Chapter 8
At the Turn of the 20th Century
It appears that after six years of
reflection and hesitation, the Tsar Alexander III irrevocably chose, as
of 1887, to contain the Jews of Russia by restrictions of a civil and
political nature, and he held this position until his death.
The reasons were probably, on the one hand,
the evident part played by the Jews in the revolutionary movement, on
the other, the no less evident fact that many Jewish youths shunned
military service: “only three quarters of those who should have been
enrolled served in the army.”1
One noticed “the ever‐increasing number of Jews who did not respond to
the appeal”, as well as the increasing amount of unpaid fines related to
these absences: only 3 million rubles out of 30 million were returned
annually to the funds of the State. (In fact, the government still had
no accurate statistics on the Jewish population, its birth rate, its
mortality rate before the age of 21. Let us remind that in 1876 [see
Chapter 4], because of this absenteeism, there had been a restriction of
the “favour accorded to certain persons by virtue of their family
situation”—which meant that the only sons of Jewish families were now
subjected, like the others, to general conscription, and as a result the
proportion of Jewish conscripts had become greater than that of
non‐Jews. This situation was not corrected until the early 1900s under
Nicolas II.2)
As far as public education was concerned,
the tsar’s wish, which he had formulated in 1885, was that the number of
Jews admitted to institutions outside the Pale of Settlement was in the
same ratio as the number of Jews in the total population. But the
authorities pursued two aims simultaneously: not only to slow down the
growing flow of Jews towards education, but also to fight against the
revolution, to make the school, as it was called, “not a pool of
revolutionaries, but a breeding ground for science.”3
In the chancelleries, they were preparing a more radical measure which
consisted of prohibiting access to education to elements likely to serve
the revolution—a measure contrary to the spirit of Lomonosov*
and profoundly vicious, prejudicial to the State itself: it was to deny
the children of disadvantaged strata of the general population (the
“sons of cooks”) admission to colleges. The formulation, falsely
reasonable, falsely decent, was: “Leave the school principals free to
accept only children who are in the care of persons who can guarantee
them good supervision at home and provide them with all that is
necessary for the pursuit of their studies”—furthermore, in higher
education establishments, it was planned to increase the right of access
to classes.4
This measure provoked a strong outrage in
liberal circles, but less violent and less lasting than the one that was
instigated in 1887 by a new measure: the reduction of the number of
Jews admitted to high schools and universities. It was originally
planned to publish these two provisions within the framework of the same
law. But the Council of Ministers opposed it, arguing that “the
publication of a general decision accompanied by restrictions for the
Jews could be misinterpreted.” In June 1887, therefore, only a part was
promulgated, the one that concerned non‐Jews: “Measures aiming to
regulate the contingent of pupils in secondary and higher
education”—measures directed in fact against the common people… As for
the reduction of the quota of the Jews, it was entrusted to the Minister
of Education, Delianov, who implemented it in July 1887 by a bulletin
addressed to the rectors of school boards. He fixed for the secondary
and higher schools the numerus clausus of the Jews at 10% for the Pale of Settlement, 5% outside it, and 3% in the two capitals.
“Following the example of the Ministry of
Public Instruction”, other organisations began to introduce “quotas of
admission into their institutions, and some were closed down to the
Jews.” (Such as the Higher School of Electricity, the Saint Petersburg
School of Communication, and, most strikingly, the Academy of Military
Medicine which temporarily prohibited, but “for many years”, its access
to Jews.5)
This numerus clausus law, which had
not been established during the ninety‐three years of massive presence
of Jews in Russia and which was to continue for twenty‐nine years
(practically until 1916) struck the Jewish society of Russia all the
more painfully because in the years 1870‒1880 there had been a
“remarkable impulse of the Jews to enter schools and colleges”, a
phenomenon which Sliosberg in particular explains is “not due to the
realisation of the masses of the necessity of education… but rather due
to the fact that, for a Jew without capital, figuring out how to deploy
one’s forces in the economic field was very difficult, and due to the
fact that conscription became compulsory for all, but that there were
dispensations for the students.” Thus, if only well‐to‐do Jewish youth
had studied before, a “Jewish student proletariat” was now being
created; if among the Russians, now as in the past, it was the favoured
social classes that received higher education, among the Jews, in
addition to the wealthy, young people from the underprivileged classes
began to study.6
We would like to add that in those years
there had been a turning‐point in the whole world and in all fields of
culture, towards a no longer elitist but generalised education—and the
Jews, particularly intuitive and receptive, had been the first to feel
it, at least instinctively. But how can we find a way to satisfy,
without causing friction, without clashes, the constant and increasing
aspiration of the Jews to education? In view of the fact that the
indigenous population, in its mass, remained fairly asleep and backward,
how to avoid prejudice to the development of either side?
Of course, the objective of the Russian
government was the struggle against the revolution, for among the
student youth many Jews had been noticed by their activism and their
total rejection of the regime in place. However, when we know the
enormous influence exerted by Pobedonostsev*
during the reign of Alexander III, it must be admitted that the aim was
also to defend the Russian nation against the imbalance that was to
occur in the field of education. This is what testifies the Baron Morits
von Hirsch, a big Jewish banker who visited Russia and to whom
Pobedonostsev expressed his point of view: the policy of the government
is inspired not by the idea that the Jews are a “threat”, but by the
fact that, rich in their multi‐millennial culture, they are more
spiritually and intellectually powerful than the still ignorant and
unpolished Russian people—that is why measures had to be taken to
balance the “low capacity of the local population to resist.” (And
Pobedonostsev asked Hirsch, known for his philanthropy, to promote the
education of the Russian people in order to realise the equal rights of
the Jews of Russia. According to Sliosberg, Baron Hirsch allocated one
million rubles to private schools.7)
Like any historical phenomenon, this measure
can be viewed from various angles, particularly from the two different
angles that follow.
For a young Jewish student, the most
elementary fairness seemed flouted: he had shown capacities,
application, he had to be admitted… But he was not! Obviously, for these
gifted and dynamic young people, to encounter such a barrier was more
than mortifying; the brutality of such a measure made them indignant.
Those who had hitherto been confined to the trades of commerce and
handicrafts were now prevented from accessing ardently desired studies
that would lead to a better life.
Conversely, the “native population” did not
see in these quotas a breach of the principle of equality, on the
contrary, even. The institutions in question were financed by the public
treasury, and therefore by the whole population, and if the Jews were
more numerous, it meant that it was at the expense of all; and it was
known that, later on, educated people would enjoy a privileged position
in society. And the other ethnic groups, did they also have to have a
proportional representation within the “educated layer”? Unlike all the
other peoples of the empire, the Jews now aspired almost exclusively to education, and in some places this could mean that the Jewish contingent in schools exceeded 50%. The numerus clausus
was unquestionably instituted to protect the interests of Russians and
ethnic minorities, certainly not to bully the Jews. (In the 20s of the
twentieth century, a similar approach was sought in the United States to
limit the Jewish contingent in universities, and immigration quotas
were also established—but we shall come back to this. Moreover, the
matter of quotas, put today in terms of “no less than”*, has become a burning issue in America.)
In practice, there have been many exceptions to the application of the numerus clausus in Russia. The first to avoid it were girls’
high schools: “In most high schools for young girls, the quotas were
not current, nor in several public higher education establishments: the
conservatories of Saint Petersburg and Moscow, the School of Painting,
Sculpture and Architecture of Moscow, the Kiev School of Commerce, etc.”8 A fortiori quotas were not applied in any private establishment; and these were numerous and of high quality.9 (For example, at the Kirpitchnikova High School, one of the best high schools in Moscow, a quarter of the students were Jewish.10
They were numerous at the famous Polivanovskaya high school in Moscow,
and the Androyeva girls’ school in Rostov, where my mother was a pupil,
there were in her class more than half of Jewish girls.) Business
schools (under the Ministry of Finance), to which Jewish children were
eager to register, were initially opened to them without any
restrictions, and those which took place after 1895 were relatively
light (for example: in commercial schools in the Pale of Settlement,
financed out of private funds, the number of Jews admitted depended on
the amount of money allocated by Jewish merchants for the maintenance of
these schools, and in many of them the percentage of Jewish students
was 50% or more).
If the official standard was strictly
observed at the time of admission to the secondary classes, it was often
largely overstepped in the larger classes. Sliosberg explains this
notably by the fact that the Jewish children who entered high school
pursued it to the end, whereas the non‐Jews often gave up their studies
before completion. This is why, in large classes, there were often much
more than 10% Jewish pupils.11 He confirmed that they were numerous, for example, at the Poltava high school. Out of 80 boys, eight were Jewish.12
In the boys ‘schools of Mariupol, at the time when there was already a
local Duma, about 14 to 15% of the pupils were Jewish, and in girls’
high schools, the proportion was even higher.13 In Odessa, where Jews constituted one‐third of the population,14
they were in 1894, 14% in the prestigious Richelieu high school, more
than 10% in the gymnasium No. 2, 37% in gymnasium No. 3; in girls’ high
schools the proportion was of 40%; in business schools, 72%, and in
university, 19%.15
To the extent that financial means permitted
it, no obstacle prevented this thirst for education. “In a number of
secondary schools in the central Russian provinces there were few Jewish
pupils at that time, and parents took the opportunity to send their
children there… The wealthiest parents had their children home schooled:
they prepared for examinations to enter the next grade and thus reached
this way the senior year.”16
In the period between 1887 and 1909, Jewish children were free to pass
the school‐leaving examinations, and “they graduated as equals those who
had followed the curriculum.”17
The majority of “external” pupils were Jewish. A family like that of
Jacob Marchak (a jeweller with no great fortune, the father of the poet*), whose five children had a higher education, was not uncommon before the revolution.
Moreover, “private establishments were
opened everywhere, whether mixed for the Jews and Christians, or for the
Jews only… Some of these establishments enjoyed the same rights as
public establishments; the others were authorised to issue certificates
entitling them to enrol in higher educational establishments.”18 “A network of private Jewish settlements was established, which formed the basis of a national‐type education,”19
“The Jews were also oriented towards higher education establishments
abroad: a large part of them, on their return to Russia, passed
examinations before the State Commissions.”20
Sliosberg himself observed that in the 80s, at the University of
Heidelberg that “the majority of Russian listeners were Jews” and that
some, among them, did not have their bachelor’s degree.21
One can rightly wonder whether the
restrictions, dictated by fear in front of the revolutionary moods of
the students, did not contribute to feeding said moods. If these were
not aggravated by indignation at the numerus clausus, and by contacts maintained abroad with political emigrants.
What happened in Russian universities after
the publication of the bulletin? There was no sharp fall, but the number
of Jews decreased almost every year, from 13.8% in 1893 to 7% in 1902.
The proportion of Jews studying at the universities of Saint Petersburg
and Moscow remained no less than the imposed 3% norm throughout the
period of validity of the said standard.22
Minister Delianov acceded more than once to the requests submitted to him, and authorised admission to university beyond the numerus clausus.23
This was how “hundreds of students” were admitted. (Delianov’s
flexibility will succeed later the rigidity of Minister Bogolepov—and it
is not excluded that this may have contributed to making him the target
of terrorists*.24)
Sliosberg gives this overview: the percentage in the superior courts of
medicine for women outweighed that of the Academy of Military Medicine
and that of the university, and “all the Jewish girls of the empire
poured in.” Several hundred Jews were enrolled at the School of
Psycho‐neuropathology in Saint Petersburg, where they could enter
without a baccalaureate, and so they were thousands over the years. It
was called the School of Neuropathology, but it also housed a faculty of
law. The Imperial Conservatory of Saint Petersburg was “filled with
Jewish students of both sexes.” In 1911, a private mining school opened
in Ekaterinoslav.25
Admission to specialised schools, such as
that of health officers, was done with great freedom. J. Teitel says
that at the Saratov school of nurses (of high quality, very well
equipped) Jews from the Pale of Settlement were admitted without any
limitation—and without prior authorisation issued by the police for the
displacement. Those who were admitted thus received full rights. This
practice was confirmed by the governor of Saratov at that time,
Stolypin. Thus the proportion of Jewish students could rise to 70%. In
the other technical colleges of Saratov, Jews from the Pale of
Settlement were admitted without any norm, and many of them continued
their studies in higher education… From the Pale of Settlement also came
“a mass of external pupils that did not find their place in university,
and for whom the Jewish community of the city struggled to find work.”26
To all this it should be added that the
number of establishments where the teaching was delivered in Hebrew was
not limited. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century there were
25,000 primary schools (Heder) with 363,000 pupils in the Pale of Settlement (64% of all Jewish children).27
It is true that in 1883 the old “Jewish establishments of the State”
were closed due to having no use: no one went there any more. (But note:
the opening of these institutions was once interpreted by the Jewish
publicists as an act and a ruse of the “adverse reaction”, and today
their closure was also the “act of adverse reaction”!)
In summary: the admission quotas did not
hinder the Jews’ aspiration to education. Nor did they contribute to
raising the educational level of the non‐Jewish peoples of the empire;
they only aroused bitterness and rage among the Jewish youth. But this,
in spite of the prohibitions, was going to constitute an intelligentsia
of vanguard. It was the immigrants from Russia who formed the nucleus of
the first intellectual elite of the future State of Israel. (How many
times do we read in the Russian Jewish Encyclopædia the notices “son of small craftsman”, “son of small trader”, “son of merchant”, and, further on, “completed university”?)
The university diploma initially conferred
the right to reside throughout the empire and to serve in the
administration (later, access to education in academies, universities
and public schools was once again limited). Graduates of the Faculty of
Medicine—doctors and pharmacists—were allowed to “reside anywhere,
whether they practised their profession or not,” and like all those who
had completed a higher degree, they could even “devote themselves to
commerce or other trades”, “be members of the merchant corps without
having previously spent five years in the first guild in the Pale of
Settlement” as was required of other merchants. “The Jews holding the
title of Doctor of Medicine” could practice their profession in any
district of the empire, hire a medical secretary and two aides among
their co‐religionists by bringing them from the Pale of Settlement. The
right to reside in any place, as well as the right to trade, was
attributed to all those who practised paramedical professions without
having completed a higher education—dentists, nurses, midwives. As from
1903, a requirement was added: that these persons should mandatorily
practise their field of specialisation.28
*
Restrictions also affected the bar, the
independent body of lawyers set up in 1864. This profession paved the
way for a successful career, both financially and personally, and to
convey one’s ideas: advocacy by lawyers in court were not subject to any
censorship, they were published in the press, so that the speakers
enjoyed greater freedom of expression than the newspapers themselves.
They exploited it widely for social criticism and for the “edification”
of society. The class of solicitors had transformed themselves in a
quarter of a century into a powerful force of opposition: one should
remember the triumphal acquittal of Vera Zasulich in 1878.* (The moral laxity of the lawyers’ argumentation at the time strongly worried Dostoevsky: he explained it in his writings.**)
Within this influential brotherhood, the Jews quickly occupied a
preponderant place, revealing themselves to be the most gifted of all.
