shabunda, 71, 181, 285 and 337
kilometres east of Bukavu respectively. Around mid-December 1996, 38,000 refugees
were registered in three makeshift camps around Shabunda: Makese I, Makese II and
Kabakita (also known as Kabakita I, Kabakita II and Kabakita III). An unknown number
of these refugees, often those falling behind, were killed by AFDL/APR soldiers on the
Shabunda road. Massacres were reported in the villages of Mukenge, Baliga and
Kigulube in January 1997. In the region, there were some sporadic clashes between
AFDL/APR soldiers, the FAZ and ex-FAR/Interahamwe soldiers beating their retreat.
The victims of the AFDL/APR units were for the most part unarmed civilians.213
  • On 5 February 1997, AFDL/APR units killed around 500 refugees at the metal
    bridge over the Ulindi River at Shabunda, nine kilometres from Shabunda-Centre.
    Most of the victims were refugees who had fled the Kabakita I, II and III camps
    when the soldiers approached. After the massacre, villagers were made to dump
    the bodies in the river and clean the bridge. The soldiers forcefully led away the
    survivors in the direction of Kabatika and executed them the following day.214
207. The refugees who managed to escape in time headed in the direction of Kindu.
Others, after hearing that UNHCR had opened a branch at Kigulube, headed towards
Bukavu. Several thousand refugees went this way, moving through the forest in small
groups of 50 to 100 people. Since January 1997, AFDL/APR soldiers had controlled the
zone and had set up many checkpoints along the major routes. Between February and
April 1997, AFDL/APR units systematically killed refugees travelling through the village
of Kigulube and the surrounding forest, and on the 156 kilometres of road between
Kigulube and the town of Shabunda.
_______________
213 IRIN, “Emergency Update No. 60 on the Great Lakes”, 17 December 1996.
214 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009; Report of the Secretary-General’s
Investigative Team (S/1998/581); confidential documents submitted to the Secretary-General’s Investigative
Team in 1997/1998; CADDHOM, “Les atrocités commises en province du Kivu 1996-1998”, p.8;
MSF, ”L’échappée forcée: une stratégie brutale d’élimination à l'est du Zaïre”, April 1997, pp.8–10; K.
Emizet, “The Massacre of Refugees in Congo: a Case of UN Peacekeeping Failure and International Law”,
The Journal of Modern African Studies, 38, 2, 2000, p.12; ICHRDD & ASADHO, International Non-
Governmental Commission of Inquiry into the Massive Violations of Human Rights Committed in the DRC
- Former Zaïre - 1996-1997, 1998, p.16.

208. When they intercepted refugees at Kigulube, the AFDL/APR soldiers usually
asked them to follow them under various pretexts, in particular helping them push their
vehicle to Mpwe. Along the way, they killed them with machete blows or knives. Despite
orders given to villagers to recover the bodies of the refugees, international NGOs and
local witnesses observed many corpses and skeletons on the roads around Kigulube, as
well as personal effects that belonged to the refugees. On several occasions, international
NGO personnel witnessed the clean-up operations between Shabunda and Kigulube and
observed the presence of mass graves around graveyards in several villages and at several
remote sites along the roadside. The total number of victims is hard to ascertain but runs
to several hundred, and could even exceed one thousand.215
  • In the evening of 13 February 1997, units of the AFDL/APR killed between 70
    and 180 refugees with machetes in the town of Mpwe, on the road leading to
    Kigulube village. After gathering the refugees together, the soldiers told them that
    they had come to sort out the “problem” that existed between the Hutus and Tutsis
    in Rwanda. They then suggested to the refugees that they rest and eat to build
    their strength before continuing their journey to Kigulube. Lastly, they led them in
    small groups into a house where they killed them. Those who tried to escape
    before they were led into the house were shot dead. The bodies of the victims
    were for the most part buried in a mass grave behind the house.216
  • On 15 February 1997, AFDL/APR units killed around 200 refugees at two sites,
    four and seven kilometres from Kigulube. In one particular incident, a group of
    around sixty refugees were imprisoned in a house which was then set on fire by
    the soldiers. The victims’ bodies were thrown into mass graves.217
  • On 30 March 1997 and in the days that followed, AFDL/APR units killed several
    hundred refugees in the presence of a number of senior APR officials between
    Katshungu and Shabunda in the towns of Ivela, Balika, Lulingu and Keisha, and
    at the Ulindi bridge. The victims, including a large number of women and
    children, were mostly survivors from the Chimanga camp who had found refuge
    in Katshungu, a town fifty-four kilometres north-west of Shabunda. The massacre
    zone remained officially inaccessible to aid agencies for a number of days but
    these organisations were nonetheless able to observe cleanup operations and the
_______________
215 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; MSF,
“L’échappée forcée: une stratégie brutale d’élimination à l’est du Zaïre”, April 1997, pp.8–10.
216 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, January and March 2009; confidential documents
submitted to the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese
forests”, 1997, p.2; ICHRDD & ASADHO, “International Non-Governmental Commission of Inquiry into
the Massive Violations of Human Rights Committed in the DRC - Former Zaïre - 1996-1997”, 1998, p.16.
217 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008, and South Kivu, January and March
2009; Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998 (S/1998/581); CADDHOM,
“Enquête sur les massacres des réfugiés 1998”, p.3; MSF, ”L’échappée forcée: une stratégie brutale
d’élimination à l’est du Zaïre”, April 1997, pp.8–10; Sunday Times, “Kabila’s death squads”, 22 June 1997.

presence along the road of human remains and personal effects that belonged to
the refugees. 218
  • In the first three months of 1997, many refugees died of exhaustion and hunger
    during their journey between Kigulube and Shabunda. In danger of being killed at
    any moment, those in these groups, who were unfamiliar with their surroundings
    and undernourished, received no humanitarian aid. Having blocked aid agencies
    from operating outside a 30-kilometre radius of Bukavu, AFDL/APR officials
    established the condition that AFDL facilitators must accompany all their
    missions. According to several witnesses, these facilitators took advantage of their
    presence alongside the aid workers to supply AFDL/APR soldiers with
    information about the whereabouts and the movements of refugees. In this way,
    the soldiers were able to kill the refugees before they could be recovered and
    repatriated. During the same period, AFDL/APR soldiers officially barred Zairian
    civilians living in the region from giving assistance to refugees. Under this
    restriction, soldiers killed an unknown number of Zairians who had directly
    assisted refugees or collaborated with international NGOs and UN organisations
    to locate them and bring them assistance. The total number of refugees who died
    of hunger, exhaustion or disease in this part of South Kivu is impossible to
    establish but is probably in the region of several hundred, or even several
    thousand.219
209. The murders and serious violations of human rights carried out against Rwandan
and Burundian refugees continued well after the military conquest of the province by the
AFDL/APR/FAB troops.
  • Between 26 April and 29 April 1997, AFDL/APR units kidnapped, arbitrarily
    detained and tortured around fifty Rwandan Hutu minors and nine adult refugees
    near Kavumu Airport, in the Kabare territory. The victims were kidnapped from
    the Lwiro processing centre for child refugees on 26 April, between the hours of
    4am and 5am. They were tortured and then transported by bus to Kavumu
    Airport, where they were placed in a container, tortured further and submitted to
    cruel, inhuman and degrading acts. The soldiers also beat the medical staff at the
    Lwiro centre on the grounds that they had agreed to treat refugees. On 29 April,
    after strong international pressure, the victims were handed over to UNHCR. The
_______________
218 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009; witness accounts gathered by the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997,
p.5; ICHRDD & ASADHO, International Non-Governmental Commission of Inquiry into the Massive
Violations of Human Rights Committed in the DRC - Former Zaïre - 1996-1997, 1998, p.16.
219 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; MSF,
“L’échappée forcée: une stratégie brutale d’élimination à l’est du Zaïre”, April 1997, pp.8–10.

victims reported that there were many other containers at the airport and that they
were used by soldiers to torture refugees.220
2. North Kivu
Attacks against refugees in camps on the Goma to Rutshuru road
210. In October 1996, UNHCR estimated that there were 717,991 Rwandan refugees
in the province of North Kivu. Most were living in the five camps located around the city
of Goma. The Kibumba (194,986), Katale (202,566) and Kahindo (112,875) camps were
located on the Rutshuru road, north of Goma. The Mugunga (156,115) and Lac Vert
(49,449) camps were located on the Sake road, less than ten kilometres west of Goma.221
Although the vast majority of the refugees were unarmed civilians, these camps also
functioned as bases from which ex-FAR soldiers (of which there were many in the Lac
Vert camp) and Interahamwe militiamen (especially in the Katale camp) could lead
frequent incursions into Rwandan territory.222
211. As in South Kivu, infiltrated units from Rwanda attacked the refugee camps on
the Rutshuru road on several occasions, even before the hostilities officially began.
  • On the evening of 27 June 1996, an infiltrated group from Rwanda killed three
    refugees, two soldiers from the CZSC (Contingent zaïrois pour la sécurité des
    camps)223 and three Red Cross wardens during an attack on the Kibumba refugee
    camp in the Nyiragongo territory.224
212. From mid-October 1996 onwards, infiltrations from Rwanda intensified and
AFDL/APR soldiers began to fire sporadically at the three camps along the Goma to
Rutshuru road, with heavy and light weapons.225 The Kibumba camp, twenty-five
kilometres north of Goma, was the first to fall.
  • In the night of 25 October to 26 October 1996, AFDL/APR soldiers bombarded
    the Kibumba camp with heavy weapons, killing an unknown number of refugees
_______________
220 Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team (S/1998/581); witness accounts gathered by the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; IRIN, “Emergency Update No.159 on the Great
Lakes”, 26–28 April 1997; MSF, “L’échappée forcée: une stratégie brutale d’élimination à l’est du Zaïre”,
April 1997, p.10.
221 Office of the Regional Special Envoy of UNHCR, Kigali, Rwanda, Zaire: “UNHCR population statistics
as of 26 September 1996”.
222 Degni-Ségui estimated the number of ex-FAR units in the Zairian camps at 16,000; see Report on the
situation of human rights in Rwanda submitted by René Degni-Ségui, Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights (E/CN.4/1995/12).
223 Since 1995, this unit had been financed by UNHCR to guarantee the protection of its facilities.
224 Witness account gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; IRIN, “Weekly
roundup of main events in the Great Lakes Region”, 23–30 June 1996.
225 Reuters, “UN: East Zaire Troubles Spread”, 21 October 1996.

and destroying the camp’s hospital. Around 194,000 refugees fled Kibumba and
headed towards the Mugunga camp.226
213. The Katale camp was also attacked in the night of 25 October to 26 October 1996
by the AFDL/APR, but FAZ/CZSC soldiers and ex-FAR/Interahamwe units drove back
the attackers.
  • On 26 October 1996, AFDL/APR soldiers attacked the Katale camp with heavy
    weapons, killing several dozen refugees and a Zairian soldier from the CZSC
    (Contingent zaïrois pour la sécurité des camps). They also killed an unknown
    number of refugees with cold weapons.227
214. After violent clashes with FAZ soldiers and ex-FAR/Interahamwe units from the
Katale refugee camp who had come in as reinforcements, the AFDL/APR soldiers took
control of the FAZ military camp at Rumangabo, between Goma and Rutshuru, close to
the Rwandan border. On 30 October, most of the refugees in the Katale and Kahindo
camps, which were close to the military camp, began to leave. As the AFDL/APR troops
had cut off the road to Goma, some of the refugees headed in the direction of Masisi via
Tongo, while others set about reaching the Mugunga camp through the Virunga National
Park.228 Other refugees remained in the camps.
  • On 31 October 1996, AFDL/APR soldiers killed several hundred refugees who
    were still in the Kahindo and Katale camps. The Special Rapporteur on the
    question of the violation of human rights in Zaire, Roberto Garretón, who visited
    the scene several months later, estimated that there were 143 victims at the Katale
    camp and between 100 and 200 victims at the Kahindo camp.229
215. In the first week after the AFDL/APR soldiers’ offensive in North Kivu, a small
number of refugees decided to return to Rwanda. According to UNHCR, around 900
refugees crossed the border at Mutura between 26 October and 31 October 1996.230 The
physical and psychological pressures to which the refugees were subjected by the ex-
_______________
226 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008; Report of the Secretary-General’s
Investigative Team (S/1998/581); Organisation interafricaine des juristes (OIJ), “Recueil de témoignages
sur les crimes commis dans l’ex-Zaïre depuis octobre 1996”, September 1997, pp.5–6; Reuters, “Human
Tide of Refugees on the Move in Zaire”, 27 October 1996; Reuters, “Aid Agencies Scramble to Help
500,000 in Zaire”, 28 October 1996; Voice of America, “Background Report”, 27 October 1996.
227 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; HRW, “Zaire:
Attacked by All Sides. Civilians and the War in Eastern Zaire”, 10 March 1997, pp.12–15; OIJ, “Recueil de
Témoignages sur les crimes commis dans l’ex-Zaïre depuis octobre 1996”, September 1997, pp.11–12;
AFP, “Un soldat zaïrois tué et trois blessés dans l’attaque du camp de Katale, selon le HCR”, 27 October
1996.
228 Reuters, “UN says 115,000 refugees flee camp in Zaire”, 31 October 1996.
229 Report on the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2), para. 11; confidential
documents submitted to the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; OIJ, “Recueil de
témoignages sur les crimes commis dans l’ex-Zaïre depuis octobre 1996”, September 1997, p.12.
230 IRIN, “Emergency Update No. 1 on Kivu, Zaire”, 30 October 1996.

FAR/Interahamwe partly explains their reluctance to re-enter Rwanda. However, their
refusal to return was also tied to the risks the refugees ran when they volunteered
themselves to the AFDL/APR soldiers for their repatriation. Indeed, the Mapping Team
can confirm that on several occasions the AFDL/APR soldiers deliberately killed
refugees who had requested their help to return to the country.
216. It was impossible to determine the number of refugees killed by AFDL/APR
soldiers in the attacks on the camps along the Goma to Rutshuru road. Figures released
by the Équipe d’urgence de la biodiversité (EUB), a local NGO which assisted in the
burial of the victims’ bodies to prevent possible epidemics in the region, along with the
Association des volontaires du Zaïre (ASVOZA) and the Zairian Red Cross, nonetheless
provide an idea of the scale of the killings.
  • From 2 November to 30 November 1996, the people of Kibumba buried 2,087
    bodies. Between 30 November 1996 and 26 January 1997, EUB buried 1,919
    bodies in and around the Kibumba camp.231
  • Between 1 December and 25 December 1996, EUB buried 281 bodies in the
    Kahindo camp. Some of the bodies were found in the public latrines. Many of
    the victims’ hands were bound.232
  • Between 1 December 1996 and 18 January 1997, EUB buried 970 bodies in
    the Katale camp. Many bodies were found in the public latrines.233
217. By 1 November 1996, all of the refugee camps between Goma and Rutshuru had
been dismantled. The survivors of Kibumba found themselves near the Mugunga camp.
The survivors of Kahindo and Katale were scattered across the Virunga National Park. As
they tried to escape the AFDL/APR interception teams sent into the Virunga National
Park, many refugees wandered into the forest for weeks on end and died of thirst due to
the lack of drinking water in the lava field that covered the Park at this point.
  • In November 1996, AFDL/APR soldiers killed an unknown number of survivors
    from the Kahindo and Katale camps at checkpoints set up between the Mount
    Nyiragongo volcano and the Mugunga camp. The survivors of Kahindo and
    Katale who survived this pursuit were the first to report that the AFDL/APR
    troops sorted the refugees they arrested at the exit of the Park according to their
    age and their sex and systematically executed the adult males.234
_______________
231 Équipe d’urgence de la biodiversité (EUB), Rapport final des activités de ramassage & inhumation de
corps, February 1997.
232 Ibid.
233 Ibid.
234 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; OIJ, “Recueil
de témoignages sur les crimes commis dans l’ex-Zaïre depuis octobre 1996”, September 1997, pp.7–8.

  • In November and December 1996, AFDL/APR units killed an unknown number
    of refugees who had resettled in makeshift camps in the Virunga National Park.235
218. The killings around the former camps of Katale, Kahindo and Kibumba and in the
Virunga National Park continued for several months.236 In February 1997, one witness
recounted how bodies of the recently deceased were found each morning by the local
people on the site of the former Kibumba refugee camp.237
  • On 11 April 1997, AFDL/APR soldiers killed several hundred refugees at a place
    called Mwaro, in the forest near the village of Kibumba. The victims, who were
    trying to return to Rwanda, had been intercepted on 9 April by AFDL/APR
    soldiers near the village of Kibumba. They were imprisoned in a mosque not far
    from the Kibumba Institute and in a former farm building, and then killed by the
    soldiers.238
Attacks against refugees in the Mugunga and Lac Vert camps
219. After the fall of the FAZ military camp in Rumangabo on 29 October,
AFDL/APR soldiers launched an attack on Goma and took control of the town on 1
November 1996. For several days, the ex-FAR/Interahamwe from the Mugunga and Lac
Vert camps and Mayi-Mayi armed groups from Sake blockaded the AFDL/APR soldiers
seven kilometres from the Mugunga camp. Some of the refugees took advantage of this
situation to leave the camps and move towards the town of Sake. On 12 November,
however, after entering into an alliance with the local Mayi-Mayi, the AFDL/APR
soldiers took control of the hills around Sake and surrounded the refugees who were
gathered between the Mugunga camp and the town.
  • On 14 November 1996, AFDL/APR soldiers fired indiscriminately with heavy
    weapons at the Mugunga camp and the surrounding area for six hours, killing an
    unknown number of refugees.239
_______________
235 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009; OIJ, “Recueil de témoignages sur les
crimes commis dans l’ex-Zaïre depuis octobre 1996, September 1997”; HRW, “Zaire: Attacked by All
Sides. Civilians and the War in Eastern Zaire”, 10 March 1997, pp.12–15.
236 Report on the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2), pp.7 and 8; OIJ, “Recueil de
témoignages sur les crimes commis dans l’ex-Zaïre depuis octobre 1996”, September 1997, pp.12–13.
237 Colette Braeckman, ”Ces cadavres dans le sillage des rebelles”, Le Soir, 26 February 1997.
238 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009; confidential documents submitted to
the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998.
239 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008; Report of the Secretary-General’s
Investigative Team (S/1998/581); OIJ, “Recueil de témoignages sur les crimes commis dans l’ex-Zaïre
depuis octobre 1996”, September 1997, p.6; APREDECI (Action paysanne pour la reconstruction et le
développement communautaire intégral), Rapport circonstanciel: novembre 1996 et ses événements, 1996,
p.8.

