IMPORTANT:Ethnic nationalism, evolutionary psychology and Genetic Similarity Theory

Ethnic nationalism, evolutionary psychology and Genetic Similarity Theory

J. PHILIPPE RUSHTON
Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario,
Canada

ABSTRACT. Genetic Similarity Theory extends Anthony D. Smith’s theory of ethno-symbolism by anchoring ethnic nepotism in the evolutionary psychology of altruism. Altruism toward kin and similar others evolved in order to help replicate shared genes. Since ethnic groups are repositories of shared genes, xenophobia is the
‘dark side’ of human altruism. A review of the literature demonstrates the pull of genetic similarity in dyads such as marriage partners and friendships, and even large
groups, both national and international. The evidence that genes incline people to prefer others who are genetically similar to themselves comes from studies of social assortment, differential heritabilities, the comparison of identical and fraternal twins, blood tests, and family bereavements. DNA sequencing studies confirm some origin myths and disconfirm others; they also show that in comparison to the total genetic
variance around the world, random co-ethnics are related to each other on the order of first cousins.

Introduction

Most theories of ethno-political conflict and nationalism focus on cultural,
cognitive and economic factors, often with the assumption that modernisation
will gradually reduce the effect of local antagonisms and promote the growth
of more universalistic societies (Smith 1998). However, purely socio-economic
explanations seem inadequate to account for the rapid rise of nationalism in
the former Soviet Bloc and too weak to explain the lethality of the conflicts
between Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda, Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs in the
Indian subcontinent, and Croats, Serbs, Bosnians and Albanians in the
former Yugoslavia, or even the level of animosity between Blacks, Whites
and Hispanics in the US. Typically, analysts have also failed to consider the
ethno-political repercussions of the unprecedented movement of peoples
taking place in the world today (van den Berghe 2002).
One of the hallmarks of true science is what Edward O. Wilson (1998)
termed the unity of knowledge through the principle of consilience, in
which the explanations of phenomena at one level are grounded in those at
a lower level. Two prominent examples are the understanding of genetics in
terms of biochemistry once the structure of the DNA molecule was worked
out and, in turn, of chemistry in terms of atomic physics. Anthony D. Smith’s
theory of ethno-symbolism unifies knowledge in the consilient manner
through its integration of history and psychology, thereby solving the
problem that nationalism poses for purely socio-economic theories – the
phenomena of mass devotion and the belief that one’s own group is
favourably unique, even ‘chosen’ (e.g. Smith 2000 and 2004; Guibernau and
Hutchinson 2004; Hutchinson 2000). With its emphasis on a group’s preexisting
kinship, religious and belief systems fashioned into a sense of
common identity and shared culture, however mythologised, Smith’s theory
explains what purely socio-economic theories do not, why the ‘glorious dead’
fought and died for their country. It is more robust than other theories
because its research analyses show that myths, memories and especially
symbols, foment and maintain a sense of common identity among the people
unified in a nation.
The ethno-symbolic perspective further unifies knowledge by highlighting
interactions between ethnicity and nationhood. For example, Hutchinson
(2000) described the episodic element in the history of countries as when
national pride is augmented by events such as sudden new archaeological
discoveries. By studying the ethnic character of modern nations over the long
term, it is possible to identify recurring causes of national revivals, the role of
cultural differences within nations, and the salience of national identities with
respect to other allegiances.
The current article presents ‘Genetic Similarity Theory’ to explain ethnic
nepotism and people’s need to identify and be with their ‘own kind’ (Rushton
et al. 1984 and 1986; Rushton 1989a, 1995, 2004; Rushton and Bons 2005).
Nationalists often claim that their nation has organic continuity and ‘ties of
blood’ that make them ‘special’ and different from outsiders, a view not fully
explained by ethno-symbolism. Although the term ‘ethnicity’ is recent, the
sense of kinship, group solidarity and common culture to which it refers is
often as old as the historical record (Hutchinson and Smith 1996). Genetic
Similarity Theory extends Smith’s theory and the unity of knowledge by
providing the next link, the necessary biological mooring.
Patriotism is almost always seen as a virtue and extension of family loyalty
and is typically preached using kinship terms. Countries are called the
‘motherland’ or the ‘fatherland’. Ethnic identity builds on real as well as
putative similarity. At the core of human nature, people are genetically
motivated to prefer others genetically similar to themselves. I will support
this contention with current findings from evolutionary psychology and
population genetics.

