Turkey with its huge population, economic power and gigantic army is a potential Muslim power factor. But since the beginning of last century its political and military centers are occupied by members of a Jewish sect, the so called Sabbateans or "doenmehs" (a group similar to the Marrano-Jews who where dominating Medieval Spain). Leading Jewish sources that we quote below concede to this fact, revealing that Kemal Ataturk himself, was nothing but a secret Sabbatean Jew! The present strategy of this clique apart from keeping their grip on political, military and economic power in the country, is to combat and halt the surge of resistance from the growing Islamist Movement and to strengthen ties beteween Turkey and their Jewish state of "Israel".
Among the documents in this section are also the diaries of the founder of Zionism, Theodor Herzl, which reveal the early tactics of the Zionists regarding Turkey and Palestine: First try to lure the Sultanto support Zionism with promises of economic support, but when he doesn´t comply immediately switch tactic and instead contemplate to wage war on Turkey, cause economic havoc and even finance a coup against the leader of the Ottoman Empire.
- When Kemal Ataturk Recited Shema Yisrael - "It's My Secret Prayer, Too," He Confessed
by Hillel Halkin, article from Jewish Newspaper Forward, New York, January 28, 1994 - The Secret Jews in Turkey
leading Zionist dr. Joachim Prinz portrays Mustafa Kemal Ataturk as an "ardent 'doenmehs' ", i.e. an ardent secret Jew! - The Young Turks: Who Were They?
from Nemesis by Ioasif Kassesian, September 2001 - Commentaries on Ataturk´s Jewish background
- Diaries of Theodor Herzl reveal a Zionist plan to backstab Turkey - to be spread!
quotes from Herzl´s diary - The Sabbatean myth revived at a political turning point
by Elif Kelebek in Turkish Daily News. Article on revelations by Sabbatean Jew Ilgaz Zorlu on Sabbatean-Jewish origins of leading power brokers in Modern Turkey such as Tansu Ciller, Ismail Cem, Kemal Dervis, Rahsan Ecevit, Sukru Sina Gurel and Can Paker. - Turkey and the Jews - "Here Jews, as in the West, play a disproportionate role in the life of the country"
"Jews dominate Istanbul's Tahtakale money market and effectively set the dollar exchange rate for Turkey's currency"
revealing article by American Jew and Zionist Daniel Pipes, Turkish Times, September 1, 1994 - Turkey again appeals to American Jews for support
by Gil Sedan, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency - Israeli Military Strategy in Turkey
by Ze'ev Schiff, Ha'aretz (09/27/1995) - Power Bloc - Turkey and Israel Lock Arms
by Jennifer Washburn - The new alliance: Turkey and Israel
by Akram T. Hawas, Aalborg University
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Diaries of Theodor Herzl reveal a Zionist plan to backstab Turkey
Below we publish quotes from the founder of Zionism, the Jew Theodor Herzl.
Turkey´s leading circles in modern times have been staunch allies of Israel and the Jewish influence in the "New Turk" movement under crypto-Jew - "the founder of secular Turkey" - Kemal Ataturk, could well explain this position.
But Turkish feelings towards the Zionist colonial project in Palestine and the attitudes of Turks towards World Jewry and its most revered leaders should be evaluated only after Turks have read the following excerpts from the very strategy books of the near-mythological hero of today´s Jewry, Theodor Herzl.
In the texts below taken from his diaries we will see how Herzl is using classic Jewish tactics when he tries to get his way regarding Turkey and the establishment of a Jewish base in Palestine, then under Ottoman rule. In his tactics towards the Turkish Sultan and his entourage Herzl at first uses the falsely friendly approach, trying to convince the Turks of the economic gains of a Palestine deal between Turkey and the Zionist movement. Turkey's heavy debts to the European powers formed the crux of Herzl's negotiations at court, and he put forward the idea that the Zionist movement could assist Turkey in paying its debts, in return for which the Zionists would be granted a charter for Jewish settlement under Turkish aegis.
"We shall bestow enormous benefits upon Turkey and confer big gifts upon the intermediaries, if we obtain Palestine. This means nothing less than its cession as an independent country. In return we shall thoroughly straighten out Turkey's finances." (volume 1, page 344)
But when the Sultan declines, using strong words of honour and national pride, the Zionist leader changes face, and shifts from boot-licking emmissary to a man who instead can use the very influence in the international finacial world that he was to assist Turkey, into an instrument to harrass an entire empire. Herzl even contemplates "going off to war against Turkey", only restrained by the lack of a political climate for such a war at the time:
"However, now I am medidating on what our next step could be. Partir en guerre contre la Turquie [Go off to war against Turkey]? We are not strong enough in public opinion, either, and have too many weak spots. (...)
At present I can see only one more plan: See to it that Turkey's difficulties increase; wage a personal campaign against the Sultan, possibly seek contact with the exiled princes and the Young Turks; and, at the same time, by intensifying Jewish Socialist activities stir up the desire among the European governments to exert pressure on Turkey to take in the Jews." (volume 3, page 960)
At last even a Zionist sponsored coup d´etat is contemplated, the plan and details are all ready (as presented to Herzl by a Turkish traitor):
"Sail into the Bosporus with two cruisers, bombard Yildiz, let the Sultan flee or capture him, put in another Sultan (Murad or Reshad), but first form a provisional government---which is to give us the Charter for Palestine. (...) The scheme could be carried out with a thousand men. Preferably during the Selamlik. The cruisers would pass through the Dardanelles at night and could bombard Yildiz by morning."
There are no moral contemplations on the Jew Herzl´s part of such actions against a man - the Sultan - that the Jew leader just some time before had pretended to have a friendly relation to. No, only the goals of Zionism and World Jewry are what are in Herzl´s mind.
From ''The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, Edited by: Raphael Patai, Translated by: Harry Zohn, New York, 1960''
"A hundred years after his birth, fifty-six years after his death, and twelve years after the realization of his dream in the State of Israel, Theodor Herzl is universally recognized in Jewish history, and, in fact, in world history, as the founder of political Zionizm and the father of the Jewish State." (volume 1, page v)
March 10, 1896
" The Rev. William H.Hechler, chaplin to the British Embassy in Vienna, called on me.
A likable, sensitive man with the long grey beard of a prophet. He waxed enthusiastic over my solution. He, too, regards my movement as a ''prophetic crisis''---one he foretold two years ago. For he had calculated in accordance with a prophecy dating from Omar's reign (637-638) that after 42 prophetical months, that is, 1260 years, Palestine would be restored to the Jews. This would make it 1897-1898." (v.1, p.310)
A likable, sensitive man with the long grey beard of a prophet. He waxed enthusiastic over my solution. He, too, regards my movement as a ''prophetic crisis''---one he foretold two years ago. For he had calculated in accordance with a prophecy dating from Omar's reign (637-638) that after 42 prophetical months, that is, 1260 years, Palestine would be restored to the Jews. This would make it 1897-1898." (v.1, p.310)
April 21, 1896
"...Thinking of Newlinsky, I said that someone had already offered to speak with the Sultan.
At that point I set forth the advantages which the project would bring to the Orient. If Turkey were partitioned in the foreseeable future, an etat tampon [buffer state] could be created in Palestine. However, we could contribute a great deal toward the preservation of Turkey. We could straighten out the Sultan's finances once and for all, in return for this territory which is not of great value to him." (p.338)
At that point I set forth the advantages which the project would bring to the Orient. If Turkey were partitioned in the foreseeable future, an etat tampon [buffer state] could be created in Palestine. However, we could contribute a great deal toward the preservation of Turkey. We could straighten out the Sultan's finances once and for all, in return for this territory which is not of great value to him." (p.338)
Budapest, May 3, 1896
"Dionys Rosenfield, editor of the Osmanische Post of Constantinople, called on me here.
He offered his services as an intermediary. (...) I told him in a few words what it was all about. We shall bestow enormous benefits upon Turkey and confer big gifts upon the intermediaries, if we obtain Palestine. This means nothing less than its cession as an independent country. In return we shall thoroughly straighten out Turkey's finances." (volume 1, page 344)
Vienna, May 7, 1896
"Newlinsky came to see me after I had telephoned him.
In a few words I brought him au courant [up to date]. He told me he had read my pamphlet before his last trip to Constantinople and discussed it with the Sultan. The latter had declared that he would never part with Jerusalem. The Mosque of Omar must always remain in the posession of Islam.
(...) Newlinsky thought that the Sultan would sooner give us Anatolia. Money was no consideration to him; he had absolutely no understanding of its value..." (v.1, pages 345-346)
In a few words I brought him au courant [up to date]. He told me he had read my pamphlet before his last trip to Constantinople and discussed it with the Sultan. The latter had declared that he would never part with Jerusalem. The Mosque of Omar must always remain in the posession of Islam.
(...) Newlinsky thought that the Sultan would sooner give us Anatolia. Money was no consideration to him; he had absolutely no understanding of its value..." (v.1, pages 345-346)
June 9, 1896
"Newlinsky described his English impressions. People there believe in the impending downfall of Turkey. No English prime minister can dare to declare his support of the Sultan because he would have public opinion against him. There is some thought of making the Bulgarian Prince Ferdinand, because he is a Coburg, heir to the Turkish Empire. If this is no diceria [rumor], it is most interesting. Newlinsky thinks the only salvation for the Sultan would be to make an alliance with the Young Turks ---who in their part are on good terms with the Macedonians, Cretans, Armenians, etc.---and to carry out the reforms with their help. He said he had given this advice to the Sultan in a report. Now I said he should add to this program the fact that he was bringing the Sultan the means to carry this out, in the form of Jewish aid. Let the Sultan give us that piece of land, and in return we shall set his house in order, straighten out his finances, and influence public opinion all over the world in his favor." (v.1, p.362-363)
June 15, 1896
" He came to Baden at nine o'clock, and I asked him to brief me on the Turkish National debt. While he was explaining to me the status of the dette publique [public debt], I worked out the financial scheme. We spend twenty million Turkish pounds to straighten out the Turkish finances. Of that sum we give two millions in exchange for Palestine, this amount being based on the capitalization of its present revenue of eighty thousand Turkish pounds per annum. With the remaining 18 millions we free Turkey from the European Control Commission. The bond-holders of Classes A, B, C and D will be induced by direct privileges we shall grant them---increased rate of interest, extension of the amortization period, etc.---to agree to the abolition of the Commission." (p.365)
June 18, 1896, Istanbul
"Newlinsky is extremely valuable to our cause. His skill and devotion are beyond all praise. He will have to be given an extraordinary reward. (...) We arrived in Constantinople yesterday afternoon..." (p.370)
June 19, 1896, Istanbul
"In the evening Newlinsky returned from Yildiz Kiosk with a long face and bad news.
He ordered only half a bottle of champagne --- en signe de deuil [as a sign of mourning] ---and told me in two words: ''Nothing doing. The great lord won't hear of it!''
He ordered only half a bottle of champagne --- en signe de deuil [as a sign of mourning] ---and told me in two words: ''Nothing doing. The great lord won't hear of it!''
I took the blow stout-heartedly.
''The Sultan [Abdulhamid Han] said:
'If Mr.Herzl is as much your friend as you are mine, then advise him not to take another step in this matter. I cannot sell even a foot of land, for it does not belong to me, but to my people. My people have won this empire by fighting for it with their blood and have fertilized it with their blood. We will again cover it with our blood before we allow it to be wrested away from us. The men of two of my regiments from Syria and Palestine let themselves be killed one by one at Plevna. Not one of them yielded; they all gave their lives on that battlefield. The Turkish Empire belongs not to me, but to the Turkish people. I cannot give away any part of it. Let the Jews save their billions. When my Empire is partitioned, they may get Palestine for nothing. But only our corpse will be divided. I will not agree to vivisection.' ''
(...) I was touched and shaken by the truly lofty words of the Sultan, although for the time being they dashed all my hopes. There is a tragic beauty in this fatalism which will bear death and dismemberment, yet will fight to the last breath, even if only through passive resistance."
(vol.1, page 378-379)
October 14, 1896; Vienna
"Today, I went to see Mahmud Nedim Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador.(...) I said there is only one salvation for Turkey: an agreement with the Jews regarding Palestine. In this way the finances could be straightened out, reforms carried out, and after a restoration of orderly conditions any foreign intervention could be permanently forbidden..." (v.2, p.482)
July 1, 1897
"I am thinking of giving the movement a closer territorial goal, preserving Zion as the final goal.
The poor masses need immediate help, and Turkey is not yet so desperate as to accede to our wishes.
In fact, there will probably be hostile demonstrations against us in Turkey in the immediate future. They will say that they have no intentions of giving us Palestine.
Thus we must organize ourselves for a goal attainable soon, under the Zion flag and maintaining all of our historic claims.
Perhaps we can demand Cyprus from England, and even keep an eye on South Africa or America---until Turkey is dissolved..." (v.2, p.644)
The poor masses need immediate help, and Turkey is not yet so desperate as to accede to our wishes.
In fact, there will probably be hostile demonstrations against us in Turkey in the immediate future. They will say that they have no intentions of giving us Palestine.
Thus we must organize ourselves for a goal attainable soon, under the Zion flag and maintaining all of our historic claims.
Perhaps we can demand Cyprus from England, and even keep an eye on South Africa or America---until Turkey is dissolved..." (v.2, p.644)
November 7, 1899; Vienna
[Letter to Nuri Bey, Chief Secretary of Foreign Affairs in Istanbul:]
"...It is up to the statesmen of Turkey to understand in time the advantages that would slip through your fingers. You would not have the Jewish establishment in Palestine that would have brought you a great deal of money immediately, then the ordering of your entire financial situation, a modern fleet, industrial and commercial life, finally the well-being of the Empire." (v.3, p.884)
November 25, 1899; Vienna
"Yesterday Carl Herbst of Sofia was here and made the good suggestion of having the Young Turks work on the Sultan. In the papers of the Young Turks we should have the government censured for its carelessness in not taking up the advantageous offers of the Zionists." (v.3, p.889)
December 27, 1899; Vienna
"Nothing from Constantinople, nothing, nothing. Je me desespere [I am in despair]..." (p.898)
Telegram: Galata to Vienna, June 4, 1900
"Schlesinger [Herzl's nickname for Arminius Vambery] tried Sultan day before yesterday, flatly refused...." (v.3 p.959)
"However, now I am medidating on what our next step could be. Partir en guerre contre la Turquie [Go off to war against Turkey]? We are not strong enough in public opinion, either, and have too many weak spots. (...)