220. In the afternoon of 14 November, after violent clashes with the Mayi-Mayi at
Sake, the ex-FAR/Interahamwe in the Mugunga camp broke through the cordon and fled
in the direction of Masisi, taking many refugees with them.
  • Around 14 November to 15 November 1996, the AFDL/APR soldiers positioned
    in the hills around Sake killed a large number of refugees who were attempting to
    flee in the direction of Masisi, firing at them indiscriminately with heavy weapons
    and machine guns. Hundreds of bodies of refugees were buried in a mass grave on
    the Madimba coffee plantation near Sake.240
221. On 15 November 1996, while the Security Council was giving the green light to
the deployment of a multinational force in eastern Zaire, AFDL/APR soldiers entered the
Mugunga camp and ordered the refugees still present in the camp to return to Rwanda.241
Between 15 November and 19 November 1996, several hundred thousand refugees left
the Mugunga and Lac Vert camps and returned to Rwanda.242
  • On 15 November 1996, AFDL/APR units deliberately killed refugees in and
    around the Mugunga camp. A journalist who entered the camp on 16 November
    counted 40 victims who were shot dead or killed with cold weapons, including
    women, children and two babies.243 An unknown number of refugees were killed
    between Mugunga and the town of Sake. On 19 November, volunteers from the
    Zairian Red Cross in Goma collected and buried 166 bodies found along the road
    between the town of Sake and the perimeter of the Mugunga camp.244
222. Many witnesses reported the existence of a checkpoint between the Mugunga and
Lac Vert camps where the AFDL/APR units would sort refugees according to their age
and sex. Generally speaking, the soldiers allowed women, children and the elderly to pass
through. Men, on the other hand, were very often arrested and executed.
  • Between 15 November and 16 November 1996, AFDL/APR units arrested an
    unknown number of Rwandan Hutu men from the Lac Vert camp and Mugunga
    and executed them. Some were bound and then thrown alive into Lac Vert, where
_______________
240 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; APREDECI,
Rapport circonstanciel: novembre 1996 et ses événements, 1996, p.8; APREDECI, Groupe des volontaires
pour la paix (GVP), Centre de recherche et d’encadrement populaire (CRE), “L’Apocalypse au Nord-
Kivu”, October 1997, p.23.
241 See Security Council Resolution 1080 (1996), dated 15 November 1996. With the mass return of
Rwandan refugees, the plan to deploy a peacekeeping force in eastern Zaire was no longer considered a
priority and the Canadian soldiers left their advanced base in Kampala at the end of December 1996.
242 The figure of 600,000 repatriates is most commonly cited. However, this figure is an estimate;
repatriated refugees were not counted as they crossed the border between 15 November and 19 November
1996. Many observers estimate that between 350,000 and 500,000 refugees crossed the border during this
time.
243 “Bloodied Corpses Litter Camp – Signs of Massacre Found in Deserted Refugee Camp”, Toronto Star,
16 November 1996.
244 AFP, “Les volontaires de la Croix-Rouge chargés du ramassage des cadavres”, 19 November 1996.

they drowned. Others were shot in the head and their bodies dumped in the
lake.245
· The killings around Mugunga and Lac Vert continued for several weeks. Some
survivors have recounted how they were attacked by AFDL/APR soldiers in late
November 1996 when they were seeking repatriation to Rwanda. Some of the
refugees were rounded up when they came out of the Park and then executed. One
source reported the existence of several mass graves inside the park, five
kilometres from the Mugunga camp.246
Attacks against refugees fleeing across the Masisi and Walikale territories
Masisi territory
223. From 15 November 1996, the AFDL/APR soldiers went in pursuit of the refugee
survivors and the ex-FAR/Interahamwe who were escaping across the Masisi towards the
town of Walikale. They caught up with the slowest units of the column, who were settled
in makeshift camps in the villages of Osso, Kinigi and Katoyi (mainly survivors of
Mugunga and Kibumba), Kilolirwe, Ngandjo, Nyamitaba, Miandja, Nyaruba, Kirumbu
and Kahira (mainly survivors of Kahindo and Katale). During their operations against the
refugees, the AFDL/APR soldiers often received the backing of local Mayi-Mayi groups,
who saw this as an opportunity to take their revenge on the Hutu armed groups with
whom they had been at war for over three years and who had been supported by the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe from 1994 onwards.
  • On 19 November 1996, Mayi-Mayi combatants siding with the AFDL stormed
    the village of Ngungu with the support of the AFDL/APR artillery,
    indiscriminately killing an unknown number of refugees and ex-
    FAR/Interahamwe. It is hard to ascertain the total number of victims. According
    to several sources, the figure may run to several hundred.247
  • In the second half of November 1996, units of the AFDL/APR killed dozens of
    refugees in the makeshift camp next to Osso farm, in the Masisi territory. First,
    the AFDL/APR soldiers exchanged fire with the ex-FAR/Interahamwe based in
    the camp. The ex-FAR/Interahamwe beat a hasty retreat, however, and the
    AFDL/APR troops entered the camp. Most of the victims were refugees, among
    them many women and children. Zairian civilians accused by the AFDL/APR
    troops of having hidden or assisted refugees were also killed. Shortly after the
_______________
245 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998.
246 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; AZADHO,
“Existence des charniers et fosses communes”, March 1997.
247 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, March 2009; AZADHO, “Existence des charniers et
fosses communes”, March 1997; APREDECI, Rapport circonstanciel: novembre 1996 et ses événements,
1996, p.8.

massacre, eyewitnesses confirmed having seen between 20 and 100 bodies in the
camp.248
  • During the week of 9 December 1996, AFDL/APR soldiers killed several hundred
    Rwandan refugees at the makeshift camp in the village of Mbeshe Mbeshe in the
    Katoyi chiefdom. Having surrounded the camp at around five o’clock in the
    morning, the AFDL/APR soldiers indiscriminately opened fire on the camp’s
    occupants, killing an unknown number of refugees. According to one source,
    internally displaced Zairians in the camp were also killed.249
224. Around 8 November 1996, many refugees, most of them survivors from the
Kahindo and Katale camps, settled in the Bashali chiefdom in the north-east of the Masisi
territory. Towards 18 November 1996, AFDL/APR soldiers attacked their makeshift
camp at Rukwi. Over the weeks and months that followed, they attacked and killed an
unknown number of survivors from the camp as they tried to flee the territory.
  • In late November 1996, AFDL/APR units killed around fifty civilians, including
    40 Rwandan refugees and ten Hutu Banyarwanda,250 in the village of Miandja.251
  • In April 1997, AFDL/APR units killed a large number of refugees who had settled
    on a site known as Karunda in the village of Kirumbu and on the Nyabura
    plantation in the Bashali-Mokoto chiefdom.252
  • Around 22 April 1997, AFDL/APR units killed 53 refugees in a school in the
    village of Humule, near the town of Karuba, fifty kilometres from Goma. The
    victims were trying to reach the UNHCR transit centre in Karuba with a view to
    being repatriated to Rwanda. According to some witnesses, the women among the
    group of victims were raped before they were killed.253
  • On 29 May 1997, AFDL/APR units killed four refugees, including a child and an
    employee of the international NGO Save the Children, in the village of Karuba.
_______________
248 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire
des crimes impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.85.
249 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, April 2009; Peacelink, “Rapport sur la situation qui
prévaut actuellement dans les provinces du Nord-Kivu et du Sud-Kivu”, 1997; APREDECI, GVP, CRE,
“L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, October 1997, p.30.
250 The term “Banyarwanda” denotes peoples originating from Rwanda and living in the province of North
Kivu.
251 Peacelink, “Rapport sur la situation qui prévaut actuellement dans les provinces du Nord-Kivu et du
Sud-Kivu”, 1997; APREDECI, GVP, CRE, “L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, October 1997, p.32.
252 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, January 2009; APREDECI, “Mission d’enquête sur la
situation des droits de l’homme dans la province du Nord-Kivu”, 1997, p.32; APREDECI, GVP, CRE,
“L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, October 1997, p.36.
253 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; Peacelink,
“Rapport sur la situation qui prévaut actuellement dans les provinces du Nord-Kivu et du Sud-Kivu”, 1997.

The victims were part of a group of refugees on their way to the Karuba UNHCR
transit centre with a view to their repatriation to Rwanda.254
Walikale territory
225. The Rwandan refugees arrived in Walikale territory in November 1996 via three
different routes. One group, which came from Bukavu, reached Walikale territory via
Bunyakiri. A second group, also from Bukavu, travelled through the Kahuzi-Biega forest
via Nyabibwe. A final group, which had fled the camps of North Kivu, reached Walikale
territory via southern Masisi territory and the towns of Busurungi and Biriko. Pursued by
the AFDL/APR soldiers, the slowest refugees, who were often left behind by the armed
men, were indiscriminately attacked and killed.
226. The AFDL/APR soldiers from Bukavu arrived at Hombo, a village located on the
border between North Kivu and South Kivu, around 7 December 1996. They then split
into several groups. Some of the troops continued to head towards Walikale town, while
others stayed in the area to hunt down the refugees. A third group left to pursue fleeing
refugees in the Walowa-Luanda groupement, in the south-east of Walikale territory.
227. When they arrived in Walikale territory, the AFDL/APR soldiers held public
meetings for the attention of the Zairian people. In these meetings, they accused the Hutu
refugees of being collectively responsible for the genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda. They
also claimed that the refugees were planning to commit genocide against Zairian civilians
in the region. In their speeches, they frequently likened the refugees to “pigs” running
rampage through the fields of the villagers. They also often called on the Zairians to help
them flush them out and kill them. According to several sources, the term “pigs” was the
code name used by the AFDL/APR troops to refer to the Rwandan Hutu refugees. When
the AFDL/APR soldiers blocked the Zairians from accessing some execution sites, they
told them that they were “killing the pigs”.255
228. In this region, massacres were staged on the basis of an almost identical plan,
designed to kill as many victims as possible. Every time they spotted a large group of
refugees, the AFDL/APR soldiers fired indiscriminately at them with heavy and light
weapons. They would then promise to help the survivors return to Rwanda. After herding
them up under a variety of pretexts, they most often killed them with hammers or hoes.
Those who tried to escape were shot dead. A number of witnesses have claimed that in
1999, APR/ANC256 soldiers went specifically to the sites of several massacres to dig up
the bodies and burn them.257
_______________
254 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; AI, “Deadly
alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997, p.6.
255 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008.
256 Armée nationale congolaise, the armed branch of the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie
(RCD), a political and military movement formed in August 1998.
257 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008.

  • From 9 December 1996, AFDL/APR soldiers shot dead several hundred refugees,
    including a large number of women and children at the Hombo bridge. Over the
    course of the following days, they burned alive an unknown number of refugees
    along the road in the town of Kampala, a few kilometres from Hombo. Many
    women were raped by the soldiers before they were killed. Before killing them,
    the soldiers had asked the victims to assemble so they could be repatriated to
    Rwanda.258
  • Around 9 December, AFDL/APR soldiers intercepted and executed several
    hundred Rwandan refugees in the vicinity of the village of Chambucha, four
    kilometres from Hombo. The victims, who included a large number of women
    and children, were shot dead or killed by blows of hammers and hoes to the head
    near a bridge over the Lowa River. Before killing them, the AFDL/APR soldiers
    had promised the refugees that they would repatriate them to Rwanda with the aid
    of UNHCR. Most of the bodies were then dumped in the Lowa River.259
229. When the AFDL/APR soldiers took control of the tarmac road between Hombo
and Walikale, the Rwandan refugees who had not yet reached the main road between
Bukavu and Walikale had to turn back towards Masisi. The majority set up home
temporarily in the village of Biriko in the Walowa-Luanda groupement.
  • Around 17 December 1996, AFDL/APR soldiers from Ziralo (South Kivu),
    Bunyakiri (South Kivu) and Ngungu (North Kivu) surrounded the makeshift
    camps at Biriko and killed hundreds of refugees, including women and children.
    The soldiers shot the victims dead or killed them with hoes. The people of Biriko
    buried the bodies in the village. Many bodies were also dumped in the
    Nyawaranga River.260
230. In the days that followed, the AFDL/APR soldiers continued their hunt, attacking
refugees in the villages of Kilambo, Busurungi (Bikoyi Koyi hill), Nyamimba and
Kifuruka in the Walowa-Luanda groupement in the Walikale territory.
  • In December 1996, AFDL/APR soldiers killed several hundred refugees around
    the town of Kifuruka, ten kilometres from Biriko. The soldiers had rounded up the
    victims in the village of Kifuruka and then led them to the road, leaving them to
_______________
258 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, April 2009 and with the Mapping Team, South Kivu,
March 2009; Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team (S/1998/581); confidential documents
submitted to the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998.
259 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November-December 2008 and April 2009; witness
accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998.
260 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November/December 2008 and April 2009;
CADDHOM, “Les atrocités commises en province du Kivu au Congo-Kinshasa (ex-Zaïre) de 1996-1998”,
July 1998.

believe that they were going to help them return to Rwanda. Once they had left
the village, however, the soldiers shot them dead or killed them with machetes.261
231. While some units of the AFDL/APR were committing these massacres in the
Walowa-Luanda groupement, others continued to head towards the administrative centre
of the territory, Walikale.
  • During the third week of December 1996, AFDL/APR troops killed hundreds of
    Rwandan refugees in the Musenge locality, between Hombo and Walikale. The
    AFDL/APR soldiers had set up several checkpoints along the roads to intercept
    the refugees. They promised to help the victims return to Rwanda through
    UNHCR, then led them into houses in Musenge. After a while, the victims were
    taken from the houses and killed with blows of iron bars in the hills of Ikoyi and
    Musenge (next to the dispensary).262
232. An execution system was rolled out around Itebero where, from December 1996,
special AFDL/APR units set about systematically hunting down refugees.
  • In December 1996, AFDL/APR soldiers killed several hundred refugees in the
    Mutiko locality. After being intercepted at checkpoints set up by the soldiers, the
    victims were transported to the village of Mukito. The soldiers gave them food
    and asked them to prepare to board UNHCR trucks that were supposedly waiting
    for them at the edge of the village. The victims were then led out of Mukito on to
    the road and killed with blows of sticks, hammers and axes to their heads. The
    soldiers encouraged the indigenous population to participate in the killings. They
    then forced them to bury the bodies.263
233. Around 16 December 1996, the AFDL/APR soldiers arrived in Walikale-Centre.
  • Between late 1996 and early 1997, AFDL/APR units killed an unknown number
    of refugees in Walikale-Centre. Most of the victims were killed in the
    Nyarusukula district. The district had been transformed into a military zone after
    the AFDL/APR troops had moved into the town, and civilians were banned from
_______________
261 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November/December 2008 and April 2009.
262 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November/December 2008 and February 2009; Report
of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team (S/1998/581); confidential document submitted to the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; APREDECI, GVP, CRE, “L’Apocalypse au Nord-
Kivu”, October 1997, p.52; CADDHOM, “Enquête sur les massacres de réfugiés rwandais et burundais”,
September 1997; Associated Press, “Massacre: Victims Leave Clues Behind”, 14 March 1998.
263 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November-December 2008; witness account gathered
by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998.

entering. Most of the victims’ bodies were dumped in the Lowa River and its
tributaries.264
234. Another group of Rwandan refugees from Masisi reached Walikale territory in
December 1996 via a forest track linking the villages of Ntoto and Ngora, around fifteen
kilometres north of Walikale-Centre. After Walikale was captured by AFDL/APR forces,
these refugees and some ex-FAR/Interahamwe tried to hide in the village of Kariki,
sheltering in an abandoned fish farm on the winding track between the Ntoto and Ngora
villages.
  • In early 1997, AFDL/APR soldiers killed an unknown number of refugees at the
    makeshift Kariki camp, 13 kilometres from Walikale. The soldiers came from
    Ngora, where they had forced civilians to follow them and carry their kit and their
    ammunitions boxes. When they arrived in Kariki, they launched a surprise attack
    on the ex-FAR/Interahamwe units at the foot of the hill and disarmed them. After
    having killed the ex-FAR/Interahamwe, they attacked the camp on the other side
    of the valley. Most of the bodies were not buried and the Mapping Team was able
    to confirm that remains were still visible as at the date of this report.265
3. Maniema
235. From late 1996, the Zairian Government massed its forces in Kindu and
Kisangani with a view to launching a counter-offensive in the Kivu provinces. The first
refugees arrived in Maniema province in early 1997 from the Walikale territory in North
Kivu. They headed first towards the town of Kisangani but were stopped by the FAZ and
rerouted to the Tingi-Tingi site, seven kilometres from Lubutu, near an airfield. Over the
weeks that followed, almost 120,000 refugees settled in a makeshift camp at Tingi-Tingi.
In the meantime, 40,000 other Rwandan Hutus, including many ex-FAR/Interahamwe,
arrived in the village of Amisi, seventy kilometres east of Tingi-Tingi. From the start of
1997, the ex-FAR/Interahamwe used the Tingi-Tingi camp as a recruitment and training
base with a view to leading a joint counter-offensive with the FAZ against the
AFDL/APR troops. The FAZ and the ex-FAR/Interahamwe began to work in very close
coordination with one another. The FAZ also provided the ex-FAR/Interahamwe with
arms, munitions and uniforms in particular.
236. In January 1997, violent clashes took place between the AFDL/APR soldiers and
the ex-FAR/Interahamwe for several weeks at the Osso bridge, at the border between
North Kivu and Maniema province. On 7 February, after violent fighting in the village of
Mungele, AFDL/APR troops took the Amisi camp. Most of the camp’s population
managed to escape in the direction of Lubutu and settled by the Tingi-Tingi camp. The
_______________
264 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November-December 2008; CADDHOM, “Enquête sur
les massacres des réfugiés rwandais et burundais hutu ainsi que des populations civiles congolaises lors de
la guerre de l’AFDL”, June 1998.
265 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008.

final skirmishes between the AFDL/APR and the ex-FAR/Interahamwe took place in the
village of Mukwanyama, eighteen kilometres from Tingi-Tingi. After this time, the
fighting virtually ceased and the ex-FAR/Interahamwe fled in all different directions.
Some dignitaries of the old Rwandan regime and refugees who could afford the price of
the ticket (USD 800) booked seats onboard commercial aircraft that landed specially at
Tingi-Tingi and left for Nairobi. In the evening of 28 February, the refugees, after
hearing that the AFDL/APR troops were ten kilometres from Tingi-Tingi, left the camp
and headed towards Lubutu. However, they were blocked until the next morning by the
FAZ at the bridge over the Lubilinga River, commonly known as “Lubutu Bridge”.
  • On the morning of 1 March 1997, AFDL/APR units entered the Tingi-Tingi camp
    and indiscriminately killed its remaining occupants. Although most of the
    refugees had already left the camp, several hundred of them remained, including
    many sick people who were being treated in the dispensary and unaccompanied
    minors. According to witnesses, the AFDL/APR troops are thought to have killed
    most of the victims with knives. The bodies were then buried in several mass
    graves by volunteers from the Lubutu Red Cross.266
  • In the afternoon of 1 March 1997, AFDL/APR units opened fire on refugees at the
    rear of the column fleeing towards Lubutu and killed several dozen of them. On
    the same day, AFDL/APR soldiers shot dead several hundred refugees who were
    waiting to cross the bridge over the Lubilinga River. Many refugees drowned
    when they jumped into the river. Others were crushed underfoot by the crowd in
    the ensuing panic. On 2 March, the AFDL/APR soldiers ordered the people of
    Lubutu to bury the victims, but most of the bodies were thrown into the river.267
237. On 27 February 1997, AFDL/APR troops entered the town of Kindu, which had
been deserted by the FAZ. The refugees continued to head towards Lodja (westwards) or
Kasongo (southwards). Previously, a third group, which was much smaller in number,
had joined the refugees at the Tingi-Tingi camp via the Punia road.
  • On 1 March 1997, AFDL/APR units killed 11 Rwandan Hutu refugees belonging
    to religious orders on the Kindu road, around twenty kilometres from Kalima, in
    the Pangi territory. The victims, eight priests and three nuns, had been refugees in
    South Kivu since 1994. They had found refuge in the parish of Kalima since 22
    February. Having captured the town on 23 February, the AFDL/APR troops told
    the priests and the nuns to follow them on the pretext of returning them to
_______________
266 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009; AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese forests”,
1997, p.5; MSF, “L’échappée forcée: une stratégie brutale d’élimination à l’est du Zaïre”, April 1997, pp.4
and 5.
267 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009; AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese forests”,
1997, p.5; MSF, “L’échappée forcée: une stratégie brutale d’élimination à l’est du Zaïre”, April 1997, pp.4
and 5.