When, in 1889, the Council of the Sworn Attorneys of Saint Petersburg
published “for the first time in its report the data concerning the
number of Jews in this trade,” the great Saint Petersburg lawyer A. J.
Passover “renounced the title of member of the Council and was no longer
a candidate for election.”29
In the same year 1889, the Minister of
Justice, Manasseine, presented a report to Tsar Alexander III; it was
stated that “the bar is invaded by the Jews, who supplant the Russians;
they apply their own methods and violate the code of ethics to which
sworn‐in attorneys must obey.” (The document does not provide any
clarification.30)
In November 1889, on the orders of the tsar, a provision was made,
supposedly provisionally (and consequently able to escape the legal
procedure), requiring that “the admission to the numbers of those avowed
and delegated authorities of non‐Christian confession… will be
henceforth, and until promulgation of a special law on the subject,
possible only with the authorisation of the Minister of Justice.”31
But as apparently neither the Moslems nor the Buddhists availed
themselves in large numbers of the title of lawyer, this provision
proved to be de facto directed against the Jews.
From that year onwards, and for another
fifteen years, practically no unbaptised Jew received this authorisation
from the minister, not even such brilliant personalities—and future
great advocates—as M. M. Winaver***
or O. O. Gruzenberg: they remained confined for a decade and a half in
the role of “law clerks”. (Winaver even pleaded more than once in the
Senate, and was very much listened to.) The “clerks” in fact pleaded
with the same freedom and success as the attorneys themselves: here,
there were no restrictions.32
In 1894, the new Minister of Justice, N. V.
Muraviev, wanted to give this temporary prohibition the value of
permanent law. His argument was as follows: “The real danger is not the
presence in the body of lawyers of a certain number of people of Jewish
faith who have rejected to a large extent the notions contrary to the
Christian norms which pertain to their nation, but it is in the fact
that the number of such persons becomes so great that they are likely to
acquire a preponderant importance and to exert an adverse influence on
the general level of morality and on the activities of that
corporation.”33
In the bill, it was advocated that the proportion of non‐Christian
solicitors be limited in each jurisdiction to 10%. The tsar’s government
rejected this project—but, as Mr. Krohl said, “this idea… did not meet
the condemnation it deserved in the Russian public opinion”, and within
the Society of Jurists of Saint Petersburg, “only a few people protested
vigorously…; the rest, the vast majority, were clearly in favour of the
draft at the time of its discussion.”34
This gives an unexpected insight into the state of mind of the
capital’s intelligentsia in the mid-90s. (In the Saint Petersburg
jurisdiction, 13.5% of the attorneys were Jews, while in Moscow, less
than 5%.35)
The prohibition for the clerks of solicitors
to become themselves avowed was felt all the more painfully because it
followed limitations in the scientific careers and the service of the
State.36 It would not be lifted before 1904.
In the 80s, a limitation on the number of
Jewish jurors was introduced in the provinces of the Pale of Settlement,
so that they did not have a majority within the juries.
It was also from the 80s that the hiring of
Jews in the judicial administration ceased. There were, however,
exceptions to this: thus J. Teitel, who had been appointed shortly after
his university studies, remained there twenty‐five years. He finished
his career ennobled with the civil rank of general. (It must be added
that, later, Cheglovitov*
forced him to retire “of his own free will.”) In the exercise of his
duties, he often had, he, the Israelite, to administer oaths to Orthodox
witnesses, and he never met any objection from the clergy. J. M.
Halpern, also an official in the judicial administration, had acceded to
the high‐ranking position of Deputy Director of the Ministry of Justice
and to the rank of Secret Advisor.37
Halpern sat on the Pahlen Commission in the capacity of expert. (Before
that, the first prosecutor of the Senate had been G. I. Trahtenberg,
and his deputy G. B. Sliosberg had initiated himself to defend the
rights of the Jews.) He was also first prosecutor of the Senate S. J.
Outine—but he was baptised and consequently, was not taken into account.
The religious criterion has never been a
false pretence for the tsarist government, but has always been a real
motive. It was because of this that the old believers**, ethnically Russian, were ferociously persecuted for two and a half centuries, as well as, later, the Dukhobors*** and the Molokanes****, also Russians.
The baptised Jews were numerous in the
service of the Russian State; we will not discuss it in this book. Let
us quote under Nicholas I, the Count K. Nesselrod, who had a long career
at the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ludwig Chtiglits, who
received the barony in Russia38;
Maximilian Heine, brother of the poet and military doctor, who ended
his career with the rank of state councillor; Governor General Bezak,
General of the suite of His Majesty Adelbert, the Colonel of the Horse
Guard Meves, the Hirs diplomats, one of whom was Minister under
Alexander III. Later, there was the Secretary of State Perets (grandson
of the tax‐collector Abram Perets39),
Generals Kaufman‐Turkestansky and Khrulyov; The squire Salomon,
director of the Alexandrovsky high school; Senators Gredinger, Posen; in
the Police Department, Gurovich, Vissarionov, among many others.
Was the conversion to Christianity,
especially to Lutheranism, in the eyes of some considered as easy? Are
all the tracks open to you at once? Sliosberg observed at one point an
“almost massive denial” on the part of young people.40
But, of course, seen from the Jewish side, this appeared to be a grave
betrayal, “a bonus to the abjuration of his faith… When we think of the
number of Jews who resist the temptation to be baptised, one gains a
great respect for this unhappy people.”41
Formerly, it was with candour: we divided
people into two categories, “ours” and “others,” according to the
criterion of faith alone. This state of mind, the Russian State, still
reflected it in its dispositions. But, at the dawn of the twentieth
century, could it not have thought a little and wondered whether such a
procedure was morally permissible and practically effective? Could we
continue to offer the Jews material welfare at the cost of denying their
faith?
And then what advantage could be derived
from Christianity? Many of these conversions were for pure convenience.
(Some justified themselves by luring themselves: “I can thus be much
more useful to my people.”42)
For those who had obtained equal rights in
the service of the State, “there no longer existed any restriction of
any kind whatsoever which prevented them from gaining access to
hereditary nobility” and to receive the highest rewards. “The Jews were
commonly enrolled without difficulty in genealogical records.”43 And even, as we see from the census of 1897, 196 members of the hereditary nobility counted Hebrew
as their mother tongue (amongst the nobility in their personal
capacities and the civil servants, they were 3,371 in the same case44). There even was, among the Brodsky, a family of modest artisans, Marshals of the nobility of the province of Ekaterinoslav.
But from the 70s of the nineteenth century
onwards, Jews who sought positions in the administration of the State
began to encounter obstacles (and this became worse from 1896 onwards);
it must be said that few were those who aspired to this kind of routine
and poorly paid activity. Moreover, from the 90s, the obstacles also
affected the elective functions.
In 1890 a new Zemstvo Ordinance was issued,
according to which the Jews were excluded from the self‐management of
the Zemstvo—in other words, outside the urban areas of the provinces and
districts. It was planned to “not allow [the Jews] to participate in
the electoral meetings and assemblies of the Zemstvos”45
(these did not yet exist in the western provinces). The motivation was
that “Jews, who usually pursue their particular interests, do not meet
the demand for a real, living and social connection with local life.”46
At the same time, to work in the Zemstvo as an independent contractor,
to the title of what was called the “outsider element” (element that
would introduce into the Zemstvo, several years in advance, the
explosive charge of radicalism), was not forbidden to Jews—and there
they were many.
The restrictions in the Zemstvos did not
affect the Jews of the central Russian provinces because the great
majority of them resided in the cities and were more interested in urban
administration. But in 1892 there appeared this time a new provision
for cities: the Jews lost the right to elect and to be elected delegates
to the Dumas and to the municipal offices, as well as to hold any
office of responsibility, or conduct there economic and administrative
services. This represented a more than sensible limitation. As
delegates, Jews were admitted only in cities of the Pale of Settlement,
but here too, subject to a restriction: no more than one‐tenth of the
number of the municipal duma, and again “on assignment” for the local
administration that selected Jewish candidates—an annoying procedure, to
say the least. (Particularly for bourgeois family men, as
Sliosberg rightly points out: what a humiliation for them in relation to
their children… how, after that, can they remain loyal to such a
government?47)
“There has been no harder time in the history of Russian Jews in
Russia. They were expelled from all positions they had conquered.”48
In another passage, the same author speaks without ambiguity of the
bribes received by the officials of the Ministry of the Interior to act
in favour of the Jews.49 (That was to soften somewhat the rigour of the times.)
Yes, the Jews of Russia were undoubtedly
bullied, victims of inequality in civil rights. But this is what reminds
us of the eminent Cadet V. A. Maklakov, who found himself in the
emigration after the revolution: “The ‘inequality in rights’ of the Jews
naturally lost its acuteness in a state where the enormous mass of the
population (82%), that on which the prosperity of the country depended,
the peasantry—dull, mute, submissive—was also excluded from common law, the same for all”50—and
it stayed in the same situation after the abolition of serfdom; for it
also, military service was inescapable, secondary and higher education
inaccessible, and it did not obtain that self‐administration, that rural
Zemstvo which it much need. Another emigrant, D. O. Linsky, a Jew, even
bitterly concluded that, in comparison with the levelling up of the
soviets, when the entire population of Russia was deprived of all
rights, “the inequality in the rights of the Jewish population before
the revolution appears like an inaccessible ideal.”51
We have gotten used of saying: the persecution
of the Jews in Russia. But the word is not fair. It was not a
persecution, strictly speaking. It was a whole series of restrictions,
of bullying. Vexing, admittedly, painful, even scandalous.
*
However, the Pale of Settlement, over the years, was becoming more and more permeable.
According to the census of 1897, 315,000 Jews were already residing outside
its boundaries, that is to say, in sixteen years, a nine‐fold increase
(and this represented 9% of the total Jewish population of Russia apart
from the kingdom of Poland.52 Let us compare: there were 115,000 Jews in France, and 200,000 in Great Britain53).
Let us consider also that the census gave undervalued figures, in view
of the fact that in many cities of Russia many craftsmen, many servants
serving “authorised” Jews did not have an official existence, being
shielded from registration.
Neither the top of the finance nor the
educated elite were subject to the restrictions of the “Pale”, and both
were established freely in the central provinces and in the capitals. It
is well known that 14% of the Jewish population practised “liberal
professions”54—not
necessarily the intellectual type. One thing, however, is certain: in
pre‐revolutionary Russia, the Jews “occupied a prominent place in these
intellectual occupations. The famous Pale of Settlement itself did not
in any way prevent a large fraction of the Jews from penetrating more
and more into the provinces of central Russia.”55
The so‐called “artisanal” trades where the
Jews were the most numerous were the dentists, the tailors, the nurses,
the apothecaries, and a few others, trades of great utility everywhere,
where they were always welcome. “In 1905, in Russia, more than 1,300,000
Jews were engaged in artisanal activities,”56
which meant that they could live outside the “Pale”. And it must not be
forgotten either that “nowhere in the laws it was stipulated, for
example, that the craftsman who exercises a trade has no right to engage
in commerce at the same time”; moreover, “the notion of ‘doing
business’ is not defined by law”: for example, “deposit‐selling” with
commission, is it trade? Thus, in order to exercise any form of trade
(even large‐scale trading), to engage in the purchase of real estate, in
the development of factories, one had to pass as “artisan” (or
“dentist”!) For example, the “artisan” Neimark possessed a factory of
sixty workers; typos thus opened their own printing press.57
And there existed yet another way: several people regroup, and only one
pays the fee of the first guild, the others pretending to be his
“clerks”. Or even, to be “adopted” in a central province by retired
Jewish soldiers (the “adopted” father received a pension in return58). In Riga, thousands of Jewish families lived on the timber trade until they were expelled due to false attestations.59 At the dawn of the twentieth century, Jewish settlements were found in all Russian cities of some importance.
J. Teitel testified that “the construction
of the Samara‐Orenburg railway line resulted in the influx of a large
number of Jews to Samara. The supervisors of this railway were
Jews—Varchavsky, Gorvitch. For a long time they were also the owners.
They occupied the control stations as well as a large number of
subordinate jobs. They brought their families from the Pale of
Settlement, and thus a very numerous Jewish colony was formed. They also
took the export of wheat from the rich province of Samara to foreign
countries. It should be noted that they were the first to export eggs
from Russia to Western Europe. All these activities were carried out by
so‐called ‘artisans’.” And Teitel enumerates three successive governors
of the province of Samara as well as a chief of police (who, previously,
in 1863, had been “excluded from the University of Saint Petersburg for
having participated in student disorders” who “closed their eyes to
these so‐called artisans.” Thus, around 1889, there lived in Samara
“more than 300 Jewish families, without a residence permit”60,—which means that in Samara, in addition to the official figures, there were in fact around 2,000 Jews.
Stories come to us from another end of
Russia: at Viazma, “the three pharmacists, the six dentists, a number of
doctors, notaries, many shopkeepers, almost all hairdressers, tailors,
shoemakers were Jewish. All those who appeared as such were not dentists
or tailors, many traded and no one prevented them from doing so. Of its
35,000 inhabitants, Viazma also had about two thousand Jews.61
In the region of the Army of the Don, where
severe restrictions were imposed on Jews in 1880 and where they were
forbidden to reside in Cossack villages and suburbs of the cities, there
were nevertheless 25,000 keepers of inns and buffets, barbers,
watchmakers, tailors. And any delivery of a quantity of goods, no matter
the size, depended on them.
The system of restrictions on the rights of
the Jews, with the whole range of corrections, reservations and
amendments thereto, had been built up stratum after stratum over the
years. The provisions aimed at the Jews were scattered in the various
collections of laws promulgated at different times, badly harmonised
among themselves, badly amalgamated with the common laws of the empire.
The governors complained of it.62
We must try to penetrate the mysteries of the innumerable derogations,
special cases, exceptions of exceptions, which swarmed the legislation
on the Jews, to understand what journey of the combatant this
represented for the ordinary Jew, and what puzzle for the
administration. Such complexity could only engender formalism, with its
succession of cruelties; thus, when a head of a family domiciled in a
central Russian province lost his right of residence (after his death or
as a result of a change of profession), his whole family lost it with
him. Families were thus expelled after the death of the head of the
family (with the exception of single persons over 70 years of age).