The evolutionary background

Starting with Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species (1859) and The Descent
of Man (1871), evolutionary explanations of the moral sentiments have been
offered for both humans and other animals. Nineteenth century evolutionists
such as Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner built on the concepts
of in-group-amity and out-group-enmity, group competition and group
replacement. Tribes, ethnic groups, even nations were seen as extended
families (see van der Dennen 1987, for a review). However, evolutionary
explanations went out of favour during the 1920s and 1930s with the rise of
fascism in Europe, largely because they were seen as providing a justification
for racially based politics (Degler 1991). During the 1960s and 1970s, most
biologists eschewed theories of group competition in favour of the mathematically
‘cleaner’ theories of individual adaptation, since the genetic mechanisms
necessary for ethnocentrism to evolve remained quantitatively
problematic. After several decades of neglect, evolutionary psychology has
now regained scientific respectability (e.g. Badcock 2000; Buss 2003; Pinker
2002; Wilson 1998).
In The Descent of Man (1871: 489–90), Darwin proposed the radical and
far-reaching hypothesis that human morality rested on the same evolutionary
basis as did the behaviour of other animals – reproductive success – described
as the ‘general good’:
The term, general good, may be defined as the rearing of the greatest number of
individuals in full vigour and health, with all their faculties perfect, under the
conditions to which they are subjected. As the social instincts both of man and the
lower animals have no doubt been developed by nearly the same steps, it would be
advisable, if found practicable, to use the same definition in both cases, and to take as
the standard of morality, the general good or welfare of the community, rather than
the general happiness; but this definition would perhaps require some limitation on
account of political ethics.
Historian Carl Degler (1991) observed that Darwin’s equating of human and
animal morality with the reproductive success of the community had the effect
of biologising ethics. Suddenly, far-flung notions of economics, demographics,
politics and philosophy, some of which had been centuries in the
making, now revolved around a Darwinian centre, capturing the nineteenth
century imagination and inspiring new analyses of the way society worked.
The philosophy termed ‘Social Darwinism’, with its emphasis on the reproductive
success of groups as well as of individuals, was taken up at every point
along the political spectrum – from laissez-faire capitalism to communist
collectivism to National Socialism (again see van der Dennen 1987, for a
review).
It was crucial for Darwin to emphasise the moral continuity between
humans and other animals because the opponents of human evolution
had argued for their discontinuity in both the moral and the intellectual
spheres. Darwin departed from utilitarian philosophers such as John Stuart
Mill and Jeremy Bentham who believed that human morality was based on
making informed choices about the greatest happiness for the greatest
number. As Darwin pointedly observed, that basis was rational rather than
instinctive. Since human beings alone were said to follow it, Darwin took
exception to it.
In The Descent, Darwin provided numerous examples of how animal
morality led to reproductive success. All animals fight by nature in some
circumstances but are altruistic in others. Acts of altruism include parental
care, mutual defence, rescue behaviour, co-operative hunting, food sharing
and self-sacrificial altruism. Darwin described how leaders of monkey troops
act as sentinels and utter cries of danger or safety to their fellows; how even
male chimpanzees might rush to the aid of infants that cried out under attack,
even though the infants were not their own.
Animal altruism – even to the point of self-sacrifice – has been massively
confirmed since Darwin wrote The Descent (see E. O. Wilson 1975, for
extended discussion). Altruism involves self-sacrifice. Sometimes the altruist
dies. For example, when bees defend their hive and sting intruders, the entire
stinger is torn from the bee’s body. Stinging an intruder is an act of altruistic
self-sacrifice. In ants, if nest walls are broken open, soldiers pour out to
combat foragers from other nests; at the same time, worker ants repair the
broken walls leaving the soldiers outside to die in the process.
Human warfare appears to be rooted in the evolved behaviour of our
nearest primate relatives. Male chimpanzees patrol their territories in groups
to keep the peace within the group and to repel invaders. Such patrols, of up
to twenty bonded males at a time, raid rival groups, kidnap females and annex
territory, sometimes fighting pitched battles in the process (Wrangham and
Peterson 1996).