Rwanda. On 1 March, they boarded a minibus sent by the soldiers. During the
evening, the soldiers beat them to death with sticks. The bodies of the victims
were buried at the scene.268
  • In March 1997, AFDL/APR units killed some 200 refugees in the territories of
    Pangi and Kasongo. The victims were for the mostly survivors of the massacres
    committed in the Shabunda territory in South Kivu. In the refugee camp opened
    near Kalima Airport, in the Pangi territory, soldiers killed at least 20 people,
    mainly women and children who were awaiting the arrival of food aid supplied by
    UNHCR. In the town of Kalima, soldiers searched houses, executed the refugees
    who were hiding there and beat Zairians who had allowed them into their homes.
    The soldiers then killed refugees all the way along the road between Kalima and
    Kindu, in particular in the villages of Kingombe Mungembe, Mumbuza, Kenye
    and Idombo. The bodies of the victims remained on the road for several days
    before being buried by local people. In the weeks that followed, the soldiers
    continued to hunt down refugees in the Kasongo territory. They killed a large
    number of them in the villages of Kisanji, Sengaluji and Karubenda. Most of the
    survivors ran off into the forest. Witnesses estimate having seen at least 165
    bodies, but in all likelihood the total number of victims is far in excess of this
    figure.269
238. Although there were no more clashes between the ex-FAR/Interahamwe/FAZ and
the AFDL/APR troops, the massacres of refugees continued in the weeks that followed
the fall of Tingi-Tingi. The refugees apprehended by AFDL/APR soldiers based in
Lubutu were led to a site called Golgotha, three kilometres from Lubutu, where they were
systematically executed.
  • On 14 March 1997, during a joint mission, UN organisations and NGOs found
    around 2,000 refugee survivors of the recent massacres wandering around the
    Tingi-Tingi and Amisi camps. Until the official closure of these camps on 2 April,
    the AFDL/APR soldiers deliberately blocked all humanitarian, health and medical
    aid efforts destined for the survivors. MSF reported that during this period it had
    been almost impossible to provide refugees with medical care because the AFDL
    authorities had forbidden or delayed aid efforts for security reasons. For want of
    humanitarian and medical aid during the three weeks that followed the capture of
    the camp, at least 216 refugees died at Tingi-Tingi.270
_______________
268 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008; Haki Za Binadamu, press release no.1,
7 March 1997; AI, “Memorandum to the UN Security Council: Appeal for a Commission of Inquiry to
Investigate Reports of Atrocities in Eastern Zaire”, 24 March 1997.
269 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009.
270 MSF, “L’échappée forcée: une stratégie brutale d’élimination à l’est du Zaïre”, April 1997, pp.4 and 5.
4. Orientale Province
239. With the exception of the group of soldiers who accompanied the entourage of the
former Rwandan president Juvénal Habyarimana that swiftly crossed the region between
late 1996 and early 1997, the vast majority of Rwandan refugees did not arrive in
Orientale Province until March 1997. Although they tried to reach Kisangani in the
company of an extremely small number of ex-FAR/Interahamwe units via the Lubutu-
Kisangani road, on the right bank of the Luluaba River (the Congo River),271 they were
pushed back by the FAZ towards Ubundu, 100 kilometres south of Kisangani, on the left
bank of the Luluaba River.
240. From 6 March 1997, tens of thousands of refugees set up camp at Njale, in the
Ubundu territory, on the right bank of the Zaire River, opposite the village of Ubundu.
The fighting that ensued between the AFDL/APR troops and the ex-FAR/Interahamwe
troops around Njale272 created a wave of panic among the refugees and many of them
tried to cross the river any way they could, in spite of the harsh weather conditions.
Several hundred refugees drowned as they tried to cross the river.
Attacks against refugees along the Lubutu-Kisangani road
241. Advancing faster than the others, a small group of approximately 1,000 refugees
and ex-FAR/Interahamwe units managed to pass through before the closure of the
Lubutu-Kisangani road and arrived on 12 March 1997 at the village of Wania Rukula,
sixty-four kilometres from Kisangani. They settled in two makeshift camps between the
towns of Luboya and Maiko, on the right bank of the Luluaba River. On the same day,
FAZ soldiers from the Special Presidential Division (DSP) entered the camps and handed
out weapons to the ex-FAR/Interahamwe in anticipation of an AFDL/APR attack.
  • Around eight o’clock in the evening on 14 March 1997, after the defeat of the
    FAZ/ex-FAR/Interahamwe coalition, AFDL/APR soldiers killed at least 470
    refugees in the two camps near Wanie Rukula, in the Ubundu territory. Most of
    the victims’ bodies were dumped in the Luboya River but some were placed in
    three mass graves.273
Executions and forced disappearances of refugees in and around the town of
Kisangani

242. After the capture of Kisangani on 15 March 1997, the AFDL/APR soldiers staged
combing operations in and around the town, looking for refugees. The new AFDL
_______________
271 The Luluaba River is known as the Congo River from Kisangani.
272 Fighting took place in the villages of Obiakutu and Babunjuli.
273 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, November 2008 and Orientale Province, January and
February 2009; Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in
1997/1998.

authorities instructed local officials to round up all the refugees in the region. Whenever
groups of refugees were spotted, the AFDL/APR soldiers went to the round-up sites and
led the refugees away towards an unknown fate.
  • Around 15 March 1997, AFDL/APR units forced the disappearance of around
    thirty refugees detained at the Prison Centrale in Kisangani. When they entered
    the prison, which had been abandoned by the Zairian security services, they sorted
    the prisoners according to their ethnic group. The Tutsis were freed and their
    repatriation to Rwanda arranged. The Hutus were taken outside the prison and
    their fate remains unknown to this day. Around twenty Hutu women and children
    were also led out of the prison under the pretext of being repatriated to Rwanda.
    However, their return has not been confirmed.274
  • At the end of April 1997, AFDL/APR soldiers arrested a group of 11 refugees on
    the Kisangani-Lubutu road. The refugees were never seen again.275
Attacks against refugees along the Ubundu to Kisangani railway line
243. After crossing the Luluaba River at Ubundu village, most of the refugees pressed
onwards and settled around 14 March 1997 in a makeshift refugee camp known as
“Camp de la Paix”, or “peace camp”, in the village of Obilo, 82 kilometres from
Kisangani. On 15 March, however, AFDL/APR/UPDF troops captured Kisangani and
most of the refugees decided to continue on their way, except for a few hundred refugees
who remained in Obilo.
  • At dawn on 26 March 1997, AFDL/APR units killed at least 80 refugees,
    including women and children, at the Obilo camp, in the Ubundu territory.
    Several days before, AFDL/APR soldiers from Kisangani had gone to Obilo and
    ordered the local authorities to take all the refugees in the village back to the
    Camp de la Paix so they could receive humanitarian aid. Also on 26 March 1997,
    villagers heard around 45 minutes of gunfire. The next day, they entered the
    camp, which was littered with spent cartridge cases, and found the bodies of the
    victims. As they left Obilo, the soldiers told the people that the refugees were evil
    and that they should on no account assist the survivors. The bodies were buried in
    four mass graves by the Red Cross and some of the residents. Two of the graves
    are located near the market, one near the church of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and
    another on the banks of the Obilo River.276
_______________
274 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, February 2009.
275 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998.
276 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, December 2008, January and May 2009;
Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998; MSF,
“L’échappée forcée: une stratégie brutale d’élimination à l’est du Zaïre”, April 1997.

244. The refugees who had left Obilo before the attack split and headed in two
different directions. One group, which included ex-FAR/Interahamwe units, left in the
direction of Équateur province, cutting through the forest at the 52 kilometre marker and
then travelling through the Opala territory. Most of the refugees continued to head
towards Kisangani in the hope of accessing humanitarian aid, or even being repatriated.
Several tens of thousands of people set up camp in the village of Lula, seven kilometres
from Kisangani, on the left bank of the river. On 31 March 1997, however, AFDL/APR
soldiers arrived in the area and forced them to turn back towards Ubundu. The refugees
then crowded into makeshift camps along the 125 kilometres of railway line linking
Kisangani and Ubundu. Towards the middle of April, at least 50,000 refugees were living
in the Kasese I and II camps,277 located near the Kisesa locality, 25 kilometres from
Kisangani. A second makeshift camp at Biaro, 41 kilometres from Kisangani, received
30,000 refugees.278 Aid workers rallied quickly to assist the refugees living in these
camps. Given the scale of the needs and due to problems accessing the camps, only a
small proportion of the refugee population were able to benefit from humanitarian aid.
Aid workers were also faced with the hostility of AFDL/APR officials in the field.
  • In April 1997, when between 60 and 120 refugees were dying each day from
    disease or exhaustion, AFDL/APR soldiers barred aid agencies and humanitarian
    NGOs from accessing the camps on several occasions and hindered the
    repatriation of refugees to Rwanda. In spite of the official approval by AFDL
    authorities on 16 April 1997 of UNHCR’s plan to airlift and repatriate the
    thousands of refugees around Kisangani, the Rwandan Government opposed the
    plan and insisted that the refugees be repatriated by road.279 On several occasions,
    however, the operations to repatriate refugees by road were delayed for a variety
    of excuses. The scheduled repatriation of 80 children from the Biaro camp on 18
    April was called off by AFDL/APR officials on the controversial grounds that
    several cases of cholera had been reported in the nearby Kasese camp.280
    Subsequently, an aid convoy and a WFP food store were attacked by locals at the
    instigation of AFDL/APR soldiers, and aid workers found themselves banned
    from accessing the camps south of Kisangani. A checkpoint set up at Lula marked
    the entrance to this restricted zone for all aid workers. On 19 April and 20 April,
    MSF negotiated entry but was only able to work in the camps for two hours each
_______________
277 For reasons unknown to the Mapping Team, reports and the international press commonly use “Kasese”
to refer to the village of Kisesa.
278 IRIN, “Emergency Update No. 156 on the Great Lakes”, 23 April 1997.
279 IRIN, “Emergency Update No. 151 on the Great Lakes”, 16 April 1997.
280 IRIN, “Emergency Update No. 152 on the Great Lakes”, 17 April 1997; MSF, “L’échappée forcée: une
stratégie brutale d’élimination à l’est du Zaïre”, April 1997, p.6.

day. From 21 April onwards, aid workers were banned entirely from accessing the
camps.281
  • On 21 April 1997, the residents of Kisesa, visibly encouraged by AFDL/APR
    soldiers, attacked the Kasese I and II camps with machetes and arrows, killing an
    unknown number of refugees and looting aid stores. Several sources have
    reported that the attack had been carried out in retaliation for the murder of six
    Kisesa villagers by the refugees. This version of the events has nonetheless been
    challenged by a number of reliable sources. AFDL/APR soldiers at the scene are
    alleged to have directly incited the people to attack the camps.282
245. Many witnesses and various sources have told how a train from Kisangani arrived
near the camps on 21 April 1997, carrying members of the APR special units that had
been deployed at Kisangani Airport since 17 April.
  • On the morning of 22 April 1997, AFDL/APR units, accompanied by villagers,
    killed at least 200 refugees in the Kasese I and II camps, in the presence of several
    APR senior figures. The massacre lasted between seven and twelve hours.
    According to several sources, some ex-FAR/Interahamwe units are thought to
    have been in the camps but the victims were mostly civilians.283 After the
    massacre, the soldiers headed to the village of Kisesa and ordered the villagers to
    go to the camps and gather up the bodies, which were initially buried in mass
    graves. At a later date, the AFDL/APR soldiers returned to Kisesa to dig up the
    bodies and burn them. On 24 April, UNHCR and WFP officials and several
_______________
281 Interview with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January and May 2009; confidential documents
submitted to the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998; UNHCR, “Situation
Reports”, April 1997; “Zaïre: le fleuve de sang”, a France-Télévisions documentary broadcast in La marche
du siècle by Jean-Marie Cavada, Pascal Richard and Jean-Marie Lemaire in June 1997; IRIN, “Emergency
Update No. 143 on the Great Lakes”, 4 April 1997; MSF, “L’échappée forcée: une stratégie brutale
d’élimination à l’est du Zaïre”, April 1997; AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997; James
McKinley Jr. “Machetes, Axes and Guns: Refugees Tell of Attacks in Zaire”, New York Times, 30 April
1997; IRIN, “Emergency Update No. 151 on the Great Lakes”, 16 April 1997 and following days.
282 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, November 2008, January-May 2009;
confidential documents submitted to the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998;
C. McGreal, “Truth Buried in Congo’s Killing Fields”, Guardian, 19 July 1997; John Pomfret, “Massacres
Were a Weapon in Congo’s Civil War; Evidence Mounts of Atrocities by Kabila’s Forces”, Washington
Post, 11 June 1997; IRIN, ”Emergency Update No. 155 on the Great Lakes”, 22 April 1997; IRIN,
“Emergency Update No. 157 on the Great Lakes”, 24 April 1997.
283 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, November 2008-January 2009 and May 2009;
confidential documents submitted to the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998;
C. McGreal, “Truth Buried in Congo’s Killing Fields”, Guardian, 19 July 1997; John Pomfret, “Massacres
Were a Weapon in Congo’s Civil War; Evidence Mounts of Atrocities by Kabila’s Forces”, Washington
Post, 11 June 1997; F. Reyntjens, La guerre des Grands Lacs: alliances mouvantes et conflits
extraterritoriaux en Afrique centrale, L’Harmattan, 2009.

journalists visited the Kasese I and II camps under AFDL/APR military escort.
All the refugees, including the sick and the children, had disappeared.284
246. Straight after the Kasese massacres, AFDL/APR soldiers attacked Biaro camp, 41
kilometres from Kisangani.
  • On 22 April 1997, AFDL/APR units opened fire indiscriminately on the Biaro
    refugee camp, killing close to 100 people, including women and children. The
    soldiers then went in pursuit of those who had managed to escape into the forest,
    killing an unknown number of them. They also requisitioned a bulldozer from a
    Kisangani-based logging company to dig mass graves. Witnesses saw AFDL/APR
    units transporting wood in trucks. This wood was then used to build pyres and
    burn the bodies.285
247. On 28 April 1997, the non-governmental organisation MSF was granted
permission to visit the Kasese and Biaro camps, but all their occupants had disappeared.
According to MSF,286 before the attacks these camps were sheltering at least 5,000
people in a state of extreme exhaustion.287
248. On 22 April 1997, while the attacks were taking place on the Biaro and Kasese
camps, AFDL/APR soldiers and villagers stopped refugees who were trying to escape
and forced them to leave in the direction of Ubundu town centre.
_______________
284 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, December 2008 and January 2009; Witness
accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998; AI, “Deadly
alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997; MSF, “L’échappée forcée: une stratégie brutale d’élimination à l’est
du Zaïre”, April 1997; James McKinley Jr., “Machetes, Axes and Rebel Guns: Refugees Tell of Attacks in
Zaire”, New York Times, 30 April 1997; James McKinley Jr., “Zaire Refugees Bear Signs of Rebel
Atrocities”, New York Times, 2 May 1997; James McKinley Jr. and Howard French, ”Hidden Horrors: A
Special Report, Uncovering the Guilty Footprints Along Zaire’s Long Trail of Death”, New York Times, 14
April 1997.
285 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, December 2008 and January 2009; confidential
documents submitted to the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998; AI, “Deadly
alliances in Congolese forests”, 3 December 1997; MSF, “L’échappée forcée: une stratégie brutale
d’élimination à l’est du Zaïre”, April 1997; James McKinley Jr., “Machetes, Axes and Rebel Guns:
Refugees Tell of Attacks in Zaire”, New York Times, 30 April 1997; James McKinley Jr. and Howard
French, “Hidden Horrors: A Special Report: Uncovering the Guilty Footprints Along Zaire’s Long Trail of
Death”, New York Times, 14 November 1997; James McKinley Jr., ”Zaire Refugees Bear Signs of Rebel
Atrocities”, New York Times, 2 May 1997.
286 MSF, “L’échappée forcée: une stratégie brutale d’élimination à l’est du Zaïre”, April 1997.
287 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, December 2008 and January 2009; Witness
accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998; AI, “Deadly
alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997; MSF, “L’échappée forcée: une stratégie brutale d’élimination à l’est
du Zaïre”, April 1997; James McKinley Jr., “Machetes, Axes and Rebel Guns: Refugees Tell of Attacks in
Zaïre”, New York Times, 30 April 1997; James McKinley Jr., “Zaire Refugees Bear Signs of Rebel
Atrocities”, New York Times, 2 May 1997; James McKinley Jr. and Howard French, ”Hidden Horrors: a
Special Report. Uncovering the Guilty Footprints Along Zaire’s Long Trail of Death”, New York Times,
14 November 1997.

  • On 22 April 1997, at the 52 kilometre marker, AFDL/APR soldiers ordered
    refugees to stop and sit down. They then opened fire on them, killing an unknown
    number of people, including a large number of women and children. Their bodies
    were piled up by the roadside and then buried or burned.288
249. In May 1997, while UNHCR and aid workers were arranging the repatriation of a
group of refugees between the 41 kilometre marker and Kisangani, the massacres
continued in the area south of Biaro camp. The zone remained out of bounds to aid
workers, journalists and diplomats until at least 19 May. On 14 May, the delegation of
UNHCR Assistant High Commissioner Sérgio Vieira de Mello was refused access to the
zone by AFDL/APR soldiers.289 At the same time, when questioned by journalists as part
of a television report, a Zairian member of the Katangese ex-Tigers who had been
integrated into the AFDL/APR claimed to have witnessed over a thousand executions
each week in this zone. He also reported that the victims’ bodies were transported to
certain sites at night to be burned.290 The AFDL/APR soldiers led an “awareness-raising”
campaign among the people to stop them speaking out about what had happened.291
250. From 30 April 1997 onwards, AFDL/APR soldiers began to transport several
groups of refugee survivors of the attacks on the Kasese camps by train to the transit
camp that had been set up near Kisangani Airport.
  • On 4 May 1997, AFDL/APR soldiers caused the deaths of over 90 refugees by
    forcing them to travel in a train in conditions likely to cause considerable loss of
    human life. The AFDL/APR soldiers who had refused to allow aid workers to
    arrange their repatriation had crammed the refugees into wagons without
    observing minimum safety guidelines for passenger survival.292
Attacks against refugees along the Kisangani–Opala road
251. In early April 1997, refugees from the Ubundu territory, the probable survivors of
the Biaro and Kasese massacres, gathered in the Yalikaka locality, by the Lobaye River.
_______________
288 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998;
“Zaire: le fleuve de sang”, a France-Télévisions documentary broadcast in La marche du siècle by Jean-
Marie Cavada, Pascal Richard and Jean-Marie Lemaire in June 1997; C. Cyusa, “Les oubliés de Tingi-
Tingi”, Éditions La Pagaie, pp.132–135; M. Niwese, “Le peuple rwandais un pied dans la tombe”,
L’Harmattan, 2001, p.149.
289 IRIN, “Emergency Update No. 172 on the Great Lakes”, 15 May 1997.
290 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, May 2009; confidential documents submitted to
the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998; “Zaire: le fleuve de sang”, a France-
Télévisions documentary broadcast in La marche du siècle by Jean-Marie Cavada, Pascal Richard and
Jean-Marie Lemaire in June 1997.
291 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, December 2008-February 2009; Witness
accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998.
292 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, January 2009 and Orientale Province, May 2009;
UNHCR “Great Lakes Briefing Notes”, 6 May 1997; J. Chatain, “Zaïre: 91 réfugiés étouffés ou piétinés”,
L’Humanité, 6 May 1997.