However, complexity did not always play in
disfavour of the Jews; it sometimes played to their advantage. Authors
write that “it was the police commissioners and their deputies who were
responsible for settling the endless wavering in the application of the
restrictive measures,” which resulted in the use of bribes and to the
circumvention of the law63—always
favourable to the Jews. There were also perfectly workable legal
channels. “The contradictory nature of the innumerable laws and
provisions on Jews offers the Senate a broad spectrum of interpretations
of legislation… In the 90s, most of the provisions appealed by the Jews
were annulled” by the Senate.64
The highest dignitaries often closed their eyes to non‐compliance with
anti‐Jewish restrictions—as G. Sliosberg testified, for example:
“Ultimately, Jewish affairs depended on the head of the police
department, Pyotr Nikolayevich Dumovo… The latter was always open to the
complainants’ arguments and I must say, to be honest, that if the
application of any restrictive regulation were contrary to human
charity, [Dournovo] would look into the matter and resolve it
favourably.”65
“Rather than the new laws, it was the
provisions tending to a harder application of the old laws which were
felt most painfully by the broad sections of the Jewish population.”66
The process, discreet but irreversible, by which the Jews gradually
penetrated into the provinces of central Russia was sometimes stopped by
the administration, and some duly orchestrated episodes went down in
history.
This was the case in Moscow after the
retirement of the all‐powerful and almost irremovable Governor General
V. A. Dolgorukov, who had regarded with great kindness the arrival of
the Jews in the city and their economic activity. (The key to this
attitude obviously resides in the person of the great banker Lazar
Solomonovich Poliakov, “with whom Prince Dolgorukov had friendly ties
and who, evil tongues affirmed, had opened to him in his bank an
unlimited line of credit. That the prince had need of money, there was
no doubt about it,” for he had yielded all his fortune to his
son‐in‐law, while he himself “loved to live it up, and also had great
spendings.” Consequently, L. Poliakov “was covered year after year with
honours and distinctions.” Thanks to this, the Jews of Moscow felt a
firm ground beneath their feet: “Every Jew could receive the right of
residence in the capital” without actually putting himself “at the
service of one of his coreligionists, a merchant of the first Guild.”67)
G. Sliosberg informs us that “Dolgorukov was
accused of yielding too much to the influence of Poliakov.” And he
explains: Poliakov was the owner of the Moscow mortgage lending, so
neither in the province of Moscow nor in any neighbouring province could
any other mortgage bank operate (i.e. granting advances on property
mortgage‐funds). Now, “there was no nobleman possessing land that did
not hypothecate his possessions.” (Such was the defeat of the Russian
nobility at the end of the nineteenth century: and, after that, of what
use could it still be for Russia?…) These noblemen found themselves “in a
certain dependence on banks”; to obtain large loans, all sought the
favours of Lazar Poliakov.68
Under the magistracy of Dolgorukov, around
the 90s, “there were many recruitments of Jews in the body of merchants
of the first guild. This was explained by the reluctance of Muscovite
merchants of Christian denomination to pay the high entrance fees of
this first guild. Before the arrival of the Jews, the Muscovite industry
worked only for the eastern part of the country, for Siberia, and its
goods did not run westward. It was the Jewish merchants and
industrialists who provided the link between Moscow and the markets of
the western part of the country. (Teitel confirms that the Jews of
Moscow were considered the richest and most influential in Russia.)
Threatened by the competition, German merchants became indignant and
accused Dolgorukov of favouritism towards the Jews.69
But the situation changed dramatically in 1891. The new Governor‐General of Moscow, the Grand Duke Sergey Alexandrovich*,
an almighty man due to his position and dependent on no one due to his
fortune, took the decision to expel all the Jewish craftsmen from
Moscow, without any preliminary inquiry as to who was truly a craftsman
and who pretended to be a craftsman. Whole neighbourhoods—Zariadie,
Marina Roscha—were emptied of their inhabitants. It is estimated that as
many as 20,000 Jews were expelled. They were allowed a maximum of six
months to liquidate their property and organise their departure, and
those who declared that they did not have the means to ensure their
displacement were shipped in prison vans. (At the height of the
expulsions and to control how they were executed, an American government
commission—Colonel Weber, Dr. Kamster—went to Russia. The astonishing
thing is that Sliosberg brought them to Moscow, where they investigated
what was happening, how measures were applied to stem the “influx of
Jews”, where they even visited the Butyrka prison incognito, where they
were offered a few pairs of handcuffs, where they were given the
photographs of people who had been sent in the vans… and the Russian
police did not notice anything! (These were the “Krylov mores”*!)
They visited again, for many more weeks, other Russian cities. The
report of this commission was published in 1892 in the documents of the
American Congress… to the greatest shame of Russia and to the liveliest
relief of Jewish immigration to the United States.70
It is because of this harassment that Jewish financial circles, Baron
de Rothschild in the lead, refused in 1892 to support Russian borrowing
abroad.71
There had already been attempts in Europe in 1891 to stop the expulsion
of the Jews from Moscow. The American‐Jewish banker Seligman, for
example, went to the Vatican to ask the Pope to intercede with Alexander
III and exhort him to more moderation.72
In 1891, “a part of the expelled Jews settled without permission in the
suburbs of Moscow.” But in the fall of 1892, following the measures
taken, an order was made to “expel from Moscow former soldiers of the
retired contingent and members of their families not registered in the
communities.”73
(It should be noted that in 1893 the large Russian commercial and
industrial enterprises intervened to soften these measures.) Then, from
1899, there was almost no new registration of Jews in the first guild of
Moscow merchants.74
In 1893 a new aggravation of the fate of the
Jews arose: the Senate first noticed the existence of a bulletin issued
by the Ministry of the Interior, in force since 1880 (the “Charter of
Jewish Freedom”) which allowed Jews who had already established
themselves outside the Pale of Settlement, illegally however, to remain
where they were. This bulletin was repealed (except in Courland and
Livonia where it was retained). The number of families who had settled
over the last twelve years amounted to 70,000! Fortunately, thanks to
Dournovo, “life‐saving articles were enacted which, in the end,
prevented the immense catastrophe that threatened.”75
In 1893, “certain categories of Jews” were
expelled in turn from Yalta, for the summer residence of the Imperial
family was not far away, and they were forbidden any new settlement
there: “The always increasing influx in the number of Jews in the city
of Yalta, the appetite for real estate, threatens this holiday resort of
becoming, purely and simply, a Jewish city.”76
(here could have been at play, after all the terrorist attacks in
Russia, the security of the Imperial family in its residence in Livadia.
Alexander III had every reason to believe—he was only one year away
from his death—that he was cordially hated by the Jews. It is not
possible to exclude as motive the idea of avenging the persecution of
the Jews, as can be deduced by the choice of terrorist targets—Sipiagin,
Plehve, Grand Duke Serge.) This did not prevent many Jews from
remaining in the Yalta region—judging from what the inhabitants of
Alushta wrote in 1909, complaining that the Jews, buyers of vineyards
and orchards, “exploit ‘to foster their development’ the work of the
local population,” taking advantage of the precarious situation of said
population and granting loans “at exorbitant rates” which ruin the
Tatars, inhabitants of the site.77
But there was also another thing in the
favour of the tireless struggle against smuggling, the right of
residence of the Jews in the Western frontier zone was limited. There
was in fact no further expulsion—with the exception of individuals
caught in the act of smuggling. (According to memorialists, this
smuggling, which consisted in passing the frontier to revolutionaries
and their printed works, continued until the First World War.) In
1903‒1904, a debate ensued: the Senate provides that the Provisional
Regulations of 1882 shall not apply to the frontier zone and that
accordingly Jews residing in that area may “freely settle in the rural
areas. The Council of the Province of Bessarabia then issued a protest,
informing the Senate that ‘the entire Jewish population’” in the border
area, including those where Jews had illegally settled there, was now
seeking to gain access to the countryside where there were already ‘more
Jews than needed’,” and that the border area “now risked becoming for
the Jews the ‘Promised Area’.” The protest passed before the Council of
State, which, taking into account the particular case of rural
localities, squarely abolished the special regime of the border area,
bringing it back to the general regime of the Pale of Settlement.78
This softening, however, did not find
significant echo in the press or in society. No more than the lifting,
in 1887, of the prohibition of the Jews to hire Christian servants. Nor
did the 1891 Act introducing into the Penal Code a new article on
“responsibility in the event of an open attack on part of the population
by another”, an article that the circumstances of life in Russia had
never required, but which had been sorely lacking during the pogroms of
1881. For greater caution it was now introduced.
*
And again, let us repeat: the limitations on
the rights of the Jews never assumed a racial character in Russia. They
applied neither to the Karaites*,
nor to the Jews of the mountains, nor to the Jews of Central Asia, who,
scattered and merged with the local population, had always freely
chosen their type of activity.
The most diverse authors explain to us, each
one more than the other, that the root causes of the restrictions
suffered by Jews in Russia are of an economic nature. The Englishman J.
Parks, the great defender of these restrictions, nevertheless expresses
this reservation: “Before the war [of 14‒18], some Jews had concentrated
considerable wealth in their hands… This had led to fear that
abolishing these limitations would allow the Jews to become masters of
the country.”79
Professor V. Leontovitch, a perfectly consistent liberal, notes: “Until
recently, we seemed to be unaware that the restrictive measures imposed
on Jews came much more from anti‐capitalist tendencies than from racial
discrimination. The concept of race was of no interest to Russia in
those years, except for specialists in ethnology… It is the fear of the
strengthening of the capitalist elements, which could aggravate the
exploitation of peasants and of all the workers, which was decisive.
Many sources prove this.”80
Let us not forget that the Russian peasantry had just undergone the
shock of a sudden mutation: from the transition of feudal relations to
market relations, a passage to which it was not at all prepared and
which would throw it into an economic maelstrom sometimes more pitiless
than serfdom itself.
V. Choulguine writes in this regard as
follows: “The limitation of the rights of the Jews in Russia was
underpinned by a ‘humanistic thought’… It was assumed that the Russian
people, taken globally (or at least some of their social strata) was, in
a way, immature, effeminate…, that it allowed itself to be easily
exploited…, that for this reason it had to be protected by state
measures against foreign elements stronger than itself. Northern Russia
began to look at the Jews with the eyes of Southern Russia. The
Little‐Russians had always seen the Jews, whom they knew well in the
days of their coexistence with Poland, under the guise of the
‘pawnbrokers’ who suck the blood of the unfortunate Russian.”81
The restrictions were designed by the government to combat the massive
economic pressure that put the foundations of the state at risk. Parks
also detects in this vision of things a part of truth; he observes “the
disastrous effect which the faculty of exploiting one’s neighbour may
have,” and “the excessive role of innkeepers and usurers in the rural
areas of Eastern Europe”, even if he perceives the reasons for such a
state of affairs “in the peasant’s nature more than in the Jews
themselves.” In his opinion, the vodka trade, as the “main activity of
the Jews” in Eastern Europe, gave rise to hatred, and among the peasants
even more than among the others. It was he who fed more than one
pogrom, leaving a deep and broad scar in the consciousness of the
Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples, as well as in the memory of the Jewish
people.82
We read in many authors that the Jewish
innkeepers lived very hard, without a penny, that they were almost
reduced to begging. But was the alcohol market as narrow as that? Many
people grew fat with the intemperance of the Russian people—and the
landowners of Western Russia, and the distillers, and the drinking‐house
keepers… and the government! The amount of revenue can be estimated
from the time it was entered as national revenue. After the introduction
of a state monopoly on spirits in Russia in 1896, with the abolition of
all private debits and the sale of beverages by excise duty, the
Treasury collected 285 million rubles in the following year—to report to
the 98 millions of the direct tax levied on the population. This
confirms that not only was the manufacture of spirits “a major source of
indirect contributions”, but also that the spirits industry’s revenues,
which until 1896 only paid “4 kopecks of excise duty per degree of
alcohol produced,” were much higher than the direct revenues of the
empire.83
But what was at that time the Jewish
participation in this sector? In 1886, during the works of the Pahlen
Commission, statistics were published on the subject. According to these
figures, Jews held 27% (the decimals do not appear here: the numbers
have been rounded up everywhere) of all distilleries in European Russia,
53% in the Pale of Settlement (notably 83% in the province of Podolsk,
76% in that of Grodno, 72% in that of Kherson). They held 41% of
breweries in European Russia, 71% in the Pale of Settlement (94% in the
province of Minsk, 91% in the province of Vilnius, 85% in the province
of Grodno). The proportion of manufacturing and sales points in Jewish
commerce is 29% in European Russia, 61% in the Pale of Settlement (95%
in the province of Grodno, 93% in Mogilev, 91% in the province of
Minsk).84
It is understandable that the reform which
established the state monopoly on spirits was “greeted with horror… by
the Jews of the Pale of Settlement.”85
It is incontestable: the establishment of a
State monopoly on spirits dealt a very severe blow to the economic
activity of the Jews of Russia. And until the First World War (it ended
at that time), this monopoly remained the favourite target of general
indignation—whereas it merely instituted a rigorous control of the
amount of alcohol produced in the country, and its quality. Forgetting
that it reached the Christian tenants in the same way (see the
statistics above), it is always presented as an anti‐Jewish measure:
“The introduction at the end of the 90s of the sale of alcohol by the
State in the Pale of Settlement has deprived more than 100,000 Jews of
their livelihood”; “Power meant… forcing the Jews to leave the rural
areas,” and since then “this trade has lost for the Jews the importance
it once had.”86
It was indeed the moment—from the end of the
nineteenth century—when Jewish emigration from Russia grew remarkably.
Is there a link between this emigration and the establishment of the
state monopoly on the sale of spirits? That is difficult to say, but the
figure of 100,000 quoted above suggests so. The fact is that Jewish
emigration (in America) remained low until 1886‒1887; it experienced a
brief surge in 1891‒1892, but it was only after 1897 that it became
massive and continuous.87
The “Provisional Regulations” of 1882 had
not prevented further infiltration of Jewish spirits into the
countryside. Just as, in the 70s, they had found a loophole against the
prohibition of selling elsewhere than home by inventing “street”
commerce. It had been devised to circumvent the law of May 3rd,
1882 (which also forbade the commerce of vodka by contract issued with a
Jew), leasing “on the sly”: to set up an inn there, one rented a land
by oral and not written contract, in order for the taxes to be covered
by the owner, and the proceeds from the sale of drinks went to the Jew.88
It was through this and other means that the implantation of the Jews
in the countryside could continue after the categorical prohibition of
1882. As Sliosberg writes, it was from 1889 that began the “wave of
expulsions” of the Jews outside the villages of the Pale of Settlement,
which resulted in “a pitiless competition, generating a terrible evil:
denunciation” (in other words, Jews began to denounce those among them
who lived illegally). But here are the figures put forward by P. N.
Miliukov: if in 1881 there were 580,000 Jews living in villages, there
were 711,000 Jews in 1897, which means that the rate of new arrivals and
births far outweighed those of evictions and deaths. In 1899, a new
Committee for Jewish Affairs, the eleventh of the name, with Baron
Lexhull von Hildebrandt at its head, was set up to revise the
Provisional Regulations. This Committee, wrote Miliukov, rejected the
proposal to expel from the countryside the Jews who illegally
established themselves there, and softened the law of 1882.89
While “recognising that the peasantry, which
is not very developed, has no entrepreneurial spirit and no means of
development, must be protected from any contact with Jews,” the
Committee insisted that “the landowners have no need for the tutelage of
the government; the limitation of the right of the owners to manage
their property as they see fit depreciates said property and compels the
proprietors to employ, in concert with the Jews, all sorts of
expedients to circumvent the law”; the lifting of prohibitions on Jews
will enable landowners to derive greater benefit from their assets.90
But the proprietors no longer had the prestige, which might have given
weight to this argument in the eyes of the administration.