At present I can see only one more plan: See to it that Turkey's difficulties increase; wage a personal campaign against the Sultan, possibly seek contact with the exiled princes and the Young Turks; and, at the same time, by intensifying Jewish Socialist activities stir up the desire among the European governments to exert pressure on Turkey to take in the Jews." (volume 3, page 960)
At present I can see only one more plan: See to it that Turkey's difficulties increase; wage a personal campaign against the Sultan, possibly seek contact with the exiled princes and the Young Turks; and, at the same time, by intensifying Jewish Socialist activities stir up the desire among the European governments to exert pressure on Turkey to take in the Jews." (volume 3, page 960)
''The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, Edited by:Raphael Patai, Translated by: Harry Zohn, New York, 1960''
February 17, 1902; Istanbul
"...The Sultan [Abdulhamid Han] is willing to open his Empire to all Jews who become Turkish subjects, but the regions to be settled are to be decided each time by the government, and Palestine is to be excluded. The Comp. Ott.-Juive is to be allowed to colonize in Mesopotamia, Syria, Anatolia,anywhere at all, with the sole exception of Palestine! A Charter without Palestine! ..." (v.3, p.1222)
August 3, 1902; Istanbul
"...Their Excellencies Tahsin Bey, H.I.M.'s First Secretary, and Ibrahim Bey, Dragoman of the Imperial Divan, have done me the honor of transmitting the following communication:
''The Israelites can be received and settled in the Ottoman Empire under the condition that they be installed, not together, that is, dispersed, in the places adjudged suitable by the government, and that their numbers be fixed in advance by the government. They will be invested with Ottoman citizenship and charged with all the civic duties, including military service, as well as being subject to all the laws of the land like Ottomans.'' ..." (v.4, p.1340)
''The Israelites can be received and settled in the Ottoman Empire under the condition that they be installed, not together, that is, dispersed, in the places adjudged suitable by the government, and that their numbers be fixed in advance by the government. They will be invested with Ottoman citizenship and charged with all the civic duties, including military service, as well as being subject to all the laws of the land like Ottomans.'' ..." (v.4, p.1340)
February 24, 1904; Vienna
"Yesterday I had a most curious visitor: ''Ali Nuri Bey, Ex-Consul General de Turquie,'' it said on his card. (...)
His proposal, which he made me in my house between 9:30 and 12:30 yesterday, comes to this: Sail into the Bosporus with two cruisers, bombard Yildiz, let the Sultan flee or capture him, put in another Sultan (Murad or Reshad), but first form a provisional government---which is to give us the Charter for Palestine.
A novel or an adventure?
The two cruisers will cost 400,000 pounds, the rest 100,000 pounds. The whole stroke would cost half a million pounds. If it fails, we would have lost the money and the participants their lives.
All this presented quite coolly and calmly, like an offer to buy a load of wheat. He said he would make the voyage and go ashore himself. The scheme could be carried out with a thousand men. Preferably during the Selamlik.
The cruisers would pass through the Dardanelles at night and could bombard Yildiz by morning." (v.4, p.1615)
His proposal, which he made me in my house between 9:30 and 12:30 yesterday, comes to this: Sail into the Bosporus with two cruisers, bombard Yildiz, let the Sultan flee or capture him, put in another Sultan (Murad or Reshad), but first form a provisional government---which is to give us the Charter for Palestine.
A novel or an adventure?
The two cruisers will cost 400,000 pounds, the rest 100,000 pounds. The whole stroke would cost half a million pounds. If it fails, we would have lost the money and the participants their lives.
All this presented quite coolly and calmly, like an offer to buy a load of wheat. He said he would make the voyage and go ashore himself. The scheme could be carried out with a thousand men. Preferably during the Selamlik.
The cruisers would pass through the Dardanelles at night and could bombard Yildiz by morning." (v.4, p.1615)
March 22, 1904; Vienna
"I have sent Kahn [a rabbi and Zionist] and Levontin [a Russian Zionist] to Constantinople. If they return bredouille [empty-handed], there will follow Tell's second arrow: Ali Nuri." (v.4, p.1619)
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From FORWARD, a Jewish newspaper published in New York
January 28, 1994 (www.forward.com)
January 28, 1994 (www.forward.com)
When Kemal Ataturk Recited Shema Yisrael
"It's My Secret Prayer, Too," He Confessed
By Hillel Halkin
Ms. Kenan checked the president's itinerary, according to which he and his wife would lay a wreath on Ataturk's grave the morning of their arrival, and asked what my second question was.
"Does President Weizman know that Ataturk had Jewish ancestors and was taught Hebrew prayers as a boy?"
"Of course, of course," she answered as unsurprisedly as if I had inquired whether the president was aware that Ataturk was Turkey's national hero.
Excited and Distressed
I thanked her and hung up. A few minutes later it occurred to me to call back and ask whether President Weizman intended to make any reference while in Turkey to Ataturk's Jewish antecedents. "I'm so glad you called again," said Ms. Kenan, who now sounded excited and a bit distressed. "Exactly where did you get your information from?"
Why was she asking, I countered, if the president's office had it too?
Because it did not, she confessed. She had only assumed that it must because I had sounded so matter-of-fact myself. "After you hung up," she said, "I mentioned what you told me and nobody here knows anything about it. Could you please fax us what you know?"
I faxed her a short version of it. Here is a longer one.
Stories about the Jewishness of Ataturk, whose statue stands in the main square of every town and city in Turkey, already circulated in his lifetime but were denied by him and his family and never taken seriously by biographers. Of six biographies of him that I consulted this week, none even mentions such a speculation. The only scholarly reference to it in print that I could find was in the entry on Ataturk in the Israeli Entsiklopedya ha-Ivrit, which begins:
"Mustafa Kemal Ataturk - (1881-1938), Turkish general and statesman and founder of the modern Turkish state.
"Mustafa Kemal was born to the family of a minor customs clerk in Salonika and lost his father when he was young. There is no proof of the belief, widespread among both Jews and Muslims in Turkey, that his family came from the Doenme. As a boy he rebelled against his mother's desire to give him a traditional religious education, and at the age of 12 he was sent at his demand to study in a military academy."
Secular Father
The Doenme were an underground sect of Sabbetaians, Turkish Jews who took Muslim names and outwardly behaved like Muslims but secretly believed in Sabbetai Zevi, the 17th-century false messiah, and conducted carefully guarded prayers and rituals in his name. The encyclopedia's version of Ataturk's education, however, is somewhat at variance with his own. Here is his account of it as quoted by his biographers:
"My father was a man of liberal views, rather hostile to religion, and a partisan of Western ideas. He would have preferred to see me go to a * lay school, which did not found its teaching on the Koran but on modern science.
"In this battle of consciences, my father managed to gain the victory after a small maneuver; he pretended to give in to my mother's wishes, and arranged that I should enter the [Islamic] school of Fatma Molla Kadin with the traditional ceremony. ...
"Six months later, more or less, my father quietly withdrew me from the school and took me to that of old Shemsi Effendi who directed a free preparatory school according to European methods. My mother made no objection, since her desires had been complied with and her conventions respected. It was the ceremony above all which had satisfied her."
Who was Mustafa Kemal's father, who behaved here in typical Doenme fashion, outwardly observing Muslim ceremonies while inwardly scoffing at them? Ataturk's mother Zubeyde came from the mountains west of Salonika, close to the current Albanian frontier; of the origins of his father, Ali Riza, little is known. Different writers have given them as Albanian, Anatolian and Salonikan, and Lord Kinross' compendious 1964 "Ataturk" calls Ali Riza a "shadowy personality" and adds cryptically regarding Ataturk's reluctance to disclose more about his family background: "To the child of so mixed an environment it would seldom occur, wherever his racial loyalties lay, to inquire too exactly into his personal origins beyond that of his parentage."
Learning Hebrew
Did Kinross suspect more than he was admitting? I would never have asked had I not recently come across a remarkable chapter while browsing in the out-of-print Hebrew autobiography of Itamar Ben-Avi, son of Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, the leading promoter of the revival of spoken Hebrew in late 19th-century Palestine. Ben-Avi, the first child to be raised in Hebrew since ancient times and later a Hebrew journalist and newspaper publisher, writes in this book of walking into the Kamenitz Hotel in Jerusalem one autumn night in 1911 and being asked by its proprietor: " 'Do you see that Turkish officer sitting there in the corner, the one* with the bottle of arrack?' "
" 'Yes.' "
" 'He's one of the most important officers in the Turkish army.' "
" 'What's his name?' "
" 'Mustafa Kemal.' "
" 'I'd like to meet him,' I said, because the minute I looked at him I was startled by his piercing green eyes."
Ben-Avi describes two meetings with Mustafa Kemal, who had not yet taken the name of Ataturk, 'Father of the Turks.' Both were conducted in French, were largely devoted to Ottoman politics, and were doused with large amounts of arrack. In the first of these, Kemal confided:
"I'm a descendant of Sabbetai Zevi - not indeed a Jew any more, but an ardent admirer of this prophet of yours. My opinion is that every Jew in this country would do well to join his camp."
During their second meeting, held 10 days later in the same hotel, Mustafa Kemal said at one point:"
'I have at home a Hebrew Bible printed in Venice. It's rather old, and I remember my father bringing me to a Karaite teacher who taught me to read it. I can still remember a few words of it, such as --' "
And Ben-Avi continues:
"He paused for a moment, his eyes searching for something in space. Then he recalled:
" 'Shema Yisra'el, Adonai Elohenu, Adonai Ehad!'
" 'That's our most important prayer, Captain.'
" 'And my secret prayer too, cher monsieur,' he replied, refilling our glasses."
Although Itamar Ben-Avi could not have known it, Ataturk no doubt meant "secret prayer" quite literally. Among the esoteric prayers of the Doenme, first made known to the scholarly world when a book of them reached the National Library in Jerusalem in 1935, is one containing the confession of faith:
"Sabbetai Zevi and none other is the true Messiah. Hear O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one."
It was undoubtedly from this credo, rather than from the Bible, that Ataturk remembered the words of the Shema, which to the best of my knowledge he confessed knowing but once in his adult life: to a young Hebrew journalist whom he engaged in two tipsily animated conversations in Jerusalem nearly a decade before he took control of the Turkish army after its disastrous defeat in World War I, beat back the invading Greeks and founded a secular Turkish republic in which Islam was banished - once and for all, so he thought - to the mosques.
Ataturk would have had good reasons for concealing his Doenme origins. Not only were the Doenmes (who married only among themselves and numbered close to 15,000, largely concentrated in Salonika, on the eve of World War I) looked down on as heretics by both Muslims and Jews, they had a reputation for sexual profligacy that could hardly have been flattering to their offspring. This license, which was theologically justified by the claim that it reflected the faithful's freedom from the biblical commandments under the new dispensation of Sabbetai Zevi, is described by Ezer Weizman's predecessor, Israel's second president, Yitzchak Ben-Zvi, in his book on lost Jewish communities, "The Exiled and the Redeemed":
'Saintly Offspring'
"Once a year [during the Doenmes' annual 'Sheep holiday'] the candles are put out in the course of a dinner which is attended by orgies and the ceremony of the exchange of wives. ... The rite is practiced on the night of Sabbetai Zevi's traditional bithday. ... It is believed that children born of such unions are regarded as saintly."
Although Ben-Zvi, writing in the 1950s, thought that "There is reason to believe that this ceremony has not been entirely abandoned and continues to this day," little is known about whether any of the Doenmes' traditional practices or social structures still survive in modern Turkey. The community abandoned Salonika along with the city's other Turkish residents during the Greco-Turkish war of 1920-21, and its descendants, many of whom are said to be wealthy businessmen and merchants in Istanbul, are generally thought to have assimilated totally into Turkish life.
After sending my fax to Batya Keinan, I phoned to check that she had received it. She had indeed, she said, and would see to it that the president was given it to read on his flight to Ankara. It is doubtful, however, whether Mr. Weizman will allude to it during his visit: The Turkish government, which for years has been fending off Muslim fundamentalist assaults on its legitimacy and on the secular reforms of Ataturk, has little reason to welcome the news that the father of the 'Father of the Turks' was a crypto-Jew who passed on his anti-Muslim sentiments to his son. Mustafa Kemal's secret is no doubt one that it would prefer to continue to be kept.
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The Secret Jews in Turkey
Leading Zionist dr. Joachim Prinz portrays Mustafa Kemal Ataturk as an "ardent 'doenmehs' ", i.e. an ardent secret Jew!
"..... In December 1686, more than three hundred families converted to Islam in Salonika. Like Shabtai and other Marranos, they continued to attend Jewish services secretly and observed certain Jewish customs in their homes.
This was the origin of the most important group, numerically and historically, of Islamic Marranos. The faithful Mohemmedans call these hidden Jews 'doenmehs', the renegades. ..... Over the years the 'doenmeh' movement became firmly established in Asia Minor. In the nineteenth century the sect was estimated to have twenty thousand members. Salonika remained its main seat until that city became Greek in 1913. Although the Jewish community remained there under Greek rule, the 'doenmehs' moved to Constantinople.
In Salonika in the early days of the movement the ten commandments "of our Lord King and Messiah Shabtai Zvi" were proclaimed by the 'doenmehs'. They still form the credo of the surviving 'doenmehs' of our time.
I shall meticulously adhere to the customs of the Turks so as not to arose their suspicion. I shall not only observe the Fast of Ramadan but all the other Muslim customs which are observed in public.
I shall not marry into a Muslim family nor maintain any intimate association with them, for they are to us an abomination and particularly their women.From time to time the Turkish governors of Salonika, who received complaints about the sect from the Mohammedan clergy, tried to investigate the strange existence of the 'doenmehs'. Their clannishness, their refusal to mingle with Mohammedan families, and their marital restrictions had become a well-known fact, difficult to hide from the majority of the people among whom they had lived for many generations. Socially, they seemed impenetrable, although in their Moslem religious practices they were beyond reproach. In fact, they often seemed even more devout followers of the Prophet Mohammed and more sincere worshipers of Allah than the rest of the community. They fasted during Ramadan, and their leaders and adherents were found in large, even conspicuous numbers among the pilgrims to Mecca. It was well known that in the seventeenth century Joseph Zvi, one of the immediate followers of Shabtai Zvi and one of his inner circle, died on the way from his pilgrimage to Mecca, and the day of his death is still commemorated.
The revolt of the Young Turks in 1908 against the authoritarian regime of Sultan Abdul Hamid began among the intellectuals of Salonika. It was from there that the demand for a constitutional regime originated. Among the leaders of the revolution which resulted in a more modern government in Turkey were Djavid Bey and Mustafa Kemal. Both were ardent 'doenmehs'. Djavid Bey became minister of finance; Mustafa Kemal became the leader of the new regime and he adopted the name of Ataturk. His opponents tried to use his 'doenmeh' background to unseat him, but without success. Too many of the Young Turks in the newly formed revolutionary Cabinet prayed to Allah, but had as their real prophet Shabtai Zvi, the Messiah of Smyrna."
[End of quotes]
Who is Joachim Prinz?
Dr. Joachim Prinz (1902-1988) was a Jewish Rabbi and Zionist born in Germany. Prinz had joined the Zionist Blau Weiss (Blue White) youth movement already in 1917. Having left Germany for the USA in 1937 Prinz, with the sponsorship of Stephen S. Wise, the famous American Rabbi and confidant of President Franklin Roosevelt, began his life in the United States by lecturing across the country for the United Palestine Appeal.
Joachim Prinz became the spiritual leader of Temple B’nai Abraham in Newark New Jersey, one of the country’s oldest synagogues.
Prinz became one of the top leaders of Jewish organizations: he held top leadership positions in the World Jewish Congress, first as its Vice President and ultimately Chairman of its Governing Council, he was a director of the Conference of Jewish Material Claims Against Germany. Prinz served as Chairman of the World Conference of Jewish Organizations and also as the President of The American Jewish Congress from 1958-1966.
Prinz´ early involvement in the Zionist movement brought him into contact with the founding leaders of the Zionist State of Israel, most of whom he counted among his good friends. Prinz helped his long time friend and world Jewish leader Nahum Goldmann (who was the chief of the World Zionist Organization) to create the Conference of Presidents of American Jewish Organizations and Prinz served as one of its early Chairmen (1965-1967).
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The Young Turks: Who Were They?
