Some Difficulties in Process Christology
by Robert M. Price
Surely one of the most discussed (since most important) aspects of theology today is Christology, the theological meaning of Jesus Christ. No school of thought can manage to avoid it; to all of them Jesus still addresses his question “And who do you say that I am?” Or, conversely, modern theologians no more than ancient Fathers can avoid asking in chorus “Jesus Christ, Jesus Christ, who are you? What have you sacrificed?” This is true even among theologians of the Process camp, who are known for their reemphasis on the doctrine of God, in reaction to the exaggerated Christocentricity of Barthian Neo-Orthodoxy. In the present essay, we will attempt to assess the validity of some efforts by Process thinkers to make sense of Jesus Christ. What weaknesses may be uncovered will probably be just as symptomatic of troubles besetting modern Liberal Christology as a whole.
2. Distinctive Christology?
First, let us try to evaluate just how novel and distinctive a Process Christology is. What is the point of such an inquiry? After all, what has novelty to do with the truth of an idea? To listen to the Process thinkers themselves, one would imagine that novelty is very important indeed, because all the old Christological answers either were always inadequate or have proven to be so in the light of newer developments. For instance, Norman Pittenger is forthright in his admission that “We do not believe any longer in divine intrusions or miraculous deliverances.”1 Anyone can see that, with this observation alone, apparently representative of all Process theologians, there is going to be quite a bit of adjustment necessary. But it doesn’t simply stop at the rejection of myths and miracles. Process theologians follow Whitehead in his contention that abstract concepts such as “substance” and “essence” are not the proper currency of modern metaphysics. All such terms suffer from "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness,” and give us a distorted picture of reality. Instead, one should realize that everything is ever “in process.” Not only can one never step into the same river twice (Heraclitus); one cannot even step into the same river once (Cratylus)! The only constancy by which “things” or individuals may be characterized is a certain "routedness” of continuous “drops of experience.”
If the map of reality must be so drastically redrawn, it is no surprise that new categories for Christological thinking are necessary. And we seem to have them in Schubert Ogden’s “re-presentation," John Cobb’s "fields of force," etc. But there may be less here than meets the eye. We may find reason for doubting that here we have truly “something new under the sun." First of all, one may note a striking similarity between the seemingly fresh ideas of Process Christology on the one hand, and much older Liberal theology on the other. The most outstanding example here is that of John Cobb. Cobb searches for a new way to formulate God’s incarnate presence in the man Jesus. He proposes, by means of Process conceptuality, that Jesus experienced no tension between his own will and the Logos (the divine lure toward creative transformation). Thus God's will became the basis for the integration of his personality. In other words, Jesus' self was co-constituted by the Logos. “In Jesus there is a distinctive incarnation because his very selfhood was constituted by the Logos.”2 Perhaps impressive, but how different is this from the idea put forth long ago by the “father of Liberal theology,” Friedrich Schleiermacher: "The Redeemer... is like all men in virtue of the identity of human nature, but distinguished from them all by the constant potency of His God consciousness, which was a veritable existence of God in Him.”3 Whereas most mortals are conscious of their “absolute dependence” upon God only intermittently, Schleiermacher's Jesus was always in a state of such satori. Has Cobb proposed anything new here? Granted, the jargon is different, but the resulting Christological solution seems pretty much the same: Jesus' complete openness to God is supposed to be tantamount to an incarnation. As Kenneth Hamilton has aptly observed, many Liberal Christologians show by their family resemblance that they are indeed “Schleiermacher's modern sons.”
Startling resemblances to old-time Liberal theology do not stop with Schleiermacher. Cobb's Christ is amazingly similar to Cobb's own description of the Enlightenment Liberal version of Jesus, a conception he seems to think he rejects (!): “a man like other men - only better. He was wiser, more pious, more free, more obedient to God.... The one caveat was that the difference must be one of degree and not one of kind.”14 Similarly, one is hard-pressed not to think back to Ritschl’s notion of Jesus “having the value of 'God' for us,” when he reads of John A. T. Robinson's view that Jesus' function is "to act and speak as God for us.”15 (On Robinson as a Process Christologian, see page 202, “the lines of the sort of solution I would favor... have already been indicated by those who stand within the tradition of process philosophy.”)