It was in 1903‒1904 that the revision of the
Regulations of 1882 was seriously undertaken. Reports came from the
provinces (notably from Sviatopolk Mirsky, who was Governor‐General and
soon to become the Liberal Minister of the Interior), saying that the
Regulations had not proved their worth, that it was imperative that the
Jews should leave towns and villages where their concentration was too
high, and that, thanks to the establishment of a State monopoly on
beverages, the threat of Jewish exploitation of the rural population was
removed. These proposals were approved by Sipyagin, the minister (who
was soon to be shot down by a terrorist), and, in 1908, endorsed by
Plehve (soon assassinated in his turn). A list of a hundred and one
villages had been drawn up and published, to which fifty‐seven others
would soon be added, in which the Jews acquired the right to settle and
purchase real estate, and to lease it. (In the Jewish Encyclopædia
dating before the revolution, we read the names of these localities,
some of which, already quite important, were to spread rapidly: Yuzovka,
Lozovaya, Ienakievo, Krivoy Rog, Sinelnikovo, Slavgorod, Kakhovka,
Zhmerynka, Chepetovka, Zdolbuniv, Novye Senjary, among others.) Outside
this list and Jewish agricultural settlements, Jews did not get the
right to acquire land. However, the Regulations were soon abrogated for
certain categories: graduates of higher studies, pharmacists, artisans
and former retired soldiers. These people were given the right to reside
in the countryside, to engage in commerce and various other trades.91
While the sale of spirits and the various
kinds of farming—including that of the land—were the main sources of
income for Jews, there were others, including notably the ownership of
land. Among the Jews, “the aspiration to possess the land was expressed
by the acquisition of large areas capable of harbouring several types of
activities rather than by the use of small parcels which are to be
developed by the owner himself.”92
When the land, which gives life to the peasant, reaches a higher price
than that of a purely agricultural property, it was not uncommon for a
Jewish entrepreneur to acquire it.
As we have seen, the direct leasing and
purchasing of the land by the Jews was not prohibited until 1881, and
the purchasers were not deprived of their rights by the new
prohibitions. This is how, for example, Trotsky’s father, David
Bronstein, possessed in the province of Kherson, not far from
Elizabethgrad, and held in his possession until the revolution an
important business (an “economy” as it was called in the South). He also
owned, later on, the “Nadejda” mine in the suburb of Krivoi Rog.93
On the basis of what he had observed in the exploitation of his
father—and, as he heard it, “in all farms it is the same”, Trotsky
relates that the seasonal workers, who had come by foot from the central
provinces to be hired, were very malnourished: never meat nor bacon,
oil but very little, vegetables and oatmeal, that’s all, and this,
during the hard summer work, from dawn to twilight, and even, “one
summer, an epidemic of hemeralopia* was declared among the workers.”94
For my part, I will argue that in an “economy” of the same type, in
Kuban, with my grandfather Scherbak (himself a member of a family of
agricultural workers), the day workers were served, during the harvest,
meat three times a day.
But a new prohibition fell in 1903: “A
provision of the Council of Ministers deprived all Jews of the right to
acquire immovable property throughout the empire, outside urban areas,
that is to say in rural areas.”95 This limited to a certain extent the industrial activity of the Jews, but, as the Jewish Encyclopædia
points out, by no means their agricultural activity; in any case, “to
use the right to acquire land, the Jews would undoubtedly have delegated
fewer cultivators than landlords and tenants. It seems doubtful whether
a population as urban as the Jewish population was able to supply a
large number of farmers.”96
In the early years of the twentieth century,
the picture was as follows: “About two million hectares which are now
owned or leased by Jews in the empire and the Kingdom of Poland… only
113,000… are home to Jewish agricultural settlements.”97
Although the Provisional Regulations of 1882
prohibited the Jews from buying or leasing out of towns and villages,
devious means were also found there, notably for the acquisition of land
intended for the sugar industry.
Thus the Jews who possessed large areas of
land were opposed to the agrarian reform of Stolypin, which granted land
to the peasants on a personal basis. (They were not the only ones: one
is astonished at the hostility with which this reform was received by
the press of those years, and not only by that of the extreme
right, but by the perfectly liberal press, not to mention the
revolutionary press.) The Jewish Encyclopædia argues: “The
agrarian reforms that planned to cede land exclusively to those who
cultivated it would have harmed the interests of a part of the Jewish
population, that which worked in the large farms of Jewish owners.”98
It was not until the Revolution passed that a Jewish author took a look
back and, already boiling with proletarian indignation, wrote: “The
Jewish landowners possessed under the tsarist regime more than two
million hectares of land (mainly around Ukrainian sugar factories, as
well as large estates in Crimea and Belarus)”, and, moreover, “they
owned more than two million hectares of the best land, black earth.”
Thus, Baron Ginzburg possessed in the district of Dzhankoy 87,000
hectares; the industrialist Brodsky owned tens of thousands of hectares
for his sugar mills, and others owned similar estates, so that in total
the Jewish capitalists combined 872,000 hectares of arable land.99
After the land ownership came the trade of wheat and cereal products. (Let us remember that the export of grain “was chiefly carried out by Jews.”100
“Of the total Jewish population of the USSR, not less than 18%, before
the revolution (i.e. more than one million people!] were engaged in the
trade of wheat, bosses and members of their families alike, which caused
a real animosity of the peasants towards the Jewish population”
(because the big buyers did everything to lower the price of the wheat
in order to resell it for more profit.101)
In the western provinces and in Ukraine, the Jews bought in bulk other
agricultural commodities. (Moreover, how can we not point out that in
places like Klintsy, Zlynka, Starodub, Ielenovka, Novozybkov, the old
believers, workers and industrious, never let trade go by other hands?)
Biekerman believes that the prohibition of Jewish merchants to operate
throughout the territory of Russia fostered apathy, immobility,
domination by the kulaks. However, “If Russia’s trade in wheat has
become an integral part of world trade, Russia owes it to the Jews.” As
we have already seen, “as early as 1878, 60% of wheat exports from the
port of Odessa were by Jews. They were the first to develop the wheat
trade at Nikolayev,” Kherson, Rostov‐on‐Don, as well as in the provinces
of Orel, Kursk, and Chernigov. They were “well represented in the wheat
trade in Saint Petersburg.” And in the North‐West region, out of 1,000
traders of cereal products there were 930 Jews.”102
However, most of our sources do not shed
light on how these Jewish merchants behaved with their trading partners.
In fact, they were often very hard and practised procedures that today
we would consider illicit; they could, for example, agree among
themselves and refuse to buy the crop in order to bring down prices. It
is understandable that in the 90s farmers’ cooperatives (under the
leadership of Count Heiden and Bekhteyev) were set up in the southern
provinces for the first time in Russia and a step ahead of Europe. Their
mission was to thwart these massive, monopolistic purchases of peasant
wheat.
Let us recall another form of commerce in the hands of the Jews: the “export of wood came second after the wheat.”103
From 1813 to 1913, these exports were multiplied by 140! And the
Communist Larinus fulminated: “The Jewish proprietors possessed… large
forested areas, and they leased a part of it, even in the provinces
where the Jews were not normally allowed to reside.”104 The Jewish Encyclopædia confirms it: “The Jews acquired the land, especially in the central provinces, chiefly to exploit the forest wealth.”105
However, as they did not have the right to install sawmills in some
places, the wood left abroad in the raw state, for a dead loss for the
country. (There existed other prohibitions: access for export of timber
in the ports of Riga, Revel, Petersburg; the installation of warehouses
along the railways).106
Such is the picture. Everything is there.
And the tireless dynamism of Jewish commerce, which drives entire
states. And the prohibitions of a timorous, sclerotic bureaucracy that
only hinders progress. And the ever‐increasing irritation these
prohibitions provoke among the Jews. And the sale of the Russian forest,
exported abroad in its raw state, as a raw material. And the small
farmer, the small operator, who, caught in a merciless vise, has neither
the relationships nor the skills to invent other forms of trade. And
let us not forget the Ministry of Finance, which pours its subsidies on
industry and railways and abandons agriculture, whereas the tax burden
is carried by the class of the farmers, not the merchants. One wonders:
under the conditions of the new economic dynamics that came to replenish
the Treasury and was largely due to the Jews, was there anyone to worry
about the harm done to the common people, the shock suffered by it,
from the break in its way of life, in its very being?
For half a century, Russia has been
accused—from the inside as well as from the outside—of having enslaved
the Jews economically and having forced them to misery. It was necessary
that the years passed, that this abominable Russia disappear from the
surface of the earth, it will be necessary to cross the revolutionary
turmoil for a Jewish author of the 30s to look at the past, over the
bloody wall of the Revolution, and acknowledge: “The tsarist government
has not pursued a policy of total eviction of Jews from economic life.
Apart from the well‐known limitations… in the countryside…, on the
whole, the tsarist government tolerated the economic activity of the
Jews.” The tensions of the national struggle, “the Jews did not feel
them in their economic activity. The dominant nation did not want to
take the side of a particular ethnic group, it was only trying to play
the role of arbiter or mediator.”107
Besides, it happened that the government was
intruding into the economy on national grounds. It then took measures
which, more often than not, were doomed to failure. Thus, “in 1890, a
bulletin was diffused under which the Jews lost the right to be
directors of corporations that intended to purchase or lease lands.”108
But it was the childhood of the art of circumventing this law:
remaining anonymous. This kind of prohibition in no way impeded the
activity of Jewish entrepreneurs. “The role of Jews was especially
important in foreign trade where their hegemony was assured and their
geographical location (near borders) and by their contacts abroad, and
by their commercial intermediaries skills.”109
As regards to the sugar industry, more than a third of the factories were Jewish at the end of the century.110
We have seen in previous chapters how the industry had developed under
the leadership of Israel Brodsky and his sons Lazar and Leon (“at the
beginning of the twentieth century, they controlled directly or
indirectly seventeen sugar mills”111).
Galperine Moses, “in the early twentieth century had eight factories
and three refineries… He also owned 50,000 hectares of sugar beet
cropland.”112
“Hundreds of thousands of Jewish families
lived off the sugar industry, acting as intermediaries, sellers, and so
on.” When competition appeared, as the price of sugar began to fall, a
syndicate of sugar producers in Kiev called for control of production
and sale, in order for prices not to fall.113 The Brodsky Brothers were the founders of the Refiners’ Union in 1903.114
In addition to the grain trade, the wood
trade and the sugar industry where they occupied a predominant position,
other areas must be cited in which the Jews largely contributed to
development: flour milling, fur trade, spinning mills, confection, the
tobacco industry, the brewery.115 In 1835 they were also present at the major fairs in Nizhny Novgorod.116
In Transbaikalia they launched a livestock trade which took off in the
90s, and the same happened in Siberia for the production of
coal—Andjero‐Soudji hard coal—and the extraction of gold, where they
played a major role. After 1892, the Ginzburg “devoted themselves almost
exclusively to the extraction of gold.” The most prosperous enterprise
was the Lena Gold Mining Company, which “was controlled in fact (from
1896 until its death in 1909) by Baron Horace Ginzburg, son of Evzel
Ginzburg, founder of the Bank of the same name and president of its
branch in Saint Petersburg. (The son of Horace, David, also a baron,
remained at the head of the Jewish community of Saint Petersburg until
his death in 1910. His sons Alexander and Alfred sat on the board of
Lena, the gold mining company. Another son, Vladimir, married the
daughter of the owner of the Kiev sugar factory, L. I. Brodsky.) Horace
Ginzburg was also “the founder of… the gold extraction companies from
Transbaikalia, Miias, Berezovka, Altai and a few others.”117
In 1912, a huge scandal about the Lena mines broke out and caused quite
a stir throughout the country: the operating conditions were
abominable, the workers had been misled… Appropriately, the tsarist
government was accused of everything and demonised. No one, in the
raging liberal press mentioned the main shareholders, notably the
Ginzburg sons.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Jews represented 35% of the merchant class in Russia.118
Choulguine gives us what he observed in the southwest region: “Where
have they gone, Russian traders, where is the Russian third estate? … In
time, we had a strong Russian bourgeoisie… Where have they gone?” “They were ousted by the Jews, lowered into the social ladder, to the state of moujiks.”119
The Russians in the southwest region have chosen their own fate: it is
clear. And at the beginning of the century, the eminent politician V. I.
Gourko* observed: “The place of the Russian merchant is more and more frequently taken by a Jew.”120
The Jews also gained influence and authority
in the booming sector of the cooperative system. More than half of the
Mutual Credit and Savings and Loan Companies were in the Pale of
Settlement (86% of their members in 1911 were Jewish).121
We have already spoken of the construction
and operation of the Russian railways by the Poliakov brothers, Bliokh
and Varshavsky. With the exception of the very first lines (the
Tsarskoselskaya line and the Nikolaevskaya line), almost all the
railways that were later built were made by concessionary companies in
which the Jews occupied the command posts; “But, as of the 1890s, the
state was the first builder.” On the other hand, it is under the
leadership of David Margoline that was created in 1883 the great
shipping company “on the Dnieper and its tributaries”, the main
shareholders of which were Jews. In 1911, the company owned a fleet of
78 vessels and accounted for 71% of the traffic on the Dnieper.122 Other companies operating on the Western Dvina, the Niemen, joined the Mariinsky Canal and the Volga.