One of the first real threats to the Ottoman Throne was a hard-core, conspiratorial group that formed in 1889 among the students of the Military Medical School in Constantinople. The dissatisfaction, though, was widespread throughout the entire military, and had to do with what might be considered today to be union demands: low wages that were paid sporadically and after months of waiting, a promotion system that was torturously slow and not based on merit but on connections, and a cynical disappointment engendered by the promised but never actualized modernization of the military. The main motivating factor in the ever-widening discontent, however, was an agony and concern over the independence of the Turkish State and how best to ensure its continuance. Added to this, and of equal concern, was the problem having to do with the welfare and perpetuation of the Muslim populations living among the many other ethnicities within the Empire.
The conspiratorial leadership, who came to be known as the Young Turks, expressed their dissatisfaction with the status quo, throwing all of the blame on the Sultan, Abdul Hamit, who they proclaimed to be too dictatorial. They demanded his exile -- though not the abolishment of the Sultanate -- together with the restoration of the constitution of 1876.
Union and Progress
The Young Turk movement -- after many mishaps and near dissolution -- finally achieved it first goal. In early July of 1908, led by the officer-members of the Committee of Union and Progress (Itihàt vè Terakì), the Turkish troops stationed in Macedonia refused to obey orders coming from Constantinople. The Young Turks then sent a telegraphed ultimatum to the Sultan from Serres on the 21st of July. They demanded the immediate restoration and implementation of the constitution, and threatened him with dethronement should he fail to comply. On the 24th of July, Abdul Hamit announced that the constitution had been restored and was in full force and effect.
The subsequent mid-20th century overthrow of King Farouk in Egypt by the Nasserite revolutionaries bears some striking similarities to the Young Turk movement. There are, however, some very striking differences as well. Some of these are: 1) the diverse ethnic background of the conspirators; 2) the significant and crucial role played by the allied movement of fellow-conspirators known as the Donmè(Jews who had converted [?] to Islam); and, 3) the enthusiastic way in which the conspiracy was embraced by Masonic elements.
As far as the multiethnic composition of the conspirators is concerned, one need only read their names to verify their diverse background: Tserkès (Circassion ), Mehmet Ali, Xersekli (Herzogovinians), Ali Roushdi, Kosovali (Kosovars) and others. In many cases, the ethnic origin of the conspirator was not evident from the name: Ibrahim Temo was an Albanian, as was Ismail Kemal. Murat Bey Dagestanos and Achmet Riza had an Arkhazian father and an Austrian mother. One of the theoreticians of the movement was Ziyia Ngiokali, a Kurd, while one of the major planners of tactics and theory was a Jew from Serres who went by the name of Tekìn Alì (real name, Moshe Cohen).
The telegraph-office clerk who became one of the ruling troika of post-revolutionary Turkey, Talaàt Pasha, was Bosnian, Pomack, or Gypsy; the point being that he was not a Turk. We should also make note of the fact that the Committee of Union and Progress admitted many members from areas outside of the Ottoman Empire, and that some of these even served on its Central Committee.
Masonic elements
The strong connection between the Itihàts (conspirators) and Masonry is a well-documented fact. The leftist Turkish writer, Kamouran Mberik Xartboutlou, in his book, The Turkish Impasse ( from the Greek translation of the French publication of 1974. p.24), wrote: "Those who desired entry into the inner circle of that secret organization [the Itihàt], had to be a Mason, and had to have the backing of a large segment of the commercial class." The true nature of the relationship between the Young Turks and the Masonic lodges of Thessaloniki has been commented upon by many researchers and writers. In her well-known and extensively documented book, Secret Societies and Subversive Movements (London. 1928, p. 284), author and historian Nesta Webster writes that "The Young Turk movement began in the Masonic lodges of Thessaloniki under the direct supervision of the Grand Orient Lodge of Italy, which later shared in the success of Mustapha Kemal."
Of course, the precise nature of this relationship is clouded in mystery, but enough facts exist allowing for more than just informed conjecture based on circumstantial evidence. An example of the Itihàt-Masonic connection is the interview that Young Turk, Refik Bey, gave to the Paris newspaper Le Temps, on the 20th of August 1908: "It's true that we receive support from Freemasonry and especially from Italian Masonry. The two Italian lodges [of Thessaloniki] -- Macedonia Risorta and Labor et Lux -- have provided invaluable services and have been a refuge for us. We meet there as fellow Masons, because it is a fact that many of us are Masons, but more importantly we meet so that we can better organize ourselves."
The Jewish Component
The Donmè ("convert" in Turkish), was a Hebrew heresy whose followers converted [?] to Islam in the 18th century. They were most heavily concentrated in Thessaloniki. According to the Great Hellenic Encyclopedia [Megali Elliniki Enkiklopethia]: "It is generally accepted that the Donmè secretly continue to adhere to the Hebrew religion and don't allow their kind to intermarry with the Muslims."
The disproportionate power and influence (in light of their number) that the Donmè had on both the Ottoman Empire and on the Young Turk movement has been the subject of a great deal of commentary by many observers and researchers. The eminent British historian, R. Seton Watson, in his book, The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans. London, 1917 (H Gennisi tou Ethnikismou sta Valkania), wrote the following: "The real brains behind the [Itihàt] movement were Jews or Islamic-Jews. The wealthy Donmè and Jews of Thessaloniki supported [the Young Turks] economically, and their fellow Jewish capitalists in Vienna and Berlin -- as well as in Budapest and possibly Paris and London -- supported them financially as well.
In the January 23rd, 1914, issue of the Czarist Police [Okrana] Ledger (Number 16609), directed to the Ministry of the Exterior in Saint Petersburg, we read: "A pan-Islamic convention of Itihàts and Jews was held in the Nouri Osman lodge in Constantinople. It was attended by approximately 700 prominent Itihàts and Jews, including "Minister" Talaàt Bey, Bentri Bey, Mbekri Bey, and (Donmè) Javit Bey. Among the many Jews in attendance, two of the most prominent were the Head of the Security Service, Samouel Effendi, and the Vice-Administrator of the Police, Abraham Bey."
Donmè and Constantine
The numerous Donmè in positions of authority within the machinery of the Itihàt government, as well as on the powerful Central Committee, strengthens the conviction that their influence was widespread and vital to the cause. Ignoring the names mentioned in the Czarist Police Ledger, and even ignoring such Jews as the fanatical Pan-Turkic [Marxist revolutionary and poet, Hikmet] Nazim, or even the many casual allusions [as if it were common knowledge at the time] to the Jewish descent of that most dedicated believer in the Young Turk movement, Mustapha Kemal "Atatürk," one still finds oneself wondering by what authority and under whose auspices was such an obscure Jewish Donmè from Thessaloniki, by the name of Emmanouel Karasso, able to become a member of the three-man committee that announced his dethronement to Sultan Abdul Hamit after the counter-coup of April 1909?
Compelling, too, is the widely-referenced document which states that Constantine, the King of Greece at the time, characterized the entire Young Turk movement as composed of "Israelites." According to the facts presented in her book, Glory and Partisanship, the Greek professor of the University of Vienna, Polychroni Enepekithi, contends that Constantine made that characterization while complaining to the German Ambassador in Athens about the outrages committed by Young Turks against Hellenes living in the Ottoman Empire.
These references to the relationship between the Donmè, the Masons, and the Young Turks has not been prompted by anti-Semitism or Masonophobia. Rather, we are attempting to shed some light on what to us seems like a puzzling paradox in this revolutionary movement, which is: Why it is that this non-Turkish leadership struggled so hard under the banner of justice for the Turkish people? Also, why is it that others, having nothing to do with Sunnite Islam [the form of Islam practiced in Turkey] struggled equally hard under the banner of justice for Islam? The only answer to this paradox demands that we consider that there may have been another reason behind their fervid struggle, and that this unstated cause is what bound these "ideologues" together.
Source Nemesis. by Ioasif Kassesian. September 2001. pp. 64-66. Translated by staff. Emphasis added.
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28 July, 2002, Turkish Probe issue 496, Copyright © Turkish Daily News
The Sabbatean myth revived at a political turning point
Are you being watched? How do you know you aren't? The fact that you are paranoid doesn't mean somebody is not watching you. Conspiracies abound at times of turmoil; some of them turn out to be facts, while some truths remain in the dark, some are false and some forgotten. In any case it's an intriguing timing to trigger a new debate on unconfirmed stories of the Sabbateans in Turkey
By Elif Kelebek
Politics never takes the backseat in Turkey. Because of its much-fragmented structure, the political scene is always apt to give way to sensations, including at times when the country least needs it, like the critical phase of an economic program or a turning point for European Union affairs.
As the country now moves fast towards an early election now, it is engulfed by speculations over the plans of key political figures, scenarios on the possible consequences of their actions, prophecy about the possible election outcome and eventually the post-election government structure, but these debates are not the center of concern here.
On the periphery of all this talk, arguments that have faded out sometime ago are once more coming to life. These arguments are of the kind that would fascinate the public like a grand conspiracy theory and have most coincidentally reemerged at a time when election campaigns are set to take off.
Ilgaz Zorlu, the author of the once hype book "Yes, I Am a Salonikan," is the one who raised the allegations in a recent interview with pro-Islamist magazine Gercek Hayat (Real Life). Zorlu has asserted that people of a mystic Jewish sect, already holding very key positions in the state, would come to power in Turkey, naming Ismail Cem, Kemal Dervis, Rahsan Ecevit among the members, none of whom publicly denied the allegations.
Zorlu, who managed to reclaim his Jewish identity a few years back at the end of a toilsome struggle, was a Sabbatean himself and revealed the secrets of this group in Turkey in his book. The reason he wrote the book in the first place, he says, was to win acceptance from the mainstream Jewish community and from Israel both for himself and the Sabbateans in Turkey.
Sabbateans take their name from the self-proclaimed messiah of the 17th century, Shabatai Zvi. Following Zvi, who ultimately chose conversion over death, the Sabbateans converted to Islam but continued to practice Judaism in secret. Salonika has been a major center for the sect until the exchange in 1924 when Zorlu argues that most people (some 25,000) Turkey welcomed as Muslim Turks expelled from Greece were in fact members of this community.
Turkey's Sabbateans have remained secretive as they were somewhat disliked by both Jews and Muslims, but maintained their beliefs and traditions. Until 1950s they only married among themselves and their children would find out about their Sabbatean origin only after the age of 18. Therefore many truths about the sect are still unknown and the veil of secrecy has added to the legends surrounding the community.
Most people who Zorlu claimed in his book to be Sabbateans denied this identity because of historic concerns, mainly the mistreatment of Jews throughout history. The closest example was his grandmother who refused to reveal her beliefs and continued to do her prayers secretly because of, for example, a wealth tax imposed on non-Muslims during the republican era in Turkey and the tendency among the overwhelmingly Muslim populace to isolate non-Muslims from the community.
Zorlu's claims were most interesting because he named the most prominent families, politicians, diplomats, journalists, businessmen among the members of the sect, only a few of whom later on admitted to being Sabbateans. He filed documented evidence at various court cases to prove his allegations and his claims were backed by leading pro-Islamist writers like Mehmet Sevki Eygi and Abdurrahman Dilipak.
Zorlu assets that Sabbateans in Turkey, which he estimates around some 100,000 now, all wealthy and well-educated, are socially, politically and economically supporting each other and also enjoying support from the Jewish lobby in the U.S. Both Zorlu and Eygi have suggested that the members of this sect are very powerful and are holding influential positions in the state and business world.
Despite their extremely different backgrounds, these two sides strangely meet on a common ground when it comes to criticizing the covert Sabbatean community in Turkey: Islamists are worried about the power of and the strong bonds among this group, probably regarding them as a threat to their own existence, while Zorlu criticizes his community for exaggerating secularism in Turkey, which Sabbateans are known to have contributed significantly through organized action under the Union and Progress Party in early 1900s.
Most recently in an interview to Jerusalem Report Ilgaz Zorlu suggested that Tansu Ciller, leader of the True Path Party (DYP) was a Sabbatean. He claims, on documented evidence, Ismail Cem and Kemal Dervis, the two key figures of the new political formation now called the "New Turkey" party, are also Sabbateans, as well as Rahsan Ecevit, who he says have always had a distance with Husamettin Ozkan, the third key figure of New Turkey, because he wasn't of the same origin.
Zorlu suggests that if it wasn't for his Sabbatean origins, Dervis could never become an independent cabinet minister without political responsibility, a theory which would delight those who have sought a conspiracy behind Dervis's unusual appointment as economy minister from a World Bank post in the U.S. last year. Dervis is now a figure seen as a vote booster for any political party he may choose to join.
Ilgaz Zorlu further claims that Rahsan Ecevit, who actually rules the Democratic Left Party although she's not a deputy and doesn't hold an official post in the government, will become president once Chief of Staff Huseyin Kivrikoglu's term expires on August 30. He argues that there are Sabbateans in senior military ranks to support this turnover, but refuses to name them. Sukru Sina Gurel, who is viewed a potential successor for Bulent Ecevit in the Democratic Left Party, is one of the people Zorlu counts among Sabbateans. Can Paker, chairman of the prominent non-governmental organization Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), is another.
"Rahsan Ecevit is like Golda Meir. Her attitude and ideology is the same. The way Golda Meir was a totalitarian and disrespectful of democracy in defending the elimination of the entire Arab world for the salvation of Israel, Ms. Ecevit accommodates the same thinking for Islamists," Zorlu has told Gercek Hayat.
"Don't underestimate Ms. Ecevit because she's 81 years old. There are people who are younger than 70 and she chewed them like gum," he said, recalling what he described as a famous statement of her after Ismet Inonu was toppled from the Republican People's Party (CHP) leadership in 1972 and Bulent Ecevit took over the post.
"'I took the revenge of the wealth tax,' she said."
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Article from The Middle East Forum, a think tank, which "works
to define and promote American interests in the Middle East": http://www.meforum.org/article/pipes/254
to define and promote American interests in the Middle East": http://www.meforum.org/article/pipes/254
Turkey and the Jews
By Daniel Pipes
Turkish Times, September 1, 1994
Jewish communities still extant in Muslim countries tend to be weak and without a future, mere shells of the vital populations that existed half a century ago. Anyone with energy or ambition long ago fled Iran, Yemen, Syria, Egypt, or Tunisia; those who remain barely eke out a living. They have no role to speak of in the business or intellectual life of their countries; politically they count only as potential victims or as hostages to be bartered away. In The Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times (1991), Norman Stillman accurately described them as "a small, vestigial, and moribund remnant."
How different in Turkey! Here Jews, as in the West, play a disproportionate role in the life of the country. During a visit not long ago to Istanbul (the city where nearly all the Turkish Jews live), I had an opportunity to meet two of the country's tycoons, both Jewish. Jefi I. Kamhi is the flamboyant, jet-setting chairman of Profilo, a company which produces almost everything you can think of (prefabricated construction units, white goods, parts and accessories); in addition, it imports and exports, distributes consumer durables, and invests.
Üzeyir Garih, CEO of Alarco, is a more restrained figure; his company contracts projects, engineers them, and specializes in building big-ticket items such as pipelines, gas storage terminals, refineries, textile factories and office complexes. Both men are active in business associations, are counted among their country's leading philanthropists, and have strong ties to the highest political circles.
Thanks to their knowledge of European languages and foreign contacts, Jewish businessmen have played an important role in the expansion of Turkish companies into international markets. They also have a prominent role in fashion, advertising, and banking; for example, Jews dominate Istanbul's Tahtakale money market and effectively set the dollar exchange rate for Turkey's currency. These Jews are not small, vestigial, or moribund.