Finally, one more rehashing of old Liberalism may be discovered in the Process view of atonement. Cobb speaks of "fields of force" generated by Jesus’ personality, which trigger in us the same sort of existence he enjoyed. This chain-reaction seems to come primarily via his recorded words. Norman Pittenger is more forthright in admitting that all this boils down to the old “moral influence theory” of Abelard. Basically, we are moved by the words of Jesus to follow him. Or the example of Jesus' self- sacrificial love moves us (and, according to Pittenger, also reflects the self-sacrificial love that characterizes ultimate reality). But at any rate, one hardly needs Process categories in order to affirm the moral influence theory of the atonement. What then is the new contribution of Process Christology at these points?
If Process Christology may to a significant degree be seen as a recapitulation of earlier Liberal theology, it might also be suggested that it is at least sometimes a recapitulation of ancient heresies. First, let us remind ourselves that Process Christologians explicitly seek to remain faithful in some sense to the traditional creedal formulae, even when they want to rephrase the creed with new conceptuality.
the creeds themselves are not part of the characteristic structure of the church; they are but ways in which the faith is stated, in language appropriate to the time when they were promulgated, and there is no reason why they may not be revised to state this faith in more understandable terms and with greater factual accuracy--but it is the faith, not the creeds, which is important. (Pittenger) 6
To mean what the New Testament writers or the Fathers intended to say of Jesus' humanity or divinity we may well have to say different things. (Robinson)7
From statements like these one receives the impression that the theologians want to tread carefully. They do not just want to start from scratch; rather, they feel they had better remain in the general confines of the old creedal categories, even when they want to fill them with new meaning. They don't want to move the ancient boundary markers. Yet sometimes we are forced to ask if they have not done just this. For example, do we detect a trace of Nestorianism in the Christology of Pittenger?
Human potentiality is not toward becoming divine, but toward so responding to the divine initiative that the Self-Expressive Activity of God would have what Athanasius styled an organon - a personal instrument open to employment by God but with full human freedom retained - adequate for the divine purpose. This would indeed be incarnation in a climactic sense.8
We get here more of a picture of a harmony between two separate agencies than of a true incarnation, despite the cosmetic allusion to Athanasius. But since Pittenger puts it in terms of Jesus' obediently yielding to a rather impersonal- sounding "Activity of God," we are even reminded strongly of adoptionistic "Dynamic Monarchianism." An adoptionistic strain also comes through in Cobb's admission that we have no reason to deny that other individuals besides Jesus were sufficiently yielded to the Logos as to qualify for Christhood. The Ebionites of course had said the same thing, only in terms of Jesus’ perfect obedience to the Law, in principle repeatable by others. We suggest that the Process Christologians are heirs of the Ebionites or adoptionists.
In clearing a space for the "full humanity" of Jesus, the real incarnation of a personal God must be compromised, and that by redefinition.. Again Schleiermacher was their pioneer and forerunner. David Friedrich Strauss pinpointed the critical shift here:
If we think of the divine in Christ according to [Schleiermacher’s understanding], then we no longer think of it in personal terms, no longer as a divine being united with the human, but only as an effective impulse working on it.... As is known, Schleiermacher also called this “constant potency of the God-consciousness" a "veritable existence of God in him," but the very fact that he calls it a real existence shows that he rather senses that it is an unreal one.9
We rather sense it too, not only in Schleiermacher but in his "modern sons" as well. And, again like Schleiermacher, Process Christologians are determined to safeguard the "true humanity" of Jesus because of their rejection of miraculous interventions into the historical sequence. “The incarnation does not mean insertion into the living stream, an intervention by God in the form of a man, but the embodiment, the realization of God in this man" (Robinson).10 "For [Process] theism, the significance of Jesus is found first in his providing the classical instance of what is always and everywhere operative” (Pittenger)11 In our next section, we will explore a few of the quandaries raised for Process Christology by this tendency.