  • In April 1997, acting on the orders of a civilian, some residents of Yalikaka
    village in the Opala territory killed at least 50 refugees with cold weapons and
    blows of sticks. The bodies were buried at the scene or dumped in the river. This
    attack is thought to have been carried out in retaliation for the murder of a village
    resident a short time earlier by ex-FAR/Interahamwe units.293
252. After the massacre, the residents of Yalikaka village continued to prevent many
refugees from crossing the river and escaping. They also informed AFDL/APR soldiers
about refugees present in the village.
  • Towards 28 April 1997, around twenty AFDL/APR soldiers arrived in the village
    of Yalikaka and killed hundreds of refugees. Upon their arrival, they interrogated
    the refugees and removed at least one Zairian who was among them. They then
    shot dead the refugees. The bodies of the victims were buried at the scene by the
    villagers.294
253. After the fall of Kisangani and the destruction of the camps between Kisangani
and Ubundu, several thousand refugees regrouped in the villages of Lusuma and Makako,
206 kilometres from Kisangani. Unable to cross the Lomami River to reach Opala, they
remained in these villages, looting the property and crops of civilians.
  • Between April and May 1997, some residents of Yalikaka village and AFDL/APR
    units shot dead or killed with cold weapons 300 refugees in the village of Makako
    in the Opala territory.295
  • In April and May, along the road between Yaoleka and Anzi in the Opala
    territory, villagers killed several dozen refugees by attacking them with poisoned
    arrows or leaving poisoned food for them to find. By so doing, the villagers hoped
    to dissuade the refugees from setting up camp in their villages and, in some cases,
    to take their revenge for the acts of looting carried out by ex-FAR/Interahamwe
    units and refugees as they crossed the area. Between 25 and 30 refugees were
    killed at Yaata, 10 at Lilanga, 21 at Lekatelo and around forty at Otala, at the
    border with Équateur province.296
_______________
293 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January and February 2009; Documents
submitted to the Mapping Team on the events in Opala; K. Emizet, “The Massacre of Refugees in Congo:
A Case of UN Peacekeeping Failure and International Law”, The Journal of Modern African Studies,
Vol. 38, No. 02, 2000, p.177.
294 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January and February 2009; Documents
submitted to the Mapping Team on the events in Opala; K. Emizet, “The Massacre of Refugees in Congo:
A Case of UN Peacekeeping Failure and International Law”, The Journal of Modern African Studies,
Vol. 38, No. 2, 2000, p.177.
295 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January and February 2009; Documents
submitted to the Mapping Team.
296 Ibid.

254. The victory of AFDL/APR over the FAZ and ex-FAR/Interahamwe in Orientale
province failed to put an end to the massacre, forced disappearances and serious
violations of the rights of refugees in the province.
  • From May or June 1997, during a planned operation, AFDL/APR soldiers killed
    an unknown number of refugees, including some ex-FAR units, in the Bengamisa
    locality, 51 kilometres north of Kisangani. The victims had been kidnapped in
    Kisangani and the surrounding area and transported to a military base.297
    According to witnesses, the soldiers are alleged to have led the victims to believe
    that they were going to take them back to Rwanda by road. When they arrived at
    the camp buildings, the victims, who included a large number of women and
    children, were led outside in small groups. They were bound and their throats
    were cut or they were killed by hammer blows to the head. The bodies were then
    thrown into pits or doused with petrol and burned. The operation was carried out
    in a methodical manner and lasted at least one month. Before vacating the
    premises, the soldiers tried to erase all trace of the massacres. With the aid of a
    motor boat and a canoe, they dumped the bodies in the river rapids, along with
    some of the soil taken from the extermination site. They also detonated bombs in
    the camp to turn over the earth where the bodies had been buried. 298
255. After the closure of the Bengamisa camp, the AFDL/APR soldiers set up camp
around thirty kilometres away in the Alibuku locality. They set up a temporary camp five
kilometres from the village, in an unoccupied zone near a gravel quarry. They told the
villagers that they were looking for the Hutus who had killed the Tutsis in Rwanda and
asked them to help in their search. They set up a roadblock on the camp’s access road and
ordered the chef de secteur to ban the people from hunting in the surrounding forest.
  • From June 1997 and in the two or three months that followed, AFDL/APR units
    killed an unknown number of refugees around Alibuku. Twice a week, a truck
    carrying refugees arrived at the site, escorted by two AFDL/APR military jeeps.
    The victims were killed with cold weapons or bound and thrown alive from the
    hilltop into the rocky valley below. It is impossible to determine accurately the
    number of people killed at this site, but given the number of comings and goings,
    the victims probably run to several hundred. Before they left, the soldiers tried to
    erase all trace of the massacres. After they had left, however, a group of women
    from the village found many human remains at the scene.299
256. As in the other provinces, the victory of the AFDL/APR soldiers over the FAZ
did not signal the end of the serious violations of human rights of refugees in Orientale
province.
_______________
297 This was a former Gendarmerie camp near the river.
298 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, December 2008 and March 2009.
299 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, February 2009.

  • On 4 September 1997, at four o’clock in the morning, FAC300/APR soldiers took
    765 refugees from a transit camp eleven kilometres from Kisangani and forcibly
    repatriated them to Rwanda and Burundi without third-party witnesses (UN
    organisations or NGOs). The operation concerned 440 Rwandans and 325
    Burundians, including 252 women and 242 children.301
  • In September 1997, in the presence of the local administrative authorities,
    FAC/APR soldiers carried out a systematic search of houses around the Lula
    refugee camp, seven kilometres from Kisangani, to remove refugee children being
    sheltered by locals. According to one witness, the soldiers are alleged to have said
    that the Hutus were an evil race that would create problems for the Congolese.
    They also added that “even the children, once they became adults (...) would start
    to do unbelievable things”. Aid agencies were not involved in the repatriation of
    these children and their fate remains unknown.302
  • In November 1997, FAC/APR soldiers kidnapped 33 refugees at Kisangani
    General Hospital and took them to an unknown destination.303
  • Between January and February 1998, FAC/APR soldiers arrested four Rwandan
    refugees, including two minors, in Kisangani. Their fate is still unknown. The
    victims were members of the same family. The father had been teaching at the
    Université des Sciences in Kisangani since 1996.304
5. Équateur
257. The first refugees arrived in Équateur province in December 1996. This initial
group predominately comprised high-ranking civilian and military dignitaries from the
old Rwandan regime. The group headed swiftly towards Zongo via Gemena or Gbadolite,
and then crossed the Ubangi River to reach the Central African Republic. Most of the
refugees did not reach Équateur province until March or April 1997. They arrived on
foot, having crossed the forest west of the Kisangani-Ubundu road, and took the road
_______________
300 From June 1997, the national army of the DRC was known as the Forces armées congolaises (FAC).
Until the start of the Second Congo War, among the ranks of the FAC, in addition to the AFDL soldiers and
the ex-FAZ, were many Rwandan and, to a lesser extent, Ugandan soldiers. On account of the difficulty in
distinguishing clearly between Congolese and Rwandan soldiers at this time, the acronym FAC/APR has
been used for the period from June 1997 to August 1998.
301 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January, February and May 2009; UNHCR,
press release: “UNHCR condemns refugee expulsion from ex-Zaire”, 4 September 2009; Great Lakes
Briefing Notes, 5 September 2009.
302 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, May 2009.
303 Report on allegations of massacres and other human rights violations occurring in eastern Zaire (now
the DRC) since September 1996, prepared by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the
DRC, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, and a member of the
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (E/CN.4/1998/64).
304 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, February 2009.

towards Ikela. They then journeyed to the heart of the province along the Ikela-Boende
road, in the Tshuapa district. They travelled for the most part in groups of 50 to 200
people, accompanied by a few armed men. Some of the groups were made up exclusively
of ex-FAR and Interahamwe militiamen. Like in the other provinces, when they passed
through the villages, the latter committed acts of violence against the civilian populations.
For their part, the AFDL/APR soldiers reached Équateur province in April via Isangi and
Djolu.
  • On 22 April 1997, as they entered Boende, a town 560 kilometres from Mbandaka
    on the left bank of the Tshuapa River, AFDL/APR soldiers shot dead an unknown
    number of refugees at the ONATRA (state-owned transport authority) port. Many
    refugees tried to escape by jumping into the Tshuapa River but they drowned. The
    refugees in Boende had been waiting for a boat for Mbandaka for several weeks.
    A first boat carrying refugees had set sail a few weeks before.305
  • Towards 24 April, under AFDL/APR military escort, the refugees who had
    survived the killings of 22 April boarded canoes and began to cross the Tshuapa
    River. During the journey, the soldiers killed an unknown number of refugees at
    the dyke between the right bank of Boende and Lifomi, a village 14 kilometres
    from Boende.306
258. The AFDL/APR troops continued to kill refugees around Boende throughout
May, June and July 1997.307 By way of example, the Mapping Team was able to confirm
the following cases.
  • Towards the end of April 1997, AFDL/APR elements burned refugees alive in the
    village of Lolengi, 48 kilometres from Boende. The soldiers covered the victims’
    bodies with plastic sheeting, to which they then set fire.308
  • Around 9 May 1997, AFDL/APR units shot dead about twenty refugees near the
    Lofonda junction, 32 kilometres from Boende. The victims had emerged from the
    forest after the soldiers promised to help them return to Rwanda.309
259. Once Boende was captured by the AFDL/APR troops, the refugees on the Ikela
road, upriver from the town, fled in several directions. Some headed in the direction of
_______________
305 Interview with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March 2009; AEFJN (Africa Europe Faith and Justice
Network), “Rapport sur les violations des droits de l’homme dans le sud de l’Équateur”, 30 September
1997.
306 Ibid.
307 AEFJN, “Rapport sur les violations des droits de l’homme dans le sud de l’Équateur”, 30 September
1997.
308 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998;
AEFJN, “Rapport sur les violations des droits de l’homme dans le sud de l’Équateur,” 30 September 1997.
309 Ibid.

Monkoto, 218 kilometres south of Boende, crossed the Zaire River at Loukolela and
entered the Republic of the Congo. Others fled northwards and reached Basankusu via
Befale. Most continued to head westwards towards Ingende and Mbandaka, pursued by
AFDL/APR soldiers.
  • On 7 may 1997, AFDL/APR units killed at least 10 refugees in the village of
    Djoa, 310 kilometres from Mbandaka. The refugees had remained in the village
    awaiting medical care.310
  • Also on 7 May 1997, AFDL/APR units killed seven refugees in the village of
    Bekondji and two in the village of Buya.311
  • On 8 May 1997, AFDL/APR units killed nine refugees in Wele village, 25
    kilometres from the Ruki River, and thirty refugees on the Lolo dyke linking the
    village of Yele and the right bank of the Ruki River.312
  • Between 7 May and 9 May 1997, AFDL/APR units killed an unknown number of
    refugees along the sixty kilometres between Djoa and the Ruki River.313
260. Towards the end of April 1997, thousands of refugees had gathered on the right
bank of the Ruki River, waiting for a boat to Mbandaka. In two trips on 1 May and 8
May, the ferry from Ingende, requisitioned for this purpose by the Military Governor,
evacuated 4,200 refugees to Irebu, a former naval command centre 120 kilometres south
of Mbandaka. Others left for Mbandaka in canoes or on foot. The weakest refugees and
the sick, however, were unable to leave the area before the arrival of the AFDL/APR
soldiers.
  • On 12 May 1997, AFDL/APR units clubbed to death a dozen civilian refugees
    between the villages of Lomposo and Kalamba, 85 and seventy kilometres
    respectively from Mbandaka. On 11 May, AFDL/APR soldiers had arrived
    onboard two trucks and several jeeps and had spent the night in Itipo parish on the
    left bank of the Ruki River, approximately 187 kilometres from Mbandaka. On 12
    May, they set off again on the road to Mbandaka.314
261. After spending the night of 12 May to 13 May in the village of Kalamba, the
AFDL/APR troops reached Wendji, 20 kilometres from Mbandaka. 6000 refugees were
living in a local Red Cross makeshift camp in the village, near an old SECLI plant
_______________
310 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009; Letter from Losanganya groupement notables,
15 July 1997.
311 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
312 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
313 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009; HRW and FIDH (International Federation for
Human Rights), “What Kabila is hiding: Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo”, October 1997.
314 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, March/April 2009.

(Société équatoriale congolaise Lulonga-Ikelemba). They were not armed because the
Gendarmerie had confiscated their weapons. Under the aegis of the Bishop of Mbandaka,
an assistance and repatriation committee comprising members of the Catholic and
Protestant Churches and MSF, ICRC and Caritas, tried to help the refugees but, given
that AFDL/APR troops were advancing swiftly towards the zone, the committee elected
to arrange the evacuation of the refugees to Irebu.
  • On 13 May 1997, in the presence of a number of APR senior figures, AFDL/APR
    units killed at least 140 refugees in the village of Wendji. Upon their arrival in the
    village, the soldiers told the Zairians not to be afraid, as they had come for the
    refugees. They then made their way towards the camp and opened fire on the
    refugees. The refugees tried to escape but were trapped by soldiers arriving from
    the south. On the same day, the soldiers entered the local Red Cross office and
    killed unaccompanied minors who were awaiting repatriation to Rwanda. On 13
    May, the people of Wendji buried 116 bodies. A three-month-old baby who was
    still alive at the time of burial was killed by an AFDL/APR soldier who was
    overseeing the burial procedure. On 14 May, another 17 bodies were buried.315
262. While one group of AFDL/APR soldiers was massacring refugees in Wendji,
another headed towards Mbandaka onboard two trucks.
  • On the morning of 13 May 1997, the second group of AFDL/APR soldiers opened
    fire on an unknown number of refugees who had escaped Wendji and were trying
    to reach Mbandaka. 18 refugees in particular were killed at the village of Bolenge
    and three at the Catholic Mission of Iyonda.316
263. Around ten o’clock in the morning on 13 May 1997, several hundred refugees
raced into the streets of Mbandaka.
  • On 13 May 1997, AFDL/APR soldiers opened fire on the refugees who had just
    arrived in Mbandaka, and killed an unknown number of them near the Banque
    Centrale du Zaïre, on the Avenue Mobutu.317
264. The soldiers then entered the ONATRA port zone, where many refugees had been
waiting for days to board a boat for Irebu.
_______________
315 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, March/April 2009; Witness accounts gathered by the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998; Howard French, “Refugees From Congo
Give Vivid Accounts of Killings”, New York Times, 23 September 1997.
316 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, March 2009; AEFJN (Africa Europe Faith and Justice
Network), “Rapport sur les violations des droits de l’homme dans le sud de l’Équateur”, 30 September
1997.
317 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, March/April 2009; Witness accounts gathered by the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998.

  • On 13 May 1997, AFDL/APR units opened fire on refugees at the ONATRA port
    for five to ten minutes, killing an unknown number. The commanding officer then
    ordered the soldiers to stop firing and told the refugees to leave their hideouts.
    Some jumped into the Zaire River, hoping to escape. The AFDL/APR soldiers
    then took up position along the river and opened fire. Around two o’clock in the
    afternoon, the soldiers began to sort the refugees, then clubbed them to death. The
    next day, the commanding officer of the AFDL/APR soldiers authorised the local
    Red Cross to collect the bodies for burial in a mass grave five kilometres from
    Mbandaka, at the Bolenge Protestant Mission. However, many of the bodies at the
    ONATRA port were dumped in the river. According to some sources, at least 200
    people are thought to have been killed in this massacre.318
265. In the end, the survivors of the various massacres committed in the south of
Équateur province were moved into a camp at Mbandaka Airport. Starting on 22 May
1997, 13,000 refugees were repatriated by air to Rwanda. Most of the Rwandan refugees
who had managed to cross the Zaire River settled in the Republic of the Congo, in three
camps approximately 600 kilometres north of Brazzaville: Loukolela (6,500 refugees),
Liranga (5,500 refugees) and Ndjoundou (3,500 refugees).
266. In the second half of 1997, the new regime’s national and provincial authorities
systematically hindered the work of the Secretary-General’s fact-finding mission, which
was trying to investigate the Wendji and Mbandaka massacres. In November, the
Governor of Équateur province, Mola Motya, ordered the human remains from the mass
grave at Bolenge to be dug up to erase all trace of evidence before UN investigators could
reach the scene. The Minister of the Interior facilitated the exhumation by imposing a
curfew in Mbandaka town on 13 November.
267. The Wendji and Mbandaka massacres revealed the doggedness with which the
AFDL/APR soldiers killed the refugees. Although the refugees had often mixed with ex-
FAR/Interahamwe units during their flight across Congo/Zaire, by the time the
AFDL/APR soldiers arrived in Mbandaka and Wendji, most of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe
had already left the zone, as had the FAZ soldiers. Despite this, the AFDL/APR soldiers
continued to treat the refugees as armed combatants and military targets.
C. Attacks against other civilian populations
268. During their flight, members of President Mobutu’s security services and the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe killed a large number of civilians and committed acts of rape and
pillage. As they advanced towards Kinshasa, in addition to vast swathes of refugees, the
_______________
318 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, March/April 2009; confidential documents submitted to
the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998; AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese
forests”, 1997, pp.6–8; Gandhi International, “Rapport d’activités avec addendum sur les violations des
droits de l’homme et le dossier de massacre sur les réfugiés”, 1997; Raymond Bonner, ”For Hutu Refugees,
Safety and Heartbreak”, New York Times, 6 June 1997; John Pomfret, “Massacres Were a Weapon in
Congo’s Civil War; Evidence Mounts of Atrocities by Kabila’s Forces”, Washington Post, 11 June 1997.

AFDL/APR soldiers massacred a large number of Hutu Banyarwanda. They also
eliminated many civilians suspected of assisting the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and Burundian
Hutu armed groups, participating in the killings of Tutsis/Banyamulenge, helping the
refugees as they fled or supporting President Mobutu’s regime. After President Laurent-
Désiré Kabila came to power in Kinshasa, the new security forces committed serious
violations of human rights against civilians viewed as opponents of the new regime and
of the continued presence of APR soldiers in the Congolese territory.
1. North Kivu
Goma city
269. On 29 October 1996, having captured the Rumangabo military base between
Goma and Rutshuru, near the Rwandan border, AFDL/APR troops launched an attack on
the city of Goma.
  • Between 29 October and 1 November 1996, the struggle for the control of Goma
    caused the deaths of an unknown number of civilians. During the fighting, FAZ
    soldiers committed many acts of looting.319
  • After the capture of Goma, on 1 November 1996, AFDL/APR troops killed or
    forced the disappearance of an unknown number of civilians, including many
    influential members of the Hutu Banyarwanda community. They also killed
    several FAZ units that were out of combat, including soldiers undergoing
    treatment at Goma General Hospital.320 In the week of 2 November to 9
    November, Équipe d’urgence de la biodiversité (EUB)321 removed 776 bodies
    from the streets of the town. Some of the victims had been killed by stray bullets
    but others had been deliberately executed. The AFDL/APR troops also proceeded
    to systematically pillage the town, even attacking the stores and offices of aid
    agencies such as the ICRC and those of UN organisations like WFP and
    UNHCR.322
270. In spite of the capture of Goma by AFDL/APR forces, the ex-FAR/Interahamwe
from the Mugunga camp remained active in the area around the city. On 3 November
1996, they looted vehicles and property from the Grand Séminaire in Buhimba, on the
outskirts of Goma.
_______________
319 Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team on serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law in the DRC (S/1998/581), Annex, p.39 and p.47; Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2), p.7.
320 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, March 2009.
321 Équipe d’urgence de la biodiversité (EUB), “Rapport final des activités de ramassage et inhumation de
corps”, February 1997. EUB was a Congolese NGO working on the issue of the environmental effects (e.g.
deforestation) of the presence of high numbers of refugees in the region. The NGO had been contracted to
bury the bodies in the vicinity of Goma.
322 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008.

