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Sunday, March 18, 2012

911 - The Flight 77 loop

Sunday, March 22, 2009


The Flight 77 loop - circular, triangular, multiangular or what?





















The above picture illustrates the final loop of Flight 77 according to the National Transportation & Safety Board (NTSB), which allegedly relies on military (RADES) radar data.

The statements of nine controllers from Dulles Airport (TRACON), published on my last blog entry


http://911woodybox.blogspot.com/2009/03/dulles-airport-controllers-on-loop-of.html

are still pending interpretation, which I'm going to deliver here. Needless to say, if the official Flight 77 loop is correct, it should match the controllers' accounts.

Here are the key results of my analysis:



1 - None of the controllers mentions the striking circular shape of the NTSB loop. You would expect the word "circle" or "circular" somewhere, but nil return. Quite the contrary, according to some controllers, the radar target was moving along a polygonal path, with corners and straight segments between the corners.

Robert Utley describes a triangular path with two sharp corners: "I observed a primary target approximately 7 miles east of AML, heading eastbound, when the target was about 1 mile west of DCA it made a right turn heading southwestbound. When it was about 3 miles north of DAA it made a sharp turn northbound, when it was about 10 miles east of AML it made a sharp turn eastbound, the target then dropped out of radar about 3 miles west of DCA. Equipment configuration was unknown to me."

James E. Walsh's path is a slight variation to Utley's, adding a corner and thus generating a quadrangle: The target proceeded to a point 1 mile west of Chrystal City and turned southwest to a point 5 miles northeast of DAA. It then made a right turn, 2 miles north of DAA, and proceeded northbound. 3 miles later the target turned northeastbound and shortly thereafter radar contact was lost.

William T. Howell also mentions a sharp turn: "The target went a few miles south of DCA and then made a sharp turn northbound, back in the direction of DCA."

Robert Devery mentions several turns, too, and stresses that, after turning south, "for a few miles, it continued south.", implying that the target moved straight south for a while.


2 - The position data of some accounts are absolutely incompatible with the NTSB loop:

Todd Lewis locates the target east of the Potomac: "The target went just south of the White House then turned southeast and disappeared."

Robert J. Brickley: "The aircraft proceeded to a point approximately 8 miles southwest of P-56, made a right 360 degree turn". The starting point of the NTSB loop is located 4 miles (not 8) southwest of P-56.

Robert Utley claims that the target was "10 miles east of AML (Dulles Airport)" after the loop and turned sharply eastbound before dropping from radar 3 miles west of DCA; so according to him, the target approached the Pentagon from due west, not southwest, as the NTSB data imply.


3 - The statements were made on 9/12/01, one day after the attacks, as part of a routine FAA procedure to document and investigate accidents. Bad memory can therefore neither explain the huge factual discrepancies between the controllers and the NTSB nor the discrepancies between controller and controller. The Flight 77 (?) target popped up on the radar screens for at least 5 minutes, enough time to concentrate on the path and keep it in memory for a few hours. We can be sure that controllers were not conducted by carelessness when filling out the FAA form.


4 - The assumption that the NTSB loop is correct leads inevitably to the question why the controller's accounts are not compatible with it, and what have been the motives of the controllers to alter it. I can't see any reasonable motive in this scenario.

However, the correctness of the NTSB loop is being shattered by eyewitnesses who have seen the plane east of the Potomac ( http://www.thepentacon.com/ ) as well as real-time radio messages open to the public. NEADS commander Kevin Nasypany and his crew have located the target at "six miles east of the White House", a point that is far away from the official loop.

The conflicting accounts of the controllers suggest that they were told - possibly for "national security reasons" - to keep their mouth about the real loop and move it to an area exclusively west of the Potomac. The exact position and shape was obviously not specified, thus generating a logical mess.

In the light of this scenario, the NTSB flight path was probably created by someone who tried to "average" the controller's versions. This must have happened weeks, months, or years after the attacks.