3. Perfect Man?
From our brief consideration of the Process juggling of Christological categories, we saw that Process thinkers tailor Jesus' “divinity" to accommodate his “true humanity.”11 Now we must ask whether they are able to do justice at least to this traditional tenet of orthodox Christology. Unfortunately, problems arise even here. First we have to ask whether their assertion of Jesus' “perfect manhood" is not an arbitrary statement, hanging in the air. The root of the problem is that historically the postulation of "true man” was the correlate of the tenet “true God," a belief we suggested has been seriously compromised through re-conceptualization (a la Strauss's criticism of Schleiermacher, cited above). Dennis Nineham sums up the point well in his criticism of his fellow contributors to The Myth of God Incarnate:
So long as the doctrine of the incarnation was taken as a statement of an objective metaphysical fact, that Jesus was literally divine, then the unique perfection of his humanity was a legitimate deduction from the fact of its hypostatic conjunction with divinity, even if the connotation of perfect humanity in this context could not be precisely specified. In [modern Liberal Christologies], however, the perfection of Jesus is being used as a support for the doctrine of the incarnation... or as a starting-point for an alternative conceptualization or symbolization.... In that case, it is difficult, at any rate at first sight, to see how the claim for the perfection of Jesus’ humanity could be supported except on historical grounds.... Is it, however, possible to validate claims of the kind in question on the basis of historical evidence? To prove an historical negative, such as the sinlessness of Jesus, is notoriously difficult to the point of impossibility.12
Nineham seems to depict with uncomfortable acuteness the dilemma facing the “perfect humanity” affirmation of Process Christology. What makes it all the more ironic is that these Christologians themselves seem to see the problem but to shrug it off! For instance, Pittenger makes “the honest admission that the material in the Gospels is not the kind that permits us ... to pay Jesus... moral compliments - as if he is indubitably known as in every sense, both in teaching and behavior, to be ideally perfect.”13
Robinson reiterates: “We simply have not the evidence to say even that he was always obedient, always loving.” “And we should be careful to avoid theological judgments that imply historical statements we cannot substantiate.”14 But Robinson himself seems in the long run not to be quite so careful. Nor does Pittenger, who can blissfully affirm: “His response to the divine intention was adequate and complete, even if this cannot be demonstrated from the material in the Gospel narratives.”15 Then on what possible basis are such statements being made? It is hard not to conclude that Process Christologians are mainly working off of what we might call “theologica1 inertia,” holding onto this or that item of traditional doctrine after having kicked most of the props out from under it.
But let us suppose that the Process thinkers’ belief in Jesus’ “perfect humanity” has some valid basis not apparent from their own defense of it. We still must question its viability at an equally crucial point. The clear direction of Process rhetoric on this issue is to say that Jesus was qualitatively different from the rest of us, that his conformity to the Logos, or to God’s aims, was unparalleled by the mass of humanity. (This is basically the claim, even if there are held to have been other occasional exceptions—a question we will take up in the next section.) Will this work? More specifically, does such a belief comport with the Process desire to have Jesus be of a piece with humanity rather than a radical exception to it? We saw that the Process zeal for a completely human Jesus recapitulates the Christological agenda of Schleiermacher: It "must... be possible with respect to our task to present the divinity of Christ in such a way that the human element in the whole phenomenon of Christ in his whole life remains unimperiled.”16
How successful was Schleiermacher in his bid to avoid the shadow of docetism at all costs? Strauss was not persuaded:
A sinless, archetypal Christ is not one whit less unthinkable than a supernaturally begotten Christ with a divine and human nature. On the contrary, since he appears on the very basis of a world view which otherwise excludes miracles or uncaused effects, a further contradiction clings to him from which the church's Christology, which proposes belief in miracles, is free. 17
In other words, this Son of Man truly has no place to lay his head, since neither naturalists nor supernaturalists can find any room for him. We think that Process Christologies have inherited the same difficulty: their "perfect" Jesus is "neither ichthus nor fowl" since his perfection seems to stick out like a sore thumb from the Process framework which disallows divine interventions.
Of all the writers on Process Christology, at least John Cobb seems to be uneasily aware of this problem. But his "solution" is not a happy one. As if to tone down all these claims for perfection, he imposes limits on Jesus' "perfect” harmony with the Logos. His selfhood, then, was "completely" constituted by the Logos, but only "at least at important times in his life.”18 Keep in mind that Cobb wants to talk about "a distinctive incarnation”19 in Jesus, i.e., the logic of the whole system tends toward attributing some kind of qualitative distinctiveness to Jesus; otherwise why bother with him?