  • On 6 November 1996, ex-FAR/Interahamwe units and Zairian gunmen killed
    three Tutsi members of religious orders at the Grand Séminaire in Buhimba, not
    far from the Mugunga refugee camp. The victims – two abbots and a nun – failed
    to escape from the Grand Séminaire when the building came under attack on 3
    November. After hiding out for three days, they were stopped and killed when
    they went in search of food and water. A fourth person, of Tutsi ethnic origin, was
    saved.323
Rutshuru territory
  • In the night of 5 June to 6 June 1996, at Bunagana, a village on the Ugandan
    border, armed units identified as APR and UPDF soldiers killed between 28 and
    36 civilians, most of them Hutu Banyarwanda.324 According to some sources,
    Tutsis from Bunagana are thought to have been used as scouts, pointing out the
    houses of people to be killed to the commandos.325
271. AFDL/APR soldiers began to infiltrate the Bwisha chiefdom in October 1996.
Towards mid-October, AFDL/APR units launched their first attack on the FAZ military
base at Rumangabo. Aided by ex-FAR/Interahamwe units from the Katale and Mugunga
refugee camps, the FAZ drove back the attackers. In the days that followed, additional
AFDL/APR soldiers infiltrated the southern part of Rutshuru territory via the Virunga
National Park and the Kibumba camp. The new infiltrators cut off the road between the
Katale and Mugunga refugee camps and the FAZ military base, with a view to launching
a second attack on Rumangabo. From the start of the infiltrations, AFDL/APR troops
massacred civilian populations in the Bweza and Rugari groupements. The victims were
principally Hutu Banyarwanda.326
272. In almost every instance, the massacres by the AFDL/APR soldiers followed the
same pattern. Upon entering a locality, they ordered the people to gather together for a
wide variety of reasons. Once they were assembled, the civilians were bound and killed
by blows of hammers or hoes to the head. Many witnesses have claimed to have spotted a
large number of Tutsi Banyarwanda youths who had left Rutshuru territory between 1990
and 1996 among the AFDL/APR soldiers. According to several witnesses, the
AFDL/APR soldiers displayed a clear desire for revenge in their massacres of the Hutu
Banyarwanda, targeting villages where Tutsis had been persecuted in the past.
_______________
323 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008 and March 2009.
324 The term “Banyarwanda” denotes peoples originating from Rwanda and living in the province of North
Kivu.
325 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008; WFP (World Food Programme),
“Emergency Report No. 22 of 1996”, 7 June 1996; AI, “Zaire – Lawlessness and insecurity in North- and
South-Kivu”, 1996, p.10.
326 Locally, these Hutu Banyarwanda are known as Banyabwisha or Hutus from the Bwisha chiefdom.

  • On 20 October 1996, AFDL/APR units killed between 70 and 150 civilians in the
    Musekera locality in the Bweza groupement, in the south of the Rutshuru
    territory. The soldiers had come to the village the previous night but had found
    no-one there, as the people had fled. On 20 October, they made a surprise return
    to the village and swiftly ordered the civilians, who were mostly Hutu
    Banyarwanda, to gather in the maison communale, or village hall, under the
    pretext that they were going to hand out food and drink to them. The victims were
    shut in the maison communale, bound and clubbed to death. Their bodies were
    then thrown into a latrine.327
  • Around 20 October 1996, AFDL/APR units killed dozens of civilians, mostly
    Hutu Banyarwanda, in the village of Tanda, near Musekera. The victims were
    killed with blows of hammers and small hoes. Before they left, the soldiers
    torched the village.328
  • Around 30 October 1996, AFDL/APR units killed over 800 people, including
    women and children, in the villages of Bisoko, Mugwata, Ngugo and Kuri-Rugari
    in the Rugari groupement in Rutshuru territory. In the days leading up to the
    attack there had been violent clashes between the AFDL/APR soldiers and the
    FAZ/ex-FAR/Interahamwe around the Rumangabo military base, located near
    these villages. In November, a local committee compiled a list of the victims
    containing 830 names. During the massacres the soldiers also pillaged the
    villages.329
273. On 26 October 1996, AFDL/APR soldiers captured Rutshuru town, the
administrative headquarters of Rutshuru territory.
  • On 26 October 1996, AFDL/APR units killed an unknown number of Hutu
    Banyarwanda civilians in the camp for displaced people at Nyongera, several
    kilometres from Rutshuru. The soldiers surrounded the camp and then opened
    fire. The victims were mostly Hutu Banyarwanda from the Bwito chiefdom in
    Rutshuru territory. They had been living in the camp for several years due to the
    prevailing climate of violence in the Bwito chiefdom. According to one source,
    however, the massacre is thought to have been preceded by a brief exchange of
    fire between the AFDL/APR soldiers and the ex-Far/Interahamwe.330
274. When the AFDL/APR troops entered Rutshuru, the inhabitants of the surrounding
villages fled into the hills in the Busanza groupement.
_______________
327 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February and April 2009.
328 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February and April 2009.
329 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February and March 2009.
330 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and February and April 2009.

  • On 30 October 1996, AFDL/APR units killed at least 350 civilians, most of them
    Hutu Banyarwanda, with blows of hammers to the head in Rutshuru town centre,
    close to the ANP house.331 In the days leading up to the massacres, the soldiers
    had appealed to civilians who had fled the village of Kiringa, one kilometre from
    Rutshuru, to return home to attend a large public meeting on 30 October. When
    they returned to the village, the inhabitants of Kiringa were led to Rutshuru town
    centre and shut away in the ANP house. In the afternoon, the soldiers began to
    compile a register and asked people of Nande ethnic origin to return home. They
    then separated the men and women on the grounds that the women had to go and
    prepare the meal. The women were taken to the Maison de la Poste, where they
    were executed. The men were bound and led in pairs to a sand quarry several
    dozen metres from the ANP house. All of them were then executed with blows of
    hammers.332
275. Over the course of the weeks that followed, AFDL/APR soldiers committed many
massacres in villages in the Busanza, Kisigari and Jomba groupements, to the south and
east of Rutshuru. The victims were principally Hutu Banyarwanda civilians.
  • Towards the end of October 1996, AFDL/APR units killed between 30 and 60
    people, most of them Hutu Banyarwanda, in the villages of Kashwa and Burayi,
    close to Rutshuru. Most of the victims had been bound before they were executed
    with blows of hammers or hoes. Some of the victims were shot dead.333
  • Also towards the end of October 1996, AFDL/APR units killed around one
    hundred civilians, most of them Hutu Banyarwanda, in the villages of the Kisigari
    groupement in the Rutshuru territory, notably Mushoro, Biruma, Kabaya and
    Kazuba. The soldiers had rounded up the residents under the pretext that they
    were going to attend a meeting. Most of the victims were killed with blows of
    hoes or hammers to the head. Some died when they were trapped in their houses
    and burned alive. Others died after being thrown into the latrines.334
  • Around 29 October 1996, AFDL/APR units forced the disappearance of an abbot
    and four nuns in the Jomba parish, in the Rutshuru territory. The victims were all
_______________
331 The Albert National Park (ANP) is the former name of the Virunga National Park.
332 Interviews with MONUC Human Rights Office, North Kivu, October 2005; CREDDHO (Research
Centre on Environment, Democracy, and Human Rights), “Appel urgent sur la découverte des fosses
communes en territoire de Rutshuru”, October 2005; APREDECI, “Mission d’enquête sur la situation des
droits de l’homme dans la province du Nord-Kivu”, pp.11 and 12.
333 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, March 2009.
334 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, January, March and April 2009.

Hutu Banyarwanda. They were last seen talking to AFDL/APR soldiers. Their
bodies have never been found.335
  • For several weeks, between October and November 1996, AFDL/APR units
    arrested and killed an unknown number of Hutu Banyarwanda civilians in a
    building where the AFDL/APR staff were based in Rutshuru town centre.336 The
    victims had been intercepted at the checkpoints set up at the entrance to Rutshuru
    and near the Mondo Giusto hydroelectric plant. The victims’ bodies were then
    dumped in the Fuko River.337
  • On 18 November 1996, AFDL/APR units massacred several hundred Hutu
    Banyarwanda at the Mugogo market, 31 kilometres from Rutshuru. Upon their
    arrival, the soldiers announced that they were going to organise a meeting to
    introduce the new chief of the locality to the people. After asking non-Hutus and
    the people of Kiwanja338 to leave, the soldiers opened fire on the crowd. Some of
    the victims were killed with blows of hammers or pestles to the head. The early
    1990s had borne witness to a conflict over land ownership at the Shinda
    plantation between the people of Mugogo village and a Tutsi family. Villagers
    had murdered a member of the Tutsi family.339 In 2005, the people of Mugogo
    submitted a list to MONUC Human Rights Office containing the names of 1,589
    victims.
  • In early November 1996, AFDL/APR units killed several hundred Hutu
    Banyarwanda in a former IZCN (Zairian Institute for Nature Conservation) camp
    at Kabaraza, at the entrance to Virunga National Park, 20 kilometres from
    Rutshuru. The victims were Hutu Banyarwanda who had been apprehended in
    Ngwenda village at a checkpoint where soldiers would sort people according to
    their ethnic origin. The soldiers had led them to the former IZCN camp under the
    pretext that they were going to cultivate bean fields as part of a community
    project. When they arrived at the camp, the soldiers killed them with pestles.
    According to most sources, the total number of victims is thought to be as high as
    600 people.340
_______________
335 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008 and February 2009; Report on the
situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2), p.7; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire des
crimes impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.76; Luc de l’Arbre, “Ils étaient tous fidèles, nos martyrs
et témoins de l’amour en RDC”, November 2005, p.177.
336 This building was located near the Bwisha chief’s house.
337 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009.
338 Kiwanja is a village near Rutshuru, with a predominately Nande population.
339 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and February/April 2009; Witness
account gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998; APREDECI,
“Mission d’enquête sur la situation des droits de l’homme dans la province du Nord-Kivu”, p.13; CEREBA
(Centre d’études et de recherche en éducation de base pour le développement intégré), “Rapport de mission
en territoire de Rutshuru”, October 2005, p.19; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire des crimes impunis, la
tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, pp.101 and 102.
340 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and February/March 2009.

276. From late 1996 onwards, the AFDL/APR soldiers began to mass-recruit among
the Congolese population. Most of the new recruits were children (CAAFAG),341
commonly known as the Kadogo (“small ones” in Swahili).
  • In late 1996, AFDL/APR units recruited many minors in the villages around the
    Kashwa locality in the Gisigari groupement in Rutshuru territory, and in those
    around Ngungu in the Masisi territory. Recruiting officers went into the village
    schools, promising the children food or money. They also forcibly enlisted an
    unknown number of children. Some of the recruits were barely ten years old.
    Most of the area’s recruits received minimal military training at the Matebe camp
    located near Rutshuru town centre. During their stay at the camp, the children
    were tortured and subjected to various kinds of cruel, inhuman and degrading
    treatment. They were raped and received only very little food. They were then
    sent straight to the front line.342
  • On 7 may 1997, AFDL/APR units killed over 300 civilians in the villages of the
    Chanzerwa locality in the Binja groupement. When they arrived in the villages,
    the soldiers burst into houses and killed an unknown number of civilians with
    hatchets. They then captured an unknown number of civilians and led them to the
    village of Buhimba. Having bound and imprisoned them in the main building and
    courtyard at the church of the 8th CEPAC (Community of Pentecostal Churches in
    Central Africa), they killed them with blows of hoes to the head. Those who tried
    to escape were shot dead. The bodies were then thrown into the latrines, not far
    from the church. The AFDL/APR troops indiscriminately killed men, women and
    children. Most of the victims were Hutu Banyarwanda, but many Nande were also
    massacred at Buhimba. According to several survivors, the AFDL/APR soldiers
    killed several children by dashing their heads against walls or tree trunks. In all,
    334 victims were recorded.343
  • On 26 May 1997, AFDL/APR units kidnapped and forced the disappearance of at
    least 17 civilians from the village of Vitshumbi, on the edge of Lake Edward. The
    victims were accused of killing an AFDL/APR soldier who had died a short while
    earlier in unexplained circumstances. 22 villagers were led to the Rwindi tourist
    complex to be interrogated. Five were eventually freed but the others were never
    seen again.344
_______________
341 Children involved with armed forces and armed groups.
342 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, March and April 2009.
343 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, April 2009.
344 Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire des crimes impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.102;
APREDECI, “Mission d’enquête sur la situation des droits de l’homme en province du Nord-Kivu”, 1997;
AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997, p.18.

Bwito chiefdom345
277. After the Katale and Kahindo refugee camps were dismantled, many Rwandan
Hutu refugees roamed the Bwito chiefdom until March 1997. They frequently mixed with
the local population, which comprised mainly Hutu Banyarwanda.
  • At the end of October 1996, a few weeks after the attack on the Katale refugee
    camp, AFDL/APR units killed at least 88 civilians, mostly Hutu Banyarwanda, in
    the village of Rusovu in the Tongo groupement. After rounding up the residents,
    the soldiers shut them away in around 15 houses, then killed them with blows of
    hoes and hammers to the head. They then set fire to the houses.346
  • In November or December 1996, AFDL/APR soldiers killed at least 200 civilians,
    most of them Hutu Banyarwanda, in the Bambu groupement, notably in the
    villages of Musanza, Marangara, Kanyangili, Kagando and Kishishe. In Kagando,
    the soldiers asked the villagers to assemble so they could receive food and salt.
    They then locked them in small groups in houses which they torched.347
  • Also in November or December 1996, elements of the AFDL/APR killed 85 Hutu
    Banyarwanda civilians in the village of Duane in the Tongo groupement. Having
    been arrested during a combing operation, the victims were bound and locked in a
    house, which the soldiers then torched. The victims were burned alive and their
    bodies buried in small groups of four or five in mass graves.348
  • On 31 December 1996, elements of the AFDL/APR killed around 300 civilians,
    most of them Hutu Banyarwanda, including women and children, in the village of
    Bukombo in the Rutshuru territory. On their arrival, the soldiers asked the
    residents to gather in order to attend a meeting. They then surrounded them and
    opened fire on the crowd. Before leaving the village, the soldiers looted medicine
    supplies and destroyed the hospital.349
  • On 11 March 1997, elements of the AFDL/APR killed dozens of civilians, most
    of them Hutu Banyarwanda, including women and children, in the village of
    Mushababwa in the Bambu groupement. Upon their arrival, the soldiers asked the
________________345 Bwito is one of two chiefdoms in Rutshuru territory. It is located in the west of the territory.
346 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, April 2009; CEREBA, “Rapport de mission en
territoire de Rutshuru”, October 2005, p.29.
347 Ibid.
348 Ibid.
349 Witness account gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998;
Report on the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2), p.6.

people to gather together in order to attend a meeting. They then surrounded the
civilians and opened fire indiscriminately.350
  • On 13 March 1997, elements of the AFDL/APR killed several hundred people,
    most of them Hutu Banyarwanda, in the village of Kazuba in the Bukombo
    locality. Upon their arrival in the village, the soldiers asked the pastor of the
    Adventist church to gather the people together to attend a meeting. The civilians
    who went to the church were shot dead. Other civilians were burned alive when
    their houses were set on fire. The soldiers indiscriminately killed men, women
    and children.351
  • Between 12 April and 19 April 1997, elements of the AFDL/APR killed over one
    hundred civilians, most of them Hutu Banyarwanda, in the village of Kabizo. The
    soldiers had asked the people to gather in order to attend a meeting. Most of the
    victims were clubbed to death. The bodies were piled into village houses, which
    were then set on fire. One source put forward a figure of 157 victims.352
Masisi territory
  • On the evening of 6 November 1996, in the villages of Tebero and Njango, “Hutu
    armed units”353 opened fire, threw grenades and fired rockets at trucks
    transporting several hundred civilians, most of them of Nande ethnic origin. On
    the morning of 7 November, armed units massacred survivors and systematically
    robbed the passengers before setting fire to the vehicles. According to some
    sources, 760 bodies were buried in three mass graves. The victims had left Goma
    on 6 November and were trying to reach the north of the province by road. The
    precise motive behind this massacre has not been determined.354
_______________
350 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and January 2009; AI, “Deadly
alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997, p.8; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire des crimes impunis, la
tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.94; APREDECI, GVP, CRE, “L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, 1997, p.36;
AZADHO, “Droits de l’homme au Nord-Kivu. Une année d’administration AFDL: Plus ça change plus
c’est la même chose”, 1997, p.17.
351 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and February 2009; CEREBA,
“Rapport de mission en territoire de Rutshuru”, October 2005, p.30.
352 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, April 2009; AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese
forests”, 1997, p.9; APREDECI, “Mission d’enquête sur la situation des droits de l’homme dans la province
du Nord-Kivu”, 1997, p.31; CEREBA, “Rapport de mission en territoire de Rutshuru”, October 2005, p.29.
353 It was not possible to determine whether these were ex-FAR/Interahamwe or Hutu Banyarwanda
militiamen.
354 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008 and February 2009; APREDECI,
“Mission d’enquête sur la situation des droits de l’homme dans la province du Nord-Kivu”, 1997, p.31;
APREDECI, “Rapport circonstanciel, novembre 1996 et ses événements”, 1996; AZADHO, press release,
“Massacre de plus de 500 personnes dans la localité de Kitchanga, zone de Masisi, par une bande armée”, 6
December 1996.