And it's not just the businessmen. I didn't get to see Sami Kohen this trip, but he's been for many the foreign affairs columnist for Turkey's largest circulation daily newspaper Milliyet, where he writes a sophisticated analysis of his country's geopoliticals, as well as frequently contributing to such American papers as the The Christian Science Monitor and The New York Times. Other Jews teach at the universities and work for the government, where they serve as diplomats and hold other positions of responsibility. In short, unlike the dying Jewish communities in other parts of the Muslim Middle East, the one in Turkey is vibrant and influential.
Interestingly, other Jews -- those of Israel and the United States -- also have a role in Turkey. In extensive talks with officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister's Office, I found a consistent interest in strengthening ties with Israel, and near delight with September's Israel-PLO agreement because it hastens this process. These analysts see Israel in a variety of ways: as a trading partner, a fellow democracy to help stabilize the region, an ally which can help deal with the Iranian and Syrian regimes, and a means of access to Washington. The first-ever visit by Turkey's Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin to Israel last November consolidated these ties and raised high hopes for the future.
Which brings us to American Jews. One Turkish analyst pointed out to me that many of the leading American scholars of Turkey are Jewish (including Bernard Lewis, Stanford Shaw, and Avigdor Levy). A Foreign Ministry official who noted that Turkey's strongest advocates in the United States are Jewish, mentioning specifically Richard Perle and Douglas Feith, concluded with the comment, "We love American Jews." Turkey's government despairs of a Turkish lobby ever emerging in the United States which will be capable of standing up to the Greeks and Armenians; in the meantime, it counts on Jews to make the argument for Turkey in Washington. More effectively than anyone else, these individuals point out Turkey's importance as an ally in an especially turbulent part of the world (for example, vis-à-vis Iraq); its positive influence in the Middle East as an enduring democracy; and its importance as a model of secularism for the Muslim world as a whole.
Of course, Turkey also has its share of fundamentalist Muslims, fascists and other forms of anti-Semite. Like their counterparts elsewhere, these spread conspiracy theories about Jews and fulminate against Israel. But in Turkey, unlike Iran and the Arab countries, these people don't make policy, nor do conspiracy theories dominate political thinking. Perhaps most important, Turks don't engage in violence against Jews. (It was foreigners, not Turks, who carried out the one major act of violence against Turkey's Jews, the 1986 bombing of Neve Shalom Synagogue.)
There's every reason to think the good news will continue in the years ahead -- that Jews of Turkey will flourish; that Ankara's relations with Israel will expand; and that American Jews will play a valuable role explaining Turkey in the United States. With regard to Jews, as is the case in so many other ways, Turkey has successfully removed itself from the paranoia and repression of the Middle East and made itself a part of the West.
Commentary by Radio Islam:
Daniel Pipes is one of chief Zionists acting within the George W. Bush Regime. Thus reading Pipe´s revelations on the disproportionate power of Jews in Turkey ("Jews, as in the West, play a disproportionate role in the life of the country") really should state the fact of the matter and cannot be labelled as "anti-Semitic" propaganda.
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Israeli Military Strategy in Turkey
Ha'aretz, Sept. 27, 1995
By Ze'ev Shiff
Three neighbors are problematic from the Turkish point of view-Iraq, Iran, and Syria. These are states also hostile to Israel. The Turkish government surely wants to convey the signal that, in the regional balance of forces, it has a strong and stable friend like Israel. Both seek stability in the region and conform with U.S. interest in such stability. Turkey also wants to carry out a modernization of its army and Israel can assist in this endeavor.
One should keep in mind the struggle of both Israel and Turkey against terrorism and Turkey's growing fear of an increase of extremist Islamic terror. Here, too, there is room for cooperation, although Israel does not want to be dragged into the bloody struggle with the Kurdish underground which finds shelter in Syria, as the Turkish intelligence knows. Turkey is an important member of NATO and its army is the second largest in the alliance. However, much of the Turkish military equipment is outdated and requires replacement.
The modernization will cost Turkey some $10 billion in the next several years while Turkey is burdened with bad economic conditions and a large foreign debt. The debt burden has grown because of the loss of revenues from the flow of Iraqi oil through the Turkish pipeline.
It is in Israel's interest to extend relations with Turkey. First the level of diplomatic relations was raised, then a military attaché was sent and a document of understanding was signed defining defense relations between the two states. The military security dialogue continues and this week the director of the Defense Ministry, David Ivri, returned from Turkey. One example of the closer diplomatic relationship is the air-fueling maneuver that was carried out in May 1994 when Turkish planes were refueled by an Israeli plane.
The negotiations on the Phantom agreement continued for a long time. The Turkish air force has six squadrons with 165 Phantom planes. Israel has experience in renovating and transforming this plane into the Kurnas 2000. The overhaul prolongs the operational life of the Phantom by 15 to 20 years. A modern American radar and an advanced computerized aeronautical system were introduced into the Phantom, including an improved electronic combat and navigation system. The capability of the plane to participate in a ground battle has also been improved. U.S. and German companies also competed for the deal in Turkey. In the beginning, Israel took part in the bid of the American radar producer Norden, whose system is installed in the new Israeli Phantoms. But this bid failed. Norden asked for $5 million for each radar system. So as not to lose the deal, Israel, through the Elta Company, proposed to produce a similar radar for only about $3 million and won the bid. Elta has now to prove to the Turks that the performance of its radar is adequate. In August an agreement was signed that included a technical and financial framework for the overhaul of 54 Phantoms, 30 of them to be overhauled in Israel.
As expected, the success of Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) angered Norden and other U.S. companies. Norden has accused Israel and Turkey of unfair practices in testimony before the U.S. Congress. The main accusation is against IAI, a former partner of Norden, blamed for giving Turkey misleading information. Norden will ask the U.S. administration to take steps for cancellation of the deal with Israel. Probably Norden will be prepared now to offer lower prices and will turn to circles in Turkey who oppose making any contacts with Israel.
For our part, the problem of the Turkish deal is financial. The Turks demand that payments begin only after two years in the five-year deal. Thus, interim financing is needed by IAI, putting heavy pressure on the company. It owes the banks about $300 million. An ugly struggle has been going on between the company and the banks about this debt. It is little wonder that the banks do not want to finance the deal with Turkey and they are not interested in the strategic importance of the deal.
The finances thus become a matter for the finance minister and the prime minister to act upon. The finance minister has already committed himself to not allow the Phantoms deal to be lost. What also bothers him is how to make sure that, on Jan. 1, 1997, when the IAI wage agreements expire, the company does not collapse financially.
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The fourth Nordic conference on Middle Eastern Studies:
The Middle East in globalizing world
Oslo, 13-16 August 1998
The new alliance: Turkey and Israel
Is it a course towards new division of the Middle East?
By Akram T. HawasAalborg University
Questions should be raised: Considering that the peace process was somehow far-reaching and the efforts of the USA seemed to be on the right course to set up a new and peaceful Middle East; why was such a new military bloc established then? What were Turkey's and Israel's purposes and objectives? Why did the Western countries not express any posture; did they actually not care about it? [2]
In fact, the agreement was originally concluded on March 23, 1996, and it was declared officially in the beginning of April. As both the Israeli and the Turkish officials have asserted that the agreement was not a military bloc, nor was it directed against any countries, an explanation tended to see the agreement not as a mere outcome of the Al-Sharm el-Shaikh Summit, [3] but as a part of a larger strategy towards Syria, Greece, and Iran.. The active Turkish participation in that summit and Demirel's following trip to Israel were two evidences of a new and hard Turkish policy based on national and economic security considerations, where the Kurdish crisis, which was estimated to cost the country about 8 billion dollars annually, [4] was seen as one of the most serious challenge to the Turkish government's efforts to transform Turkey to be an economic superpower in the Middle East. Another explanation indicated that the agreement was perhaps responding to the renewed military agreement between Syria and Greece; the traditional enemies of Turkey, thus, the Turkish-Greek confrontation would then exceed the low-level of disputes and would be accentuated projecting historical conflicts: Hellenic-Ottoman or Christian-Islamic confrontation. [5]
However, insisting that, the agreement with Israel was not much different compared with similar former agreements with Arab countries like Iraq, Saudi-Arabia, Jordan and Libya, Turkish officials showed a tendency to put pressure on Syria regarding the accusations of support to the Kurdish Movement: Syria might choose between its relations with Turkey and its protection of PKK's leader Ugelan. At the same time, Turkey had refused any attempt to regionalisation the water-disputes considering that the Arab countries have no rights to intervene in this problem. On the other hand, most of the Arab countries accused Israel of disrupting the peace process by establishing a new military bloc in the region. Simultaneously, the relations between Turkey and some of the Arab countries like Syria and Iraq and some Islamic countries like Iran experienced tensions. Internal tension especially in Turkey was also an aspect of reactions towards the military agreement with Israel. In this context, the personal attentat against Demirel's life [6] has been connected to the theory that Israel's last assault on South Lebanon (Qana), where hundreds of civilians were killed, was a result of the military agreement.
The objectives of this paper
On the national level, the alliance was projecting the nature of intra-social and political relations in the Israeli and the Turkish societies. Undoubtedly both societies were experiencing severe division; in Israel because of the peace-process, and in Turkey because of the controversial view on Islam and the Islamic World and the relations with the West. The new military alliance could be seen as projecting the globalization of national crises, or in other words a rational attempt to solve domestic social, economic and political crises within a regional network of economic expansionism, where the role of the military power experiences an essential transformation in its nature from self-defence to a guarantee for economic expansionism.
However, the objective of this paper is to contribute to the discussion of the new role of the military power on the national plan of Third World countries. The paper seeks to prove that in light of the new structure of international relations, some selected countries in the Third World can improve their national economic, political, and social conditions through regional economic expansion secured by sophisticated military power. The role of military power is in no way a return of colonialism, but to function as an overbearing body that by permanent threats to suppress any antagonistic action and to secure the articulation of the resources and opening of markets externally. It is, basically an attempt at imposing coercive hegemony.
Methodologically, my point of departure is at the level of regional actors. This is in contrast to Realism and other schools of international politics, whose level of analysis relates mostly to the world powers. Furthermore, I will examine the impact of internal changes on the state's apparatus in Turkey and Israel.
The paper has six sections: The first section includes the introduction and the objectives of the paper. The second section, Old Rules, New Potentials, is a theoretical discussion of the potentials, which the structure of the so-called New World Order offers for small countries who seek to secure their interests. The third section, Old Ambitions, seeks to show that Turkey and Israel had have historical ambitions, which have not been realized. By exploiting the new potentials, these two countries tried to realize those old ambitions. The fourth section, Internal Developments, concentrates on the internal evolution that necessitated the realization of these old ambitions as well as the start to a new project of economic development. The fifth section, A Common Project, is a problematization of the Turkish-Israeli military agreement which, depending on the new evolutions in the international environment, aimed to realize the old ambitions based on structural adjustments with regard to internal and regional developments. Finally the sixth section, Conclusion, sums up the former sections and examines the possibility for realizing the project.
Old rules, new potentials
As the Cold War was over, the structure of international relations was also experiencing changes. The Neo-realists consider the new world order on the basis of the same principles; 'The new pattern is a combination of several poles of power, a single dominant ideology and a single dominant coalition. This combination defines a new international order that can usefully be seen as structured along centre-periphery lines'. Here two changes can be observed: Firstly, 'the organisational structure of global management is still confused; secondly, 'aid (economic) is no longer easily available for strategic reasons.[8] This means that clients can no longer depend on their former patrons.
Obviously, the conditions of the Cold War necessitated a long range of commitment by the superpowers towards their proxies in order to hold on to them as allies. One of these proxies was Turkey, which received essential economic aid and political support from the USA in order to keep its position as the south wing of NATO to confront any Soviet expansionist potential. Israel was another proxy with the duty to preserve Western, mainly USA's economic interests in the Middle East and in the Gulf region.
However, although Israel was still receiving American economic aid as well as political support, USA's growing presence in the Arab countries in the aftermath of the Second Gulf War had perhaps resulted in a relative reduction of Israel's importance. Because, as its economy was in decline, the world superpower, USA, might so take over a big part of the job by itself. On the other hand, Turkey's importance was also experiencing a decline as the Soviet threat was no longer valid. This meant that the country could not count on any direct rescue from the USA. Under the emergence of the New World Order, the hegemony of the superpower USA is no longer able to secure the interests of each client country, nor can it homogenize the world. In return, as it is no longer willing to provide economic aid, USA's unipolar hegemony provides the opportunity for its former allies to seek securing their own interests as they can. [9] This is perhaps one of the new main elements in the New World Order: Every single country is seen to be free to secure its own interests. The only condition is not to challenge the world system, or in other words, securing the interests of countries must not be at the expense of the interests and superiority of the world hegemon, the USA. What is essential in the new order is the stability of the world system and the commitment to preserve American hegemony, not necessarily a common parameter for development in the whole world, nor a more fair distribution of the world resources. This can be seen as a new phase in the process of unequal development of the world capitalist system. [10] In a world of capital expansionism that perpetuates unequal development, the only logical model is the development of the stronger while leaving the weaker in a category that can be politely called underdevelopment.
Thus, a sort of selective stability gives the powerful allies of the USA the right to expand at the expense of the weak and the 'defected' countries. [11] In the light of this structure of relations, it was perhaps quite appropriate for countries like Turkey and Israel to follow the pattern of the world hegemon and play the game of securing their own national interests also by exporting their national crises. In a system, like the world capitalist system, where the values of moral and justice [12] have no place, the military threats remain the only and the most practical guarantee not only for the survival of the system itself but also for any successful operation within its context. [13]
Supposedly, without such a military power Iraq would never have given up its occupation of Kuwait, nor could democracy have been reinserted in Haiti. Also when Israel agrees to give up territories in Gaza and the West Bank, its deportment might be seen as a response to the violent Intifada and not least the intensive military actions of the Islamic groups. Even economic sanctions, as the new innovation of the international system to impose changes on single countries, can never be effective without military observance.
The importance of the military boom is undoubtedly essential to support the economic expansion, because without it, economic corporations remain exposed to antagonism of the contra-forces either by sabotage or by seeking counter-bloc. [14] In fact a parameter of international relations, i.e., to secure the interests of all partners is not born yet. Coercion is therefore still necessary when consent is absent. Since the end of the Second World War, military power is still the only guarantee for economic and political flourishing. Japan's and Germany's economic powers have flourished under the American military protection. Now when these two countries are in economic conflicts with the USA, they are well under way to reconsider their military position.
What we actually have experienced in the aftermath of the Cold War was not a really demilitarization process of the world super military powers as it has been expected. [15] In some countries, it was in fact a process of transforming the nature of the military tenets in the domain of both mobilization and weapons from accumulated quantity to selected quality. France's insistency on conducting nuclear testing followed by changes in its mobilisation methods was significant evidence of a new qualitative military competition. The difficulties in the international negotiations to stop nuclear testing and expansion are other signs, where the less developed countries like India and Pakistan desire a common pledge by all counties to reduce their nuclear arsenals. To India it seems that the demilitarization process was but a trick by which the most sophisticated nuclear countries sought to dismantle any challenge to their military dominance. [16] In the world of today, the new role of military power is in no way defined by traditional issues like security. Nor has it much to do with democracy, while some scholars emphasize its negative impact. [17] It seems the negative impact can both be economic, because of the high level of military expenditure, defence-budget; and political, because when the army has no external enemy, internal societal interference can be an attractive gaol. It seems also that military power is under way to possess a 'productive' role and have a positive impact in securing the outwarded economic expansion. This is not new to the history of the superpowers, because colonization and imperialism might have already signified the central role of military as a productive factor for their economies. In contrast, it would be a new phenomenon in the history of the Third World countries since the establishing of the world capitalist system. Iraq was expelled out of Kuwait because it used the traditional methods of colonization and because it challenged the world system and dissatisfied the world hegemon. Israel and Turkey were not placed in the same categorization and would use different methods. Turkey and Israel were two countries with tight relations with the USA, and then they had to take initiative to seek to secure their national interests by their own capabilities in the Middle East: a rich region characterized by both resources and crises, where the majority are Arab and Muslim countries.