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Tuesday, March 17, 2009

Dulles Airport controllers on the "loop" of Flight 77



Here's another collection of air traffic controller statements, written on 9/11 or the day after and therefore of superb authenticity. Many thanks again to http://911workinggroup.org/ for their efforts to obtain and publish the documents. The URL of these hand-written notes is a pdf file - scroll down to page 145:

http://www.911workinggroup.org/foia/911%20COMMISSION%20REPORT%20DATA%20(redact)/5%20AWA%20928%20Documents%20and%20Data%20Douglas%20Gould%20hard%20drive%20REDACT.pdf

I have not evaluated the position data in detail yet, but the bottom line is: none of the observations match the official Flight 77 loop, some of them are absolutely incompatible with it. The reports of Todd Lewis and Rosanne McConnell, for instance, imply that the plane was east of the Potomac at one point.

Abbreviations:

AML - AML VORTAC navigoid, at Dulles Airport
DAA - Davison Army Airfield, approx. 12 miles southwest of the Pentagon
DCA - Reagan National Airport
P-56 - Restricted airspace over the White House
1330z - Zulu time, corresponds to 9:30 EDT (subtract four hours)



Todd Lewis (TL), South Departure position, 9/11/01

I was working South Departure radar postion when someone mentioned a primary target south of AML heading east at a high rate of speed. This or another controller said we need to call National Approach and warn them. This was done immediately over the handoff line. The target went just south of the White House then turned southeast and disappeared.



William T. Howell, West/South arrival, 9/12/01

I was working the West Arrival and South Arrival positions combined. Danielle O'Brien was working the final position next to me. She leaned in my direction and asked if I have a primary target on my scope just south of Dulles. I scanned the scope and observed the same target. I told her I see it, ad it appears headed eastbound. At that point I yelled for the supervisor and told him we had a target headed eastbound towards the White House. I continued to watch the target move eastbound and then turn southbound. The target went a few miles south of DCA and then made a sharp turn northbound, back in the direction of DCA. I was continuing to give position reports to the supervisor. Shortly after he turned northbound. I no longer observed the target on radar.



James E. Walsh (FM), 9/12/01

The following is a preliminary statement from FM regarding the observation of a primary target just prior to the attack on the Pentagon being reported. It was dictated to TW over the telephone at approximately 9 am on 9/12/01. It should be noted that due to this being dictated and copied inaccuracies may be present.

FM was alerted to a fast moving primary target by QZ ((Danielle O'Brien)), who was working the target 2 miles east of AML. The target proceeded to a point 1 mile west of Chrystal City and turned southwest to a point 5 miles northeast of DAA. It then made a right turn, 2 miles north of DAA, and proceeded northbound. 3 miles later the target turned northeastbound and shortly thereafter radar contact was lost.

The elapsed time of the observation was 1,5 to 2 minutes. During this time FM kept JH and Bob Birckly updated on the position of the aircraft.



Danielle O'Brien (QZ), Final West/East, 9/12/01

I was working the Final West/East position. I observed a primary target approximately ten miles northwest of the Manassas Airport, proceeding southeastbound at a high rate of speed. I adjusted the filter limits on the scope so as to display limited data blocks for altitudes higher than standard to the final control position. No transponder information was displayed for the target.

I moved to the West Arrival position located immediately to my left. I asked the West Arrival controller if he observed a primary target south of Dulles now moving eastbound at a high rate of speed. He agreed with my observation. I was suspicious because I had viewed the media video of the incidents in New York City, and I was aware an aircraft was unaccounted for with Washington ARTCC.

I tried to gain the attention of the TRACON Operations Supervisor (OS) by yelling for him. I again adjusted my filter limits. I tried to contact Washington National's radar controllers via the 62 line. I advised the Dulles TRACON OS of the target's heading and rate of speed. I again adjusted the filter limits. I provided updates to the OS as I observed the target tracking toward the White House. I heard the OS relaying the information vial landline (ICSS) and then via the dedicated phone to the White House switchboard.