Solving the paradox of altruism

In The Origin, Darwin (1859) saw that altruism posed a major enigma for his
theory of evolution. How could altruism evolve through ‘survival of the
fittest’ if altruism means self-sacrifice? If the most altruistic members of a
group sacrifice themselves for others, they will have fewer offspring to pass on
the genes that made them altruistic. Altruism should not evolve, but selfishness
should. Darwin was unable to resolve the paradox of altruism to his
satisfaction because to do so required greater knowledge of how heredity
worked than he had available (the word ‘genetics’ was not coined until 1905).
Nonetheless, in The Descent, Darwin (1871) intuited the solution when he
wrote, ‘sympathy is directed solely towards members of the same community,
and therefore towards known, and more or less loved members, but not all the
individuals of the same species’ (Vol. 1: 163).
In 1964, evolutionary biologist William Hamilton finally provided a
generally accepted solution to the problem of altruism based on the concept
of inclusive fitness, not just individual fitness. It is the genes that survive and
are passed on. Some of the individual’s most distinctive genes will be found in
siblings, nephews, cousins and grandchildren as well as in offspring. Siblings
share fifty per cent, nephews and nieces twenty-five per cent, and cousins
about twelve and a half per cent of their distinctive genes. So when an altruist
sacrifices its life for its kin, it ensures the survival of these common genes. The
vehicle has been sacrificed to preserve copies of its precious cargo. From an
evolutionary point of view, an individual organism is only a vehicle, part of an
elaborate device, which ensures the survival and reproduction of genes with
the least possible biochemical alteration.
‘Hamilton’s Rule’ states that across all species, altruism (or, conversely,
reduced aggression) is favoured when rb c40, where r is the genetic
relatedness between two individuals, b is the (genetic) fitness benefit to the
beneficiary, and c is the fitness cost to the altruist. Evolutionary biologists
have used Hamilton’s ‘gene’s eye’ point of view to carry out research on a
wide range of social interactions including altruism, aggression, selfishness
and spite. The formulation was dubbed ‘kin selection theory’ by John
Maynard Smith (1964) and became widely known through influential books
such as The Selfish Gene by Richard Dawkins (1976) and Sociobiology: the
New Synthesis by Edward O. Wilson (1975).
In 1971, Hamilton extended his formulation and hypothesised that altruism
would result from any degree of genetic relatedness, not just that based on
immediate kin. Hamilton equated his genetic relatedness variable r to Sewall
Wright’s FST measure of within-group variance (typically r   2FST), and cited
an experimental study of semi-isolated groups of mice where even random
mating produced an FST of 0.18. Hamilton concluded that the within-group
mice should therefore favour each other over those in the out-group, treating
‘the average individual encountered as a relative closer than a grandchild (or
half-sib) but more distant than an offspring (or full-sib)’.
In order to favour near kin over distant kin and distant kin over nonrelatives,
the organism must be able to detect degrees of genetic similarity in
others. Hamilton (1964 and 1971) proposed several mechanisms by which
detection could occur: (1) location or proximity to self as in the rule ‘if it’s in
the nest, it’s yours’; (2) familiarity, which is learning through social interaction;
(3) similarity-to-self through imprinting on self, parents or nest mates as
in the rule ‘look for physical features that are similar to self’ – dubbed the
‘armpit effect’ by Dawkins (1976); and (4) ‘recognition alleles’ or innate
feature detectors that allow detection of genetic similarity in strangers in the
absence of any mechanism of learning – dubbed the ‘green beard effect’ by
Dawkins (1976). In this latter, a gene produced two effects: (a) creating a
unique trait such as a green beard, and (b) preferring others who also have
Genetic Similarity Theory 493
that trait. Hamilton and Dawkins both favoured an imprinting mechanism,
which Hamilton (1971) suggested would be most effective if it occurred on the
more heritable traits because these best indicate the underlying genotype.
There is dramatic evidence that many animal species do detect and then act
on genetic similarity (Fletcher and Michener 1987; Hauber and Sherman
2001). In a classic study of bees, Greenberg (1979) bred for fourteen degrees of
closeness to a guard bee, which blocks the nest to intruders. Only the more
genetically similar intruders got through. A classic study of frog tadpoles
separated before hatching and reared in isolation found the tadpoles moved to
the end of the tank where their siblings had been placed, even though they had
never encountered them previously, rather than to the end of the tank with
non-siblings (Blaustein and O’Hara 1981). Squirrels produce litters that
contain both full-siblings and half-siblings. Even though they have the same
mother, share the same womb, and inhabit the same nest, full–siblings fight
less often than do half-siblings. Full-siblings also come to each other’s aid
more often (Hauber and Sherman 2001).
Similarity detection is also required for assortative mating, which occurs in
insects, birds, mammals and even plants. Optimal outbreeding in some plants
is promoted by acceptance of pollen from source plants that are neither too
similar nor too dissimilar molecularly from the host plant’s own pollen (see
Hauber and Sherman 2001, for review). Even in species that disperse, the
offspring typically show strong aversion to mating with close relatives. One
study of wild baboons showed that paternal kin recognition occurs as
frequently as maternal kin recognition even though identifying paternal kin
is much more difficult in species where the mother mates with more than one
male (Alberts 1999).
Although in 1975 Hamilton extrapolated his ideas to human warfare, his
formulations have only seldom been taken beyond immediate kin. In The
Selfish Gene, Dawkins (1976) argued that the mathematics of kin selection
soon made coefficients of relatedness, even between kin, vanishingly small.
One example he offered was that Queen Elizabeth II, while a direct
descendant of William the Conqueror (1066), is unlikely to share a single
one of her ancestor’s genes. In a 1981 editorial for Nature, Dawkins used
similar arguments to rebut claims made by Britain’s far-right National Front
that kin selection theory provided a genetic justification for ethnocentrism.
Perhaps feeling a moral obligation to condemn racism, some evolutionists
minimised the theoretical possibility of a biological underpinning to ethnic or
national favouritism. Hamilton himself (1987: 426) pithily commented, ‘in
civilized cultures, nepotism has become an embarrassment’.
These qualifications turn out to have been overstated. Through assortative
mating and other cultural practices, the selfish gene’s capacity to replicate
itself in combination with those clusters of other genes with which it works
well may be extended for hundreds of generations, not three. Elizabeth II is
considerably more genetically similar to William the Conqueror than she is to
an average person alive today.