A partnership of economic cooperation with the Arab and the Islamic countries in the region, needs a non-antagonistic atmosphere of relations. Both Turkey's and Israel's relations with their neighbour countries were constantly lacking such a non-antagonistic atmosphere: As the bilateral relations between Turkey and Israel have been shaped by a kind of mutual understanding [18] since the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the Holocaust and later the establishment of the state of Israel, both the Turks and the Israelis may be quite convinced that in acceptance by the Arabic and the Islamic masses was still far from being reached. These masses cannot be satisfied as long as what they fought for in the last several decades is not achieved yet. [19] History is still the major contributor to form the consciousness and the attitude of these masses. In the Turkish example, although they share the same religion, the bad and bloody memories of the Ottoman Era are still shaping the minds of these masses: The attempts to 'Turkicization' of the non-Turks and the brutal suppressing of the Arab nationalists especially in Syria and Lebanon; of the Kurd nationalists in the whole region; and of the Shiite-Muslims in the Arabic Peninsula and Iraq. In the Israeli example, the heritage is even heavier: The relations are dominated by the logic of revenge and resistance.
On the other hand, countries like Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi-Arabia (only relatively) and Syria have likewise regional ambitions of hegemony and economic cooperation projects, which have caused more antagonisms between regional states rather than cooperation potentials.
However, in the light of all these realities, and in order to secure its national interests in the context of the rules of the world system, it was quite legitimate for Israel and Turkey to use coercion. This was accentuated by the fact that Shimon Peres' [20] vision of the project of a Middle East Economic Market was rejected outright by some Arab countries and Iran, while other countries were sceptical. Even Egypt had reservations. [21]
In fact, the role of the military power has never been absent from Israeli strategy towards the Arab countries in the Middle East. Although it usually refuses to recognize that it possesses nuclear capability, Israel has actually rejected signing the international treaty on nuclear proliferation. Despite Arab and especially Egyptian appeals to the USA to put pressure on Israel to open its arsenals to international inspections, it still rejects any discussions of the subject. However, the essential transformation in the nature of the Israeli military doctrine is seemingly, that its role is no longer merely to protect the existence of Israel from any Arab 'invasion' and secure it as a state in the Middle East, but to work for its economic expansionism in the region. (see later on Israel's ambitions) Similarly, the Turkish military which had the duty to safeguard the south wing of NATO from any Soviet invasion and to secure Turkey's unity against the Kurdish separatists, was now to fulfil the tasks of securing the regional economic expansionism of the country.
Old ambitions
However, these dreams created a tradition within the military institution of Turkey, and consolidated its position as the absolute societal force, whose authority determines the capacity of manoeuvre of the political elite both what concerns domestic and foreign policies. The political elite can only act when the military institution is satisfied. That means in areas where the military institution is opposed to policies, the political elite is actually paralyzed. One important aspect of this paralysis was the disability of the political elite to carry out any successful economic policies. [23]
Similar to Turkey, the political life in Israel is also dominated by a strong military tradition. The power of Israeli military institution stems from the history of the state, which was established in 1947 as a result of the efforts of the Zionist para-military organizations cleansing Palestinian-Arab areas and replacing them with imported Jews from all over the world, in order to impose the new state as a reality. But this state has always been rejected and suspected by its neighbours, the Arab countries. This posture has strengthened the position of the military institution; the organization of the army which waged four wars against the Arabs in order to force the Arab to accept it as a member state of the Middle East. The war struggle for legitimacy has been the doctrine that shaped and still shapes not only the attitude of the Zionist organizations and the military institution, but also the discourse of the political elite. Based on the historical passions of the Jews in the ancient of the East but in the modern history in the West, where the term of anti-Semitic was born and where the Holocaust took place, the only logic that determines the consciousness of Israelis is the necessity of strength; in order to impose your own state and to force the others to accept Israel. Thus, the dream of Greater Israel [24] might be seen as a product of this doctrine. But although Israel, since its establishment, and depending on the West particular by the USA, has been the strongest state in the Middle East, it had not been managed to realize the project of Great Israel yet. What is important here is that, in order to be the strongest, Israel has always allied itself with those stronger outsiders who have interests in the region. Thus, Israel's permanent allied was/is the American superpower. In its efforts to secure its interests, Washington has always faced antagonism in the region, therefore it had/has to have permanent military threat, either indirect through proxies like Israel and Iran under the Shah, or its own forces as now.
However, as far as Turkish ambitions to play a greater role in the Middle East and perhaps in the world are concerned, Europe plays an important role. Since the establishment of the European Community, Turkey has applied for membership several times, but all applications have been rejected on different grounds: Sometimes economic reasons and other times new issues like the development of democratic institutions and the violations of human rights are invoked by Brussels. However, this was/is not the only defeat in seeking to play a greater role. Nor has membership in NATO offered Turkey the opportunity to play a hegemonic role in the Middle East. Under the Shah, Iran was preferred by the US to exercise regional hegemony in the Middle East. After the fall of the Shah, the Western countries supported Iraq to dominate the Gulf region, and Israel was strengthened by the US. During the Gulf crises, Turkey offered the Western-led alliance the use of its bases in the military offensive and control of the economic sanctions against Iraq, and also to offer the Iraqi Kurds the secure zone in Iraqi Kurdistan. As a result Turkey lost the earnings from the Iraqi oil export through its territories, while its project to be the motherland of all Kurds has been rejected. [25] But Western economic aid was not increased
Internal developments
However, developments in the post-1980 coup created a course of new relations between the state and the masses. The focus on the triad: secularism-nationalism-Westernization has actually deepened the chasm between what the state was projecting and how the social development has taken place. Due to the Islamic traditions, the people rejected this project. Significance for this rejection is seen in the growing Islamic Movement both in the form of the democratic-parliamentary aspect, the Islamic Party and the Welfare Party, and in the form of Islamic militant organizations like Hizbullah-Turkey. The repeated anti-state demonstrations and the social unrest are also signs of this chasm. [30] The state/society dichotomy can also be related to a complex of political instability based on crisis of identity and elite monopoly. [31] A significance for that was the cabinet-formation process in the aftermath of the last general election is a good and clear example of the influence of the military institution. Although the Welfare Party, which propagated Islamic positions, won the election, it was immediately been restrained to form a mini-cabinet, and then when it managed to form a coalition with Ciller's party, this coalition has been forced to resign and the Welfare Party has been dissolved.
On the other hand, as already mentioned, in Israel, like in Turkey, there is also a rigid and influential military institution. The political elite is not able to act without regard to the view of the military. [32] A difference can be found in the stage of societal intervention. In contrast to the wide societal intervention of the Turkish military, as emphasized above, it is necessary to underline that the degree of political democracy in Israel has always limited the role of the military to national defence and strategic policies. This difference might be seen as the result of the historical role of the two military institutions: In Turkey, the military played a great role in reforming the national identity [33] of the Turks as a new nation after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. In Israel, as the Jews were already organized in the Zionist organizations, the military role was defined by the creation of the territorial structure of the state of Israel. Nevertheless, as a response to the desires of the military and the political pressure of religious-Zionist groupings, the political elite is sharply divided on the peace process. In return this has created a social-political division in society. The military institution and the religious-Zionist grouping are influenced by a certain kind of xenophobia expressed in mistrust to all others than Jews. [34] Historically, the military desires have been translated into an ideology and an action of revenge. Simultaneously, these xenophobia and mistrusts of anyone have also shaped the definition of who is really Jewish, [35] which in turn created sharp discriminations within the Israeli social structure. [36] The white and European immigrated Jews are favoured and they actually dominate the political as well as the military domains. The Oriental Jews including those who actually were the original inhabitants of Palestine before the establishment of the state of Israel are less favoured. [37] Meanwhile, the black Falasha Jews from Ethiopia and the black Jews from USA whose origins are in Africa, they are generally excluded from any political influence as well as any social position; in fact they are excluded from the economic privileges like housing and jobs, which immigrants normally be privileged; they are marginalized and live in containers in extremely unsatisfactory social and health conditions; their future is vague or perhaps they are without any future prospects, as long as their children have no access to schools. [38] This is only one small aspect of the split in the Israeli social structure. The main and the sharpest division is actually grounded in the duality created by the peace process. That is the duality between the complex of xenophobia, mistrust, revenge, the Greater Israel and God's Best Nation on the one side, and the peace agreement which demands trust, cooperation, stability and security for all on the other side. In practice these requirements need ideological change as well as territory concessions.
The explicit expression of the enormous difficulties which cause the realization of these changes almost impossible, is exemplified by the breaking of the Jewish religious taboo by a young student of law who killed Prime Minister Rabin. The recent general election and its result support this argument.
To go back to the developments in Turkey, the view of the Kurds is the most essential issue, where disagreement between the military institution and the political elite, can be assessed. For a long time, since the dispersion of the Ottoman Empire and after the establishment of the modern Turkish Republic, the Kurds were viewed as a non-civilized group. But, as a consequence of the tragedy of the Iraqi Kurds, who have been severely suppressed at the end of the Second Gulf War, the world's humane view of the Kurds has changed. The Western countries led by USA who offered the Iraqi Kurds a secure zone in Northern Iraq, has also pushed Turkey to change its position towards the Turkish Kurds. The political elite had actually shown a tendency towards a kind of concession in the form of securing the cultural rights of the Kurds, and for the first time in Turkey's modern history, to recognize them as a separate ethnicity. Prime Minister Turket Uzal, who at that time expressed sympathy for the idea, 'suddenly'died. Although his successors the current President Suleiman Demirel, Tanso Ciller, Erbakan and Yalmaz, perhaps had shared in part the same attitude on the Kurdish issue, they were actually under the pressure of the military to send troops to the Kurdish areas in southeast Turkey and across the Iraqi border to chase the PKK's guerrillas.
What is significant, is that neither the great offensive during the past year in Northern Iraq nor the military operations either inside Turkey or in Northern Iraq could paralyse PKK's actions. [39] The case was still unclear as to what a rational and better solution could be? The popularity of the PKK has clearly increased in Turkey, and the European as well as the general Western pressure on Turkey was also increasing especially after PKK's new strategy to threaten Western tourists in Turkey and the bloody demonstrations by the Kurds in European countries like Germany, France, Belgium, simultaneously with political efforts to declare a Kurdish Parliament in exile. The army institution in Turkey still insisted (s) on a military solution while a group in the political elite was seemingly convinced that such a solution was no longer possible. In this context also, the relations between Turkey and respectively Syria and Iran were to be tackled. Although both the military and the political elite had agreed on the necessity of securing the country's interests, the dispute was still shaping on how to do that. Both Syria and Iran were accused of seeking the destabilization of Turkey: Syria by supporting the PKK, and Iran by supporting the PKK as well as a growing radical Turkish Islamic Movement. In return, Iran accused Turkey of supporting the Mujahideen Khalq, an Iranian opposition militant group, who was said to carry out sabotage actions across the Irani borders to Iraq and Turkey.
In Israel, the view on the occupied territories of Gaza and the West Bank had shown a tendency towards transformation. During the past few years, the Israeli authorities in these areas were faced with a strong uprising by the Palestinians, Al-Intifada, which survived the brutal suppression of the Israeli soldiers. As a consequence of that, a part of the Israeli political elite, the majority of the Labour Party supported by some generals in the military institution, realised the need to find a solution. Responding to Western pressure, the Israelis and the Arabs were gathered in Madrid Conference followed by the Oslo agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Here the Israeli view on the solution was seen as moving towards a willingness of giving up territories and perhaps even accepting a Palestinian state. [40] Not only territorial concessions meant the recognition of official boundaries, something which has never been defined since the establishing of the Israeli state, but more essentially it meant renouncing the traditional definition of the dream of Greater Israel.
But could this essential transformation of the Israeli dream be conceived simply on a humanitarian base or as a response to international pressure? And although the Intifada has been a permanent internal exhaustive war, could it be the only reason? (see the next section) As such, conducting the peace process was in no way without a price; as it has already been emphasized, the peace process in fact created severe social division in the Israeli society. Seen in this light the military alliance could be seen as a tool to hinder further escalation in the crises.
However, this division was not totally new. Maybe Israeli intellectuals have been aware of it. Thus alliance with Turkey was perhaps an attempt to rehomogenize the social structure. But the result of the last general election and Prime Minister Netanyaho's reemphasis of the old principles are perhaps expressions of frustration more than a further step to reunite the society. But as the alliance was an attempt by the peace supporters to get the accept of the conservatives to continue the new course, perhaps it would have other objectives!
A two-partners project
The project of Two Partner is neither against the world hegemon, USA, nor is it merely an instrument for its interest-management. In fact, it seems that this sort of project was seen to fitting Turkey and Israel's position in the Middle East regional, where it is too difficult to find other partners to share the same objectives. Thus, both USA's esprit de corps as well Jordan's substitute positions are not seen as to be partners.
The project of Two Partners is aimed to serve Israel and Turkey in various areas in the contemporary Middle East structure and in the light of the opportunities offered by the globalization process.
Nevertheless, in addition to many of the interests and crises already mentioned, the main dreams of Turkey and Israel were to be integrated as important actors in the Middle East region. As the new innovation of the international structure is the formation of regional blocs for securing economic cooperation, both countries were assumed to have intentions in this direction, also to solve internal crises and secure national interests. But in fact realization of economic cooperation is restricted by the political disintegration of the region. Shimon Peres, the former Foreign Minister and then Prime Minister in the Labour Party-led government had already formulated a project for a sort of economically based cooperation. A mechanism for international conferences on economic cooperation in the Middle East has bee established: The first conference was held at Casa Blanca in 1994, the second took place in Amman in 1995, but nothing practically has been done mainly because of political reasons. [42]
On its side, Turkey has been one of the most enthusiastic countries to the project of Middle East Economic Cooperation. But Turkey also faced serious problems to integrate itself in the region because of historical problems; Turkey's hitherto policy of searching integration in Europe at the expense of its relations with the Arab and the Islamic countries, and not least because of the water disputes with Syria and Iraq as well as the Kurdish problem which involves these countries and Iran.
Moreover, since establishing of the new secularized Turkey by Ataturk, the country has suffered several defeats in its efforts to play a greater role on the international arena: The first and perhaps most bitter is that Turkey has been rejected by EEC (EU) several times. The second concerned Turkey's relations with NATO: Here despite Turkey's essential position as the south wing of NATO confronting Soviet expansion, NATO's countries did not offer Turkey any important support; in its disputes with Greece the Western countries have been conceived to side the latter; Turkey's project to annex all Kurdish territories to establish the Turkish-Kurdish great state is rejected by the West, the Arabs, and Iran. Thirdly, the project of a Great Turk empire has failed, because the Asian Islamic countries are divided between Iranian, American and Russian and later also Saudi-Arabian and Israeli influences.