There were also about ten oil companies
belonging to Jews from Baku. “The biggest were the oil company belonging
to the brothers S. and M. Poliak and to Rothschild, and the joint‐stock
company of the Caspian‐Black Sea, behind which was also found the name
of Rothschild.” These companies were not allowed to extract oil; they
specialised in refining and exporting.123
But it was in finance that the economic
activity of the Jews was the most brilliant. “Credit is an area where
Jews have long felt at home. They have created new ways and have
perfected the old. They played a leading role in the hands of a few
large capitalists and in the organisation of commercial investment
banks. The Jews brought out of their ranks not only the banking
aristocracy but also the mass of employees.”124
The bank of Evzel Ginzburg, founded in 1859 in Saint Petersburg, grew
and strengthened thanks to its links with the Mendelssohn in Berlin, the
Warburg in Hamburg, the Rothschild in Paris and Vienna. But when the
financial crisis of 1892 broke out, and “because of the government’s
refusal to support its bank with loans,” as had happened twice before,
E. Ginzburg withdrew from business.125
By the 70s, there existed a network of banks founded by the three
Poliakov brothers, Jacob, Samuel and Lazar. These are the Azov‐Don
Commercial Bank (to be later managed by B. Kaminka), the Mortgage
Lending of Moscow, the Don Land Bank, the Poliakov Bank, the
International Bank and “a few other houses which will later form the
Unified Bank.”—The Bank of Siberia had A. Soloveitchik at its head, the
Commercial Bank of Warsaw was directed by I. Bliokh. In several other
large establishments, Jews occupied important posts (Zak, Outine,
Khesine, A. Dobryi, Vavelberg, Landau, Epstein, Krongold). “In two large
banks only, the Commercial Bank of Moscow and that of the Volga‐Kama,
there were no Jews either in the leadership or among the staff.”126 The Poliakov brothers all had the rank of secret counsellor and, as we have said, all three were granted hereditary nobility.127
*
Thus, at the dawn of the twentieth century,
the Pale of Settlement had already completely emptied itself of its
substance. It had not prevented the Jews from occupying solid positions
in the vital sectors of the country’s life, from economy and finance to
the intellectual sphere. The “Pale” no longer had any practical utility;
its economic and political purpose was outdated. It had only filled the
Jews with anti‐government bitterness and resentment; it had thrown oil
on the fire of social discontent and had struck the Russian government
with the seal of infamy in the eyes of the West.
But let us be clear: this Russian Empire,
with the slowness and sclerosis of its bureaucracy, the mentality of its
leaders, where and in what way did it fall behind all through the
nineteenth century and decades before the revolution? It had been unable
to settle a dozen major problems affecting the life of the country. It
had not been able to organise local civil self‐government, install
zemstvos in rural districts, carry out agrarian reform, remedy the state
of pernicious state of humiliation of the Church, or communicate with
civil society and make its action understood. It had managed neither the
boom of mass education nor the development of Ukrainian culture. To
this list let us add another point where the delay proved catastrophic:
the revision of the real conditions of the Pale of Settlement, the
awareness of their influence on all positionings of the State. The
Russian authorities have had a hundred years and more to solve the
problems of the Jewish population, and they have not been able to do so,
neither in the sense of an open assimilation nor by allowing the Jews
to remain in voluntary isolation, that which was already theirs a
century before.
Meanwhile, during the decades from the 70s
to the beginning of the twentieth century, Russian Judaism experienced a
rapid development, an undeniable blossoming of its elite, which already
felt cramped, not only within the limits of the Pale of Settlement, but
in those of the empire.
When analysing the concrete aspects of the inequality in Jewish rights in Russia, the Pale of Settlement and the numerus clausus,
we must not lose sight of this general picture. For if American Judaism
grew in importance, the Jews of Russia at the beginning of the
twentieth century still constituted nearly half of the Jewish population
of the planet.128
This is to be remembered as an important fact in the history of
Judaism. And it is still Mr. Biekerman who, looking behind him over the
ditch of the revolution, wrote in 1924: “Tsarist Russia was home to more
than half the Jewish people. It is natural, consequently, that the
Jewish history of the generations that are closest to us is mainly the
history of the Jews of Russia.” And even though in the nineteenth
century “the Jews of the West had been richer, more influential, and
more cultured than we were, the vitality of Judaism was nevertheless in
Russia. And this vitality grew stronger and stronger at the same time as
the Russian Empire flourished… It was only when provinces populated by
Jews were united to Russia that this rebirth began. The Jewish
population grew rapidly in number, to such an extent that it was able to
leave a very numerous colony overseas; it had amassed and possessed
important capital in its hands; a middle class had grown and acquired
authority; the standard of living of the lower strata had also grown
incessantly. By a variety of efforts, the Jews of Russia had been able
to overcome the physical and moral abjection which they had brought from
Poland; European culture and education reached Jewish circles… and we
went so far in this direction, we have amassed such spiritual wealth
that we have been able to afford the luxury of having a literature in
three languages…” All this culture, all this wealth, it is in Russia
that the Jews of Eastern Europe have received them. Russian Judaism, “by
its numbers and by the greenness of the energies it contained, proved
to be the backbone of all the Jewish people.”129
A more recent author, our contemporary,
confirms in 1989 the correctness of this painting brushed by his elder,
witness of the time. He wrote: “The public life of the Jews of Russia
had reached, at the turn of the two centuries, a degree of maturity and
amplitude which many small peoples in Europe might have envied.”130
If there is a reproach that cannot be made
to the “prison of the people”, it is to have denationalised the people,
be it the Jews or others.
Certain Jewish authors, it is true, deplore
the fact that in the 80s “the cultivated Jews of the capital had hardly
been involved in the defence of Jewish interests”, that only Baron
Ginzburg and a few other wealthy Jews with good relations.131
“The Jews of Petersburg (30,000 to 40,000 in 1900) lived unconnected
with one another, and the Jewish intelligentsia, in its majority,
remained aloof, indifferent to the needs and interests of the community
as a whole.”132
Yet it was also the time when “the holy spirit of the Renaissance…
hovered over the Pale of Settlement and awakened in the younger
generations the forces that had been dormant for many centuries among
the Jewish people… It was a veritable spiritual revolution.” Among
Jewish girls, “the thirst for instruction showed literarily religious
signs.” And already, even in Saint Petersburg, “a large number of Jewish
students frequented higher education institutions.” At the beginning of
the twentieth century, “a great part of the Jewish intelligentsia…
felt… that it was its duty to return to its people.”133
Thanks to this spiritual awakening at the
end of the nineteenth century, very diverse and sometimes contradictory
trends emerged in Russian Judaism. Some of them will be called upon to
determine to a large extent the destinies of our land throughout the
twentieth century.
At the time, the Jews of Russia envisaged at least six possible orientations, however incompatible with each other. Namely:
- the safeguard of their religious identity by isolation, as had been practised for centuries (but this path became more and more unpopular);
- assimilation;
- the struggle for national and cultural autonomy, the active presence of Judaism in Russia as a distinct element;
- emigration;
- adherence to Zionism;
- adherence to the revolution.
Indeed, the proponents of these different
tendencies were often united in the work of acculturation of the Jewish
masses in three languages—Hebrew, Yiddish and Russian—and in welfare
works—in the spirit of the theory of “small gestures” in vogue in Russia
in the 80s.
Mutual aid was embodied in Jewish
associations, some of which, after the revolution, were able to continue
their action in emigration. This was the case with the Society for the
Dissemination of Education among the Jews of Russia, which had been
founded in 1863. By the mid-90s, this Society was already opening its
own schools, with, besides an education in Russian, courses in Hebrew.
It convened Pan‐Russian conferences on the theme of Jewish popular
education.134
In 1891 began the works of a Commission of
Jewish History and Ethnography, which in 1908 became the Society of
Jewish History and Ethnography. It coordinated the study of Jewish
history through Russia and the collection of archives.135
In 1880, the “King of the Railways”, Samuel
Poliakov, founded the Society of Craft and Agricultural Labour among the
Jews (SCAL). The latter collected a good deal of money and “devoted the
bulk of its efforts, at the beginning of its efforts, to the transfer
of Jewish artisans outside the Pale of Settlement to the central
provinces.”136
We have seen that after the initial authorisation given (in 1865) to
this transfer the craftsmen moved only in small numbers. What happened
after the pogroms of 1881‒1882? We could think: now, they will certainly
leave, they have the help the SCAL, plus a subsidy from the government
for the displacement, they will not remain there, moping around,
confined in this damned Pale where one was condemned to a wretched
death, but no: after more than ten years of efforts on the part of the
SCAL, only 170 artisans moved! The SCAL decided then to help artisans
inside the Pale by purchasing tools, setting up workshops and then
creating professional schools.137
Emigration was taken over by the Society for
Colonisation by the Jews (SCJ), whose creation followed the opposite
course: first abroad, then in Russia. It was founded in London in 1891
by Baron Moritz von Hirsch, who for this purpose made a donation of
2,000,000 pounds sterling. His idea was the following: to substitute the
chaotic emigration of the Jews of Eastern Europe with a well‐ordered
colonisation, oriented towards the countries requiring cultivators, and
thus to bring back at least part of the Jews to the cultivation of the
land, to free them from this “anomaly… which arouses the animosity of
the European peoples.”138
“To seek for the Jews who leave Russia ‘a new homeland and try to
divert them from their usual activity, trade, make them farmers and
thereby contribute to the work of rebirth of the Jewish people’.”139
This new homeland, it would be Argentina. (Another objective was to
divert the wave of Jewish immigration away from the shores of the United
States where, owing to the influx of immigrants, the wage decline
induced by their competition, there rose the spectre of anti‐Semitism.)
As it was proposed to populate this land with Jews of Russia, an office
of the Society for Colonisation opened in Saint Petersburg in 1892. It
“set up 450 information offices and 20 neighbourhood committees. They
received the candidates for emigration to help them obtain their exit
papers from the territory, they negotiated with the maritime messengers,
they procured travellers with tickets at reduced prices, they published
brochures” on countries likely to welcome new settlers.140
(Sliosberg denounces in passing the fact that “no person not holding a
double title as a banker or a millionaire had access to their
direction.”141)
Since the end of the nineteenth century, the
emigration of Jews from Russia had been growing steadily for various
reasons, some of which have already been mentioned here. One of the most
serious of these was the compulsory conscription: if so many young men
(it is Denikin who writes it) chose to mutilate themselves, was it not
better to emigrate? Especially when we know that conscription simply did
not exist in the United States! (The Jewish authors are silent on this
motif, and the Jewish Encyclopædia itself, in the article “The Emigration of the Jews of Russia”, does not say a single word of it.142
It is true that this reason does not explain on its own the emigration
boom in the 90s.) Another reason, also of significance: the Provisional
Regulations of 1882. The third major shock was the expulsion of Jewish
craftsmen from Moscow in 1891. And also this other, very violent: the
establishment of the state monopoly on spirits in Russia in 1896, which
deprived all the tenants of drinking places of their income and reduced
the revenues of the distillers. (Sliosberg: those who had been expelled
from the villages or provinces of the interior were volunteers for
emigration.) G. Aronson notes that in the 80s an average of 15,000 Jews
emigrated each year, and that they were up to 30,000 in the 90s.143
The attitude of the Russian authorities in
the face of this growing emigration—a genuine boon to the State—was
benevolent. The Russian Government readily agreed to the establishment
of the SCJ in Saint Petersburg, and the measures that it adopted to
promote emigration; it did not interfere in any of its actions,
authorising the age group of the conscripts to emigrate with their
families; it issued free exit visas and granted special rates on
trains—on one condition, however: once gone, the emigrants were never to
return to Russia again.144
To cross the ocean, it was necessary at the
time to pass through England, which meant that in the English port
cities there was provisionally a crowd of Jewish emigrants—some of whom
remained and settled in Great Britain while others returned there after
an attempt to settle in the United States. As early as 1890, English
public opinion rebelled against the policy of the Russian government:
“The Jewish question is constantly occupying the columns of the British
newspapers… In America, too, the question of the situation of Jews in
Russia remains day after day of actuality.”145 Having assessed the proportions that this migratory flow was likely to take, Great Britain soon closed its doors.146
The immigration to Argentina had also stopped in 1894. The Jewish Encyclopædia described this as a “brooding crisis… in the Argentine question.”147
Sliosberg spoke of the “disenchantment of immigrants in Argentina” (the
disgruntled rebelled and sent collective petitions to the
administration of Baron Hirsch). The Duma debates highlighted a
situation similar to the experience in New Russia: “Immigration to
Argentina provides examples that confirm that in many cases people have
received land on very advantageous terms, but have abandoned it to
engage in other trades more in line with their abilities.”148
After this, although its vocation remained
in the principle of pushing the Jews to become farming “settlers”, the
Society for Colonisation renounced this objective. It set itself the
task of helping “the excessively disorderly emigration of Jews from
Russia”, “it was concerned with providing information to the emigrants,
defending their interests, being the connection with host countries”,
and it had to modify its statutes, which had been bequeathed by Baron
Hirsch. Large sums were allocated “to raise the standard of living of
Jews in their places of residence”; from 1898 onwards, “action was taken
among the population within Russia itself,” and in the existing Jewish
agricultural colonies the “introduction of more modern tools and methods
of cultivation”, “the granting of an advantageous credit for the
improvement of the soil.” However, again, “despite the large sums
invested in this sector, agricultural activity remained relatively
stagnant.”149
Conversely, migratory flows outside Russia continued to increase, “in
direct connection with the craft crisis and the gradual elimination of
small trade and factories”; this flow “reached its peak… in 1906”, but
was not “able to absorb the annual surplus of the population” of the
Jews. It should be noted that “the great mass of emigrants was destined
for the United States”—for example, in 1910, they were 73%.150 “From 1881 to 1914, 78.6% of emigrants from Russia landed in the United States.”151
From this period, we can thus see what will be the general movement of
our century. (Note that at the entrance to the American territory no
paper certifying craftsmanship was required, and it followed that during
the first six years of the century 63% of Russian immigrants “engaged
in industry”. This meant that those who left Russia for America were
exclusively artisans? This could offer an explanation to the question as
to why the artisans did not go to the Central provinces, which were now
open to them? But it is also necessary to consider that for many
immigrants, and especially for those who had neither resources nor
trade, no other answer was possible than that of recognising themselves
as part of the “category notoriously well accepted by the Americans.”152)
One is struck by how few of the emigrants
are the individuals belonging to the cultivated stratum, the one
allegedly the most persecuted in Russia. These people did not emigrate.
From 1899 to 1907, they were barely 1% to do so.153
The Jewish intelligentsia did not in any way tend to emigrate: it was,
in its eyes, a way of escaping the problems and fate of Russia at the
very moment when opportunities for action were opening up. As late as
1882, the resolution of a Congress of Jewish public figures “called for a
definite rejection of the idea of organising an emigration, for this
idea contradicts the dignity of the Russian State.”154
In the last years of the nineteenth century, “the new generation wanted
to be actively involved in history… and across the board, from the
outside as well as from the inside, it has gone from defensive to
offensive… Young Jews now want to write their own history, to affix the
seal of their will to their destiny, and also, to a just extent, on the
destiny of the country in which they live.”155
The religious wing of Russian Judaism also
denounced emigration, considering it as a break with the vivifying roots
of East European Judaism.
The secular efforts of the new generation
were primarily concerned with a vast program of specifically Jewish
instruction, culture and literature in Yiddish, the only ones capable of
creating a link with the mass of the people. (According to the census
of 1897, only 3% of Russian Jews recognised Russian as their mother
tongue, while Hebrew seemed forgotten and no one thought it could be
reborn.) It was proposed to create a network of libraries specially
designed for Jews, newspapers in Yiddish (the daily Der Freynd
appeared in 1903; and it sold like hot cakes in the villages; not
belonging to any political party, it nevertheless sought to give
political training156).