Genetic Similarity Theory

In 1984, the current author, along with Robin Russell and Pamela Wells,
began to apply the Hamiltonian perspective to human dyads, small groups
and even larger national and international entities (Rushton et al. 1984;
Rushton 1986, 1989a, 2004; Rushton and Bons 2005). We dubbed our
approach ‘Genetic Similarity Theory’ and reasoned that if genes produced
effects that allowed bearers to recognise and favour each other, then altruistic
behaviour could evolve well beyond ‘kin selection’. By matching across the
entire genome, people can maximise their inclusive fitness by marrying others
similar to themselves, and like, make friends with and help the most similar of
their neighbours, as well as engage in ethnic nepotism. As the English
language makes clear, ‘likeness goes with liking’.
Social-assortment studies
Of all the decisions people make that affect their environment, choosing
friends and spouses are among the most important. Genetic Similarity Theory
was first applied to assortative mating, which kin-selection theory sensu stricto
does not readily explain since individuals seldom mate with ‘kin’. Yet, the
evidence for assortative mating is pervasive in other animals as well as in
humans. For humans, both spouses and best friends are most similar on
socio-demographic variables such as age, ethnicity and educational level
(r50.60), next most on opinions and attitudes (r50.50), then on cognitive
ability (r50.40), and least, but still significantly, on personality (r50.20) and
physical traits (r50.20).
Even marrying across ethnic lines ‘proves the rule’. In Hawaii, men and
women who married cross-ethnically were more similar in personality than
those marrying within their group, suggesting that couples ‘make up’ for
ethnic dissimilarity by choosing spouses more similar to themselves in other
respects (Ahern et al. 1981). Evolution has also set an upper limit on ‘like
marrying like’ – incest avoidance (van den Berghe 1983). Too close genetic
similarity between mates increases the probability of ‘double doses’ of
harmful recessive genes. The ideal mate is one who is genetically similar but
not a close relative.
Several studies have shown that people prefer genetic similarity in social
partners, and assort on the more heritable components of traits, rather than
on the most intuitively obvious ones, just as Hamilton (1971) predicted they
would if genetic mechanisms were involved. This occurs because more
heritable components better reflect the underlying genotype. These studies
have used homogeneous sets of anthropometric, cognitive, personality and
attitudinal traits measured within the same ethnic group. Examples of varying
heritabilities are: for physical attributes, eighty per cent for middle-finger
length vs. fifty per cent for upper-arm circumference; for intelligence, eighty
per cent for the general factor vs. less than fifty per cent for specific abilities;
Genetic Similarity Theory 495
for personality items, seventy-six per cent for ‘enjoying meeting people’ vs.
twenty per cent for ‘enjoying being unattached’; and for social attitudes, fiftyone
per cent for agreement with the ‘death penalty’ vs. twenty-five per cent for
agreement with ‘Bible truth’.
In a study of married couples, Russell et al. (1985) found that across thirtysix
physical traits, spousal similarity was greater on attributes with higher
heritability such as wrist circumference (seventy-one per cent heritable) than it
was on attributes with lower heritability such as neck circumference (fortyeight
per cent heritable). On fifty-four indices of personality and leisure time
pursuits, Rushton and Russell (1985) found that spousal similarity was
greater on items such as ‘enjoying reading’ (forty-one per cent heritable)
than on items such as ‘having many hobbies’ (twenty per cent heritable). On
twenty-six cognitive ability tests, Rushton and Nicholson (1988) found that
spousal resemblance was greater on more heritable subtests from the Hawaii
Family Study of Cognition and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS).
When spouses assort on more heritable items, they report greater marital
satisfaction (Russell and Wells 1991).
In a study of best friends, Rushton (1989b) found that across a wide range
of anthropometric and social attitude measures, such as agreement with
‘military drill’ (forty per cent heritable) and with ‘church authority’ (twenty-
five per cent heritable) the similarity of the friends was more pronounced on
the more heritable measures. These results were extended to liking in
acquaintances by Tesser (1993) who manipulated people’s beliefs about how
similar they were to others on attitudes pre-selected as being either high or low
in heritability. Tesser found that people liked others more when their
similarity had been chosen (by him) on the more heritable items.
The above results cannot be explained by culturalist theories. Genetic
Similarity Theory and culturalist theory make opposite predictions about
social assortment. Cultural theory predicts that phenotype matching by
spouses will be greater on those traits that spouses have become more similar
on through the shared experiences that shape attitudes, leisure time activities
and waist and bicep size (e.g. through diet and exercise). Genetic Similarity
Theory, on the other hand, predicts greater matching on the more heritable
traits (e.g. wrist size and middle finger length, not easily changed).
Twin and adoption studies
Several twin and adoption studies show that the preference for genetic
similarity is heritable, that is, people are genetically inclined to prefer similar
partners. In one of these studies, Rowe and Osgood (1984) analysed data on
delinquency from several hundred adolescent monozygotic (MZ) twin pairs,
who share one hundred per cent of their genes, and dizygotic (DZ) twin pairs,
who share fifty per cent of their genes. They found that adolescents genetically
inclined to delinquency were also genetically inclined to seek out similar
others as friends. Dovetailing with these results, Daniels and Plomin (1985)
examined friendships in several hundred pairs of siblings from both adoptive
and non-adoptive homes, and found that whereas biological siblings (who
share genes as well as environments) had friends who resembled each other,
adoptive siblings (who share only their environment) had friends who were
not at all similar to each other. These results show that shared genes lead to
similar friends.
Rushton and Bons (2005) analysed a 130-item questionnaire on personality
and social attitudes gathered from several hundred pairs of identical twins,
fraternal twins, their spouses and their best friends. They found that: (a)
spouses and best friends are about as similar as siblings, a level of similarity
not previously recognised; and (b) identical twins choose more similar spouses
and best friends to their co-twin than do non-identical twins. The preference
for similarity is about thirty per cent heritable. Moreover, once again,
matching for similarity was greater on the more heritable items showing
that social assortment is based on the underlying genotype. Similarity was
greater on items such as preferring ‘business to science’ (heritability50.60)
than on liking to ‘travel the world alone’ (twenty-four per cent heritable).