As a response to all these defeats and still looking for a greater role and a better integration in the world system, both the Turkish military institution and the political elite (the Welfare Party was not in power yet) were supposedly agreed that Israel was the proper ally; it is the best card guaranteed by the West to put pressure on the Arabs; and it is the proper gate into the international scene, because Israel, since its establishment has been the dearest protégé of the world community. This was what Turkey tried to utilize. [43]
On the other hand, as far as the Jewish state is concerned, as the project of Great Israel has shown the need of a transformation from the physical-territorial context to the economic sphere, thus, according to the new international structure, Israel had to find a strong partner who not only accepts it but also as an ally. This project is to secure Israel the position of a mini USA.
Nevertheless, it has been emphasized, that the economic dominance should be secured by a military and political presence and attendance. Politically, and in addition to the peace agreements with Egypt, the Palestinians, and Jordan, Israel has actually established a network of relations with two Gulf countries: Oman and Qatar, and with three Magreb countries: Morocco, Tunisian and Mauritania. [44]These political relations have also opened the door to embryonic economic cooperations, which can be extended in the case of full commitment to the peace process. But what about the military?
Israel has been a target of a wave of para-military actions by groups of the Islamic Movement, both inside Israel, in the occupied territories and by Hizbullah in the Israeli-occupied zone in Lebanon. Iran was accused to be the major supporter to these groups. In this context, Israel has always expressed the desire to dismantle Iran's capacity. [45] Thus, targeting Iran might be seen as an important priority for the Israeli military, particularly due to the allegations about future Iranian Nuclear potentials. As Israel does not share borders with Iran, its air force needs midway bases. Here Turkey can provide vital assistance as long as Turkey may have similar reasons. Iran had been actually accused by Turkey of supporting PKK's guerrillas as well as the Islamic Movement of Hizbullah-Turkey.
However, in addition to its bases in the Kurdish area in Northern Iraq and supposedly in Iran, the PKK also has a base in Lebanon, precisely in Al-Beqa'e valley, which is under the control of Syrian troops. Moreover, the Turkish authorities insisted that the PKK's leader, Abdullah Ugelan, lives in Syria under the protection of the Syrian securities. But as all operations, which the Turkish troops have hitherto lunched against the Kurds were resultless, it seemed that Turkey was actually not able to incapacitate PKK's guerrilla war.
In addition to the security problems, Israel faces an essential water problem. This problem has actually been one of the main factors in the peace process. Because of its great agricultural projects, Israel utilizes the biggest share of the water from Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinians rivers. Now these countries are also under the way to develop their own agriculture projects. Some of these rivers stem from Turkey, which has in fact built up important agriculture, industrial, and tourists projects. The water issue is also a disputable between Turkey and both Syria and Iraq. In this context, in 1992, Suleiman Demirel, Prime Minister at that time and now President, launched the principle that Turkish water is for the Turks. [46] The slogan was perhaps a revised Turkish response to the Arab motto Naftul-Arab Lil-Arab; Arab's oil for Arabs; the principle which was launched by the Baath regime in Iraq in relation to the nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Corporation in 1972 and later on the Arab-Israeli war of October in 1973. Demirel's new principle called on exchanging Arab oil for Turkish water with Syria and Iraq. Although Turkey actually started to build large dams at the water sources in the Kurdish areas of southeast of Turkey as agriculture, industrial and tourists projects as the main bases for its economic and development strategy, [47] the major aim of the principle, that is the exchange of Arab oil for Turkish water, was not realized yet. Nevertheless these projects have reduced Syrian and Iraq's access to the water, but the influx of the water to Syria and Iraq was still gratuitous. As Turkish officials insisted, the quotas of the water were shared according to former agreements concluded under other circumstances. [48] On the other hand, and to confirm that there is a new world order now with different conditions and rules, the US, which offered essential assistance both in planning and implementing the Turkish dams and projects, has not reacted to Iraq's and Syria's insisting on the necessity of commitment to international law and the former agreements. Even if the US wished an overall solution of these main water problems the question would be how to implement it. However, what concerns Turkey, and in order to ensure that the Turkish development projects survive, the southeast part of Turkey must experience stability. But as long as the PKK continued its military actions, stability could not be settled in this part of Turkey, which is historically a Kurdish territory. This problem has already been emphasized in this section.
Thus, the case might be formulated in the following way: Now Israel needs Arab water, Arabs need Turkish water, Turkey needs Arab oil, Arabs have claims on territories from Israel. The new alliance might be seen to seek to realize this project, but the Arabs were not willing to give up, neither oil, water, nor territories. The alliance would seek to push the Arab regimes into accepting the new formula. Perhaps this could be realized through long range efforts and through an overall solution of the problems in the Middle East, and not least through realization of the project of Middle East economic cooperation. [49]
Although it might be an obvious, that any foreign policy needs its own operational model of internal changes as dynamic precondition, I have to be very prudent to involve the internal political and social changes, which have taken place in both Turkey and Israel in this discussion. [50]
The main objective of the internal political changes, would lie in an attempt to extend the popular bases of the governments. This would be an condition for pushing the project of economic expansion forward.
In Turkey, however, in the midst of all the disputes the way was open to Erbakan to form a new cabinet: a coalition with his earlier 'enemy' Ciller and her party. The military institution finally seemed to have accepted. Erbakan was perhaps one of two options: either a new military coup to confront the social and political crises as well as, especially, the growing influence of the Islamic-attitude, or an attempt to contain them. The military and the political elites chose the second option not because of its inherent nature, but in order to ameliorate the already negative picture of Turkey and its regime in Western eyes. But even more important the aim was to avoid an overall social explosion; the memories of what happened in Iran in the second half of the 1970's which ended with the Islamic revolution in 1979 were present in the minds of Middle Eastern elites. The assumption was that the Erbakan in power would not be the Erbakan in opposition. While in opposition the man used to express 'Islamic' attitude freely, even calling for the unification of the whole Islamic world in a new Khilafah Islamiyah (Islamic Great State). [51] In power he would be bounded to the state's real politik towards international agreements including the military agreement with Israel. The agreement which Erbakan, as opposition leader, had severely criticized. But as government leader Erbakan would talk about Turkey's national and strategic interests; the importance of the Turkish Republic in Northern Cyprus; renewing the agreement with the Western countries: USA, France and Britain to save the Kurds in Northern Iraq. [52] A second main objective of Erbakan's government was perhaps to find a sort of permanent solution to the Kurdish problem: Relying on his Islamic credentials, Erbakan could use terms like Muslim-fraternity to minimize the Kurdish claims and to preserve the unification of the country menaced by the separatist movement. [53]
In Israel, the changes have been more dramatic, during his election campaign the candidate Netanyahu voiced rigid rightist principles and when he became prime minister he continued to insist on those principles; he emphasized a policy of three Nos: [54] When the former labour government conducted the peace-process, it created divisions in society, because the party was representing only a half of the Israeli population. Then Netanyahu's policy represented the other half. The main objective of this hard line may lie in the efforts to contain the intensive resistance to the peace-process by the rightist-religious groupings, because as he has been opponent of the peace-process, he postulates that it is his model of peace, which is favoured by all Israelis. [55]
Conclusion
While the Israeli-Turkish agreement aimed at satisfying the military institutions and at consolidating the position of the political elite in both countries, it had, as far as democracy is concerned, different impacts on Turkey and Israel. In the latter, the agreement could have positive effects in the efforts of the political elite to rehomogenize the Israeli society after the divisions on the peace-process. Actually the parties at which the agreement was aimed, Syria, Iran, and the Islamic fundamentalism, are considered enemies by both the pro- and anti-peace process supporters. These adversaries are estimated by both wanting to sabotage the peace-process and to destroy Israel as well.
In Turkey, in contrast, the agreement deepened the dichotomy between the state and the pro-Western elite on the one side and the majority of the people and the opposition parties and movements, who explicitly rejected and condemned the agreement on the other side. Some saw the later Israeli incursion of Lebanon (Qana), where hundreds of civilians were killed, as result of the agreement. A personal attentat on Demirel's life followed. Erbakan called for an anti-Zionist Islamic pact. These developments necessitated the change of power or more precisely allowed a new policy in order to hinder a worsening of the situation. Erbakan's potentials to continue his course were related to his efforts to rehomogenize the society as well as to secure Turkey's interests. Thus came his initiatives on both the national as well as the regional plans: His visions of a peaceful and total solution of the Kurdish problem in cooperation with Iran, Iraq, and Syria, and his efforts to have independent relations with these countries as well as with other countries in the Middle East including economic cooperation and not least to resolve the disputes around the water question. [56]
In Israel, the long commitment of Israeli politicians to the view of the military institution expressed in the four general wars against the Arabs; the occupation of territories in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine; the several assaults on Lebanon, developing nuclear power and rejecting to sign the international agreement of banning nuclear testing and prelimination; the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor and the threats to the supposedly Iranian and Pakistani nuclear capacity. These are a few evidences of the influence of the military institution and its dominating doctrine.
The essential question of this paper is whether the new military alliance can realize the objectives of restructuring the Middle East region in the light of globalization process, by imposing the project of economic cooperation guaranteed by military power. Obviously the realization of any project depends partly on the country's own capacities, and partly on the reactions of the exterior.
What concerns their own capacities, it seems that the governments in Turkey and Israel have so far made a great part, but in creating internal changes, which aimed at broadening the mass mobilization, the efforts have not much successful.
The reaction of the exterior was in fact connected to individual countries. Egypt, one of the great countries in the Middle East, was and still is desperate. It refused the idea of joining the new alliance, because it seeks to assert its position as the vanguard of the Arabs and their interests, but on the other side it feels that it once more has been defrauded by the US, Israel, and Turkey by excluding it from the arrangements of the future of Middle East.
The Israel-Turkish alliance will probably realize its goals as an alternative contra alliance is not foreseen. A contra alliance would have to include Egypt, Iran, Syria, Iraq, and the other Arab countries. However, there is a conflictual relationship between most of these countries and Iran on ideological grounds. There is also a historical confrontation between Egypt and Iran on hegemony in the Middle East generally and particularly in the Gulf. [57] Nor are Egypt and Syria quite agreed on the peace-process with Israel. Iraq is actually paralysed. Most of the Gulf countries are neither able to stand against Iran nor against Egypt, nor do they actually possess any ambitions of external expansionism. In fact any contra alliance can not be effective without Iraq and Iran. Another stumbling bloc is not least the dispute between Syria and Jordan. Rejecting Syrian critics, Jordan has not only declared the desire to join the new Israeli-Turkish military alliance, but has also indicated a threat to Syria, when Prince Hassan accused Syria of having the intention of regenerating the Great Syria at the expense of Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. He added that the region will experience vital developments, and the Americans will put crucial pressure on Syria especially concerning its position on the peace process. [58]
As the realists point out war is clash of wills led by the rationality of the state. The states, which neither are rationale nor express any will, are weak and defenceless. In the case under discussion here, the weakness of the regional counter-front is not foreseen as capable to prevent implementation of the Israeli-Turkish agreement in achieving its goals. But on the other hand, wills can also be changed. In the Middle East nothing is stabilized: The peoples who established the first civilizations on earth are now besieged; they still have potentiality and they strive for material capability. This is the dynamic behind instability characterizing the region. The social formation in Turkey and Israel represent two different historical courses; there is no guarantee that they will continue what their military institutions and political elites have initiated; in short, the alliance between Turkey and Israel can easily be changed to enmity, thus making room for new constellations and a new regional balance/imbalance.
Further reading
Barbir, K.: Modernization in the Middle East: Ottoman Empire, London, Al-Saqi, 1992.
Begin, Ze'ev B.: A Zionist Stand, London, 1993.
Ben-Rafael, Eliezer: Language, Identity, and Social Division; the case of Israel, Oxford, 1994.
Bruno, Michael: Crisis, Stabilization, and economic reform; Therapy by consensus, Oxford, 1993.
Catudal, H.: Isreal's Nuclear Weaponary, London, Al-Saqi, 1991.
Cohen, Y.: Nuclear Ambiguity: Vanunu Affair, London, Al-Saqi, 1992.
Cosyantine P. Danopolous (ed): From Military to Civilian Rule, London, 1992.
Efraim Karsh and Gregory Mahler (ed): Israel at the Crossroad: The Challenge of Peace, London and New York, British academic Press, 1994.
Flapan, Simha: The Birth of Israel; myths and realities, New York, 1987.
Gabriel Ben-Dor and David B. Dewitt (ed): Confidence Building in the Middle East, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994.
Gerard Chaliand, (tr) Philip Black: The Kurdish Tragedy, London and Atlantic Highlands, HJ: Zed Books, 1994.
Gunter, M.: Kurds in Turkey, London, Al-Saqi, 1990.
Hale, W.: Turkish Politics and the Military, Lonod, Al-Saqi, 1994.
Heper, Metin: The State Tradititon in Turkey, Beverley, 1985.
Hunter, F. Robert: The Palestinian Uprising; a war by other means, London, 1991.
Jamison, D.M.: The Israel People; a study, Nogales, Ariz., 1992.
Kahhaleh, Subhi: The Water Problem in Israel and its Repercussions on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Beirut, 1981.
Landau: The Arab Minority in Israel, 1967-1991; political aspects, Oxford, 1993.
Metin Heper and Ahmed Evin (ed): Politics in the Third Turksih Republic, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994.
M. J. Laver (ed): Party Policy and Government Coalition, London, 1992.
Raphael Patai and Emmanuel Goldsmith (ed): Events and Movements in Modern Judaism, New York, Paragon House, 1995.
Robert Wistrich and David Ohana (ed): The Shaping of Israel Iddentity: Myth, Memory and Trauma, London, Frank Cass & Co., 1995.
Robins, Philip: Turkey and Middle East, London, 1991.
Rugman, Jonathan: Ataturk's Children; Turkey and the Kurds, New York, 1996.
Schiff, Ze'ev: Intifada; the Palestinian uprising; Israel's third front, New York, cop.1990.
Schindler, C.:Israel, Likud and the Zionist Dream, London, Al-Saqi, 1995
Shaw, S.: Turkey and the Holocaust, London, Al-Saqi, 1995.
Shaw, Stanford jay (ed): History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern, Cambridge, 1977.
Shipler, David K.: Arab and Jews; wounded spirits in a promised land, New York, 1986.
Walter, F. Weiker: Ottoman, Turks and the Jewish Polity: A History of The Jews in Turkey, Landham, MD: University Press of America; and Jerusalem, Israel: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 1992.
Williams, A.: Turkey and Europe, London, Al-Saqi, 1993.
Zvi Sobel and Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi (ed): Tradition, Innovation, Conflict; Jewishness and Judaism in contemporary Israel, New York, 1991.