  • Towards mid-November 1996, fleeing ex-FAR/Interahamwe killed between five
    and eleven civilians in the village of Ngungu.355
  • On 5 December 1996, elements of the AFDL/APR killed at least 97 people in the
    village of Matanda. The majority of the victims were Hutu refugees and Hutu
    Banyarwanda.356
  • On 7 December 1996, elements of the AFDL/APR killed around 310 civilians,
    including a large number of women and children, in the village of Kinigi in the
    Masisi territory. The soldiers had accused the local people, most of them Hutu
    Banyarwanda, of sheltering ex-FAR/Interahamwe. When they arrived, however,
    the ex-FAR/Interahamwe had already left the village. First, the soldiers tried to
    reassure civilians by telling them that they had nothing to fear. They then asked
    them to assemble in several buildings, including the Adventist church and the
    Rubona primary school, to attend a meeting. In the afternoon, the AFDL/APR
    soldiers entered the buildings and killed the villagers with hoes and hatchets to the
    head. They also killed some civilians in their homes. The bodies were buried at
    Kinigi in several mass graves.357
  • On 9 December 1996, elements of the AFDL/APR killed around 280 civilians in
    the village of Katoyi, in the south-west of the Masisi territory. When they arrived,
    the soldiers asked the tribal chief to gather the people together for a meeting.
    They then surrounded the civilians who had gathered in the village centre and
    bound them before killing them with cold weapons and small axes. Those who
    tried to escape were shot dead. The victims included a large number of women
    and children, as well as Rwandan refugees.358
  • Around 23 December 1996, elements of the AFDL/APR killed over 460 Hutu
    Banyarwanda civilians, mostly men, in the village of Kausa, near the Nyamitaba
    locality. When they arrived, the soldiers explained that they were only looking for
    the Interahamwe and that they had come to reconcile the communities. They then
    asked the people to convene in the village square to attend a meeting. They then
    fired shots and bound the civilians. Some were locked in buildings, while others
    were led into the fields around the village. Still others were led on to the
    Kanyabihanga hill. Most of the victims were killed with hammer blows. Those
_______________
355 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, March 2009.
356 APREDECI, GVP, CRE, ”L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, 1997; Peacelink, “Rapport du Kivu - bilan
victimes, territoire de Masisi”, undated. Available online at the following address:
http://ospiti.peacelink.it/bukavu/znews047.html.
357 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and February/March 2009;
APREDECI, GVP, CRE, “L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, 1997, p.27; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire
des crimes impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.85.
358 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and February 2009; Didier Kamundu
Batundi, Mémoire des crimes impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.86; APREDECI, GVP, CRE,
“L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, 1997, p.30.

who tried to escape were shot dead. After the massacre, the soldiers raped many
women. A large number of women and children, as well as Rwandan refugee
survivors of the Mugunga camp, were among the victims.359
  • On 24 December or 25 December 1996, elements of the AFDL/APR from
    Kilolirwe killed around 160 civilians in the Nyakariba parish, in the Masisi
    territory. Upon their arrival in the village, the soldiers ordered the people of
    Nyamitaba and Nyakariba to gather in the parish of Nyakariba to attend a
    meeting. The victims were bound before being killed with hammer blows to the
    head. Those who tried to escape were shot dead. At least one priest was killed in
    this attack. The bodies of the victims were thrown into several mass graves
    located near the dispensary, the parish church and a place known as Camp Nord.
    In 1997, AFDL/APR soldiers returned to dig up the remains, some of which were
    burned at the scene.360
  • From late 1996 and over the course of the months that followed, elements of the
    AFDL/APR based on the Mufunzi hill kidnapped and killed an unknown number
    of civilians in the hills around Ngungu. The soldiers arrested civilians suspected
    of collaborating with Hutu militiamen at checkpoints they had set up on the main
    routes around the area. They also carried out frequent raids on the villages of
    Ngungu, Murambi, Kashovu, Karangara, Mumba, Kibabi and Nyambisi. Different
    sources report the number of victims as anywhere between one dozen and several
    hundred. The region’s inhabitants named the Mufunzi hill Nyabihanga, which
    means “place of the skulls” in Kinyarwanda.361
  • At the end of December 1996, AFDL/APR soldiers killed between 16 and 22
    people and set fire to houses in the village of Muheto, ten kilometres from
    Nyakariba. In early 1997, they returned to Muheto and killed 16 civilians.362
  • On 9 January 1997, elements of the AFDL/APR killed between 107 and 134
    civilians in the village of Bitonga in the Masisi territory. Arriving in the village
    very early in the morning, the soldiers accused the local people, most of them
_______________
359 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and January 2009; Report of the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team (S/1998/581), Annex, p.48; Report on the situation of human rights
in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2), p.7; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire des crimes impunis, la tragédie
du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.96; APREDECI, GVP, CRE, “L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, 1997, p.34; Grande
Vision pour la défense des droits de l’homme, “Rapport sur les violations des droits de l’homme dans la
zone agropastorale de Masisi”, March 1997, p.4.
360 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and January 2009; Report on the
situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2), para. 21; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire
des crimes impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.97; La Grande Vision, “Rapport sur les violations
des droits de l’homme dans la zone agropastorale de Masisi”, March 1997, p.4.
361 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and March/April 2009.
362 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and January 2009; Grande Vision,
“Rapport sur les violations des droits de l’homme dans la zone agropastorale de Masisi”, March 1997, p.3.

Hutu Banyarwanda, of collaborating with ex-FAR/Interahamwe. The soldiers then
opened fire and threw grenades at the civilians.363
  • Around 20 January 1997, elements of the AFDL/APR killed 14 members of the
    same family, including children, in a house in Kanyangote village, near the
    Matanda parish.364
  • On 25 January 1997, elements of the AFDL/APR killed at least 20 Hutu
    Banyarwanda civilians in the village of Kalangala. The soldiers had asked the
    villagers to convene in order to attend a meeting. They then surrounded them and
    opened fire.365
  • On 23 February 1997, during military operations targeting Hutu armed units
    operating in the region, AFDL/APR soldiers killed over one hundred civilians,
    most of them Hutu Banyarwanda, in the village of Rubaya. Some of the victims
    were shot dead. Others were killed with cold weapons or burned alive in their
    homes. A large number of women and children were among the victims.366
  • Towards 23 February 1997, elements of the AFDL/APR killed an unknown
    number of civilians in the village of Nambi. The soldiers arrived in the village
    while the cattle market was being held and accused certain civilians of stealing
    cattle. They then kidnapped between 30 and 50 civilians. That evening shots were
    heard, and the next day 15 bodies, including those of two women, were found on
    the Kayonde hill. To date, the bodies of the other victims have never been
    found.367
  • In April 1997, elements of the AFDL/APR from Mushake, Kilolirwe and
    Ruvunda killed an unknown number of civilians in the village of Chandarama.
    The victims were shot dead or killed with blows of hoes. According to one source,
    only the men are thought to have been killed. The residents of the villages from
_______________
363 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and March 2009; Report on the
situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2), p.6; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire des
crimes impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.81.
364 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, March and April 2009.
365 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and February/March 2009;
APREDECI, GVP, CRE, “L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, 1997, p.25; La Grande Vision, “Rapport sur les
violations des droits de l’homme dans la zone agropastorale de Masisi”, March 1997, p.4.
366 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, March 2009; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire des
crimes impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.86; APREDECI, GVP, CRE, “L’Apocalypse au Nord-
Kivu”, 1997, p.28.
367 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009; Witness account gathered by the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998; Report of the Secretary-General’s
Investigative Team (S/1998/581), Annex, p.48; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire des crimes impunis, la
tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.83.

which the victims came buried the bodies at a number of locations, most of them near the Kinyabibuga River.368
  • Around 16 April 1997, elements of the AFDL/APR massacred around one
    hundred civilians at Mweso. The victims, most of them Hutu Banyarwanda, were
    on their way to the Kabizo market when the soldiers, based on the Kilumbu hill,
    requested their attendance at a public meeting. Some of the victims were then shot
    dead. Others were burned alive in a house. Several bodies were dumped in the
    Mweso River. Others were buried in a mass grave behind the Mweso parish.369
  • On 9 July 1997, FAC/APR370 units killed 17 civilians and looted the village of
    Ruzirantaka. The soldiers had come to raid the house of the school principal, but
    during the raid an argument broke out and an AFDL/APR soldier was killed. To
    cover up the death vis-à-vis their superiors, the soldiers decided to create an
    incident and killed 16 villagers.371
  • On 12 July 1997, a coalition between the Mayi-Mayi, Hutu armed units and
    members of village self-defence groups killed between 7 and 20 people, most of
    them Tutsi Banyarwanda, in the village of Ngungu. Following the massacre,
    FAC/APR units attacked and destroyed the villages of Katovu, Ufamando,
    Musongati, Kabingo, Rubaya, Kanyenzuki, Kibabi and Ngungu. The precise
    number of victims is still unknown.372
  • Around August 1997, FAC/APR units burned alive several hundred civilians,
    most of them Hutu Banyarwanda, in the village of Mushangwe. After ordering
    local people to convene in a building to attend a meeting, the AFDL/APR soldiers
    set fire to the building.373
278. After President Kabila came to power in Kinshasa, the alliance between the
AFDL/APR and the Hunde Mayi-Mayi swiftly deteriorated. Accusing the new regime of
trying to marginalise them in the new army and refusing to accept the long-term presence
_______________
368 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and April 2009; APREDECI, GVP,
CRE, “L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, 1997, p.35.
369 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008; AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese
forests”, 1997, p.15; APREDECI, GVP, CRE, “L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, 1997, p.35.
370 As mentioned before, from June 1997 the national army of the DRC was known as the Forces armées
congolaises (FAC). Until the start of the Second Congo War, in addition to AFDL soldiers and ex-FAZ, the
FAC included many Rwandan and, to a lesser extent, Ugandan soldiers. On account of the difficulty
distinguishing accurately between Congolese soldiers and Rwandan soldiers at this time, the acronym
FAC/APR is used for the period from June 1997 to August 1998.
371 APREDECI, “Mission d’enquête sur la situation des droits de l’homme dans la province du Nord-Kivu”,
1997, p.38; AZADHO, “Une année d’administration AFDL: plus ça change plus c’est la même chose”,
1997.
372 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, March 2009.
373 AZADHO, ”Une année d’administration AFDL: plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose”, 1997, p.5;
AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997, p.8.

of APR soldiers in the two Kivu provinces, a number of Mayi-Mayi groups decided to
take up the armed struggle again. On 22 July 1997, violent clashes broke out in the
village of Katale, twelve kilometres from Masisi, where the AFDL/APR had a military
base. On 29 July, FAC/APR soldiers received reinforcements from Goma and embarked
on a combing operation in the vicinity of Masisi. During the operation, they committed
many acts of violence against the predominately Hunde civilian population, whom they
accused of supporting the Mayi-Mayi.
  • On 29 July 1997, FAC/APR units from the Katale military camp killed around
    fifty civilians, including women and children, in the banana plantations and fields
    surrounding the village of Mutiri, next to Masisi town. The victims, who had fled
    the village when the soldiers arrived, were captured and bound before being shot
    or killed by hammer blows to the head. Killings also took place in the surrounding
    villages, such as Kiterire. The soldiers then headed to Nyabiondo, nineteen
    kilometres from Masisi. On the way, they killed several dozen civilians and
    pillaged and torched at least a dozen villages, including Kanii, Masisi, Bulwa,
    Buabo, Bangabo, Kihuma, Luashi, Bukombo, Kamarambo and Kinyanguto.374
Nyiragongo territory (Petit Nord)
279. Situated between the city of Goma and the Mount Nyiragongo volcano,
Nyiragongo is the smallest territory in the province of North Kivu. One refugee camp
was located in this territory, on the Goma to Rutshuru road. From mid-October 1996,
AFDL/APR soldiers moved on to the small strip of land of the Virunga National Park
between the village of Rugari, in the Rutshuru territory, and Kibumba, in the Nyiragongo
territory.
  • Around 19 October 1996, unidentified men armed with guns and rocket launchers
    killed at least one hundred people between the villages of Rugari and Kibumba.
    The victims were killed in a series of attacks on vehicles on the Goma to Rutshuru
    road. 18 members of a Butembo football team who were on their way to Goma
    were killed when rockets were fired at their minibus. According to one source,
    members of the FAZ appointed to oversee the security of the vehicles were
    among the victims. The survivors were pursued by the attackers and killed in the
    forest.375
  • On 12 April 1997, AFDL/APR units killed at least 33 people in the villages of
    Kanyati and Mudja. Upon their arrival at Kanyati, the soldiers asked the people to
    follow them to help them find Interahamwe. On the way, they ordered the
    civilians to lie on the ground and opened fire, killing 23 people. In the afternoon,
_______________
374 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008-January 2009; APREDECI, GVP,
CRE, “L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, 1997, pp.55 and 56; AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese forests”,
1997, p.15 and 16; APREDECI, GVP, CRE, “L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, 1997, pp.55 and 56.
375 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and March/April 2009.

they entered Mudja and opened fire on the people, killing ten civilians and
injuring four. The soldiers had accused the people of Mudja of bartering supplies
and coal with the Interahamwe operating near Goma.376
Territories of Beni and Lubero (Grand Nord)
280. In 1997 and 1998, the AFDL/APR soldiers (known as the Forces Armées
Congolaises (FAC) from June 1997377) and those of the APR committed massacres in the
territories of Lubero and Beni. As the local population is 95% Nande and few refugees
attempted their escape via these two territories, these massacres fulfilled a different logic
to that observed in the territories of Masisi and Rutshuru. The main massacres took place
in 1997 after the breakdown of the alliance between the AFDL/APR soldiers and the
numerous local Mayi-Mayi groups. Denouncing the constant interference of Rwanda in
the region and the brutal methods used by the AFDL/APR soldiers towards refugees and
local people alike, many Mayi-Mayi groups distanced themselves and then entered into
conflict with them. In response, the AFDL/APR soldiers carried out several attacks on
populations suspected of collaborating with Mayi-Mayi groups.
  • On 6 January 1997, AFDL/APR units killed 184 people and torched the village of
    Kyavinyonge, in the Beni territory. The soldiers, who had come from Butembo,
    were pursuing Mayi-Mayi units from Kasindi. The “Kasindian” Mayi-Mayi had
    made Kyavinyonge one of their strongholds. Two weeks before the massacre,
    violent clashes took place forty kilometres from Kyavinyonge in the village of
    Kyondo, forcing AFDL/APR troops to withdraw to Butembo. Having driven the
    Mayi-Mayi out of Kyavinyonge, the soldiers asked some of the civilians to come
    out of their houses and shot them dead. They also threw grenades at dwellings,
    resulting in many casualties. Among the 184 bodies recovered was that of a
    pastor, killed while he was trying to persuade soldiers to spare the civilians who
    were sheltering in his church. The victims’ bodies were buried in various mass
    graves located in the village.378
  • At the start of January 1998, FAC/APR soldiers killed an unknown number of
    people in the village of Kyavinyonge. The soldiers had come to Kyavinyonge to
_______________
376 AZADHO, ”Une année d’administration AFDL: plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose”, 1997, p.30;
APREDECI, GVP, CRE, “L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, 1997, p.42; APREDECI, “Rapport sur le massacre
de Mudja”, 25 April 1997; AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997, p.14.
377 As mentioned before, from June 1997 the national army of the DRC was known as the Forces armées
congolaises (FAC). Until the start of the Second Congo War, in addition to AFDL soldiers and ex-FAZ, the
FAC included many Rwandan and, to a lesser extent, Ugandan soldiers. On account of the difficulty
distinguishing accurately between Congolese soldiers and Rwandan soldiers at this time, the acronym
FAC/APR is used for the period from June 1997 to August 1998.
378 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008 and February 2009; APREDECI, GVP,
CRE, “L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, 1997, p.43; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire des crimes impunis,
la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.106.

flush out the Mayi-Mayi. In the course of the operation, they killed civilians and
looted dwellings.379
  • On 20 February 1998, FAC/APR soldiers killed and raped an unknown number of
    civilians and looted dwellings during a combing operation in the city of Butembo.
    The victims were accused of collaborating with the Vurondo Mayi-Mayi, who had
    attacked the FAC/APR camp on the Kikyo hill, near Butembo city centre.380
  • From 14 April to 17 April 1998, FAC/APR units killed several hundred civilians,
    committed many rapes and carried out a large number of arbitrary arrests in the
    villages on the outskirts of Butembo. Some sources have put forward a figure of
    300 victims. The FAC/APR had accused the victims of supporting the Mayi-Mayi
    responsible for the recent attack on their military base at Butembo. The combing
    operation lasted several days. Some of the victims were shot dead in their homes;
    others were taken to the Kikyo military camp where they were shot, run over by
    jeeps or buried alive. During the combing operation, the soldiers moved from
    house to house looking for Mayi-Mayi. They raped dozens of women and girls in
    their homes. On several occasions they forced the men to sleep with their sisters
    and/or their daughters.381
  • From 1996 to 1998, the “Kasindian” Mayi-Mayi forcibly recruited a large number
    of minors and adults in the Lubero territory. After the death of their commanding
    officer, part of the group assumed the name of Vurondo Mayi-Mayi. Some of the
    minors, many of whom were no more than 11 years old, were recruited in schools
    on a voluntary basis, mainly on the promise of sums of money. Others, however,
    were kidnapped and forcibly enlisted. Once enrolled, the minors underwent secret
    initiation ceremonies. They were also tattooed to mark their lifelong connection
    with the group. The minors lived in appalling conditions under a reign of terror.382
2. South Kivu
281. During their capture of South Kivu, “Tutsi/Banyamulenge armed units” and
_______________
379 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009.
380 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009; ASADHO, Annual Report, 1998, p.13;
Groupe de chercheurs libres du Graben, “Rapport sur les massacres perpétrés au camp militaire de Kikyo”;
AI, DRC: A Year of Dashed Hopes, 1998, pp.2–3.
381 Ibid.
382 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009

forces from the AFDL, APR and the FAB383 committed serious violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law against Zairian civilians viewed as hostile to
local Tutsi and Banyamulenge communities or friends of their enemies (the FAZ, the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe, Burundian Hutu armed groups, “Bembe armed units” and the Mayi-
Mayi groups in general). Many tribal chiefs were also killed during this time on political
and ethnic grounds, or simply in order to loot their property afterwards.
  • On 12 September 1996, “Tutsi/Banyamulenge armed units” killed nine civilians
    at Kanyura and Makutano in the Itombwe sector of the Mwenga territory. Among
    the victims were the chef de poste d’encadrement (from the Rega tribe) and his
    collaborators, and the chief of the Basymuniaka II groupement, a Bembe from the
    Fizi territory, along with two members of his family. Many Bembe viewed this
    massacre as the start of the “total war” against the Banyamulenge.384
  • On 6 October 1996, “Tutsi/Banyamulenge armed units” killed over fifty people in
    the village of Kidoti, two kilometres from Lemera, in the Uvira territory. The
    victims were mainly civilians. Some of the victims were killed by shrapnel; others
    were executed after being forced to dig mass graves, into which their bodies were
    then thrown.385
  • On 6 October 1996, in the village of Lemera, eighty kilometres north-west of
    Uvira, “Tutsi/Banyamulenge armed units” killed 37 people in a hospital,
    including two members of the medical staff, civilians and FAZ soldiers
    undergoing treatment at the hospital. Before they left Lemera, the
    “Tutsi/Banyamulenge armed units” ransacked the hospital.386
_______________
383 As mentioned before, given the high numbers of APR soldiers among AFDL troops and at AFDL
headquarters – a fact later acknowledged by the Rwandan authorities – and the great difficulty experienced
by witnesses questioned by the Mapping Team distinguishing between AFDL and APR members in the
field, this report will refer to AFDL armed units and APR soldiers engaged in operations in Zaire between
October 1996 and June 1997 under the acronym AFDL/APR. In cases where, in certain regions, several
sources have confirmed high numbers of Ugandan soldiers (in some districts of Orientale Province, for
example) or the Forces armées burundaises (as in some territories in South Kivu) under the cover of the
AFDL, the acronyms AFDL/APR/UPDF and AFDL/APR/FAB or AFDL/UPDF and AFDL/FAB may also
be used.
384 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009; CADDHOM (collective action for human
rights development), “Les atrocités commises en province du Kivu au Congo Kinshasa (ex-Zaïre) de 1996
à 1998”, 1998, p.5; Palermo-Bukavu Solidarity Committee, “Les morts de la rebellion”, 1997, p.2.
385 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998;
Report of the Secretary-General’s investigative team (S/1998/581), Annex, p.45; Palermo-Bukavu
Solidarity Committee, “Les morts de la rébellion”, 1997, p.2; AI, “Loin des regards de la communauté
internationale: Violations des droits de l’homme dans l’est du Zaïre”, 1996, p.3.
386 Interview with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February 2009; Witness accounts gathered by the
Secretary-General’s investigative team in the DRC in 1997/1998; Report of the Secretary-General’s
investigative team (S/1998/581), Annex, p.45; Report on the situation of human rights in Zaire
(E/CN.4/1997/6), para. 198; Palermo-Bukavu Solidarity Committee, “Les morts de la rébellion”, 1997, p.1;
AI, “Loin des regards de la communauté internationale: Violations des droits de l’homme dans l’est du
Zaïre”, 1996, pp.3 and 4.