It was in the 90s that took shape “the grandiose metamorphosis of the
amorphous Jewish mass into a nation, the Jewish Renaissance.”157
One after the other, authors writing in
Yiddish became very popular: Mendele Mocher‐Sefarim, Scholom‐Aleichem,
Itzhak‐Leibush Peretz. And the poet Bialik, to follow the movement,
translated his own poems into Yiddish. In 1908, this trend reached its
peak at the Tchernovtsy Conference, which proclaimed Yiddish as the
“national language of the Jewish people” and advocated the translation
of all printed texts into Yiddish.158
At the same time, considerable efforts were made for Jewish culture in the Russian language. Thus the ten volumes of the Jewish Library, of historical and literary content159; the Petersburg magazines born from 1881, Rassvet (“The Dawn”), then Rousski Evrei (“The Russian Jew”). (They soon stopped appearing: “these publications did not meet the support of the Jewish public itself”160). The magazine Voskhod
(“The Break of Day”) opened its pages to all Jewish authors,
translating all the novelties, offering a place of choice for studies on
Jewish history,161
(May we, Russians, show the same interest in our own history!). For the
time being, “the dominant role in the public life of Russian Judaism”
was held by the “Jewish Petersburg”: “towards the middle of the 90s, [it
is in Petersburg that] almost all senior management was formed, the
Jewish intellectual aristocracy”; all the talents are in Petersburg.162
According to an approximate calculation, only 67,000 Jews spoke Russian
fluently in 1897, but it was the cultivated elite. And already “the
whole younger generation” in Ukraine in the 90s was raised in Russian,
and those who went to study in the high schools completely lost contact
with Jewish education.163
There was not, strictly speaking, a slogan of the type: Assimilation!
We must blend into the Russian element! Nor an appeal to renounce one’s
nationality. Assimilation was a commonplace phenomenon, but it created a
link between Russian Judaism and the future of Russia.164 Moreover, Sliosberg refutes the term assimilation:
“Nothing was more opposed to the truth” than to say that “assimilated
persons considered themselves… Russians under the Mosaic Law.” On the
contrary, “the appetite for Russian culture did not exclude confessing
the traditions of Hebrew culture.”165
However, after the disillusionment of the 80s, “certain Jewish
intellectuals, deeply imbued with the idea of assimilation, felt a break
in their conception of public life.”166
Soon, “there soon was only one Jewish organisation left, one party
defending assimilation. However… while it had given up arms as a theory,
it remained a very real part of the life of the Jews of Russia, at
least among those who lived in the big cities.”167
But it was decided to “break the link between emancipation… and…
assimilation”—in other words: to obtain one and not the other, to gain
equality but without the loss of Jewishness.168 In the 90s, Voskhod‘s primary objective was to fight for the equal rights of Jews in Russia.169
A “Defence Office” for the Jews of Russia
had been formed in Saint Petersburg at the beginning of the century, the
members of which were eminent advocates and men of letters. (Before
them, Baron Hirsch had been the only one to work as they did: it was to
him that all the grievances of the Jews went.) Sliosberg speaks to us in
detail about its founders.170
During those years, “the Jewish spirit awoke
for the struggle”, the Jews were assisted to “a strong thrust of their
self‐consciousness, public and national”—but a conscience now devoid of
any religious form: “The villages deserted by the most fortunate…, the
villages abandoned by the young people, gone to join the city…, the
galloping urbanisation” undermined the religion “in broad sections of
the Jewish population from the 90s”, and caused the authority of the
rabbis to fall. The scholars of the Talmudic schools themselves were
seduced by secularisation.171 (That being said, the biographical notes of the Jewish Encyclopædia
concerning the generation that grew up at the turn of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries often include the words “received a traditional
religious education”.)
On the other hand, as we have pointed out, what developed with unpredictable force and in an unexpected form was palestinophilia.
*
The events in Russia could not but be
perceived by the Jews of Russia and by the Russians involved in public
life in the light of what was happening at the same time in Europe:
contacts were then free and frequent between educated people and the
borders were permeable to ideas and events.
European historians point to a
“nineteenth‐century anti‐Semitism… a growing animosity towards Jews in
Western Europe, where, however, it seemed that we were making great
strides towards its disappearance.”172
Up to Switzerland where the Jews, in the middle of the century, had not
been able to obtain freedom of residence in the townships, the freedom
to trade or to exercise handicrafts. In France, it was the blast of the
Dreyfus Affair. In Hungary, “the old landed aristocracy… accused the
Jews… of having ruined it”; In Austria and in the present‐day Czech
Republic, at the end of the nineteenth century, an “anti‐Semitic
movement” was spreading, and “the petty bourgeoisie… fought the social‐democratic proletariat with anti‐Jewish slogans.”173 In 1898, bloody pogroms took place in Galicia. The rise in all countries of the bourgeoisie
“increased the influence of the Jews, grouped in large numbers in
capitals and industrial centres… In cities such as Vienna and Budapest…,
the press, the theatre, the bar, the medical profession, found in their
ranks a percentage of Jews much higher than their proportion in the
population as a whole. Those years mark the beginning of the great
fortunes of certain Jewish merchants and bankers.”174
But it was in Germany that the anti‐Jewish
tendencies manifested themselves with the greatest insistence. Let us
first name Richard Wagner (as early as 1869). In the 70s conservative
and clerical circles demanded that the rights of German Jews should be
restricted and that any new Jewish immigration should be banned. From
the end of the 70s, the “intellectual circles themselves,” whose
spokesman was the Prussian historian Heinrich von Treitschke, said: “The
agitators of today have well perceived the mindset of society which
regards the Jews as our national misfortune”; “The Jews never succeed in
merging with the peoples of Western Europe”, and show hatred towards
Germanism. Then comes Karl Eugen Duhring, made famous for his polemic
with Marx and Engels*:
“The Jewish question is a simple matter of race, and the Jews are a
race that is not only foreign but irremediably and ontologically bad.”
Then comes the philosopher Edward Hartman. In the political sphere, this
movement led to the first international anti‐Jewish congress of 1882
(in Dresden), which adopted the “Manifesto addressed to the Christian
peoples and governments that are dying of Judaism”, and demanded the
expulsion of Jews from Germany.—But in the early 90s the anti‐Jewish
parties had regressed and suffered a series of setbacks on the political
scene.175
France was also the scene if not of the
emergence of an equally aggressive racial theory, at least of a broad
anti‐Jewish political propaganda: the one broadcast by Edouard Drumont
in his Libre Parole from 1892. Then came “a real competition
between Socialism and anti‐Semitism”; “The Socialists did not hesitate
to embellish their speeches of outputs against the Jews and to lower
themselves right up to anti‐Semitic demagogy… A social anti‐Semitic fog
enveloped the entirety of France.”176
(Very similar to the propaganda of the populists in Russia in the years
1881‒1882.) And it was then that in 1894 the thunderous Dreyfus Affair
broke out. “In 1898, it [anti‐Semitism] reached its climax throughout
Western Europe—in Germany, France, Great Britain and the United States.”177
The Russian press of the years 1870‒1890
also issued some anti‐Jewish statements, but without the strong
theoretical colouring they had in Germany, nor the exacerbated social
violence in Austria‐Hungary and France. Let us recall the accounts of
Vsevolod Krestovsky (Egyptian Darkness, among others) and some crude newspaper articles.
It is appropriate to set apart the newspaper Novoïe Vremia
(“The New Times”), which owed its success to its engaged positions to
the “Slav movement” linked to the Russo‐Turkish war for the defence of
the Balkans. But when “from the theatre of operations were received
reports on acts of plunder perpetrated by intendants and suppliers,
these suppliers “of Jewish origin” appeared as the incarnation of all
Russian Judaism, and Novoïe Vremia adopted a frankly
anti‐Semitic stance.” Beginning in the 80s, the newspaper did more than
“go into the camp of reactionaries”, “it went beyond all the limits of
hatred and improbity in the Jewish question. The warning cry ‘Beware the
Jew!’ resounded for the first time in the columns of Novoïe Vremia.
The paper insisted on the need to take firm measures against the Jews’
‘stranglehold’ over Russian science, literature and art…” It did not
miss an opportunity to denounce the fact of “withdrawing from military
service.”178
These attacks on Jews, both abroad and in
Russia, stirred Vladimir Solovyov, and in 1884 he vigorously criticised
them: “The Judaeans have always behaved to us in the manner of the
Judaeans, and we, Christians, have not yet learned to behave with
Judaism in a Christian way”; “With regard to Judaism, the Christian
world in its mass has so far shown only an irrational jealousy
or a feeble indifference.” No, “it is not Christian Europe that is
tolerant of Jews, it is the Europe of unbelievers.”179
The growing importance of the Jewish
question for Russia, Russian society understood it only half a century
behind its government. It was only after the Crimean War that “the
emerging Russian public opinion began to conceive the existence of a
Jewish problem in Russia.”180 But there needed to elapse a few more decades before it understood the primacy
of this question. “Providence has brought the greatest part of the
Jewish people to our country, and the strongest,” wrote Vladimir
Solovyov in 1891.181
The year before, with the support of some
sympathisers, Solovyov wrote a “Protest” in which it was said that “the
sole cause of the so‐called Jewish question” was the abandonment of all
righteousness and humanity, “a senseless craze for blind national
egoism.” “To stir up racial and religious hatred, which is so contrary
to the spirit of Christianity…, deeply perverts society and can lead to a
return to barbarism…” “We must strongly denounce the anti‐Semitic
movement, “even if only through the instinct of national survival.”182
According to the account given to him by M.
Doubnov, Solovyov collected more than a hundred signatures, including
those of Tolstoy and Korolenko*.
But the editors of all the newspapers had been ordered not to publish
this protest. Solovyov wrote a scalding letter to Tsar Alexander III,
but was told that if he persisted, he would be punished with an
administrative measure. He gave up.183
Just as in Europe, the multifaceted thrust
of Jewish ambitions could not fail to arouse anxiety among the actors of
Russian public life here, a fierce opposition there, and there again,
on the contrary, sympathy. And, in some, a political calculation. Like
the Will of the People in 1881, who understood the profit to be drawn
from the Jewish question (at the time, it was in the direction of
persecution), the radical and liberal circles of the time, namely the
left wing of society, conceived and made theirs for a long time still
the idea that the Jewish question could be used as a political map of
the struggle against the autocracy: it was necessary to repeat over and
over that the only way to obtain equality in rights for the Jews was the
definitive overthrow of the power of the tsars. From the Liberals to
the Bolsheviks. Passing by the S.‐R., all have never ceased to involve
the Jews—some with real sympathy—to use them as a convenient asset in
the anti‐monarchical combat. This asset, the revolutionaries never let
it go, they exploited it without the least scruple until 1917.
However, these various tendencies and debates in the newspapers did not affect the attitude of the people towards the Jews in Greater Russia. Many testimonies confirm this.
Thus J. Teitel, a man who lived for a long
time in deep Russia and frequented common people, affirms that “any
racial or national hostility is foreign to the common people.”184
Or, in memoires left by the Viazemsky princes, this episode: there was
at Korobovka Hospital, a district of Ousmansky, a somewhat inconsiderate
Russian physician, Doctor Smirnov; the peasants did not like him, and
his successor, the devoted Doctor Szafran, immediately benefited from
the affection and gratitude of all the peasants in the neighbourhood.
Another confirmation, inspired by the experience of the prisoners of the
years 1880‒1890: P. F. Iakoubovitch‐Melchine writes: “It would be an
ungrateful task to seek, even in the scum of our people, the least trace
of anti‐Semitism.”185
And it was indeed because they sensed this that the Jews of a small
town in Belarus addressed a telegram at the beginning of the twentieth
century to Madam F. Morozova, the wife of a wealthy merchant, who was in
charge of charity: “Give us this much. The synagogue burned down. You
know we have the same God.” And she sent the sum requested.
Deep down, neither the Russian liberal press
nor the Jewish press have ever accused the Russian people of any
land‐based anti‐Semitism. What both of them repeated relentlessly was
that anti‐Semitism in the popular mass, had been completely fabricated
and fuelled by the government. The very formula “Autocracy, Orthodoxy,
Nationality” was felt in Jewish circles as a formula directed against
the Jews.
In the middle of the twentieth century, we
can read from a Jewish writer: “In tsarist Russia, anti‐Semitism had no
deep roots among the people… In the broad masses of the people, there
was practically no anti‐Semitism; moreover, the very question of
relations with Judaism did not arise… It was only in certain parts of
what was called the Pale of Settlement, and mainly in Ukraine since the
time of Polish domination, that, due to certain circumstances on which
there is no need to dwell here, a certain tendency towards anti‐Semitism
manifested itself in the peasantry,”186
that is perfectly true. And one could add: Bessarabia. (One can judge
of the antiquity of these feelings and circumstances by reading Karamzin*: the Cossacks who surrounded the False Dmitry**—of the Cossacks of the Don, obviously—treated the Russians of Jidy (Jews)187, which means that in the western provinces this word was an insult.)
And what about Russian folklore? The Dahl
dictionary encompasses Great Russia, and the western provinces, and
Ukraine. Editions before the revolution contain a large number of words
and expressions formed on the root jid‐ (Judeo‐). (Significant
detail: in the Soviet edition of 1955, the entire typography of the page
containing these words was revised188, and the whole lexical “niche” between jidkii and jigalo
has been entirely suppressed.) However, amongst these expressions
quoted by Dahl, there are some which are inherited from the Slavonic
Church where the word jid was by no means pejorative: it was
the name of a people. There are also some that come from Polish and
post‐Polish practice within the Pale of Settlement. Still others were
introduced into the language at the time of the Troubles, in the
seventeenth century, at a time when, in Greater Russia, there was almost
no contact with the Jews. These inheritances are also reflected in the
dicta that Dahl mentions in their Russian form—but we can guess under
the latter the southern form. (And, what is certain is that they did not
leave the bowels of the Ministry of the Interior! …)
And then, let us compare these sayings with
others: oh how the people created malicious adages against the Orthodox
clergy! Not one, almost, is favourable to it!
A witness of Mariupol 189
(and he is not the only one, it is a well‐known fact) tells us that
among them, before the revolution, there was a clear distinction between
the two words evrei (Hebrew) and jid (Jew). The Evrei
was a law‐abiding citizen, whose morals, conduct, and behaviour towards
others did not differ in any way from the surrounding environment.
While the Jid was the jivoder (the swindler). And it was not uncommon to hear: “I’m not a Jid, I’m an honest Evrei,
I do not intend to dupe you.” (Such words put into the mouths of Jews,
we find them in literature, and we have also read them in the pamphlets
of the populists.)
This semantic differentiation, we must never lose sight of it when interpreting sayings.
All this is the trace of an old national quarrel on the territory of the West and Southwest.