Notes
1. Later in 1997, USA has officially approved the agreement and thus it has participated in the first Israeli-Turkish marine exercise, where Jordan has also been adopted as an observer. [*]
2. The British foreign minister emphasized he had not heard about the agreement, interview with MBC (an Arabic Broadcast from London), 26 June 1996. Onther other hand, (Alhayat [an Arabic daily newspaper published in London], 9 April 1996) writes: The American administration points out that, as the agreement is between an Islamic country and a non-Islamic country, it will offer a good basis for stability in the Middle East and that it is not directed against anyone. Muhammad Awadh, an Egyptian journalist, foresees that, by this agreement USA will give Israel access to the Iranian border. ( ibid, Al-Hayat 21 August 1996). [*]
3. Anti-terrorism top summit was held in Egypt, 13 March 1996 at the initiative of the USA and Egypt with the participation of many countries including Europeans, Japan, some Arabic countries, Israel and Turkey. [*]
4. Muhammad Nur el-Din, Turkish-Israeli Agreement was the Parameter to Confront Syria, Greece and Iran, Al-Hayat April 25, 1996. [*]
5. Khurshid Delly in ibid Al-Hayat. [*]
6. As many Turks, especially the Islamists, were against the development in the relations with Israel, the attentat on Demirel 18 Maj 1996 could be seen as a response to his trip to Israel; this would perhaps be connected to the attempts to abolish the Welfare Party and restrain its endeavours to have power, especially by the Army as well as the traditional political parties, because Ataturk's secular doctrine was still shaping the political life in Turkey. (Husni Mahli, The World This Week, MBC, 23 May 1996). [*]
7. For more about the realist approach see Pierre de Senarclens, The 'realist' paradigm and international conflicts, in International Social Science Journal, Vol. 127, February 1991, pp. 5-19. [*]
8. Both citations are from Barry Buzan, The Changing Security Agenda in Europe, in Ole Waever et al, Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, Pinter Publishers Ltd, London, 1993, pp. 11-12. [*]
9. It is useful here to refer to a new definition of the USA's hegemony in the New World Order. William Kristol and Robert Kagan call it BENEVOLENT global hegemony: Having defeated the 'evil empire' the United States enjoys strategic and ideological predominance. The first objective of US foreign policy should be to preserve and enhance that predominance by strengthening America's security, supporting its friends, advancing its interests, and standing up for its principles around the world...In the Middle East, the United States maintained the deployment of thousands of soldiers and a strong naval presence in the Persian Gulf region to deter possible aggression by Saddam Hussein's Iraq or the Islamic fundamentalist regime in Iran, and it mediated in the conflict between Israel and Syria in Lebanon. William Kristol and Robert Kagan: Toward a Neo-Reganite Foreign Policy, in Foreign Affairs, No.4, July/August 1996, pp. 21-22. [*]
10. Samir Amin works, respectively: Accumulation on a world scale: a critic of the theory of underdevelopment / translated by Brian Pearce, New York, 1974; Unequal Development: an essay on the social formation of peripheral capitalism / translated by Brian Pearce, Hassocks, 1976; Imperialism and Unequal Development, New York, 1979. [*]
11. With the conception of defected countries I address the countries which defect from the international system and challenge the world hegemon. These countries are now Iraq, Iran, Sudan, North-Korea, Cuba, Syria. [*]
12. Definition of these conceptions is obviously complicated and controversial. What I mean is the minimum commitment to the values of democracy and human rights which are mentioned in the UN Charter as well as the Western countries' constitutions, and which imply the right of the individuals as well as the nations to secure a better life-conditions by a better distribution of the resources. [*]
13. Edward N. Lutwak points out that: A policy of nonintervention would yield a world not only less stable, but also more militarized...[because]..A vacuum will have been created..[by supposedly USA's nonintervention policy] that other countries will fill. Edward N. Lutwak: A Post-Heroic Military Policy, in Foreign Affairs, No. 4, July/August 1996, p. 44. [*]
14. Jeremy D. Rosner emphasizes that the American supporters of NATO enlargement intend to sustain the 'idealists who seek to bolster democratic and economic reform in Central and Eastern Europe..' Jeremy D. Rosner: NATO Enlargement's American Hurdle, The Perils of Misjudging Our Political Will, in Foreign Affairs, No.4, July/August 1996, p. 9. [*]
15. See f.ex. Martin Shaw , Post-Military Society: militarism, demilitarization and war at the end of the twentieth century, London, 1991. [*]
16. Kenneth J. Cooper says: From the Third World perspective, the treaty appears to be colonization. The white nations want to maintain their monopoly on the advancement of military power. [India's Veto of a Treaty Banning All Nuclear Tests Is Popular at Home, International Herald Tribune, August 24-25, 1996]. However, both Indian and Pakistanis recent nuclear tests are not seen to form any real challenge to the structure of the world system or to USA's world hegemony. These tests project regional geopolitical lack of stability as well as they express frustration towards the nuclear monopoly by the five world superpowers. [*]
17. See Charles W. Kegley, JR and Margret G. Hermann; How Democracies Use Intervention: A Neglected Dimension in Studies of the Democratic Peace, in Journal of Peace Research, vol, 33, No, 3, 1996, pp. 308-311. [*]
18. Al-Bakkush, Abd el-Hamid: Why should we lose Turkey by Politics addressing Crises as Funds, Al-Hayat, 22 August 1996. [*]
19. What I mean here is among other things, simple objectives like development, liberalization of Palestine and unification of all Arab land, liberalization and unification of Kurdistan, and re-establishing the Islamic State. [*]
20. See Peres, S.: The New Middle East, 1993. [*]
21. Egypt insists always on the necessity for full-completion of the peace process prior to any further economic steps. The role of the military power is to offer an umbrella to realize such a project, and also to contribute to the security of the Gulf countries vis-a-vis Iraq's and Irans ambitions. On the basis of its territorial disputes with Saudi-Arabia and Bahrain, Qatar's economic relations with Israel are seen to be an attempt to break up the security chain around itself. [*]
22. For more details of Ataturk's era see f.ex. Preston Hughes, Ataturkculuk ve Turkiye'nin Demokratiklesme Sureci, Istanbul, Miliyet Yayinlari, 1993, reviewed by Coskun Can Aktan, Middle East Journal, No. 1, Winter 1996, p. 125-26. [*]
23. Henry J. Barkey; The State and the Industrialization Crisis in Turkey, Boulder, 1990, reviewed by Kerim K. Key in Middle East Journal, No. 3, Summer 1991, p. 523. Here the author emphasizes that this paralysis resulted in military interventions in 1960, 1971, and 1980. In the post 1960 military intervention and up to the return of the civilian rule, the military, civilian bureaucracy, and industrialists were supporters of import substitutions...which caused in hampering the formulation and implementation of cohesive long-term policies led to a paralysis of the political leadership. [*]
24. That is from Euphrates to Nile. [*]
25. Turket Uzal's sudden conciliatory policy in 1991 towards the Kurds was seen as an attempt to convince the Iraqi Kurds to join a great Turk-Kurd state. [*]
26. Ziya Onis, Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era: In Search of Identity, Middle East Journal, Volume 49, No. 1, Winter 1995, p. 52-3 [*]
27. Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, St. Martin's Press, New York, p. 194. However, the Shah of Iran did the same; the consequence was the emergence of the Islamic resistance which resulted in the revolution of 1979. In recent years such an Islamic embryonic resistance has been a social and political reality in Turkey. Efforts are perhaps made or to be made to avoid a similar Iranian experience. [*]
28. Ibid, Preston Hughes. he points out that Ataturkism should no longer be accepted as a dogmatic ideology...The principles of Ataturkism are not taboos. [*]
29. Kamaran Qara Daghi, Did Uzal project destruction of Kemalism or did he seek to be a new Ataturk? Al-Hayat 25 April 1996. [*]
30. Sami Shoresh, Al-Hayat, 26 May 1996. [*]
31. The Turkish Ambassador to Denmark Turhan Morali says in a lecture at Aalborg University, 2 November 1998, that the problem of democracy is that the political system is shaped by party-oligarchy restraining grass-roots movements to form any alternative. On the identity crisis, he said: We still ask ourselves: who are we? [*]
32. Yehuda Ben-Meir, Civil-Military Relations in Israel, New York, Colombia University Press, 1995, reviewed by Amos Perlmutter in ibid Middle East Journal, No. 1, Winter 1996, p. 117-18. The author points out that the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) have played a disproportional role in shaping Israel's strategy... In view of the professionalization of the IDF, its role in the decisions to go to war, and now in the peace negotiations, the Israeli military is certainly more important than in other democratic political systems. [*]
33. The imposed identity, as the Kemalist ideology had defined, was based on two cornerstones: non-ethnicity and secularism. But this identity never been realized (see ibid Turkish Ambassador), because the non-ethnicity led to Turkicization of the non-Turks and the secularism projected merely the dis-Islamization of the society in Modern Turkey. [*]
34. Kevin A. Avruch, Gush Emunin: Politics, Religion, and Ideology in Israel, in Michael Curtis (ed) Religion and Politics in the Middle East, West view Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1981, pp. 207-215. [*]
35. Daniel J Elazar and Janet Aviad; Religion and Politics in Israel, in ibid, Michael Curtis (ed), pp. 163-66. As the authors point out 'Israel is formally a secular democratic state', and the Jewish people are categorized either as religious, non-religious traditionalists or secularists. Furthermore, they emphasize that 'it is difficult to distinguish between a pure national Israeli identity and a Jewish identity. National historical consciousness does not exist without reference to the religious historical past. Continuity with Jewish national culture implies continuity with religious tradition in some form. The sources to be confronted are religious sources. The consciousness and sensibility are religious.' [*]
36. Within the right wing, there are both secularists and non-secularists, and in fact the right-left conflict is also inherent in the conflicts between the liberal citizenship and the religious-nationalist citizenship. Azmi Besharah, On the Current Challenges, Al-Hayat, Arabic Newspaper issued in London, August 24, 1996. [*]
37. In the last general election, the Russian Jews, who are relatively new immigrants won the same number of mandates (6) like Shas, and the Arabs won 4 mandates. [*]
38. MBC's interview with a leading figure in black Jews movement under the general election. See also Teshome G. Wagaw: For Our Soul: Ethiopian Jews in Israel, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1993, where the author points out that the Ethiopian Jews are alienated in their resettlement in Israel. [*]
39. The recent Turkish threats to Syria which aimed to dismantle PKK's infrastructure in Syria had temporally led to minimizing PKK's actions, but there is no significance for a total uprooting of its military power, nor it can give a sense of future developments. [*]
40. Usi Sarid, the former deputy foreign minister in the Labour government, who was one of the main figures behind the Oslo accord, MBC's report, August 2, 1996. [*]
41. Baizhu Chen, Yi Feng and Cyrus Masroori; Collective Action in the Middle East? A Study of Free-ride in Defence Spending, in Journal of Peace Research, vol. 33, No. 3, 1996, pp. 323-24. [*]
42. President Mubarak states that the time is not in favour of peace, nor is it in favour of the region including Israel; without peace security is not expected, and without security there is no stability. News conference together with President Assad in Alexandria August 7, 1996. However, as the Third Economic Conference was held in Cairo in 1996 and was categorized as successful, it was clear that the unsolved political conflicts were still restraining real initiative to regional economic cooperation. Thus, the Forth Conference in Dawha (Qatar) in 1997 was a real fiasco because the majority of the Arab countries have boycotted it 'as long as there was not any progress in the peace process, due to Netanyaho's hard line'. [*]
43. Rumours have also been released that Iraq and Sudan have tried this gate. [*]
44. As issues like development and more integration in the international system (see note 36) can be seen as the main reasons behind these countries' relations with Israel. However, Qatar and Oman may have additional reasons: both countries seek to retain their national autonomy vis-a-vis the joint platform of the Gulf Economic Corporation, GEC, which is conceived to be dominated by Saudi-Arabia. [*]
45. Under the general election in Israel, Prime minister Shimon Peres called for the formation of a Western-Arabic coalition against Iran. [*]
46. Demirel said: Neither Syria nor Iraq lay claim to Turkey's rivers any more than Ankara could claim their oil, Turkish Daily News, July 25, 1992. [*]
47. See Water Issues Between Turkey, Syria and Iraq, A study by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Department of Regional and Transboundary Waters, in Perception-Journal of International Affairs, No. 2, June-August 1996, pp.94-96. [*]
48. Ibid, pp. 105-107. [*]
49. Sami Kohen emphasizes: The question of water certainly needs a new approach and should become the subject of bilateral and regional cooperation, rather than of dispute. In this regard, I believe that the Water for Peace project offers great opportunities for closer economic and political links among the nations of the Middle East. Sami Kohen: On the Future of the Middle East, in ibid, Perception, p. 116. [*]
50. My discretion derives from the point of view that the election programme of both Erbakan and Netanyahu were substantially contrary to the political reality in both countries. Therefore it would be too difficult to anticipate the compromises will evolute. To deal with Erbakan and Netanyahu, I think it needs a more comprehensive study of their programmes and the new realities they seek to create. [*]
51. A conference was held in Istanbul, Al-Hayat, May 29, 1996. [*]
52. This agreement was concluded in the aftermath of the Second Gulf War, according to which the Turkish authorities allow the air forces from the USA, France, and Britain to use Turkish military bases to observe the free zone for the Kurds in Northern Iraq. The agreement must be renewed every 6 months. Erbakan was very critical of the agreement, but when he became prime minister, he agreed to renew it. However, Erbakan's attempts to establish a political basis for cooperation (also economic) with the Islamic World, Asian and African countries, remained merely personal initiatives because of the tough opposition by the secular parties in Parliament. [*]
53. This option failed as well. Erbakan's government and party have been quickly crippled by a harmonic play between the military institution and the secular political elite. Meanwhile the relations with Israel continued its progress despite the wide popular opposition. [*]
54. No withdrawal from Golan Heights, No withdrawal or even discussion of the case of Jerusalem, No negotiations under any preconditions. [*]
55. Interview in MBC, 7 August, 1996. [*]
56. During his trip to Iran 10-11 August 1996, Erbakan called on a summit between the leaders of Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq to find an overall solution of the Kurdish problem and all other security problems, and to establish a program of economic cooperation. [*]
57. Recently there have been some evidences about a progress in Egyptian-Iranian relations. But concert initiatives are still not been taken, due the ideological and political conflicts. E.g. Mubarak accused Iran to encourage terrorism and to intervene in Arab affairs (a statement on 7 July 1996). [*]
58. Al Sharq el-Awsat (an Arabic daily newspaper issues in London) 27 May 96 referring to a conference at the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo. [*]
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Power Bloc
Turkey and Israel Lock Arms
By Jennifer Washburn
The Progressive magazine, December 1998
" Turkey stands as a country committed to democracy and the promotion of tolerance," proclaimed ADL director Abraham Foxman in a press release distributed at the time. According to the ADL, its Distinguished Statesman Award goes "to those leaders who exhibit an extraordinary dedication to regional and world peace, and who possess a special commitment to promoting human and civil rights."
Such high praise for Turkey and its head of state prompted a sharply worded rebuttal from the Washington Kurdish Institute. Yilmaz's treatment of the Kurds, the group wrote to Foxman, "amount[s] to little more than ethnic cleansing."
Since 1984, the Turkish military has bombed and depopulated more than 3,000 Kurdish villages in its campaign to eradicate the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a militant Kurdish opposition group. As a result, 30,000 people have died, and two million Kurdish refugees have been driven out of their homes into overcrowded urban shantytowns.
The Turkish government "has long denied the Kurdish population . . . basic political, cultural, and linguistic rights," notes the U.S. State Department in its most recent human rights report. In 1997," torture remained widespread," and "government officials continued to harass, intimidate, indict, and imprison human rights monitors, journalists, and lawyers for ideas that they expressed in public forums."
So why would the ADL and other Jewish leaders lavish such praise on Yilmaz?
The reason is Turkey's burgeoning military partnership with Israel. In February 1996, Turkey and Israel signed a historic military training agreement, followed six months later by an arms-industry cooperation pact. Since that time, military and economic ties between the two countries have blossomed. Both nations now fly and train in one another's airspace, share sophisticated intelligence information, enjoy extensive trade relations, and cooperate on joint security and weapons projects.
"We think the relationship gives hope to the region; we believe it can be helpful in moving the region toward peace," said the ADL's assistant national director Kenneth Jacobson in an interview with The Progressive. "This award doesn't specifically use the word human rights," he explained defensively. "We always raise questions about human rights and the need for further democratic reform."