  • On 18 October 1996, AFDL/APR units killed at least 88 civilians in the village of
    Kiliba, thirteen kilometres north of Uvira city. The victims were civilians who
    were unable to escape in time after the departure of the town’s eight gendarmes.
    Before they left Kiliba, the soldiers also pillaged the village. Of the 88 victims
    identified by the Red Cross, 15 were buried at Uvira.387
  • On 18 October 1996, in Uvira territory, AFDL/APR units killed at least 51
    civilians in the village of Bwegera in the Kakamba groupement in the Ruzizi
    Plain chiefdom. After the FAZ had left the village, the victims tried to escape into
    the mountains towards Kiringye but were caught by the soldiers. The Red Cross
    buried the bodies in mass graves.388
  • On 25 October 1996, during the capture of Uvira, AFDL/APR/FAB units
    indiscriminately killed several hundred people, including refugees and Zairian
    civilians accused of belonging to Mayi-Mayi groups.389
282. When they left Uvira, the AFDL/APR/FAB soldiers advanced towards the interior
of Fizi territory.
  • In late October 1996, AFDL/APR units killed 27 civilians, most of them women
    and children, in the village of Mboko, fifty-two kilometres south of Uvira, in the
    Fizi territory. The victims were trying to cross Lake Tanganyika in canoes to
    reach Tanzania. Some were shot dead; others drowned in the lake.390
  • On 28 October 1996, AFDL/APR units killed 101 Zairian civilians in the village
    of Abala-Ngulube, at the junction between the Moyen Plateau and the Haut
    Plateau near Minembwe, in the Fizi territory. The victims were Bembe, and were
    members of the third Malikia wa Ubembe Church. They had refused to leave the
    village and were in the church when the soldiers arrived. Some of the victims
    were burned alive in the church. A few days before the attack, “Bembe armed
    units” had killed two AFDL/APR soldiers in an ambush in the area around Abala-
    Ngulube. Since this massacre, the members of the third Malikia wa Ubembe
    Church have held a ceremony to remember the victims each 28 October.391
_______________
387 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, November 2008 and March 2009; Confidential
document submitted to the Secretary-General’s investigative team in the DRC in 1997/1998; Report on the
situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6), para. 198; AI, “Loin des regards de la communauté
internationale: Violations des droits de l’homme dans l’est du Zaïre”, 1996, p.4.
388 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009; Witness accounts gathered by the
Secretary-General’s investigative team in the DRC in 1997/1998.
389 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, November 2008 and February 2009; Report of the
Secretary-General’s investigative team (S/1998/581), Annex, p.37; AI, “Loin des regards de la communauté
internationale: Violations des droits de l’homme dans l’est du Zaïre”, 1996, pp.5 and 6.
390 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009.
391 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February 2009.

  • In the second half of October 1996, AFDL/APR units killed 130 civilians in the
    Kaziba locality, fifty-three kilometres south-west of Bukavu, in the Walungu
    territory. On 16 October in particular, they killed 36 civilians in the Kaziba
    commercial centre. The bodies of the victims were buried in Kaziba town centre
    in a mass grave located near the Mennonite church. A short while later, the
    soldiers killed many civilians with spears and machetes in the
    Namushuaga/Lukube district. Subsequently, they killed at least 11 civilians in the
    Cihumba district, where a large number of inhabitants had found refuge. In
    addition to these massacres, the soldiers also looted the hospital, stores and many
    dwellings and ransacked the small local hydroelectric plant.392
  • During the struggle for the control of Bukavu, on 29 October and 30 October
    1996, AFDL/APR units killed over 450 civilians. On 29 October, they fired on the
    city with heavy weapons, indiscriminately killing civilians and soldiers. After the
    departure of the FAZ, they opened fire on the people who were trying to escape.
    They killed many civilians at point-blank range, including Catholic Archbishop
    Monsignor Munzihirwa, killed in his vehicle with his driver and bodyguard. From
    30 October, the soldiers began to systematically search the houses,
    indiscriminately killing and torturing dozens of people, both civilians and military
    personnel.393
  • From October 1996, the AFDL/APR soldiers recruited children in the territories
    of Uvira and Fizi and in the city of Bukavu. In Bukavu, recruiting was carried out
    in particular at the AFDL headquarters (Lolango Building) on the Avenue
    Maniema. Child recruits underwent basic military training in the village of Kidoti,
    in the Uvira territory, and were then sent to the front line.394
  • On 6 February 1997, retreating ex-FAR/Interahamwe units and members of the
    FAZ killed four civilians and injured another two in the village of Matili, fifty-one
    kilometres from Shabunda town centre, in the Bakisi chiefdom in the Banguma
    groupement. The victims were accused of spying on behalf of AFDL/APR
    soldiers. Their bodies were buried in the cemetery at Matili.395
_______________
392 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February and March 2009.
393 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February and March 2009; Witness accounts gathered
by the Secretary-General’s investigative team in the DRC in 1997/1998; ICHRDD (International Centre for
Human Rights and Democratic Development) and ASADHO, “International Non-Governmental
Commission of Inquiry into the Massive Violations of Human Rights Committed in the DRC - Former
Zaïre - 1996-1997”, 1998, p.12; CADDHOM, “Les atrocités commises en province du Kivu, 1996-1998”,
1998, pp.9 and 10; Lutheran Church, “Rapport d’enquête sur les violations des droits de l’homme à l’est du
Congo”, May 1997, p.7.
394 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, December 2008 and March 2009.
395 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, January and February 2009.

  • On 14 March 1997, AFDL/APR units killed nine civilians, including one child,
    with knives and machetes at the VIPAM project396 concession at Lwana, 101
    kilometres north-west of Bukavu, in the Kalehe territory. The victims came from
    the territories of Shabunda and Kabare and were working for the VIPAM project.
    They were accused of assisting the Hutu refugees in their flight.397
  • On 26 May 1997, at Uvira, AFDL/APR units killed 126 civilians during a
    demonstration staged in protest of the murder of eight people by armed men
    suspected of belonging to the new security forces of the AFDL regime. After the
    massacre, the soldiers sealed off the zone and threw most of the bodies in two
    mass graves in the “Biens mal-acquis” (“ill-gotten goods”) district, where they
    had set up their headquarters. Eight bodies were collected by the people and
    buried over the course of the following days.398
  • In July 1997, FAC/APR soldiers399 massacred between 500 and 800 people in the
    villages of Kazumba, Talama, Mukungu and Kabanga, on the border between the
    provinces of Katanga and South Kivu. These villages were used as bases by the
    small-scale “Jeshi la Jua” or “Sun army” militia, which was in open war with the
    new regime. The massacre was carried out in retaliation for an attack by Jeshi la
    Jua units, which resulted in one casualty on the FAC/APR side. The killings were
    spread out over several days and were indiscriminately targeted at combatants and
    civilians.400
  • In the night of 22 December to 23 December 1997, FAC/APR soldiers killed 22
    civilians at the Bulambika commercial centre, at Bunyakiri, in the Kalehe
    territory. The victims were accused of supporting the Mayi-Mayi who had
    occupied the village until then.401
_______________
396 Pilot village for modern farming.
397 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009; Witness accounts gathered by the
Secretary-General’s investigative team in the DRC in 1997/1998; AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese
forests”, 1997, p.8.
398 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, November 2008 and February/March 2009; Report of
the joint mission charged with investigating allegations of massacres and other human rights violations
occurring in eastern Zaire (now DRC) since September 1996 (A/51/942), p.14; CADDHOM, “Les atrocités
commises en province du Sud-Kivu”, 1998, pp.11 and 12; AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese forests”,
1997, p.9; ICHRDD and ASADHO, International Non-Governmental Commission of Inquiry into the
Massive Violations of Human Rights Committed in the DRC - Former Zaïre - 1996-1997, 1998.
399 From June 1997, the national army of the DRC was known as the Forces armées congolaises (FAC).
Until the start of the Second Congo War, in addition to AFDL soldiers and ex-FAZ, the FAC included many
Rwandan and, to a lesser extent, Ugandan soldiers. On account of the difficulty distinguishing accurately
between Congolese soldiers and Rwandan soldiers at this time, the acronym FAC/APR is used for the
period from June 1997 to August 1998.
400Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February and April 2009; Witness accounts gathered by
the Secretary-General’s investigative team in the DRC in 1997/1998; CADDHOM, “Enquête sur les
massacres de réfugiés”, 1998.
401 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March and April 2009; AI, DRC: A Year of Dashed
Hopes, 1998, p.3.

3. Orientale
283. In December 1996, President Mobutu sent his elite troops and large stockpiles of
weapons into the provinces of Orientale and Maniema. Mercenaries and the ex-FAR were
integrated into the Zairian military system. The counter-offensive promised by the
Kinshasa government in the Kivu provinces never materialised, however, owing to the
state of decline of Mobutu’s regime, the prevailing disorder within the FAZ and the
careful planning by the AFDL/APR/UPDF soldiers of their attacks on Kindu and
Kisangani.
284. After their lightning conquest of the Kivu provinces and Ituri, AFDL/APR/UPDF
leaders made contact with Mobutu’s generals and various Mayi-Mayi groups and led an
intensive campaign of demoralisation against the FAZ. The AFDL President, Laurent-
Désiré Kabila,402 who initially had only very few troops, drafted in many CAAFAG403 or
Kadogo recruited during his conquests, then received strategic reinforcement from the
“Katangese Tigers”. These long-time opponents of Mobutu’s regime, who had served for
decades in the Angolan government army, arrived in Orientale province in February 1997
and provided the AFDL/APR/UPDF soldiers besieging Kisangani with the heavy artillery
capacity they lacked.
  • From November 1996, the AFDL/UPDF soldiers recruited thousands of young
    people, including many minors, across the Ituri district.404
285. As they retreated, FAZ soldiers committed acts of murder and rape against
civilians. They also looted and destroyed much of their property. They often forced
civilians to carry the goods they had looted over long distances.405 The looting was of
such an intense and systematic nature that the Kinshasa government declared Orientale
province (formerly Haut-Zaïre) a disaster area on 10 January 1997.
  • Between December 1996 and March 1997, retreating FAZ elements carried out
    widespread looting of places of worship and buildings used for education and aid
    efforts across Orientale province. The looting began in Ituri after their defeat in
    December 1996 at the hands of the AFDL/UPDF troops. The pillaging then
    continued as they retreated across the territories of Buta and Aketi in the district
    of Bas-Uélé, and Opala in the Tshopo district. In the same period, the FAZ looted
    the facilities of the companies Plantation Lever au Congo (PLC) and Plantations
    et Huileries au Congo (PHC) at Lokutu, Hasson et Frère and Regideso (stateowned
    water distribution company) at Opala, the Compagnie de développement
    du Nord (CONEDORD) at Aketi, Dingila, Malingweya and Maleganda and those
_______________
402 Following the death in January 1997 in mysterious circumstances of the first AFDL president, Kisase
Ngandu, the party’s spokesperson Laurent Désiré Kabila became president of the Alliance.
403 Children involved with armed forces and armed groups.
404 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March and May 2009.
405 A practice known as botikake.

of the Congolese institute for agronomic studies and research (INERA) at
Yangambi.406
  • Between December 1996 and March 1997, retreating FAZ units killed and
    tortured an unknown number of civilians during their acts of pillage. Most of the
    victims were killed because they refused to allow the soldiers to loot their
    property. FAZ members also raped an unknown number of women and girls. In
    December 1996, in the Yayango, Yomaie and Yalingo chiefdoms in the Opala
    territory and in the territories of Buta and Bondo, they raped an unknown number
    of women and a man whom they had kidnapped to carry the looted goods. The
    FAZ also committed many acts of gang rape against women in Ituri, in particular
    at Komanda.407
  • Following the capture of Kisangani, on 15 March 1997, retreating FAZ soldiers
    set fire to the village of Yaolalia, in the Opala territory.408
286. After the AFDL captured Bunia, in December 1996, military leaders in Kinshasa
sent an elite Civil Guard unit comprising Katangese ex-Tigers siding with Mobutu into
Orientale province to support the FAZ.
  • In the night of 24 January to 25 January 1997, a FAZ commando unit comprising
    many Katangese ex-Tigers from the Civil Guard killed several dozen civilians in
    the village of Bafwanduo in the Bafwasende territory. The victims were shot
    dead, killed with bayonets or burned alive after the soldiers threw grenades at
    their huts. According to several sources, soldiers also carried out acts of
    cannibalism on their victims. Before they fled when Mayi-Mayi from the Nia Nia
    locality launched a counter-attack, the soldiers set fire to the village. According to
    the sources, the total number of dead is thought to be between fifty and over three
    hundred. The bodies of the victims were buried in the village by the Mayi-
    Mayi.409
287. As they withdrew in the face of the advancing AFDL/APR/UPDF, the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe also attacked civilians.
_______________
406 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January and February 2009; Mgr Banga Bana,
“La situation de violence à Buta”, in Zaïre-Afrique-CEPAS (Centre of Study for Social Action), February
1997; La Tempête des tropiques, “Buta, Lodja et Katako-Kombe pillés”, 6 and 7 March 1997; Le Soft
international, “Des soldats en déroute pillent Isangi”, no.630, March 1997; La Référence Plus, “Le pillage
du Haut-Zaïre se poursuit en toute impunité”, 5 March 1997; AI, “Zaire: Rape, killings and other human
rights violations by security forces”, 1997.
407 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January-February 2009; AI, “Zaire: Rape,
killings and other human rights violations by security forces”, 1997.
408 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January 2009.
409 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, December 2008; La Référence Plus, “Massacre
des habitants de tout un village à 314 km de Kisangani”, 17 February 1997; N. Kristof, “Along a Jungle
Road in Zaire, Three Wars Mesh”, New York Times, 26 April 1996.

  • On 6 March 1997, in Bamoneka village, eighty-seven kilometres from Kisangani
    in the Ubundu territory, ex-FAR/Interahamwe executed four unarmed villagers
    whom they had accused of being part of the FAZ group who had betrayed them in
    the AFDL/APR attack on the Tingi-Tingi camp.410
  • In the first three months of 1997, AFDL/APR units summarily executed an
    unknown number of CAAFAG (child soldiers known as Kadogo in Swahili) and
    Mayi-Mayi serving in the ranks of the AFDL. In early 1997, having captured the
    town of Dungu, in the Haut-Uélé territory, AFDL/APR units killed an unknown
    number of Kadogo accused of carrying out acts of violence against civilians,
    committing rape or lacking discipline. In February, they killed around twenty
    Kadogo with cold weapons in the town of Wamba in the Haut-Uélé district. On
    18 February, in the town of Isiro in the Rungu territory, they bombarded a camp
    housing Kadogo and Mayi-Mayi with cold weapons, killing at least ten of them.
    In the days that followed, AFDL/APR soldiers went to the hospital where
    survivors of the attack were being treated and kidnapped them. The victims were
    never seen again.411
288. After the capture of Kindu, on 27 February 1997, AFDL/APR/UPDF troops
stepped up the military pressure on Kisangani and the surrounding area. The FAZ and
foreign mercenaries in Kisangani stepped up their acts of violence against the population,
known for its hostile attitude towards the Mobutu regime. According to some sources,
they executed over 120 civilians at this time.412
  • On 9 March 1997, nine kilometres from Kisangani, near the Tshopo bridge,
    foreign mercenaries killed 15 civilians in the village of Benwengema in the
    Banalia territory. The victims were part of a group of 16 civilians arrested a short
    while earlier that day near the Tshopo bridge and accused of being Mayi-Mayi in
    league with the AFDL. The 16 civilians were locked in a house and the
    commanding officer of the mercenaries gave orders to fire at the house with
    rocket launchers. After the massacre, the inhabitants of Bayanguna village went to
    the scene to bury the bodies and collect the only survivor. On 10 March, FAZ
    units and foreign mercenaries led a punitive campaign against the village of
_______________
410 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, February 2009.
411 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, February 2009; La Voix des opprimés, “Rapport
sur les événements du Haut-Zaïre entre 1993 et 2003”, 2008.
412 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, February 2009; Witness account gathered by the
Secretary-General’s investigative team in the DRC in 1997/1998; Friends of Nelson Mandela for the
Defence of Human Rights (ANMDH), “La précarité de la situation des droits de l’homme avant la chute de
la ville de Kisangani entre les mains de l’AFDL”, March 1997; ICHRDD and ASADHO, “International
Non-Governmental Commission of Inquiry into the Massive Violations of Human Rights Committed in the
DRC - Former Zaïre - 1996-1997”, June 1998, AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997; AI,
“Zaïre -Viols, meurtres et autres violations des droits de l'homme imputables aux forces de sécurité”, 1997;
M. Mabry and S. Raghavan, “The Horror, The Horror: With A Final Spasm Of Violence, Mobutu’s Corrupt
Regime Lurches Toward A Chaotic Collapse”, Newsweek, 31 March 1997.

Bayanguna, killing at least four civilians. Some were stabbed; others were shot
dead.413
  • Between 1 March and 14 March 1997, FAZ units and foreign mercenaries
    arbitrarily arrested over one hundred civilians and summarily executed an
    unknown number of them. Most of the people arrested were tortured in cells
    located near Bangoka Airport, twenty kilometres east of Kisangani. Some were
    executed on the airport runway. Before leaving the town, on 14 March 1997, the
    mercenaries kidnapped 11 detainees, who were never seen again. In all, between
    13 March and 14 March, the mercenaries killed or forced the disappearance of at
    least 28 people at Kisangani Airport and along the road linking Kisangani and the
    Ituri district.414
289. Deserted by the FAZ, Kisangani fell into the hands of the AFDL/APR/UPDF
soldiers on 15 March 1997. Over the course of the months that followed, AFDL leaders
tried to form a new army incorporating Kadogo and young Mayi-Mayi militiamen
recruited during their conquests.
  • After the capture of Kisangani, on 15 March 1997, the AFDL/APR/UPDF
    soldiers billetted almost one thousand CAAFAG (Kadogo) and Mayi-Mayi in the
    Kapalata training camp, seven kilometres north of Kisangani, in conditions likely
    to cause considerable loss of human life. In 1997, between ten and twenty Kadogo
    and Mayi-Mayi died each day. In all, around 400 Kadogo and Mayi-Mayi died at
    the Kapalata camp or at Kisangani General Hospital. Between January and
    February 1998, under pressure from the international community and with the
    support of UNICEF, the FAC transferred several hundred children in the camp to
    the “Mama Mobutu” orphanage in the Mangobo district. One night in June 1998,
    FAC/APR soldiers kidnapped between 200 and 300 Kadogo, who were never
    seen again.415
_______________
413 Ibid.
414Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, February 2009; Witness account gathered by the
Secretary-General’s investigative team in the DRC in 1997/1998, 14 March 1997; Friends of Nelson
Mandela for the Defence of Human Rights (ANMDH), “La précarité de la situation des droits de l’homme
avant la chute de la ville de Kisangani entre les mains de l’AFDL”, March 1997; ICHRDD and ASADHO,
“International Non-Governmental Commission of Inquiry into the Massive Violations of Human Rights
Committed in the DRC - Former Zaïre - 1996-1997”, 1998; AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese forests”,
1997; AI, “Zaire: Rape, killings and other human rights violations by security forces”, 1997; M. Mabry and
S. Raghavan, “The Horror, The Horror: With A Final Spasm Of Violence, Mobutu’s Corrupt Regime
Lurches Toward A Chaotic Collapse”, Newsweek, 31 March 1997; James McKinley Jr., “Serb Who Went to
Defend Zaïre Spread Death and Horror Instead”, New York Times, 19 March 1997.
415 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, November 2008; Groupe Horeb, Annual Report,
1999.