Blood group studies

Yet another way of testing the hypothesis that humans typically choose mates
and friends who are genetically similar is to examine blood antigens. In one
study, Rushton (1988) analysed seven polymorphic marker systems at ten
blood loci across six chromosomes (ABO, Rhesus [Rh], MNSs, Kell, Duffy
[Fy], Kidd [Jk] and HLA) in a study of 1,000 cases of disputed paternity,
limited to people of North European appearance (judged by photographs).
Couples who produced a child together were fifty-two per cent similar but
those that did not were only forty-three per cent similar. Subsequently,
Rushton (1989b) used these blood tests with pairs of male best friends of
similar background and found the friends were significantly more similar to
each other than they were to randomly matched pairs from the same database.
Bereavement studies
Within-family bereavement studies show just how fine-tuned human preferences
for genetic similarity can be. One study of 263 child bereavements found
that (a) spouses agreed seventy-four per cent of the time on which side of the
family a child ‘took after’ the most, their own or that of their spouse, and (b)
the grief intensity reported by mothers, fathers and grandparents was greater
for children who resembled their side of the family than it was for children
who resembled the other side of the family (Littlefield and Rushton 1986). A
study of bereavement in twins found that MZ twins who share one hundred
per cent of their genes, compared to DZ twins who share fifty per cent of their
genes: (a) work harder for their co-twin; (b) show more physical proximity to
Genetic Similarity Theory 497
their co-twin; (c) express more affection to their co-twin; and (d) show greater
loss when their co-twin dies (Segal 2000).

Other lines of research

Women prefer the bodily scents of men with genes similar to their own more
than they do those of men with nearly identical genes or genes totally
dissimilar to their own (Jacob et al. 2002). Each woman’s choice was based
upon the human leukocyte antigen (HLA) gene sequence – the basis for
personal odours and olfactory preferences – inherited from her father but not
her mother. Another study found that both men and women rated versions of
their own face as the most attractive after they had been computer-morphed
into faces of the opposite-sex, even though they did not recognise the photos
as images of themselves (Penton-Voak et al. 1999). Similarly, people whose
faces were morphed with strange faces trusted others most when they looked
like themselves (DeBruine 2002). Familiarity was ruled out by using morphs
of celebrities; only self-resemblance mattered.