For neither in Central Russia nor in the
North and East, not even during the general shock of October 1905, there
weren’t any anti‐Jewish pogroms (if there was indignation, it was
against the revolutionary intellectuals in general, against their
jubilation and ridicule of the Manifesto of October 17th). But this does not prevent, in the eyes of the whole world, the pre‐revolutionary Russia—not the empire, but Russia—to
bear forever the seal of infamy, that of the pogroms and the Black
Hundreds. And it is indelible, encrusted in minds for yet how many
centuries to come?
The anti‐Jewish pogroms have always and
exclusively broken out in South‐Western Russia—as it was the case in
1881. And the Kichinev pogrom of 1903 was of the same nature.
*
Let us not forget that at the time the
population of Bessarabia was largely illiterate, that in Kishinev there
were 50,000 Jews, 50,000 Moldovans, 8,000 Russians (in fact, mainly
Ukrainians, but the difference was not noted) and a few thousand others.
What were the main forces responsible for the pogroms? “The delinquents
of the pogroms were mainly Moldovans.”190
The Kishinev pogrom began on April 6, the
last day of the Jewish Passover and the first day of the Orthodox
Passover. (This is not the first time we have observed this tragic link
between anti‐Jewish pogroms and the Passover of Christians: in 1881,
1882, and 1899 in Nikolaev191—and it fills us with extreme pain and anxiety.)
Let us use the one document that is based on
a rigorous investigation carried out right after the events. This is
the indictment issued by the local court prosecutor, V. N. Goremykine,
who “did not call a single Jew as an accused, for which he was harshly
vilified by the reactionary press.”192
(As we shall see, the court first sat in closed session to “not
exacerbate the passions”, and the indictment was originally published
abroad in the emigrated press organ of Stuttgart Osvobojdenie [“Release”].193)
The document begins with an account of “the
usual clashes between Jews and Christians as happened in recent years at
Easter” and “the animosity of the local population towards the Jews.”
It says that “two weeks before the Passover… rumours circulated in the
city, announcing that there would be, during future holidays,
aggressions against the Jews.” A newspaper, the Bessarabets
(“the Bessarabian”), had played a role of blaster in publishing “day
after day, throughout the last few weeks, incendiary articles, strongly
anti‐Jewish, which did not go unnoticed among small clerks,
pencil‐pushers, the entire little people of Bessarabia. Among the last
provocative articles in the newspaper was the one about the murder of a
Christian child in the village of Doubossary, allegedly carried out by
Jews for ritual purposes” (and another rumour ran that a Jew had
murdered his Christian servant when she had actually committed suicide194).
And the police of Kishinev, what did it do?
“Did not give any particular consideration to the rumours,” and despite
the fact that “in recent years there has been regular fighting between
Jews and Christians, the Kishinev police did not take any serious
preventive measures,” it only reinforced the patrols “for the holidays,
in the places where the crowd was going to be the densest”, by adding
men recruited from the local garrison.195 The chief of police gave no clear instruction to his officers.
This is clearly the most unpardonable:
repeated brawls every year for the Passover, rumours of such a
content—and the police fold their arms. One more sign of the state of
decline of the governmental machinery. For there are two things, one:
either we let go of the empire (how many wars, how many efforts have
been made to unite, for obscure reasons, Moldavia with Russia), or we
safeguard the good order which must reign over its entire territory.
On the afternoon of April 6, the streets of
the city is invaded by “people in celebration”, with “many teenagers”
wandering among the crowd, as well as angry people. The boys start
throwing stones at nearby Jewish houses, throwing harder and harder, and
when the commissioner and his inspectors try to arrest one of them,
“they get stones in their turn.” Adults then get involved. “The police
took no firm measures to stop the disorders” and these led to the
sacking of two Jewish shops and a few sheds. In the evening, the
disorders subsided, “no assault had been perpetrated against the Jews
that day”; the police had arrested sixty people during the day.
However, “on the early morning of April 7,
the very agitated Christian population began to assemble in various
parts of the city and in the suburbs, in small groups which provoked
Jews to clashes of increasing violence.” In the same way, from the first
hour on the New Market, “more than a hundred Jews had gathered, armed
with stakes and pickets, rifles even here and there, who fired a few
shots. The Christians had no firearms. The Jews said: ‘Yesterday you did
not scatter the Russians, today we will defend ourselves.’ And some
held bottles of vitriol in their hands, which they threw at the
Christians they met.” (Pharmacies were traditionally held by Jews.)
“Rumours spread throughout the city, reporting that the Christians were
being assaulted by the Jews; they swell from mouth to mouth and
exasperate the Christian population”: one transforms “were beaten” into
“were slaughtered”, one carries that the Jews have sacked the cathedral
and murdered the priest. And now, “in various parts of the town, small
groups of fifteen to twenty persons each, chiefly workmen, with
teenagers in their lead who throw stones into the window‐panes, begin to
plunder the shops, the premises, the dwellings of the Jews, smashing
everything inside. These groups are gradually enlarged by the
passers‐by.” Towards two, three o’clock in the morning, “disturbances
spread in a more and more extended radius”; “the houses where icons or
crosses have been exposed in windows are not affected.” “In the sacked
premises, everything was totally destroyed, the goods ejected from the
shops to be trampled or stolen by individuals who escorted the
attackers.” They went so far as to “sack the houses of prayer of the
Jews, and throw down the sacred scrolls [the Torah] in the street.”
Drinking places, of course, were sacked; “The wine was poured into the
street or drunk on the spot by the bandits.”
The inertia of the police, owing to the
absence of a proper command, caused these crimes to be perpetrated with
impunity, and this did not fail to encourage and excite the evil‐doers.
The police forces, left to their own devices, far from uniting their
efforts, acted according to their instinct… “and the subordinate
policemen were mostly mute spectators of the pogrom.” However, a phone
call was made to the local garrison to call for reinforcements, but
“whenever the soldiers went to a certain point, they could not find
anybody there,” and “in the absence of new instructions, they remained
inactive”; “They were scattered in the city in isolated groups, with no
clear objective and no coordination with each other”; “They only
dispersed the excited crowds.” (This garrison was not the most
efficient, and, moreover, it was just after Passover: many officers and
soldiers were on leave.196)
“The inertia of the police… engendered new rumours, saying that the
government would have allowed to attack the Jews, since they are enemies
of the country”—and the pogrom, unleashed, inebriated, became
envenomed. “The Jews, fearing for their possessions and for their lives,
lost all composure, fear made them go mad. Several of them, armed with
revolvers, proceeded to counter‐attack to defend themselves. Ambushed on
street corners, behind fences, on balconies, they began to shoot
looters, but awkwardly, without aiming at their targets, so that it did
nothing to help them and only aroused in the pogrom troublemakers a
terrible explosion of rage. “The crowd of plunderers was seized with
rage, and where the shooting had resounded, it came at once to tear
everything apart and be violent towards the Jews who were there. “A shot
was particularly fatal to the Jews: the man who snatched a young
Russian boy, little Ostapov.” “From one, two o’clock in the afternoon,
the blows of the Jews became more and more violent,” and by five o’clock
they were accompanied by “a series of murders.” At half‐past three in
the afternoon, Governor Von Raaben, completely overwhelmed, passed an
order to the chief of the garrison, General Bekman, authorising the “use
of arms”. Bekman immediately had the city canvassed, and the troops,
who had “ventured out” walked in good order from that moment on. “From
that moment on, the troops were now able to carry out mass arrests,” and
energetic measures were taken. At nightfall, the pogrom was under
control.
The act stipulates the death toll: “There
were 42 deaths, including 38 Jews”; “all the bodies bore traces of blows
by blunt objects—clubs, shovels, stones—and some, blows of axes”;
“almost all were wounded in the head, some in the chest also. They had
no traces of bullets, no evidence of torture or rape either (this was
confirmed by doctors’ expert opinions and autopsies, as well as by the
report of the Medico‐Legal Department of the Central Administration of
Bessarabia); “there were 456 wounded, including 62 among the
Christians…; eight were wounded by bullets… of the 394 Jewish wounded,
only five were seriously injured. No trace of abuse… except for a
one‐eyed man whose healthy eye had been ripped out… three‐quarters of
the men assaulted were adults; there were three complaints of rape, two
of which were prosecuted.” Seven soldiers were wounded, including a
soldier who “had his face burned with vitriol”; 68 policemen received
minor injuries. “There were 1,350 homes ransacked, almost a third of the
houses in Kishinev: an enormous figure, the equivalent of a bombing… as
for the arrests, “there were 816 on the morning of April 9”, and in
addition to the investigations into the murders, 664 persons appeared in
court.
In some authors, the figures of the victims
among the Jews differ from the official statistics, but the gap is not
very large. The Book of the Jews of Russia estimates that there were 45 Jews killed, 86 seriously wounded, 1,500 houses and shops looted or destroyed.197 Biekerman puts forward the figure of 53 dead, but maybe not all Jews.198 The recent Jewish Encyclopædia (1988) states: “49 people were killed, 586 wounded, more than 1,500 houses and shops looted.”199
This is the official description. But we
sense what is hiding behind it. We are told: “Only one person, one Jew
with one eye” has had the other ripped out. We learn a little more from
Korolenko in his essay Dom no 13 (“House No. 13”).200
This poor man was called Meer Weisman: “To my question, wrote
Korolenko—did he know who did this?—, he answered with perfect serenity
that he did not know, but that ‘a kid’, the son of his neighbours, had
boasted that he had done it with a lead weight attached to a string.” We
see then that perpetrators and victims knew each other rather well…
Korolenko resumed: “It is true that what I advance, I hold of the Jews
themselves, but there is no reason not to believe their sayings… Why
would they have invented these details? …” And, in fact, why would the
family of Bentsion Galanter, mortally hit on the head, invent that the
murderers had planted nails all over his body? Was not the family of the
Nisenson accountant sufficiently tried, why would it add that he had
been “rinsed” in a puddle before being massacred? These details are not
fiction.
But to those who were far from the events, to the agitators of public opinion, these horrors were not enough.
What they remembered was not tragedy, misfortune, the dead, but rather:
how to exploit them to strike the tsarist power? And they resorted to
terrifying exaggerations. To overcome reactions of horror, to try to see
clearly in the versions built up in the months and years following,
would it not be minimising the tragedy? And to attract many insults? But
to see it clearly is a duty, because we took advantage of the pogrom of
Kishinev to blacken Russia and mark her forever of the seal of infamy.
Today, all honest historical work on the subject demands a distinction
between the horrible truth and the treacherous lies. The conclusion of
the indictment is the following: the disorders “have reached the
magnitude described only because of the inertia of the police, deprived
of an adequate command… The preliminary investigation did not find
evidence that the disorders had been premeditated.”201
These clues, no further investigation found them either.
But so be it: the Office for the Defence of
the Jews, which we have already mentioned, (was attended by such eminent
persons as Mr. Winaver, Mr. G. Sliosberg, Mr. Bramson, Mr. Koulicher,
Mr. A. Braoudo, Mr. S. Pozner, Krohl202),
as soon as the news of the pogrom of Kishinev reached it, it excluded
from the outset all possible causes apart from that of a conspiracy
fomented from above: “Who gave the order of organising the pogrom, who
took the direction of the dark forces that perpetrated it?”203
“As soon as we learned of the climate in which the killings of Kishinev
took place, we did not doubt that this diabolical undertaking had been
concocted by the Police Department and carried out at his command.”
Although, of course, “the wretches kept their project secret,” wrote
Krohl in the 40s of the 20th century.204
“But, as convinced as we are that the killings of Kishinev were
premeditated in high places, with the tacit agreement and perhaps at the
initiative of Plehve, we can unmask these high‐placed assassins and
expose them to the light of the world only on one condition: if we have
the most indisputable proofs against them. That is why we decided to
send the famous lawyer Zaroudny to Kishinev.”205
“He was the most suitable person for the mission we had entrusted to
him,” “he undertook to reveal the hidden springs of the Kishinev
massacre, after which the police, to divert attention, arrested a few
dozens thieves and looters.”206
(Recall that in the aftermath of the pogrom, 816 people were arrested.)
Zaroudny gathered information and brought back “material of exceptional
importance”. That is to say that “the chief person in charge, the
organiser of the pogrom, had been the head of local security, K.
Lewendal,” a gendarmerie officer who had been appointed to Kishinev
shortly before the pogrom. It was “at his command that the police and
the troops openly lent a hand to the assassins and the looters.”207 He would have “totally paralysed the action of the governor.”208 (It is known, however, that in Russia neither the police nor the troops were under the orders of the Okhrana.)
This said “exceptionally important”
material, which denounced the guilty “with absolute certainty,” was
never published neither at the time or later. Why? But because, if it
had been so, how could Lewendal and his accomplices escape punishment
and dishonour? This material is known only by hearsay: a dealer named
Pronine and a notary named Pissarjevsky would have been found several
times in a certain café and, on Lewendal’s instructions, would have
planned the pogrom.209
And it was after these meetings that all the police and the troops
opted for the pogrom. The prosecutor Goremykine examined the charges
against Lowendal and declared them unfounded.210
(The journalist Kruchevane, whose incendiary articles had really
favoured the pogrom, was stabbed in Petersburg two months later by
Pinhas Dachevsky who wanted to kill him.211)
The authorities, during this time, continued
the investigation. The director of the police department, A. A.
Lopoukhine (with his liberal sympathies, he was unsuspected in the eyes
of the public) was quickly dispatched to Kishinev. Governor Von Raaden
was dismissed, along with several other senior officials from
Bessarabia; a new governor was appointed, Prince S. Urusov (soon to be a
prominent K. D., and would sign the appeal to the rebellion called
“Vyborg’s Appeal”). A bulletin from the Minister of the Interior,
Plehve, was published in The Messenger of the Government of
April 29: in it he stated his indignation at the inaction of the
authorities of Kishinev; he called on all provincial governors, city
governors and police chiefs to vigorously halt all violence by taking
all possible measures.212
The Orthodox Church also expressed itself.
The Holy Synod issued a bulletin inviting the clergy to take measures to
extirpate feelings of hostility towards the Jews. Some of the
hierarchs, notably Father John of Kronstadt, who were very much listened
to and revered by the faithful, appealed to the Christian people,
expressing their disapproval, their exhortations, their appeals for
appeasement. “They have substituted for the Christian holiday a
sanguinary and satanic orgy.”213
And Bishop Antony (Krapovitsky) declared: “The punishment of God will
befall the wretches who have spilled blood related to that of the
God‐Man, to His pure Mother, the apostles and the prophets… so that you
know how much the Divine Spirit cherishes the Jewish people, still
rejected today, and know what is His wrath against those who would want
to offend Him.”214
A text on the subject was distributed to the people. (The long
exhortations and explanations of the Church, however, were not unrelated
to an archaic state of mind, frozen for centuries and to be surpassed
by the formidable evolutions in progress.)