In slightly different terms, we can find the same tension in Process talk about "incarnation." Whitehead's use of this term is hailed as at last providing the grounds for an intelligible doctrine of incarnation. But since Whitehead's "incarnation” refers to what is always and everywhere the case, it is in a real sense trivial (not in the sense of being an unimportant idea, but rather in the sense that it is an explanation of the mundane). Process thinkers can apply the idea to Christ only with difficulty. Now Christ is to be considered merely "a paradigm case of incarnation." Something seems to have been lost in the translation. Cobb seems to be importing religious significance into what for Whitehead was almost a kind of physics. It makes about as much sense for Jesus to be the paradigm case of Whitehead's "incarnation" principle as of Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle or of Mendel's theory of genetic inheritance.
To return to Cobb's attempt to downplay Jesus’ "perfection," it will be revealing to see just how distinctive his "historical Jesus” turns out to be. He was a person who "felt peculiarly alive;” he took advantage of "rich potentialities for experience.”20 Thus his "human potential was actualized "at least at important times in his life.”21 Could not as much be said for most adherents of popular self-help therapies or of the psychology of human potential? We may justifiably apply to Cobb this observation of Schleiermacher:
those who take their departure from the attempt to represent the life of Christ completely as a genuinely human life usually end up by conceiving Christ in such a way that no intelligible reason remains for making him in any way... an object of faith.22
4. Decisive Disclosure?
Process Christology relies heavily upon the conception of Jesus as a “decisive disclosure" or "re-presentation" of what God is doing in the world, or of what reality is all about. A couple of representative statements make this clear:
To say with the Christian community... that Jesus is the distinctive act of God is to say that in him, in his outer acts of symbolic word and deed, there is expressed that understanding of human existence which is, in fact, the ultimate truth about our life before God. (Ogden)23
Christian faith sees in Jesus Christ the appearance of a focus, a specific point, a decisive event. In him the entire movement is crowned, so far as humankind is concerned, with an action that shows the meaning of it all.... In him we see what God is up to in the world. (Pittenger)24
Basically the idea here is that it should be evident that the “way of the world” in God’s plan is love, but it is not obvious to man in his fallenness or forgetfulness. The appearance of Jesus in history wakes us from our forgetful slumber to see not what is true only with Christ's advent, but what was ignored until then (or until our conversion). So far, it seems that Process Christology has been able to "save the appearances” of older Christological thinking quite well. For example, this schema sounds very close to that of Calvin, for whom God's glory is always manifested, "mirrored,” in the world, yet remains invisible to man until he receives God's "spectacles" in Christ. The analogy is all the more remarkable since Process thinking disavows the older framework of supernatural intervention.
But the parallel may not be so close after all. The general assertions come to be qualified in very important ways. Ogden does not leave it at saying that what Christ "re-presents" is the "primordial,” “original possibility" for authentic existence, with the implication that this possibility was lost with man's sinful forgetfulness. On the contrary, we soon find that men still can and do realize the original possibility for existence apart from Christ. Seen this way, how “decisive” can Christ be? Ogden says Christ's revelation “corrects and fulfills” all other ways of apprehending God’s offer of life, but what is this supposed to mean since other ways are adequate on their own (e.g., secular philosophy, Old Testament Judaism, other religions)?
We can observe a similar evacuation of the term “decisive” in this statement by Pittenger: “what happens to the so-called 'finality' of Christianity? The answer here is partly that Christianity does not claim finality for itself. Rather, it stresses the decisiveness of Jesus Christ as the one who is 'important' and... 'unlosable'”25 These words just do not mean the same thing. The drop from “decisive” through the anticlimactic “important” to the downright comical “unlosable” is much more of a distance than Pittenger would like to admit.