I heard Washington National state over the ladline to hold their traffic because the Pentagon had been hit. I do not recall the equipment configuration at the time of the incident.



Rosanne McConnell (RO), North Arrival, 9/12/01

While working radar on the North Arrival position I was alerted by the final controller that there was a primary target in Dulles airspace heading for the White House. I looked for the target and saw it west of the White House. It was primary only and it appeared to be traveling at a very high rate of speed. It then started a right turn and came back towards DCA and the White House. Myself and other controllers gave the supervisor up-to-the-second information as the position of the target. When the target was just west of DCA the target disappeared. Seconds later an unknown DCA c0ntroller told us that the Pentagon was hit.



Robert J. Brickley Jr. (BY), 9/12/01

I observed a primary target approximately 8 miles east of Manassas Airport moving eastbound at a high rate of speed. I advised the OS (other controllers were doing the same). The aircraft proceeded to a point approximately 8 miles southwest of P-56, made a right 360 degree turn, proceeded northeastbound and dropped from radar approximately 6 miles south-southwest of P-56.

Equipment configuration was unknown.



John Hendershot (JH), RS position, 9/12/01

Both World Trade Centers had been crashed into. There was a report that one aircraft had been hijacked and another was missing. Several controllers reported simultaneously to me that they saw a primary target moving at a high speed in DCA airspace heading for the White House. I immediately picked up the hotline to the White House and advised them that Dulles Approach observed a target closing on the White House at a high speed. The White House operator acknowleged. I then immediately advised DCA Approach of the same. I then described the movements of the aircraft on the Critical Event Eastern Region Hot Line as they were described to me by the controllers observing the primary return. I continued this for a short period of time until we lost radar contact with the aircraft. The equipment configuration is unknown.



Robert Devery (DR), North Departure, 9/12/01

I was working the North Dept position when the incident occurred. We had been advised that all departure would be stopped. I was told that I had 2 more coming to me. Both aircraft did depart, were radar identified and handed off to North High as per (SoP?). Shortly after handing off the 2nd aircraft, I heard final controller mention a primary target. The time is not fixed in my mind but it was at 1330z-1335z. The target was eastbound at a high rate of speed based on the tracking of it. I believe that I saw the target initially just to the SE of Dulles. To me it appeared as though it were heading 090 degree +- 10 degree ((east to east-north-east)). It appeared that it was heading towards P-56 where the White House is.

I called to anyone at DCA on the 62 line to advise of a primary target moving fast forward towards P-56. After the 2nd call, someone acknowledged "I see him". At that time or shortly after, someone on the 62 line confirmed "notifying P-56". Then, the aircraft (target) turned south to parallel the North final to DCA as though it was entering a west downwind for Rw((Runway)) 1 at DCA. For a few miles, it continued south. Then, it made a right turn for a moment, it appeared as though it were turning towards a DCA departure being handed off to our High Sector. At that moment, I thought it may try to hit the dept. or perhaps it may be a U.S. fighter checking the area (since the observed target movement was still very fast). However, the target continued the right turn back to a NE heading - again, aimed, in my opinion, at P-56. I think I called again on the 62 line to try to warn DC(A?). Everything was a blur at that moment. Thought someone reaffirmed contacting the White House. Target disappeared approx. 3-4 miles from P-56. Shortly after, DCA called on 62 line to advise that the target had hit the Pentagon.



Robert Utley (UY), AD/DD position, 9/12/01

I observed a primary target approximately 7 miles east of AML, heading eastbound, when the target was about 1 mile west of DCA it made a right turn heading southwestbound. When it was about 3 miles north of DAA it made a sharp turn northbound, when it was about 10 miles east of AML it made a sharp turn eastbound, the target then dropped out of radar about 3 miles west of DCA. Equipment configuration was unknown to me.

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