In the first days of May, a month after the
events, an information campaign but also one of intoxication about the
pogrom broke out in the Russian press as well as in the European and
American ones. In Petersburg, fanatical articles spoke of assassinations
of mothers and infants, of rape—sometimes of underage girls, sometimes
of women under the eyes of their husbands or of their father and mother;
there was talk of “torn tongues; a man was ripped open, a woman’s head
was pierced with nails driven in by the nostrils.”215
Less than a week had elapsed when these horrifying details appeared in
the papers of the West. Western public opinion gave it full credence.
The influential Jews in England relied on these fabrications and
included them word for word in their public protest.216 Should we repeat: “No evidence of abuse or rape was observed on the bodies.”
Due to a new wave of newspaper articles, forensic pathologists were
asked to submit supplementary reports. The doctor of the City Health
Service, named Frenkel (who had examined the bodies in the Jewish
cemetery), and another named Tchorba (who had received the dead and
wounded at the hospital in the Kishinev Zemstvo between 5 P.M., the
second day after the Passover, and noon, the third day, and then at the
Jewish hospital), and the doctor Vassiliev (who had carried out an
autopsy of thirty‐five corpses)—all attested the absence of traces of
torture or violence on the bodies described in the newspapers.217
It was later learned at the trial that doctor Dorochevsky—the one who,
it was thought, had supplied these frightening reports—had seen nothing
of these atrocities, and declined any responsibility for the publication
of the tabloids.218
As for the prosecutor at the Criminal Chamber of Odessa, he had, in
reply to a question from Lopoukhine regarding the rapes, “secretly
conducted his own investigation”: the accounts of the families of the
victims themselves did not confirm any case of rape; the concrete cases,
in the expertise, are positively excluded.219
But who paid attention to the examinations and conclusions of doctors?
Who cares about the prosecutor’s specific research? All these documents
may remain, turning yellow, in cabinets files!
All that the witnesses had not confirmed,
all that Korolenko had not related, the authorities did not have the
presence of mind to refute it. And all these details spread throughout the world, and took the form of a fact
in public opinion, which they were to remain throughout the twentieth
century, and which they will probably still be throughout the whole of
the twenty‐first century—cold, frozen, stowed forever in the name of
Russia.
However, Russia, for many years now, but
with increasing acuteness, knew a mad, deadly distortion between “civil
society” and the government. It was a struggle to the death: for the
liberal and radical circles, and even more so for the revolutionaries,
any incident (true or false) discrediting the government was a blessing,
and for them everything was permitted—any exaggeration, any distortion,
any make‐up of facts; the important thing was to humiliate power as
severely as possible. For the Russian radicals, a pogrom of this gravity
was a chance in their fight!
The government resolved to forbid all
publication in the newspapers concerning the pogrom, but it was a
blunder, for the rumours were re‐echoed with greater force by the
European and American press; All the rantings escalated with even more
impunity—exactly as if there had never been any police report.
And here it was, the great offensive
launched against the government of the tsar. The Bureau for the Defence
of the Jews sent telegrams to all the capitals: organise protest
meetings everywhere!220
A member of the Bureau wrote: “We have communicated the details of the
atrocities… in Germany, France, England, the United States… The
impression that our information caused was shattering; in Paris, Berlin,
London and New York, there were protest meetings in which the speakers
painted a frightening picture of the crimes committed by the tsarist
government.”221
Here he is, they thought, the Russian bear as it has been since the
dawn of time! “These atrocities shocked the world. And now, without any
restraint, the police and the soldiers have by all means assisted the assassins and the plunderers in perpetrating their inhuman acts.”222
The “cursed autocracy” has marked itself with an indelible stigma! In
meetings, they stigmatised the new plan of tsarism, “premeditated by
it”. In the synagogues of London, they accused… the Holy Synod of having
committed this killing due to religious inspiration. Some of the
hierarchs of the Catholic Church also declared their disapproval. But it
was by far the European and American press that showed themselves as
being the most virulent (notably the press tycoon William Hearst): “We
accuse the tsarist power of being responsible for the massacre of
Kishinev. We declare that his guilt in this holocaust is total. It is
before his door and in front of any other that the victims of this
violence are exposed. “May the God of Justice descend here below to
finish with Russia as He has finished with Sodom and Gomorrah… and let
him evacuate this pestilential focus from the face of the earth.” “The
killing of Kishinev surpasses in insolent cruelty all that has ever been
recorded in any civilised nation”223… (including, one must believe, the extermination of the Jews in medieval Europe?).
Alas, Jews more or less circumspect, more or
less stunned, joined in the same assessment of the events. And not less
than thirty years after the events, the respectable jurist G. Sliosberg
retains the same details in publications of emigration—(even though he
himself never went to Kishinev, then or later): the nails planted in the
head of the victim (he goes so far as attributing this information to
the account of Korolenko!), and the rapes, and the presence of “several
thousand soldiers” (the modest garrison of Kishinev had never seen as
many!) who “seemed to be there to protect the perpetrators of the
pogrom.”224
But Russia, in the field of communication,
was inexperienced, unable to justify itself coherently seeing it was
still unaware of the methods used for this.
Meanwhile, the so‐called “cold
premeditation” of the pogrom was not supported by any solid proof—none
that was commensurate with the raging campaign. And although lawyer
Zaroudny had already “closed his investigation and… firmly established
that the chief organiser and the sponsor of the pogrom was none other
than the chief of the local Okhrana, Baron Lewendal”225—even
in this variant, the character of Lewendal did not reach the government
sufficiently, it was necessary to draw a little more to reach the
central power.
But here we are!—six weeks after the pogrom,
in order to further stir up general indignation, and to dishonour the
key figure of power, one “discovered” (no one knows by whom, but very
appropriately) an “ultra‐secret letter” from the Minister of Interior
Plehve to the governor of Kishinev, Von Raaben (not a bulletin addressed
to all the governors of the Pale of Settlement, no, but a letter
addressed to him alone ten days before the pogrom), in which the
minister, in rather evasive terms, gave advice: if serious disturbances
occur in the province of Bessarabia, not to repress them by arms, but to
use only persuasion. And now an individual, very timely there too,
transmitted the text of this letter to an English correspondent in Saint
Petersburg, D. D. Braham, and the latter hastened to publish it in
London in the Times of 18 May 1903.226
A priori: what is the weight of a
single publication in a single newspaper, which nothing
corroborates—neither on the spot nor later? But it weighs as much as you
want! Enormously, even! And in this case, the publication of the Times was supported by the protest of prominent British Jews, with Montefiore at their head (from an internationally‐known family).227
Thanks to the climate that reigned
throughout the world, this letter was a colossal success: the sanguinary
intentions against the Jews of the universally abhorred tsarism, which
had not yet been proved, were suddenly “attested with supporting
documents.” Articles and meetings had a new upsurge throughout the
world. On the third day after the publication, the New York Times
pointed out that “three days already that the letter was disclosed—and
no denial occurred”, and the British press has already declared it to be
authentic. “What can we say about the level of civilisation of a
country, of which a minister can give his signature to such exactions?”228
The Russian government, in its awkwardness and incomprehension of the
gravity of the matter, found nothing better to do than to negligently
abandon a laconic denial signed by the head of the Police Department, A.
Lopoukhine, and only on the ninth day after the scandalous publication
of the Times,229 but instead of investigating the falsification, he simply settled on expelling Braham from the territory.
One can argue with certainty that this was
indeed a forgery, for several reasons. Not only because Braham never
exhibited any proof of the authenticity of the letter. Not only because
Lopoukhine, the declared enemy of Plehve, had himself denied this text.
Not only because Prince Urusov, the great Jewish sympathiser who had
succeeded Von Raaben and controlled the archives of the governorate,
found no “letter of Plehve.” Not only because poor Von Raaben,
dismissed, his life and career broken, never, in his desperate efforts
to restore his reputation, complained of having received instructions
“from above”—which would have immediately restored his career and made
him the idol of liberal society. The main reason lies in the fact that
the State archives in Russia had nothing in common with the rigged
archives of the Soviet era when any document was concocted upon request
or others burned in secret. No, in the Russian archives everything was
preserved, inviolably and forever. Immediately after the February
Revolution, an extraordinary commission of inquiry of the Provisional
Government, and, still more zealously, the “Special Commission for the
Study of the History of the Pogroms,” with investigators as serious as
S. Dubnov, Krasny‐Admoni, did not find the document in Petersburg or
Kishinev, nor its record it upon entrance or exit; they found only the translation
into English of Braham’s English text (as well as papers containing
“indications of severe punishment and dismissal… sanctioning any illegal
action by agents responsible for the Jewish question”).230
After 1917, what was still to be feared? But
not a single witness, not a single memorialist, was able to tell the
story of where this immortal telegram had fallen, or to boast of having
acted as an intermediary. And Braham himself—neither at the time, nor
later—didn’t say a single word about it.
But this did not prevent the constitutional‐Democratic newspaper Retch
(“The Word”) from writing with confidence, on 19 March 1917: “The
bloodbath of Kishinev, the counter‐revolutionary pogroms of 1905 were
organised, as was definitively established, by the Police Department.”
And, in August 1917, at the Moscow State Conference, the President of
the Special Commission of Inquiry publicly declared that he would “soon
present the police department’s documents concerning the organisation of
anti‐Jewish pogroms”—but neither soon nor later, neither the
Commission, nor, subsequently, the Bolsheviks exhibited any document of
this kind. Thus the lie encrusted itself, practically up to now! … (In
my November 16, one of the characters evokes the pogrom of
Kishinev, and in 1986 the German publisher adds an explanatory note in
this regard stating: “Anti‐Jewish Pogrom, carefully prepared, which
lasted two days. The Minister of the Interior Plehve had conjured the
governor of Bessarabia, in the event of a pogrom, not to use firearms.”231) In the recent Jewish Encyclopædia
(1996) we read this statement: “In April 1903, the new Minister of the
Interior, Plehve, organised with his agents a pogrom in Kishinev.”232 (Paradoxically, we read in the previous tome: “The text of Plehve’s telegram published in the Times of London… is held by most scholars as being a fake”233).
And here: the false story of the Kishinev
pogrom made much more noise than the real, cruel and authentic one. Will
the point be made one day? Or will it take yet another hundred years?
The incompetence of the tsarist government,
the decrepitude of its power, had manifested itself on various
occasions, in Transcaucasia, for example, during the killing spree
between the Armenians and Azeris, but the government was declared guilty
only in the affair of Kishinev.
“The Jews,” wrote D. Pasmanik, “have never
imputed the pogrom to the people, they have always accused the power and
the administration exclusively… No facts could ever shake this opinion,
a furthermore perfectly superficial opinion.”234
And Biekerman emphasised that it was a matter of public knowledge that
pogroms were for the government a form of struggle against the
revolution. More circumspect minds reasoned thus: if in the recent
pogroms no technical preparation by the power is attested, “the state of
mind which reigns in Saint Petersburg is such that any virulent
judeophobe will find among the authorities, from the minister to the
last sergeant of town, a benevolent attitude towards him.” Yet the
Kishinev trial, which took place in the autumn of 1903, showed exactly
the opposite.
For the liberal and radical opposition, this
trial was to be transformed into a battle against the autocracy. Were
sent as “civil parties” eminent lawyers, Jews and Christians—Mr.
Karabchevsky, O. Gruzenberg, S. Kalmanovitch, A. Zaroudny, N. Sokolov.
The “brilliant left‐wing advocate” P. Pereverzev and a few others joined
as defenders of the accused “so that they would not be afraid to tell the court… who had prompted them to start the carnage”235—to
clarify: to say that it was the power that had armed them. The “civil
parties” demanded that further investigation be carried out and that the
“real culprits” should be placed on the stand. The authorities did not
publish the transcripts so as not to exacerbate the passions in the city
of Kishinev, nor those already white‐hot of world opinion. Things were
all the easier: the squad of activists who surrounded the “civil
parties” made their own reports and sent them through the world, via
Romania, for publication. This, however, did not modify the course of
the trial. The killers’ faces were scrutinized, but the culprits were
undoubtedly the authorities—guilty only, it is true, of not having
intervened in a timely manner. At that point, the group of lawyers split
a collective statement stating that “if the court refuses to bring to
justice and punish the main culprits of the pogrom”—that is, not some
ordinary Governor Von Raaben (he no longer interested anyone), but
indeed Minister Plehve himself and the central government of
Russia—“they [the defenders] will have nothing more to do in this
trial.” For they “encountered such hostility on the part of the court
that it gave them no possibility… to defend freely and in conscience the
interests of their clients, as well as those of justice.”236
This new tactic of the lawyers, which constituted a purely political
approach, proved to be quite fertile and promising; it made a great
impression on the whole world. “The action of lawyers has been approved
by all the best minds in Russia.”237
The trial before the Criminal Division of
Odessa was now proceeding in order. The prognostications of Western
newspapers that “the trial of Kishinev will only be a masquerade, a
parody of justice,”238
were not confirmed in any way. The accused, in view of their number,
had to be divided into several groups according to the gravity of the
charge. As mentioned above, there were no Jews among the accused.239
The chief of the gendarmerie of the province had already announced in
April that out of 816 people arrested, 250 had been dismissed for
inconsistency of the charges against them, 446 had immediately been the
subject of judicial decisions (as evidenced in the Times), and
“persons convicted by the court have been sentenced to the heaviest
penalties”; about 100 were seriously charged, including 36 accused of
murder and rape (in November, they will be 37). In December, the same
chief of the gendarmerie announced the results of the trial: deprivation
of rights, property, and penal colony (seven years or five years),
deprivation of rights and disciplinary battalion (one year and one and a
half years). In all, 25 convictions and 12 acquittals.240
The real culprits of real crimes had been condemned, the ones we have
described. The condemnations, however, were not tender—“the drama of
Kishinev ends on a usual contradiction in Russia: in Kishinev, criminals
seem to be subjected to a rigorous judicial repression,” the American Jewish Yearbook stated, astonished.241
In the spring of 1904, the Cassation proceedings in Petersburg were made public.242 And in 1905 the Kishinev pogrom was once again examined in the Senate; Winaver took the floor to prove nothing new.
In reality, the affair of the Kishinev
pogrom had inflicted a hard lesson on the tsarist government by
revealing to it that a State that tolerates such infamy is a
scandalously impotent State. But the lesson would have been equally
clear without poisonous falsifications or false additions. Why did the
simple truth about Kichinev’s pogrom seem insufficient? Presumably
because this truth would have reflected the true nature of the
government—a sclerotic organisation, guilty of bullying the Jews, but
which remained unsteady and incoherent. However, with the aid of lies,
it was represented as a wise persecutor, infinitely sure of himself, and
evil. Such an enemy could only deserve annihilation.
The Russian government, which for a long
time already had been largely surpassed on the international stage, did
not understand, either on the spot nor afterwards, what a shocking
defeat it had just wiped out there. This pogrom soiled a stinking stain
on all of Russian history, all the ideas that the world had of Russia as a whole; the sinister gleam of fire projected by it announced and precipitated the upheavals which were soon to shake the country.
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