Another difficulty with the Process thinkers’ use of the term “decisive” has to do with the manner in which they relate Jesus to their concept of the overarching meaning in the world. Though they claim to have gotten their world-vision from Jesus, it becomes apparent that they have first established their world-view and then derived the significance of Jesus from it. First let us remind ourselves of the Process concept of an “act" or “revelation" of God. David Ray Griffin describes it well:
Every event in the world is an act of God in the sense that it originates with an initial aim derived from God. But some [events] will be his acts in a special sense, just as some of a man’s external acts are the man’s in a special sense... Now, every event is to some extent an expression of God's nature. But specially suited for this are the words and deeds of a human being through which he expresses a vision of reality, for in such events intelligible expression could be given to God's character and purpose.26
And how does Jesus fit into this picture? “The aims given to Jesus and actualized by him during his active ministry were such that the basic vision of reality contained in his message of word and deed was the supreme expression of God’s eternal character and purpose.”27 But Griffin, with most other Process thinkers, has passed too quickly over a major question, the question of criteria. Just how is one supposed to find out that Jesus is the “human being" whose “vision of reality” is the true one? Obviously, there are several other candidates for this position. Why not Nietzsche? Machiavelli? We only know that Jesus' “Galilean vision" accurately reflects the reality of the world if we can compare his vision with some independent knowledge of what that reality is like. And if we do have such prior knowledge, then Jesus' appearance is not a “decisive disclosure” at all. At best he may be judged a “particularly good example” of it, or in Cobb's terms “a paradigm case.” But “decisive disclosure” and “paradigm case" are not the same thing.
Rather than deriving one's worldview from Jesus, as "decisive disclosure" language would lead us to expect, Process thinkers seek to understand Jesus in terms of a worldview derived from elsewhere. One more example of this reversal may be found in Cobb's puzzling connection of the terms "Logos," "Christ," and "Jesus." In chapter 4 of his book Christ in a Pluralistic Age, he observes that in early Christianity the "Logos" was understood, with Heraclitus, as a universal principle of proportion-in-change. The Process equivalent would be the "principle of creative transformation." The Apologists, of course, made the Heraclitean "Logos" synonymous with "Christ" because of the application of both terms to Jesus in the Fourth Gospel. Thus Cobb feels justified in equating his Process "Logos" with the term "Christ." (Note that this connection is made simply on the basis of historical precedent, not because of any inherent relation of the two terms.) And since Jesus may be shown in some sense to have partaken of "creative transformation," then he may be said to have been the "Christ" or the "Logos" as already defined. Clearly Cobb has placed Jesus into a system defined a priori by Process Theology.
The contrast with early Christianity is indicated by his reversal of the historical connection between the three terms. Early Christians began with "Jesus" of Nazareth whose impact on them caused them to recognize him as "the Christ," the savior of Israel. Further reflection led believers to the conclusion that Jesus was of more than national importance; his view of things was seen as the way the world was. He was called the "Logos." Jesus became known as "Christ," and then "Logos" as he was taken with greater and greater seriousness. Cobb has reversed the whole process logically as well as historically.
This whole avenue of approach points up an important, even a fatal, irony in Process Christology. If he qualifies as "Christ" who most clearly conveys to us God's aims in the universe, then the most obvious candidate for the job might seem to be Alfred North Whitehead. On the criteria set forth by Process Christologians themselves (e. g., Griffin, quoted above), naming Whitehead as the Messiah would seem to be inevitable, since it was through him that the Process view of God and the universe appeared in its greatest fullness and clarity. Jesus is at best an illustrative example of God's aims (and this is really all Cobb and company are able to show). Whitehead, not Jesus, "revealed" the Process vision.
In conclusion, let us return to the question, briefly raised above, of Jesus' "decisiveness" as implying either uniqueness or finality. It is important at this point to remember that these Process thinkers have indicated their aim of reinterpreting the assertions of the Christian faith, not of rejecting them and starting over. At least, as Robinson put it, their goal was to wind up "meaning what the New Testament writers and the Father s meant." Robinson eventually addresses the crucial question of Jesus' finality.