The gravity of groups

The pull of genetic similarity does not stop at family and friends. Group
members move into ethnic neighbourhoods and join together in clubs and
societies. Since people of the same ethnic group are genetically more similar to
each other than to members of other groups, they favour members of their
own group over outsiders.
In his groundbreaking book, The Ethnic Phenomenon, van den Berghe
(1981) applied kin-selection theory to explain why people everywhere are
prone to develop ethnocentric attitudes toward those who differ in dress,
dialect and other appearance, and how even relatively open and assimilative
ethnic groups ‘police’ their boundaries against invasion by strangers by using
‘badges’ as markers of group membership. Van den Berghe hypothesised that
these ‘badges’ would typically be cultural, such as scarification, linguistic
accent and clothing style rather than physical. He agreed that shared traits of
high heritability could provide more reliable indicators than cultural, flexible
ones, but he thought these heritability indices would likely only be relevant to
modern times when they could be used to discriminate between widely
differing groups such as the Boers and Xhosa.
The studies I reviewed above on kin recognition in animals and social
assortment in humans shows that the preference for similarity is fine-tuned. It
takes place within ethnic groups, even families, and it occurs on the more
heritable items from sets of homogeneous traits. As such, the process is
considerably more variegated, subtle and powerful than van den Berghe (1981)
conjectured. (His 1989 position paper went further toward acknowledging the
more ‘primordial’ elements involved.) The reviewed data confirms Hamilton’s
(1971) prediction that kin-recognition systems would use the more heritable
attributes of others if they were based on mechanisms such as imprinting-onself
(Dawkins’s ‘armpit effect’) and recognition alleles (Dawkins’s ‘green
beard effect’). Detecting degrees of genetic similarity is much more fine-tuned
than simply determining whether someone is a Boer or a Xhosa. The question
is: How similar to one is the particular Boer (or Xhosa)?
In his 2003 book On Genetic Interests, Frank Salter, a political ethologist at
the Max Planck Institute in Munich, extrapolated genetic similarity theory
and the logic of taking all shared genes into account to also explain ethnic
nepotism. He showed how Hamilton’s (1964, 1971, 1975) coefficient of
relatedness (r) equated to the FST estimates of genetic variance (on average
r   2 FST ) that had become available (e.g. Cavalli-Sforza et al. 1994). Since
FST provides both a measure of genetic distance between populations and of
kinship within them, it followed that in comparison to the total genetic
variance around the world, random members of any one population group are
related to each other on the order of r   0.25 or 1/4 or about the same as halfsiblings.
(A general rule would be: If a fellow ethnic looks like you, then on
average, he or she is genetically equivalent to a cousin.)
Salter’s analysis of Cavalli-Sforza’s FST data showed that if the world
population were wholly English then the kinship between any random pair of
Englishmen would be zero. But if the world population consisted of both
English people and Germans, then two random English people (or Germans)
would have a kinship of 0.0044, or that of 1/32 of a cousin. As genetic
distances between populations become larger, the kinship coefficient between
random co-ethnics within a population increases. Two English people become
the equivalent of 3/8 cousin by comparison with people from the Near East; 1/
2 cousin by comparison with people from India; half-sibs by comparison with
people from China or East Africa; and like full-sibs (or children) compared
with people from South Africa. Since people have many more co-ethnics than
relatives, the aggregate of genes they share with their fellow ethnics dwarfs
those they share with their extended families. Rather than being a mere poor
relation of family nepotism, ethnic nepotism is virtually a proxy for it.
In two other books, Salter (2002 and 2004) and his colleagues found that
ethnic bonds are central to explaining such diverse phenomena as ethnic
mafias, minority middlemen networks, heroic freedom fighters, the welfare
state, generous foreign aid and charity in all its more unstinting manifestations.
One study examined street beggars in Moscow. Some were ethnic
Russians, just like the vast majority of the pedestrians. Others were dressed in
the distinctive garb of Moldova, a small former Soviet republic, ethnically and
linguistically kin to Romania. Finally, some of the beggars were darkerskinned
Roma (Gypsies). The Russian pedestrians preferred to give to their
fellow Russians, with their fellow Eastern EuropeanMoldavians, second. The
Gypsies were viewed so negatively that they had to resort to a wide variety of
tactics ranging from singing and dancing, to importuning tightwads, to
sending out groups of young children to beg.
In an earlier study, anthropologist Colin J. Irwin (1987) tested formulations
of in-group co-operation in inbred populations by calculating coeffi-
cients of consanguinity within and between various Eskimo tribes and subtribes
in the western Hudson’s Bay region of Canada. He found that prosocial
behaviour such as wife exchange, and anti-social behaviour, such as the
genocidal killing of women and children during warfare, followed lines of
genetic distance, albeit mediated by ethnic badging such as dialect and
appearance.
Even very young children typically show a clear preference for others of
their own ethnic heritage (Aboud 1988). In fact, the process of making racial
groupings has been shown to result from a natural tendency to classify people
into ‘kinds’. Children quickly begin to sort people into ‘basic kinds’ by sex,
age, size and occupation. Experiments show that at an early age children
clearly expect race to run in families (Hirschfield 1996). Very early in life, a
child knows which race it belongs to, and which ones it doesn’t.
The whisper of the genes
The history of the Jewish people provides a well-documented example of how
genetic similarity theory intersects with Anthony D. Smith’s (2000 and 2004)
ethno-symbolic approach. As shown by Batsheva Bonne-Tamir at Tel Aviv
University (e.g. 1992; and others, such as Thomas et al. 2002), Jewish groups
are genetically similar to each other even though they have been scattered
around the world for two millennia. Jews from Iraq and Libya share more
genes with Jews from Germany, Poland and Russia than either group shares
with the non-Jewish populations among whom they have lived for centuries.
Although the Ethiopian Jews turn out not to be ‘genetically Jewish’, many
other far removed Jewish communities share a similar genetic profile despite
large geographic distances between the communities and the passage of
hundreds of years.
Genetic Similarity Theory predicts that many other seemingly purely
cultural divides are, in fact, rooted in the underlying population genetics.
Recent DNA sequencing of the ancient Hindu caste system has confirmed that
higher castes are more genetically related to Europeans than are lower castes
who are genetically more related to other south Asians (Bamshad et al., 2001).
Although outlawed in 1960, the caste system continues to be the main feature
of Indian society, with powerful political repercussions.
Genetic studies can thus confirm (or disconfirm) people’s ideas about their
origins. In the case of Jews and the Indian caste system, traditional views have
been confirmed. Israel is a new state, yet one which is built on an ancient
tradition of ethnicity and nationhood. Much recent analysis of Israeli society,
however, has tended to downplay connections between modern Israel