Most Turkey and Israel supporters, including the Clinton Administration, agree that this partnership is a cause for celebration. "We are very supportive of it," says Dana Bauer, deputy director of the Office of Southern European Affairs at the State Department. "It strengthens two pro-Western allies in the region and helps both to modernize their defense capabilities in areas that are of mutual interest. We see it as a stabilizing agreement."
Yet throughout the Arab world, and among arms-control and human-rights groups in the United States, this dramatic strategic development has raised a host of disturbing questions about the prospects for Arab-Israeli peace, the stability of the Middle East, the plight of the Kurds and the Palestinians, and regional arms-control efforts.
One immediate threat is a massive buildup of Turkey's military strength. Israel's willingness to sell top-of-the-line military hardware to Turkey, with no questions asked, could undermine progress on human rights. As the Congressional Research Service recently observed, "The Israeli connection enables Turkey to circumvent U.S. and European arms embargoes and what it believes to be the influence of anti-Turkish ethnic lobbies in Congress."
Of course, Turkey's main military supplier is the United States. Eighty percent of Turkey's weapons imports are stamped MADE IN THE U.S.A. and, over the last decade, Ankara has received more than $12 billion in direct and indirect U.S. military assistance. In recent years, however, mounting human rights criticism in the United States and Europe has been a persistent thorn in Ankara's side. In 1996, Turkey angrily accused the U.S. Congress of imposing a "shadow embargo" after a coalition of arms-control and human-rights groups succeeded in blocking two pending sales of Cobra helicopters and frigates. Last December, Europe rejected Turkey's application for membership in the European Union, in part because of Turkey's failure to improve human rights.
Israeli weapons offer Turkey a way around such sanctions. David Ivri, an adviser to the Israeli Defense Ministry who was instrumental in bringing about the Turkish-Israeli accord, was asked by the Jerusalem Post last year whether Israel considers human rights when it sells arms to other countries. "Israel to this day has a policy of not intervening in any internal matters of any country in the world," Ivri responded. "We don't like it when others interfere in our internal matters. For this reason, our policy doesn't touch on such matters."
Over the next twenty-five years, Turkey plans to spend an astonishing $150 billion to modernize its military. U.S. arms manufacturers will continue to lobby hard for these lucrative sales but, increasingly, Israel will be a major competitor. Already, Turkey and Israel have signed a number of arms deals, with many more in the works. Two of these involve Israeli contracts worth $715 million to upgrade Turkish F-4 and F-5 combat planes with high-tech radar and avionics to improve their performance in bombing missions. Israel also has orders for night-vision systems, tank upgrades on F-16 fighter planes, and 200 Popeye missiles. In May 1997, the two countries agreed to co-produce advanced Popeye II missiles, with a range of ninety miles, which will involve a significant transfer of technology and manufacturing capability to Turkey. This year, the two partners also sealed a controversial deal to jointly produce a new medium-range missile, similar to the Arrow missile that Israel has been developing using U.S. technology and $785 million of U.S. funding. Such sales raise questions about whether Israel will become a back door conduit for Turkey to obtain American technology.
Arms control advocates fear that Ankara's access to Israeli weapons could exacerbate the arms race between Greece and Turkey (by breaking the military parity that the United States has sought to maintain) and jeopardize resolution of their dispute over Cyprus. The Israeli connection could also further strengthen Turkey's military-the country's ruling power behind the scenes-just when international pressure is mounting for Turkey to democratize and find a political solution to its fourteen-year conflict with the Kurds.
Currently, arms control groups are gearing up for a major battle over Turkey's plan to purchase 145 advanced attack helicopters, worth $3.5 billion-one of the most lucrative helicopter deals in the world. Vying for the contract are a French-German consortium (Eurocopter), an Israeli-Russian consortium (Israeli Aircraft Industries and Kamov), and two American companies (Boeing Corporation of Seattle and Bell Helicopter Textron of Fort Worth). Groups like Amnesty International U.S.A. are campaigning hard to block any American sale, since the Turkish armed forces routinely use these helicopters and other U.S. weapons to carry out their scorched-earth campaigns against Kurdish villages in the southeast.
When President Clinton met with Prime Minister Yilmaz last December, he pledged that no final U.S. export license would be approved unless Turkey could demonstrate improvements in human rights. Now, however, the Israel-Turkey connection may jeopardize these gains.
"There will be tremendous pressure from arms contractors to grant an export license," says John Tirman, executive director of the Winston Foundation for World Peace, and author of Spoils of War: The Human Cost of America's Arms Trade. "Choosing Israel is a way to leverage the U.S. because no one in Israel . . . is going to raise any human rights problems for Turkey."
The Israeli-Turkish pact fundamentally shifts the balance of power in the Middle East. As a 1997 paper by Michael Eisenstadt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy observes Israel's enemies must now weigh the possibility that Turkey will provide Israel assistance in the event of a confrontation. The same logic makes Turkey's enemies more circumspect, as well.
Turkey and Israel have repeatedly stressed that their accord is not an "alliance" requiring either country to defend the other. But the Arab countries are dubious-and not without justification. In February, a former Turkish ambassador to Washington announced that Turkey would consider allowing Israel to use Turkish airspace to retaliate if Iraq ever threatens a missile attack on Israel. And reports already indicate that Israeli planes flying in Turkish airspace are gathering detailed intelligence on Iran, Iraq, and Syria- Israel's chief enemies.
Officially, the United States denies that it played any direct role in bringing this military axis together. But as Eqbal Ahmad, emeritus professor of Middle East Studies at Hampshire College, explains, "It seems an impossibility that two principal U.S. allies could form a bilateral alliance without the U.S. playing a matchmaking role. There is a long history of the U.S. trying to find strategic allies in the Middle East who would play deputy to American power."
Last December, following a U.S.-Turkish-Israeli meeting at the Pentagon, Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai explicitly confirmed the U.S. role: "I certainly describe the relationship between us and the Turks as the development of a strategic relationship. All this with the backing and coordination of the U.S."
One key target of the Israeli-Turkish military partnership is Syria. "The entire state of Syria, to put it bluntly, is now surrounded," says Robert Fisk, the Beirut bureau chief for the London Independent. In addition to its regular reconnaissance missions over the Golan Heights, Fisk explains, "Israel can fly along Syria's northern border, just inside Turkey, and presumably over the northern Iraqi border with Syria as well," where Turkey regularly goes in pursuit of the PKK. The Economist reports that Turkey is already receiving detailed information about Syria from Israel's military intelligence service, Mossad.
Turkey's antagonism toward Syria centers primarily on Damascus's support for the PKK, which is believed to have bases in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley of Lebanon.
Turkey and Syria also have a long-running territorial conflict over the Turkish province of Hatay (which Syria used to control), and a major dispute over access to water from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which originate in Turkey and flow through Iraq to Syria. (It is widely thought that Syria supports the PKK largely to increase its leverage with Turkey over its water rights.)
Israel, meanwhile, has similar objections to Syria's backing of the Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, with whom it continues to fight a low-intensity war. Israel hopes that pressure from Turkey along Syria's northern frontier will force Damascus's hand on talks over the contested Golan Heights.
In early October, simmering tensions in the Middle East boiled over into a serious confrontation when a top Turkish military commander announced that Syria and Turkey, which share a 550-mile border, had reached "a state of undeclared war" over Syria's support for the PKK. Ankara sent 10,000 troops and equipment to the border and indicated that it was prepared to invade Syria to attack the bases of the PKK, just as it does inside northern Iraq. Damascus responded by calling for talks. The Syrian government's official newspaper, Al Baath, declared that Turkey's aggressive behavior could mean only one thing: "full coordination between Ankara and Tel Aviv in accordance with their alliance."
Seeking to avert a crisis, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu suspended flights over the Golan Heights to stress Israel's noninvolvement. But many analysts question whether Turkey would have threatened strikes against the PKK in Syria were it not for its access to intelligence from Mossad and the heightened confidence Ankara feels from its military partnership with Israel.
"I don't think there is any doubt that this type of confrontation is what the relationship was conceived to do," says Alan Makovsky, a Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "It was specifically created to intimidate Syrian President Hafez al-Assad."
Sukru Elekdag, a former Turkish ambassador to the United States, clearly identified Israel as the source of Ankara's new bravado in a column appearing in the Turkish Milliyet. "Syria . . . cannot risk a hot clash with Turkey under today's conditions," he reasoned. "Syrians know that . . . if they lose their military forces in a war with Turkey, they would become totally vulnerable to Israel, their arch enemy.... In other words, Israel is breathing down Syria's neck."
In late October, Turkey and Syria reached an agreement in which Syria would end its support for the PKK and turn over its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, to Ankara. "I think it worked beautifully from Ankara's point of view," Makovsky exclaimed. "Turkey never felt emboldened before, and now it does, Assad never caved in, and now he did." For Makovsky, Damascus's "surrender" is evidence that the Turkish-Israeli pact may compel Syria to bow to Israel's demands, as well.
But others are skeptical. John Tirman believes that the agreement was probably a "face-saving device." "The Syrians could easily agree to remove Ocalan, only to let him back in six months later," he explains. "I would doubt that the Syrians even have the capacity to eject the PKK out of their territory completely. The Turkish military continually claims they've done the PKK in, but then it always seems to resurface again."
Even Makovsky acknowledges that the Turkish-Israeli pact "might make Assad less secure about making peace." On September 16, the Arab League, led by Damascus, announced that the Turkish-Israeli pact "exposes Arab interests to real danger and brings the region back to the policy of axes and alliances" that proved so destructive during the Cold War.
Assad is certainly not blameless in these conflicts with Israel and Turkey, but it is by no means clear that a united Turkey-Israel front is going to soften his stance. Syria has already marshaled support from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq to form a possible counter-alliance. Egypt, a traditional U.S. ally, has expressed strong opposition to the pact's effect on regional peace, while Iraq and Syria, formerly hostile neighbors, appear to be developing closer ties in response to the pact, despite Syria's support for the U.S. during the Gulf War.
The new Israel and Turkey relationship may also reinforce each country's inclination to find military solutions to their internal conflicts and to view these conflicts primarily through a "terrorism" lens.
Turkey and Israel's interests "coincide from an international 'terrorism' perspective," notes Mike Amitay, the executive director of the Washington Kurdish Institute. "How do you justify using force against segments of your own society? The answer is you create a terrorism mind-set."
No one disputes the fact that groups like Hamas and the PKK have committed serious acts of terrorism, but in both Israel and Turkey the governments' hard-line, anti-terrorism approach has been strongly criticized as an impediment to dialogue and lasting peace.
In Israel's case, despite the interim agreement signed in October at Wye Plantation, the Netanyahu government's ongoing land expropriations, restrictions on travel, and refusal to concede any genuine autonomy have left many Palestinians deeply disillusioned with the peace process.
In Turkey, meanwhile, the government's position is yet more extreme. "There is no dialogue whatsoever," explains Amitay, "even with legitimate Kurdish groups. Incredible as it is, Turkey is willing to go to war with a neighboring state-Syria- rather than identifying Kurdish interlocutors with whom it can start to negotiate a political solution." Still, he cautions, "the Turkish military won't find a resolution of its PKK problem in Damascus; it's a domestic issue."
There is a striking parallel between the Turkish and Israeli anti-terrorism campaigns. Both countries have violated the sovereignty of neighboring nations in pursuit of their enemies. In northern Iraq, Turkey has set up a security zone, nine miles deep, along the entire length of the Iraq-Turkey border, where it regularly conducts aerial bombing missions and sends in troops to eliminate PKK bases. Since 1982, Israel has occupied a similar security zone inside Lebanon, also nine miles deep, where persistent fighting with the Hezbollah has ensued. In both cases, civilian casualties have been high, and no resolution of the conflict is in sight.
Netanyahu publicly acknowledged in May 1997 that the threat of terrorism has drawn Israel and Turkey together. "Turkey has suffered from terrorist attacks from the PKK, and we see no difference between the terrorism of the PKK and that which Israel suffers," he said. The speech was significant not only because Netanyahu abandoned Israel's historic neutrality toward the Kurds and ruled out the establishment of a Kurdish state, but because he explicitly warned there would be no peace between Israel and Syria unless Damascus ended its support for the PKK.
Netanyahu's desire to involve Turkey in Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations could stall the peace process further. Turkey has long been an outspoken opponent of Israeli-Syrian peace talks because it fears that, if the two countries ever come to an agreement, Syria will re-deploy its army from the Golan Heights to the Turkish border. Given the trouble that Israel and Syria have encountered in their own negotiations over Lebanon and the Golan Heights, any participation by Ankara would certainly make reaching a settlement more difficult.
The same may be true of the Palestinian issue. Even though Ankara has supported the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, a Washington Post editorial last year suggested that a strengthening of Israel's security through its partnership with Turkey could actually reduce Israel's perceived need to reach a settlement.
In the Arab world, pessimism reigns. Recently, when Israel suggested it would like to invite Egypt to participate in joint military exercises with Turkey, Egypt's foreign minister Amr Moussa responded forcefully. "There has been no invitation, and there had better not be one," he said. "We regard this [military pact] as untimely, negative, and unhelpful to efforts to revive the peace process."
In Washington, the pro-Turkey and pro-Israel lobbies are working together to pursue their common interests. The Congressional Research Service notes that Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai has confirmed that "Israel is assisting
Turkey on the American political scene and encouraging Jewish organizations to follow this example." Earlier this year, according to the Economist of London, Turkey "was pleased to have the support of the powerful Jewish lobby in Washington," which "helped to get Congress to unfreeze the sale of two frigates" to Ankara. The Wall Street Journal notes that Turkish interests "are now on the agenda" of groups like the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), a Washington-based think tank, and the American-Israel Public Action Committee (AIPAC), an influential pro-Israel lobby. JINSA has spoken out against foreign aid cuts to Turkey and has organized meetings between retired U.S. military officers and their Turkish counterparts.
More recently, the Dallas Morning News reports that the American-Turkish Association, based in Ankara, has asked a number of Jewish groups-including the American Jewish Congress, B'nai B'rith, and AIPAC-for their help on Turkey's upcoming helicopter deal. "Help" essentially means persuading the Clinton Administration that Turkey's human rights practices have improved enough to warrant approval of a U.S. export license." I think Turkey deserves this sale," Foxman told the newspaper, citing "the relationship with Israel."
For Turkey, this is a dream come true. The new alliance "gives Ankara something they've never had before," notes John Tirman." An ethnic constituency in the U.S. that can strengthen Turkey's lobbying presence in Washington."
Last February, all the threads of this intricate alliance came together at the annual conference of the American-Turkish Council, a lobbying group in Washington that promotes closer U.S.-Turkish business and military relations. There, some of the largest U.S. weapons companies- Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Textron, Raytheon, Sikorsky/United Technologies-were in attendance, which was not surprising, since representatives from these firms either sit on the Council's board of directors or have other leadership posts in the organization. The conference also attracted U.S. officials like Senator Jesse Helms (Republican of North Carolina), Commerce Secretary William Daley, and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Ralston. One panel on the Turkish-Israeli military pact, with Alan Makovsky speaking, drew considerable attention.
"The fact that Israel and Turkey-the most economically and militarily powerful states in the region-are working together as partners is a very dramatic development," says Makovsky. The conference made it clear that this new power bloc, while cementing U.S. control over the region, will do little for human rights and peace.
Jennifer Washburn is a Senior Research Associate at the World Policy Institute and a freelance journalist based in New York City.
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