  • After Laurent-Désiré Kabila came to power in Kinshasa, the AFDL/APR/UPDF
    soldiers, and then the FAC/APR,416 led several operations to secure Orientale
    Province, which gave rise to serious violations against civilians. In several towns,
    cases of torture, summary execution and rape were reported, particularly in
    Kisangani, in the territories of Isangi and Opala in the Tshopo district and in the
    district of Bas-Uélé.417
  • On 22 December 1997, FAC/APR soldiers from Buta killed two civilians and
    tortured seventeen in the village of Bondo in the district of Bas-Uélé. The victims
    were accused of instigating a revolt against the local security services controlled
    by Mayi-Mayi bandits who were oppressing the people. Having been detained at
    Buta, and then Kisangani, the survivors were finally released on 16 January
    1998.418
4. Maniema
290. On 24 February 1997, the FAZ fled the town of Kindu and AFDL/APR troops
entered the town on 27 February.
  • Between the end of February and the beginning of March 1997, as they fled
    across the Kailo territory towards the Kasai provinces, the retreating FAZ soldiers
    raped and kidnapped an unknown number of women in the villages of Tchoko,
    Kasuku, Lukama, Olangate and Tchumba Tchumba, some of whom were used as
    sex slaves. After several months some of the victims were released but others
    were never seen again. The FAZ also looted widely and forced civilians to follow
    the soldiers and carry the stolen goods.419
5. Katanga
291. As they retreated, the FDD units420 from South Kivu arrived in the north of
Katanga province. They killed civilians and pillaged villages, in particular in the
territories of Moba and Pweto.
_______________
416 In late 1997, Uganda had withdrawn most of its troops from Orientale Province. However, large
numbers of APR soldiers remained in the major towns. On behalf of the FAC, an APR commander ran the
military region covering Orientale Province, North Kivu and South Kivu from Kisangani.
417 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January-February 2009; Groupe Lotus, press
release on acts of violence committed at Ubundu and Kisangani, 22 September 1997.
418 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January 2009; Groupe Lotus-Groupe Justice et
Libération, “Rapport conjoint sur les événements de Bondo”, 1998; AI, “Zaire: Rape, killings and other
human rights violations by security forces”, 1997.
419 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009.
420 The FDD (Forces pour la défense de la démocratie) were the armed wing of the Burundian Hutu rebel
movement CNDD (Centre national pour la défense de la démocratie).

  • In March 1997, FDD units killed between two and ten civilians in the village of
    Kansenge in the Mulonde groupement, in the Moba territory. Before they left,
    they pillaged and torched the village.421
292. Since the 1970s, a sizeable Tutsi community from the Minembwe plateaus in the
Fizi territory in South Kivu had settled in the area of Vyura, a locality situated 150
kilometres from Moba, in the Tanganyika district. As the anti-Tutsi sentiment deepened
from 1995 onwards and the start of the First Congo War, relations between the Tutsis of
Vyura (known as the Banyavyura) and the rest of the predominately Tabwa population
seriously deteriorated.
  • In April 1997, at Vyura, in the Moba territory, “Tutsi/Banyamulenge armed units”
    and AFDL/APR soldiers killed the tribal chief of Vyura and a member of his
    family. The victims were arrested in the village of Mwanza. After being led to
    Vyura, the tribal chief was stripped, tortured and dragged along the road by a
    vehicle. His nephew was buried alive in the pit where the chief’s body was
    thrown.422
6. Équateur
293. After the fall of Kisangani, on 15 March 1997, FAZ soldiers fled towards the west
of the country, taking a variety of routes. On the way, they were joined by groups of
Rwandan refugees. As they retreated, the FAZ, ex-FAR/Interahamwe and Rwandan
refugees looted many civilian properties and public buildings and destroyed facilities,
including hospitals, health centres, schools and places of worship.
  • In March 1997, FAZ units looted the general hospital, the convent of the
    Missionaries of the Sacred Heart and the Ekombo primary school in the Ikela
    locality, in the district of Tshuapa.423
  • In April 1997, Rwandan refugees looted the Catholic Mission of Yalisele and
    Yoseki Hospital in the Djolu territory, and stole 76 cattle from a farm in the
    village of Mondombe in Bokungu territory, in the Tshuapa district.424 On 19
    April, ex-FAR units stole the cattle and looted the property of the Protestant
    church at Deke, sixty-eight kilometres from Bokungu town centre.425
_______________
421 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, March 2009.
422Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, March 2009; Report of SOCIMO (civil society of Moba)
submitted to the Mapping Team on 2 March 2009.
423 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, March 2009; Document submitted to the Mapping Team,
Équateur, April 2009.
424 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
425 Witness account gathered by the Secretary-General’s investigative team in the DRC in 1997/1998.

  • Towards mid-May 1997, soldiers from the Special Presidential Division (DSP)
    looted the Bwa Félix school, the CDI (Centre for Development and Integration)
    hospital and the residences of some former dignitaries from the Mobutu regime in
    the Wapinda locality in the Yakoma territory, in the North Ubangi district.426
  • From 17 May to 20 May 1997, units from the FAZ and the DSP killed an
    unknown number of civilians and systematically looted property in the town of
    Gbadolite.427
294. Throughout their withdrawal, the FAZ and the ex-FAR/Interahamwe units
committed many acts of assault on women living in the villages in the region. The ex-
FAR/Interahamwe also killed civilians when they refused to allow them to loot their
property.
  • In early April 1997, ex-FAR/Interahamwe units killed an unknown number of
    civilians in the Ene groupement, ten kilometres from Ikela, in the Tshuapa
    district. In Moma village, they killed a civilian, after stealing his food. In the
    village of Yali, they killed a man who refused to hand over a goat. They also
    killed a nine-year-old boy during an attack on the village of Ene-Punga.428
  • Also in early April 1997, ex-FAR/Interahamwe units killed a man who refused to
    hand over his cattle in the village of Ilombo in the Ikela territory.429
  • On 16 May 1997, a group of around fifteen ex-FAR/Interahamwe units killed two
    civilians, including a girl, on the road between Mpenda and Iyembe, two villages
    120 kilometres from Mbandaka, in the Bikoro territory in the Équateur district.
    The militiamen opened fire when one of the victims refused to hand over their
    bicycle.430
295. Generally speaking, the AFDL/APR troops did not encounter serious resistance as
they advanced across Équateur province. Fighting was limited to a few skirmishes with
ex-FAR/Interahamwe units near Lolengi, in the Boende territory, and clashes with DSP
units at Wapinda. As a whole, the people of Équateur gave a relatively warm welcome to
the AFDL/APR troops on their arrival. However, large-scale public massacres of
Rwandan refugees, summary execution of many civilians, and arbitrary arrests, torture431
_______________
426 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March and April 2009.
427 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March and April 2009.
428 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, February and March 2009; AI, Deadly Alliances in the
Congolese Forests, 1997, p.14.
429 Interview with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009; AEFJN (Africa Europe Faith and Justice
Network), “Rapport sur les violations des droits de l’homme dans le sud de l’Équateur”, undated.
430 Interview with the Mapping Team, Équateur, March and April 2009.
431 One of the most frequently used methods of torture was “Fimbo Na Libumu” (“whipping to the
stomach” in Lingala), which involved forcing the victim to drink five litres of water and then beating their
stomach.

and other ill-treatment inflicted on the population swiftly worsened their relations with
the locals.432
  • Towards mid-May 1997, AFDL/APR units killed seven civilians originally from
    the area around the village of Vabesu, eight kilometres from Wapinda, in the
    Yakoma territory. The victims had been kidnapped by the soldiers, who wanted
    them to reveal where the DSP soldiers were in hiding. They were shot and their
    bodies buried in a mass grave.433
  • Around 16 May 1997, at Mbandaka, AFDL/APR units executed the chief of the
    Losanganya chiefdom at the PLZ port, now Endundu Port. The chief, who was
    suspected of having informed the Mobutu authorities about the massacres of
    refugees in his chiefdom, was arrested at his home in Djoa village on 14 May and
    taken to Mbandaka. His body has never been found.434
  • On 28 October or 29 October 1997, FAC/APR soldiers435 killed nine civilians in
    the village of Baenga in the Basankusu territory. They also committed many acts
    of rape.436
7. Kasaï occidental
296. The AFDL/APR forces arrived in Kananga on 12 April 1997.
  • On 6 June 1997, AFDL/APR soldiers killed nine civilians and a young noncombatant
    soldier in the town of Tshimbulu, administrative centre of the Lulua
    district.437
  • On 22 June 1997, in Kananga, AFDL/APR soldiers subjected an unknown
    number of civilians to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and committed
    many acts of looting and armed robbery. Nuns from the Carmelite Order of St.
    Joseph were among the victims.
_______________
432 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur and Kinshasa, February, March and April 2009.
433 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, April 2009.
434 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur and Kinshasa, March and April 2009.
435 As mentioned before, from June 1997 the national army of the DRC was known as the Forces armées
congolaises (FAC). Until the start of the Second Congo War, in addition to AFDL soldiers and ex-FAZ, the
FAC included many Rwandan and, to a lesser extent, Ugandan soldiers. On account of the difficulty
distinguishing accurately between Congolese soldiers and Rwandan soldiers at this time, the acronym
FAC/APR is used for the period from June 1997 to August 1998.
436 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, March and April 2009; Report of Gandhi International
(Équateur), Mbandaka, 1997.
437 Interview with the Mapping Team, Kasai Occidental, April 2009.

  • Between June 1997 and August 1998, the town’s military commander established
    a reign of terror in Kananga, allowing the security forces to torture civilians and
    loot their property with complete impunity.438
8. Bandundu
297. In May 1997, the two main towns in Bandundu province, Bandundu town and
Kikwit, fell into the hands of AFDL/APR troops, without a great deal of resistance. In a
last-ditch effort to halt the progress of the AFDL/APR towards Kinshasa, military leaders
sent FAZ and DSP troops, along with UNITA439 and ex-FAR units and mercenaries of
various nationalities to Kenge, approximately 200 kilometres from Kinshasa.440 When
they arrived near Kenge, on 4 May, the troops passed themselves off as AFDL/APR units
to test the loyalty of the people towards President Mobutu’s regime. In their eagerness to
see the AFDL arrive, some of Kenge’s inhabitants had already destroyed symbols of state
authority – the state authorities having fled before the rebels arrived – and prepared
welcome banners for the soldiers of the Alliance.
  • On 4 May 1997, FAZ/DSP/UNITA/ex-FAR units summarily executed an
    unknown number of civilians considered as traitors in the village of Mangangu,
    west of the town of Kenge, and at the entrance to the town.441
  • On 5 May 1997, FAZ/DSP/UNITA/ex-FAR units clashed with AFDL/APR units
    in heavy weapon fire in Kenge town centre, killing at least 65 people, including
    children. During the struggle, first-aid workers were not adequately protected and
    ten members of the Red Cross, who were trying to assist the injured, were killed.
    An unknown number of CAAFAG, sent to the front line by the AFDL/APR
    soldiers, are thought to have been killed by Katyusha rocket launchers used by the
    FAZ. The fighting also resulted in at least 126 civilian wounded.442
  • As they retreated, FAZ/DSP/UNITA/ex-FAR units executed at least 30 civilians
    across the town. Some of the victims were bound before they were executed. The
    members of the local Kimbanguist Church were particularly targeted due to their
_______________
438 Interview with the Mapping Team, Kasai Occidental, April 2009; Société civile du Kasai Occidental,
“Panorama de la situation des droits de l’homme au Kasai Occidental”, August 2000, pp.7–10.
439 União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola), an armed group at war with the Angolan government from 1975 to 2002.
440 In the text that follows, this coalition is designated as FAZ/DSP/UNITA/ex-FAR.
441 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bandundu, February 2009; Odon Bakumba, “La bataille de Kenge”,
pamphlet created at Kenge, undated.
442 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bandundu, February 2009; LINELIT (National League for Free and
Fair Elections), “Jungle ou état de droit”, 1997; Odon Bakumba, “La bataille de Kenge”, pamphlet created
at Kenge, undated; Le Moniteur, “Toute la vérité sur les massacres de Kenge, 1997”, 9 May 2005; HRW
and FIDH, “What Kabila is hiding: Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo”, October 1997; ICRC
(International Committee of the Red Cross), press release no.7, May 1997; Zaire Watch News Briefs, 1
May and 12 May 1997; World Vision, “Zaire Update”, 8 May 1997; Australian Broadcasting Corporation
(ABC), “Fierce fighting continues”, 9 May 1997.

open support for the AFDL. The soldiers of the FAZ/DSP/UNITA/ex-FAR also
raped an unknown number of women, in particular in the Kwango Bridge
district.443
  • From 6 May and over the course of the days that followed, FAZ/DSP/UNITA/ex-
    FAR units fleeing towards Kinshasa killed several dozen civilians, committed
    rape and pillage and torched several houses along the Kenge to Kinshasa road.
    Mass graves are still marked, in particular in the villages of Moyen-ville,
    Tiabakweno, Ndjili, Mbinda and Mbinda Nseke. In all, the fighting at Kenge
    caused the deaths of over 200 civilians and injured over one hundred more. 444.
9. Kinshasa
298. In the days that followed the capture of Kinshasa, the AFDL/APR troops and their
allies committed summary executions, acts of torture sometimes resulting in death, and
rape. Between 18 May and 22 May 1997, volunteer teams from the national Red Cross
collected between 228 and 318 bodies in Kinshasa and the surrounding area. They also
evacuated over a dozen wounded to various hospitals and clinics in the city.445 Soldiers
from the DSP were a particular target, as were the former dignitaries of the Mobutu
regime. Ordinary civilians were also victims of serious violations. In particular, many
people were arbitrarily arrested and detained in conditions likely to cause considerable
loss of human life. In October 1997, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in the DRC referred over 40 cases of torture to the Government.446
  • Between May and June 1997, AFDL/APR units, aided by the civilian population,
    carried out a large number of public executions. In many instances, the bodies of
    the victims were burned, notably in the communes of Masina and Matete, and in
    the Kingabwa district of the Limete commune.447
  • Between May and June 1997, AFDL/APR units executed an unknown number of
    ex-FAZ soldiers and political opponents detained in the GLM (Litho Moboti
    Group) building. Every night, several people were brought out of their cells and
_______________
443 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bandundu, February 2009; Odon Bakumba, “La bataille de Kenge”,
pamphlet created at Kenge, undated.
444 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bandundu, February 2009.
445 ICRC, press release, 22 May 1997.
446 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Republic of Zaire (now DRC)
(A/52/496).
447 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March-April 2009; Report of the Secretary-General’s
investigative team (S/1998/581), Annex; ACPC (Association des cadres pénitentiaires du Congo), “30 jours
de violations des droits de l’homme sous le pouvoir de l’AFDL”, 1997; VSV (La Voix des sans-voix pour
les droits de l’homme), “Bref aperçu sur la situation actuelle des droits de l’homme à Kinshasa sous
l’AFDL”, 1997; La lettre hebdomadaire de la FIDH, 3 July to 10 July 1997; Info-Congo/Kinshasa,
11 August 1997; AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997; “Jours de guerre à Kinshasa”, a France-
Télévisions documentary broadcast in La marche du siècle by Jean-Marie Cavada, Pascal Richard and
Jean-Marie Lemaire in June 1997.

Antoine Gizenga, in the Limete commune. During the operation, they killed a
PALU activist and seriously injured six more by beating them with whips, iron
bars and rifle butts.456
  • Between 1997 and 1998, FAC/APR soldiers frequently arrested UDPS activists
    and tortured them for several months at various detention sites.457
  • On 10 December 1997, FAC/APR soldiers beat and gang-raped two sisters of the
    President of the FSDC (Front pour la survie de la démocratie au Congo – Front
    for the Survival of Democracy in Congo). The FSDC President, a former
    dignitary under Mobutu, was finally arrested in February 1998. During his
    detention at the central prison and then at the Mikonga military training centre, he
    was frequently tortured.458
10. Bas-Congo
302. Under President Mobutu’s regime and until its fall, in May 1997, the various
Zairian security services, in particular the Civil Guard, committed many acts of violence,
especially rape, and tortured many civilians with complete impunity. An illustrative case
has been heard in the Rotterdam District Court (Netherlands).
  • In October 1996, at Matadi, the Civil Guard commander Colonel Sébastien
    Nzapali, nicknamed “King of the Beasts” on account of his notorious brutality,
    had a customs officer working at the Matadi port tortured. On 7 April 2004,
    Colonel Nzapali was sentenced to two and a half years in prison by the Rotterdam
    District Court (Netherlands) for these crimes. Nzapali had been living in the
    Netherlands since 1998 but his application for political asylum was denied.459
303. From the start of 1997, the Angolan government made contact with the Rwandan
and Ugandan authorities and lent its support to the AFDL/APR/UPDF operation aimed at
removing President Mobutu from power. The FAA (Forces armées angolaises) soldiers
took advantage of their presence in Kinshasa alongside AFDL/APR/UPDF troops to step
up their crackdown on Cabindan populations who had taken refuge in the province of
Bas-Congo.
  • From June 1997, in the Bas-Fleuve district in Bas-Congo province, FAA units
    arrested and forced the disappearance of an unknown number of refugees
_______________
456 HRW, “Uncertain Course: Transition and Human Rights Violations in the Congo”, 1997; Info-
Congo/Kinshasa, 11 August 1997; AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997.
457 HRW, “Uncertain Course: Transition and Human Rights Violations in the Congo”, 1997; AI, “Deadly
alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997; AI, DRC: A Year of Dashed Hopes, 1998.
458 Interview with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, May 2009; AI, DRC: A Year of Dashed Hopes, 1998.
459 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009; Verdict of the Rotterdam District Court
(Netherlands), 7 April 2004.

originating from Cabinda. In 1998, the FAA set up an operations centre at Tshela,
from where they led several crackdown operations. The Congolese security forces
also arrested several natives of Cabinda accused of having separatist designs and
transferred them to various detention sites in Kinshasa.460
304. At the end of May 1997, after the capture of Kinshasa, the AFDL/APR soldiers
arrived in the province of Bas-Congo. They publicly inflicted cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment and punishment on a large number of civilians for often minor
offences. Several people who were tortured with the chicotte died from internal bleeding
caused by being whipped on the stomach.461
305. The AFDL/APR soldiers also raped a large number of women. By way of
example, the Mapping Team has been able to document the following cases.
  • From June 1997, in the Lisanga (Missioni) camp at Matadi, AFDL/APR units,
    later the FAC/APR, raped an unknown number of wives of ex-FAZ soldiers left
    alone when their husbands were sent to the Kitona military centre to be “reeducated”.
    They forced a large number of them to carry out domestic chores for
    them.462
  • In the same period, FAC/APR/UPDF units also raped several women at the
    Redjaf military camp at Matadi.463
306. After President Laurent-Désiré Kabila came to power, between 35,000 and 45,000
FAZ soldiers from all over the country were sent to the Kitona military base, in the town
of Moanda, to be “re-educated”. The base could only accommodate around 10,000 people
and was in an advanced state of disrepair.
  • From June 1997, the ex-FAZ present at the Kitona base were kept in conditions
    likely to cause considerable loss of human life, in particular due to lack of food,
    unhygienic conditions and a lack of access to appropriate medical care. FAC/APR
    units summarily executed several ex-FAZ soldiers. They submitted others to
    cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, such as whipping and public torture. The
    total number of deaths is hard to determine but many witnesses have claimed that
_______________
460 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, Kinshasa, March-April 2009; Report of the Special
Rapporteur (A/52/496); Info-Congo/Kinshasa (citing an AZADHO report), 11 August 1997; Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices, 2001; Mouvement séparatiste cabindais (Cabindan separatist movement), press release, 8
November 1998.
461 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009.
462 Ibid.
463 Ibid

during the first two months of operation at the Kitona centre, between five and ten
people died every day.464
In July 1997, FAC/APR units secretly executed ex-FAZ soldiers who had rebelled in
protest against the living conditions enforced on them at the Kitona base. From October
1997, living conditions at the base improved and the soldiers began to receive their
pay.465
464 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, Kinshasa, March-April 2009; AZADHO, “Espoirs
déçus”, 1997; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Rapport sur le Congo”, 1998; Colonel Kisukula
Abeli Meitho, “La désintégration de l’armée congolaise de Mobutu à Kabila”, L’Harmattan, 2001, p.78; AI,
“Deadly alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997.
465 Interview with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, April 2009; “Emergency Update No. 211 on the Great
Lakes”, 15 July 1997.



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