and pre-modern Jewish identity, seeing Israel rather as an unambiguously
modern phenomenon (cf. Smith 2000). Some Jews have greeted the genetic
‘validation’ positively because it affirms the organic nature of the Jewish
people. However, it is also recognised as a two-edged sword, that could be
invoked by claims from certain quarters that a ‘Jewish Race is working to
dominate the world’.
Hindu nationalists have expressed similar mixtures of feelings. While
pleased to confirm ‘Aryan’ origins, they fear a backlash over elitism and
exclusivity. In other cases, genetic evidence refutes origin myths, such as that
the Chinese gene-pool goes back a quarter of a million years to Beijing Man,
or that Amerindians have always existed on the American continent rather
than being only the most ancient of ‘immigrants’ (Rushton 1995). Genetic
distance studies are likely to play an increasing role in debates about ancestral
custodial rights over disputed territory.
People can be predicted to adopt ideologies that work in their genetic selfinterest.
Examples of ideologies that have been shown, on analysis, to increase
genetic fitness are religious beliefs that regulate dietary habits, sexual
practices, marital customs, infant care and child rearing (Lumsden and
Wilson 1981). Amerindian tribes that cooked maize with alkali had higher
population densities and more complex social organisations than tribes that
did not, partly because alkali releases the most nutritious parts of the cereal,
enabling more people to grow to reproductive maturity. The Amerindians did
not know the biochemical reasons for the benefits of alkali cooking but their
cultural beliefs had evolved for good reason, enabling them to replicate their
genes more effectively than would otherwise have been the case.
Political interests are typically presented in terms of high ethical standards,
no matter how transparent these appear to opponents. Consider the competing
claims of Palestinians and Israelis, or the Afrikaners and the Bantus.
Psychological explanation is made especially difficult since the rival groups
construct very different histories of the conflict and all parties tend to see
themselves as victims whose story has not been told. Because ethnic aspirations
are rarely openly justified in terms of naked self-interest, analyses need
to go deeper than surface ideology.
Political issues are especially explosive when survival and reproduction are
at stake. Consider the growth of Middle Eastern suicide bombers. Polls
conducted among Palestinian adults from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank
show that about seventy-five per cent support suicidal attacks, whereas only
about twelve per cent are opposed (Margalit 2003). Many families state that
they are proud of their kin who become martyrs.
Most analyses of the motives of suicide bombings emphasise unique
aspects such as the Palestinian or Iraqi political situation, the teachings of
radical Islam, or a popular culture saturated with the glorification of martyrs.
These political factors play an indispensable role but from an evolutionary
perspective aspiring to universality, people have evolved a ‘cognitive module’
for altruistic self-sacrifice that benefits their gene pool. In an ultimate rather
than proximate sense, suicide bombing can be viewed as a strategy to increase
inclusive fitness.
What reasons do suicide bombers themselves give for their action? Many
invoke the rhetoric of Islam while others appeal to political and economic
grievances. Mahmoud Ahmed Marmash, a twenty-one-year-old bachelor
from Tulkarm who blew himself up near Tel Aviv in May 2001 said in a
videocassette recorded before he went on his mission (cited in Margalit, 2003):
I want to avenge the blood of the Palestinians, especially the blood of the women, of
the elderly, and of the children, and in particular the blood of the baby girl Iman Hejjo,
whose death shook me to the core.
Many other national groups have produced suicide warriors. The term ‘zealot’
originates in a Jewish sect that existed for about 70 years in the first century
CE. According to the classical historian Flavius Josephus (1981), an extreme
revolutionary faction among them assassinated Romans and Jewish collaborators
with daggers; this likely reduced their chances of staying alive. A
group of about 1,000 Zealots, including women and children, chose to commit
suicide at the fortress of Masada rather than surrender to the Romans.
Masada today is one of the Jewish people’s greatest symbols. Israeli soldiers
take an oath there: ‘Masada shall not fall again’.
Soldier armies – the Japanese kamikaze, or the Iranian basaji – have
carried out suicide attacks against enemy combatants. Winston Churchill
contemplated the use of suicide bombers against the Germans if they invaded
Britain (see Cornwell 2003). Some of the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka, who are
Hindus, have killed themselves in attacks on politicians and army installations,
and they have done so with utter disregard for the lives of civilians who
happened to be around.
Genes, of course, typically only ‘whisper’ their wishes rather than shout.
They keep cultures on a long rather than a short leash (to use Lumsden and
Wilson’s 1981 metaphor). This allows for pragmatism and flexibility in the
strategies that groups adopt to serve their aspirations. For example, Zubaida
(2004) noted that the ideological weapons Arabs have employed to further
their cause against political dominance by the Ottoman Turks (who were
fellow Muslims), the Western Great Powers, the United States and now Israel
have alternated between Islam and nationalism, with all the continuities and
contradictions in between.
Zubaida (2004) also noted that Turkish, Egyptian and Iranian Islamisms
(and sometimes anti-Islamisms) have often been national, and often nationalistic.
Across the Muslim world, Arabs have often seen themselves as the
mainstay of Islam, and Islam as the national culture of the Arabs. Nationalism
became unpopular when it failed to satisfy Arab aspirations and is now
often seen as an import from the West to ‘divide and conquer’. Although
fundamentalism is typically seen as subversive by Arab regimes, ethnic
nationalists often celebrate it as a demonstration of revolutionary power.
The Shi’ite Revolution in the non-Arabic but Islamic Republic of Iran, for
example, served as an example not only for Islamists, but also for many
nationalists and leftists in the Arab world.
The political pull of ethnic identity and genetic similarity also explains
voting behaviour. The re-election victory of George W. Bush in the 2004 US
presidential election was largely attributed to White votes and to the higher
value placed by these voters on ‘values’ than on the economy. A closer look at
the demographics reveals that ‘values’ may be, at least in part, a proxy for
ethnic identity and genetic similarity. The majority of White Americans voted
based on which candidate – and candidate’s family – they believed most
appeared to look, speak and act like them (Brownstein and Rainey 2004).
Another timely example is the growth of Christian fundamentalism in the
United States. Analyses show that it represents a reaction to what is perceived
as the moral breakdown of society (Marty and Appleby 1994). Because of
trends in the mass media and education system, many religious people believe
they now live in a hostile culture where their core values are under siege. The
issue on which they are most politically active is opposition to abortion. One
hypothesis to be investigated is that if estimates of genetic similarity could be
obtained, fundamentalists would prove close to each other and to the basic
Anglo-Saxon gene pool. If so, it would be informative to know what
percentage of the estimated fifty million women who have had legal abortions
in the United States since 1973 were predominantly of that ethnic background.