In a pluralistic age, is there still any sense in which Christ can be spoken of as the man for all? Many Christians, I am sure, find themselves genuinely torn at this point between not being able to deny. that Jesus Christ for them remains central and final, in the sense that he gives unity to their whole perspective on life, and yet not being able to assert that this must be so for all, in the sense that this is the only true perspective without which in traditional terms, men "cannot be saved." 28
Similarly Cobb calls for “a full recognition of the variety of structures of existence among which that of Jesus is one and that of Gautama, for example, is another.”29 He allows that "There is no a priori basis for determining whether others have participated in this structure of existence." Jesus is unique, then, not in principle but only “so far as we know.”30 But the most interesting statement along these lines is made by Schubert Ogden:
The New Testament sense of the claim "only in Jesus Christ" is not that God is only to be found in Jesus and nowhere else, but that the only God who is to be found anywhere - though he is to be found everywhere - is the God who is made known in the word that Jesus speaks to us. 31
Is it really very difficult to surmise that the assertions “Jesus is the only way to God” and “There are many ways to God besides Jesus” intend to exclude one another? It is certainly doubtful whether the uniqueness and finality of Jesus Christ are as peripheral to the Christian faith as suggested by Ogden, Cobb, Pittenger, and Robinson. On the contrary, we believe that a fair analysis will show the systematic logic of the Christian tradition to have stressed that Christ is unique because of his finality. This was the whole point of calling him “the savior of the world" (John 4:42) and claiming that he was “predicted by the prophets" (John 1:45). In other words, "In the past God spoke... through the prophets at many times and in various ways, but in these last days he has spoken to us by his Son, whom he appointed heir of all things" (Hebrews 1:1-2). It is important to see that statements like "only through Jesus Christ” do not merely represent an aberrant narrow-mindedness easily detachable from the body of Christian belief. When Cobb, Ogden, et al., effectively make Jesus one of many prophets with a "message" about God, instead of God incarnate to save us and sum up all revelation, they have fundamentally shifted the whole logic of Christian faith. Now to do such a thing might be quite advisable. But this seems to be far from the stated intent of the Process thinkers we have been considering, who want to "mean what the Fathers meant.”
Our study of some problematical aspects of Process Christology has indicated that the whole enterprise seems to be reductionistic in its effects, though this is contrary to its intentions. Initially we found that the use of the highly-touted Process conceptuality actually contributed little that wasunique to a mode of theologizing essentially of a piece with traditional Liberalism. Next we suggested that the important Christological category of "perfect man" in Process thinking ran into serious problems because of its adaptation to a non-supernaturalist worldview in the light of which the category "true God" was radically changed in meaning. This latter concept had been the traditional prop of the "true man" notion, which could not stand very intelligibly without it. Finally, we concluded that what is probably the central Process Christological category, that of Jesus Christ as "decisive disclosure," was misleading since the Process Christologians tended to evacuate the term "decisive" of any real meaning. They did so by making Jesus derivative of, instead of determinative of, their worldview; and by placing Jesus, at least theoretically, on a level with other bearers of a divine vision. Our final observation was that Process Christology represents a much more radical reshaping of Christianity than it claims or intends. All this should not be taken to suggest a smug complacency with regard to traditional orthodox Christology. The conceptual problems raised by Process thinkers are real ones; it is their proposed solutions we must question. But they are quite justified in their concern to make God-Man Christology intelligible in our day. This work must be taken up by others, hopefully in more satisfactory ways.
1 Norman Pittenger, The Lure of Divine Love (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1979), p. 15.
2 John B. Cobb, Christ in a Pluralistic Age (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1975), p. 139.
3 Friedrich Sch1eiermacher, The Christian Faith (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1963), p. 385.
4 Cobb, p. 165.
5 John A. T. Robinson, The Human Face of God (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1973), p. 210.
6 Pittenger, p. 158.
7 Robinson, Human Face of God, p. 17.
8 Pittenger, p. 112.
9 David Friedrich Strauss, The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), pp. 24-25.
10 Robinson, Human Face of God, p. 203.
11 Pittenger, p. 81.
12 John Hick (ed.), The Myth of God Incarnate (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977), p. 188.
13 Pittenger, p. 106.
14 Robinson, Human Face of God, pp. 96, 123.
15 Pittenger, p. 147.
16 Friedrich Sch1eiermacher, The Life of Jesus (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), p. 34.
17 Strauss, Christ of Faith, p. 29.
18 Cobb, p. 173.
19 Ibid., p. 139.
20 Ibid., p. 145.
21 Ibid., pp. 171, 173.
22 Schleiermacher, Life of Jesus, p. 82.
23 Schubert M. Ogden, The Reality of God (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977), pp. 185-186.
24 Pittenger, p. 99.
25 Ibid., p. 163.
26 David R. Griffin, A Process Christology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973), p. 215.
27 Ibid., p. 218.
28 Robinson, Human Face of God, p. 220.
29 Cobb, p. 169.
30 Ibid., p. 142.
31 Schubert M. Ogden, Christ without Myth (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1979), p. 144.