Conclusion

Genetic similarity, of course, is only one of many possible influences operating
on political alliances. Causation is complex and there is no value in reducing
relationships between ethnic groups to a single factor. Fellow ethnics will not
always stick together, nor is conflict inevitable between groups any more than
it is between genetically distinct individuals. In addition to reproductive
success, individuals also work for motives such as economic success. However,
as van den Berghe (1981) pointed out, from an evolutionary perspective,
the ultimate measure of human success is not production but reproduction.
Behavioural outcomes are always mediated by multiple causes. Nonetheless,
genetic similarity can be expected to play a clear role in the social behaviour of
small groups and even of large ones, both national and international.
The hypothesis presented here is that because fellow ethnics carry copies of
the same genes, ethnic consciousness is rooted in the biology of altruism and
mutual reciprocity. Thus ethnic nationalism, xenophobia and genocide can
become the ‘dark side’ of altruism. Moreover, shared genes can govern the
degree to which an ideology is adopted (e.g. Rushton 1986 and 1989a). Some
genes will replicate better in some cultures than in others. Religious, political
and class conflicts become heated because they affect genetic fitness. Karl
Marx did not take his analysis far enough: ideology may be the servant of
economic interest, but genes influence both. Since individuals have a greater
concentration of genetic interest (inclusive fitness) in their own ethnic group
than they do in other ethnic groups, they can be expected to adopt ideas that
Genetic Similarity Theory 503
promote their group over others. Political ethologist Frank Salter (2003)
refers to ideologies as ‘fitness portfolios’, and psychologist Kevin MacDonald
(2001) has described co-ethnics as engaging in ‘group evolutionary strategies’.
It is because genetic interests are a powerful force in human affairs that
ethnic insults so easily lead to violence. Although social scientists and
historians have been quick to condemn the extent to which political leaders
or would-be leaders have been able to manipulate ethnic identity, the
questions they never ask, let alone attempt to answer are, ‘Why is it always
so easy?’ and ‘Why can a relatively uneducated political outsider set off a riot
simply by uttering a few well-delivered ethnic epithets?’
Many caveats must be noted to the theoretical approach described here.
Thus, Salter (2003) concluded that although (a) ethnic bonds can be adaptive
because they unite people in defence of shared interests, and (b) down-sizing
ethnicity through multiculturalism might change the competitive advantage of
particular groups for dominance but is unlikely to eliminate ethnic identity
from our nature as social beings, nonetheless (c) there are many examples of
how maladapted modern humans are for defending their ethnic interests due
to the competing demands of family and immediate kin and the sheer
complexity of modern societies including the impacts of cultural factors (see
his Chapter 6).
It would be incorrect to over-generalise findings on genetic similarity and
reify primordialism or resurrect ideas of organic nationalism. Rather, the
potential is provided for an even more nuanced ethno-symbolic approach to
the forces operating both within and between countries, many of which can
otherwise seem irrational. Although the modern idea of citizenship has
replaced the bond of ethnicity (‘people who look and talk like us’) with that
of values (‘people who think and behave like us’), the politics of ethnic identity
are increasingly replacing the politics of class as the major threat to the
stability of nations.
Patriotic feeling is much more than a delusion constructed by elites for
their own purpose. The ethno-symbolic approach anchors the psychology of
social identity in national identities and in previously existing ethnicities and
their ‘sacred’ traditions and customs (e.g. Smith 2000 and 2004). Ethnic
communities have been present in every period and have played an important
role in all societies on every continent. The sense of common ethnicity remains
a major focus of identification for individuals today. Genetic Similarity
Theory helps to explain why.